

# Manual of LogTP

2024.8

In Section 1 of this manual, we introduce the concept of pairwise stability and show the basic idea of our algorithm LogTP. In Section 2, we introduce the basic version for problems with concave and differentiable utility functions. In Section 3, we present a version for mixed-extended problems, where agents all have multi-linear utility functions. In Section 4, we show an accelerated version of LogTP that applies to problems where only direct connections matter.

## 1 Introduction

### 1.1 Pairwise stability

In a network formation game, there is a finite set of agents  $N = \{1, 2, \dots, N\}$  that are considering links with each other. Let  $L = \{(i, j) \in N \times N | i < j\}$  be the set of links. For ease of notation,  $L$  denotes either the set of links or its cardinal, and we use  $ij$  instead of  $(i, j)$  to denote the link between nodes  $i$  and  $j$ . In the framework of unweighted networks, each pair of agents is either connected or not. An unweighted network on  $N$  then corresponds to a binary vector  $g \in \{0, 1\}^L$ , where  $g_{ij} = 1$  if  $i$  and  $j$  are connected and  $g_{ij} = 0$  otherwise for every  $ij \in L$ .

In our paper, we focus on the formation of weighted networks. That is, we associate each link  $ij \in L$  with a variable  $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$ , which can measure intensity, level of confidence, geographical distance, and so on. A weighted network can then be represented by a vector  $x = (x_{ij})_{ij \in L} \in [0, 1]^L$ . We denote the set of all possible weighted networks by  $G = [0, 1]^L$ . For all  $ij \in L$ , let  $x_{-ij} \in [0, 1]^{L-1}$  denote the rest part of the network  $x$  while not taking  $x_{ij}$  into account. Each agent  $i \in N$  has a utility function  $u^i : G \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ . The

concept of pairwise stability is introduced in [Jackson and Wolinsky \(1996\)](#) for unweighted networks and extended to a weighted version in [Bich and Morhaim \(2020\)](#).

**Definition 1** (Pairwise stable network). A network  $x \in G$  is *pairwise stable* with respect to  $u$  if for all  $ij \in L$ ,

1. for every  $y \in [0, x_{ij})$ ,  $u^i(y, x_{-ij}) \leq u^i(x)$  and  $u^j(y, x_{-ij}) \leq u^j(x)$ ,
2. for every  $y \in (x_{ij}, 1]$ ,  $u^i(y, x_{-ij}) > u^i(x)$  implies  $u^j(y, x_{-ij}) \leq u^j(x)$  and  $u^j(y, x_{-ij}) > u^j(x)$  implies  $u^i(y, x_{-ij}) \leq u^i(x)$ .

## 1.2 Basic idea of LogTP

We develop the algorithm LogTP that helps compute and select pairwise stable networks in weighted network formation games satisfying the following assumption.

**Assumption 1.** For every agent  $i \in N$  and every link  $ij \in L$ , the utility function  $u^i(x_{ij}, x_{-ij})$  is continuously differentiable and concave with respect to  $x_{ij}$ .

Our algorithm is derived from the logarithmic tracing procedure of [Harsanyi and Selten \(1988\)](#) based on the observation that a pairwise stable network in a weighted network formation game corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of a non-cooperative game. Here we provide an outline for LogTP. For a detailed mathematical background, please refer to our paper.

Let  $p = (p_{ij}^i, p_{ij}^j, p_{ij})_{ij \in L} \in G^3$ ,  $\sigma = (\sigma_{ij}^i, \sigma_{ij}^j, \sigma_{ij})_{ij \in L} \in G^3$  and  $\eta > 0$  be given parameters. For  $s = (s_{ij}^i, s_{ij}^j)_{ij \in L} \in G^2$  and  $\alpha = (\alpha_{ij})_{ij \in L} \in G$ , let  $q : G^3 \rightarrow G$  be a mapping given by  $q(s, \alpha) = (q_{ij}(s, \alpha))_{ij \in L}$  where

$$q_{ij}(s, \alpha) = \alpha_{ij} s_{ij}^i + (1 - \alpha_{ij}) s_{ij}^j. \quad (1)$$

For  $t \in [0, 1]$ , we define the function  $\alpha^* : G^2 \times [0, 1] \rightarrow G$  by

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha^*(s, t) &= (\alpha_{ij}^*(s, t))_{ij \in L}, \\ \alpha_{ij}^*(s, t) &= \frac{1}{2A} (A + B - \sqrt{(A + B)^2 - 4AB\sigma_{ij}}), \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

where  $A = ts_{ij}^i - ts_{ij}^j + (1-t)p_{ij}^i - (1-t)p_{ij}^j$  and  $B = (1-t)\eta$ . The solution set of the following system of equations contains a differentiable path that starts from the level of  $t = 0$  and intersects the level of  $t = 1$ .

$$t\partial u^i(s_{ij}^i, q_{-ij}(s, \alpha^*(s, t))) + (1-t)(\partial u^i(s_{ij}^i, q_{-ij}(p)) + \eta(\frac{\sigma_{ij}^i}{s_{ij}^i} - \frac{1 - \sigma_{ij}^i}{1 - s_{ij}^i})) = 0, \quad (3)$$

$$t\partial u^j(s_{ij}^j, q_{-ij}(s, \alpha^*(s, t))) + (1-t)(\partial u^j(s_{ij}^j, q_{-ij}(p)) + \eta(\frac{\sigma_{ij}^j}{s_{ij}^j} - \frac{1 - \sigma_{ij}^j}{1 - s_{ij}^j})) = 0, \quad (4)$$

where  $\partial u^i(s_{ij}^i, q_{-ij}(s, \alpha^*(s, t)))$  and  $\partial u^i(s_{ij}^i, q_{-ij}(p))$  are the partial derivatives of  $u^i(y, q_{-ij}(s, \alpha^*(s, t)))$  and  $u^i(y, q_{-ij}(p))$  at  $y = s_{ij}^i$ . If  $\bar{s} = (\bar{s}_{ij}^i, \bar{s}_{ij}^j)_{ij \in L} \in G^2$  is the intersection point of the path and the level of  $t = 1$ , then  $(\min\{\bar{s}_{ij}^i, \bar{s}_{ij}^j\})_{ij \in L} \in G$  provides a pairwise stable network of the network formation game. Let  $H : G^2 \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{2L}$  be the mapping given by the left-hand sides of (3) and (4).

In LogTP, we apply the predictor-corrector method of [Allgower and Georg \(1990\)](#) to numerically trace the path. We show its framework in Algorithm 1.

When the form of the utility functions varies, we recommend using different versions of Matlab software.

- For general problems, we recommend the software in folder “LogTPc”, introduced in Section 2.
- For a special type of problem with multi-affine utility functions, we recommend the version in folder “LogTPm”, introduced in Section 3.
- If the problem has a sparse structure, an accelerated version in the folder “comp/ALogTP” is available. i.e. for each agent  $i \in N$ , the utility function  $u^i$  is only influenced by  $x_{ij}$  with  $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$ . A brief introduction is presented in Section 4.

## 2 LogTPc

LogTPc is the basic version of our algorithm for problems where agents all have concave and differentiable utility functions. We illustrate how to apply it.

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Algorithm 1: LogTP

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**Require:**

- $\epsilon > 0$ , which determines the termination of the algorithm;
- $\alpha > 0$ , which determines the velocity;
- $\delta_0 > 0$ , which determines the starting velocity;
- $p = (p_{ij}^i, p_{ij}^j, p_{ij})_{ij \in L} \in G^3$ , the prior;
- $\sigma = (\sigma_{ij}^i, \sigma_{ij}^j, \sigma_{ij})_{ij \in L} \in G^3$  and  $\eta > 0$ , weights of the logarithmic penalty terms;
- $l_0 = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1) \in \mathbb{R}^{2L+1}$ , the initial prediction direction;
- $k = 0$ , the number of iterations;

**Ensure:**

A pairwise stable network;

- 1: Initialization: Compute the unique solution  $s_0 \in G^2$  of the equation  $H(s, 0) = 0$ .  
Let  $z_0 = (s_0, 0) \in G^2 \times [0, 1]$ .
- 2: Predictor step: Set  $z'_k = z_k + \delta_k l_k$ .
- 3: Velocity test and corrector step:
  - Let  $t(z)$  denote the value of  $t$  at the point  $z \in G^2 \times [0, 1]$ .
  - Make sure  $z'_k$  is feasible: if  $t(z'_k) < 0$  or  $t(z'_k) > 1$ , set  $\delta_k = 0.9\delta_k$  and return to the predictor step.
  - Make sure  $z'_k$  is a good guess: if  $\|H(z'_k)\| > \alpha$ , set  $\delta_k = 0.9\delta_k$  and return to the predictor step.
  - Corrector step: solve the following system of equations starting from  $z'_k$  and obtain  $z_{k+1}$ .

$$\begin{aligned} H(z) &= 0, \\ l_k^T(z - z'_k) &= 0. \end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

- 4: If  $t(z_{k+1}) > 1 - \epsilon$ , apply it as the starting point to solve the equations

$$\begin{aligned} H(z) &= 0, \\ t(z) &= 1. \end{aligned} \tag{6}$$

The result provides a pairwise stable network.

Otherwise, set  $\delta_{k+1} = \delta_0$ ,  $l_{k+1} = \frac{z_{k+1} - z_k}{\|z_{k+1} - z_k\|}$ ,  $k = k + 1$  and return to the predictor step.

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- **main.m**: the main program of LogTP, including parameter setting and the implement of the predictor-corrector method.

### Parameter settings

$\epsilon > 0$ , which determines the termination of the algorithm;

$\alpha > 0$ , which determines the velocity in the predictor step;

$\delta_0 > 0$ , which determines the starting velocity;

$p \in G^3$ , the prior;

$\sigma \in G^3$  and  $\eta > 0$ , weights of the logarithmic penalty terms;

$N$ , number of players;

$L$ , number of links;

$M = 2L$ , dimension of variables;

$lin$ , the set of all possible links derived from “link.m”;

and other parameters in the model to which LogTPc is applied. **These are all global variables!**

### Predictor-corrector method

We conduct the algorithm shown in Algorithm 1. We initialize the algorithm with functions “init.m” and “u0.m”. In the iterations, we compute the mapping  $H$  with functions “F.m”, “def.m” and “homof.m”.

- **link.m**: to show the set of all possible links.

Input:  $N$ , number of players.

Output: a  $L \times 2$  matrix  $lin$  whose each row represents a possible link. For example, the row given by  $(i, j)$  represents the link between agent  $i$  and  $j$ .  $lin$  can be interpreted as a mapping from  $\{1, 2, \dots, L\} \rightarrow L$ , which sorts the links.

- **init.m**: to search for the starting point of the homotopy path (solve the equation  $H(s, 0) = 0$ ). Notice that when  $t = 0$ , the equation  $H(s, 0) = 0$  consists of  $2L$  independent equations (given in “u0.m”). We solve them in sequence with the Matlab function “fsolve”.

Input: none.

Output: a vector  $s_0 \in G^2$  such that  $H(s_0, 0) = 0$ .

- **u0.m**: to compute the elements of the mapping  $H : G^2 \times [0, 1] \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^{2L}$ . In “init.m” we apply “fsolve” function to search for the zeros of the mapping given by “u0.m”.

Input:  $x$ , link strength;  $i, j$ , index for link and player (in the sense of “lin”).

Output: the  $2i - 2 + j$ -th element of the mapping  $H$  at  $t = 0$ . (corresponding to the link given by  $lin(i, :)$  and agent  $lin(i, j)$ )

- **F.m**: to combine the favorite strength via the decision of link players.

Input:  $t \in [0, 1]$ ;  $s \in G^2$ , the vector of favorite strengths;  $p \in G^3$ , the prior;

Output: a network whose each link strength is derived from formula (2).

- **def.m**: to compute the partial derivatives of the utility functions with respect to a given network.

Input:  $s \in G^2$ , the vector of favorite strengths;  $x \in G$ , a given network;

Output: a  $N \times N$  matrix whose  $(i, j)$  and  $(j, i)$ -th element equals to  $\partial u^i(s_{ij}^i, x_{-ij})$  and  $\partial u^j(s_{ij}^j, x_{-ij})$ , respectively.

- **homof.m**: to compute the value of the mapping  $H$ . The partial derivatives in  $H$  are computed with the functions “def.m” by setting the parameter  $x$  to be  $q(s, \alpha^*)$  and  $q(p)$ .

Input:  $(s, t) \in [0, 1]^{2L+1}$ .

Output:  $H(s, t) \in \mathbb{R}^{2L}$ .

- **ahomof.m**: to compute the value of the system (5), which we require in the corrector step.

Input:  $(s, t) \in [0, 1]^{2L+1}$ .

Output: the value of system (5), in  $\mathbb{R}^{2L+1}$ .

When applied to a new problem, one has to adjust the formulas in “def.m” apart from necessary adjustments to the parameters in “main.m”.

### 3 LogTPm

The LogTPm applies to a special type of network formation games with multi-affine utility functions. They are called mixed extension of network formation games, analogous to mixed extension of non-cooperative games. Given a network  $x \in G$ ,  $x_{ij} \in [0, 1]$  is interpreted as the probability that link  $ij$  is built, for every  $ij \in L$ . The probability that an unweighted network  $g \in \{0, 1\}^L$  forms equals to

$$P_g(x) = \prod_{ij \in L} (x_{ij}g_{ij} + (1 - x_{ij})(1 - g_{ij})).$$

Each agent  $i \in N$  maximizes the expected payoff

$$u^i(x) = \sum_{g \in \{0,1\}^L} P_g(x) v^i(g), \quad (7)$$

where  $v^i(g)$  is the payoff agent  $i$  receives from the unweighted network  $g$ . We can solve unweighted network formation games by studying their mixed extension since the unweighted pairwise stable networks still satisfy pairwise stability after the extension.

It follows from (7) that

$$\partial u^i(y, x_{-ij}) = \sum_{g \in \{0,1\}^L} v^i(g)(2g_{ij} - 1) \prod_{k\ell \in L \setminus \{ij\}} (x_{k\ell}g_{k\ell} + (1 - x_{k\ell})(1 - g_{k\ell})).$$

Obviously, the partial derivatives are irrelevant to the variable  $y$  and are determined by the payoffs the agents yield from the unweighted networks. Therefore, we record the partial derivative by  $\partial u^i(x_{-ij})$  for short. Based on these observations, we compute the partial derivatives in a different way from LogTPc.

- **graphs.m**: to show the set of all possible unweighted networks.

Input:  $L$ , the number of links.

Output: a  $2^L \times L$  matrix *gra* whose each row represents a possible network. (**global variable**)

- **values.m**: to compute the payoff vectors in each possible network.

Input: *gra*, a  $2^L \times L$  matrix recording all possible networks derived from “graphs.m”.

Output: a  $2^L \times N$  matrix *Va* whose each row corresponds to the payoff vector. (**global variable**)

- **def.m**: to compute the partial derivatives of the utility functions with respect to a given network.

Input:  $x \in G$ , a given network;

Output: a  $N \times N$  matrix whose  $(i, j)$  and  $(j, i)$  -th element equals to  $\partial u^i(x_{-ij})$  and  $\partial u^j(x_{-ij})$ , respectively.

The rest parts of the codes are the same as LogTPc. When applying to a new model, one has to adjust the formulas in “values.m”.

## 4 ALogTP

Inspired by the insightful approach of [Leung \(2020\)](#), we develop ALogTP, an accelerated version of LogTP, that applies to problems with a sparse structure. i.e. For each agent  $i \in N$ , the utility function  $u^i$  is only influenced by  $x_{ij}$  with  $j \in N \setminus \{i\}$ . Its basic idea is to first figure out the links that are sure to be absent or built, which we call the robust absent or built links. These links decompose the whole network into smaller ones, to which we then apply LogTPc (or LogTPm).

A link  $ij \in L$  is robustly absent if  $\sup_{x \in G} \frac{\partial u^i(y, x_{-ij})}{\partial y} \leq 0$  or  $\sup_{x \in G} \frac{\partial u^j(y, x_{-ij})}{\partial y} \leq 0$  and robustly built if  $\inf_{x \in G} \frac{\partial u^i(y, x_{-ij})}{\partial y} > 0$  and  $\inf_{x \in G} \frac{\partial u^j(y, x_{-ij})}{\partial y} > 0$ .

In the implementation of ALogTP, we do:

- **main.m**: the main program of ALogTP, including parameter setting and the implement of the predictor-corrector method.



## Parameter settings

$N$ , number of players;

$L$ , number of links;

$M = 2L$ , dimension of variables;

$lin$ , the set of all possible links derived from “link.m”;

and other parameters in the model to which ALogTPc is applied. (we take the public good provision model of [Bramoullé and Kranton \(2007\)](#) as an example in the codes presented)

## Outline

We first figure the robust links in the problem with the functions “robust\_links.m” and “combine.m”. Then we decompose the network into smaller ones with Matlab function “conncomp” and summarize its result with “search\_problem.m”. Finally, we apply LogTP to the subnetworks via functions “solution.m” and “path-following.m”.

- **robust\_links.m**: to figure out the robustly absent and built links.

Input: parameters in the model. Take the public provision model of [Bramoullé and Kranton \(2007\)](#) as an example. (in Section 5.4 of our paper)  $e \in \mathbb{R}_+^N$ , the effort vector;  $d > 0$ , cost for links.

Output: two  $N \times N$  matrices  $M$  and  $D$ . A link  $ij \in L$  is surely to be absent if  $M_{ij} = 0$  or  $M_{ji} = 0$ . This link is sure to be established if  $D_{ij} = 0$  and  $D_{ji} = 0$ .

- **combine.m**: to summarize the results of “robust\_link.m” and prepare for the decomposition.

Input: the matrices  $M$  and  $D$  derived from “robust\_link.m”.

Output: a  $N \times N$  matrix  $\tilde{D}$ . For  $ij \in L$ ,  $\tilde{D}_{ij} = 0$  if the link is surely to be absent or built and  $\tilde{D}_{ij} = 1$  otherwise. With this matrix, we can decompose the network into smaller ones (via the Matlab function “conncomp( $\tilde{D}$ )”).

- **search\_subproblem.m**: to modify the results of the Matlab function “conncomp” in the decomposition step.

Input:  $S$ , the output of “conncomp( $\tilde{D}$ )”;  $D$ , the  $N \times N$  matrix derived from “robust\_link.m”;  $num\_S$ , the number of connected components computed by Matlab codes  $max(S)$ .

Output:  $group$ , a matrix of  $N$  columns. Each row of the matrix corresponds to a subnetwork. Its  $(i, j)$ -th element equals to 1 if agent  $j$  is included in the  $i$ -th subnetwork and 0 otherwise.

- **solution.m**: to figure out the non-robust links in a subnetwork and then apply LogTP to compute the corresponding pairwise stable subnetwork (to determine the strength of the non-robust links).

Input:  $group$ , a  $1 \times N$  vector that records a subnetwork.

Output:  $sol \in G$ , a pairwise stable subnetwork;  $indicator$ , the number of non-robust links in this subnetwork.

- **path-following.m**: the main program of LogTP, which is applied to the subnetworks. For more details, one can refer to the introduction in Section 2.

Input:  $Link \in G$ , a network where strengths of the links not included in the subnetwork equal zero. (In problems with a sparse structure, it makes no difference when computing the utility functions and their partial derivatives) The robustly absent or built links have strength 0 or 1, respectively. The strengths of the non-robust links in the subnetwork are set as  $-1$ .

Output:  $PS$ , a pairwise stable subnetwork that we derive from  $Link$  by replacing the  $-1$ ’s with the results of LogTP;  $num$ , number of the non-robust links.

When applied to a new problem, one has to adjust the formulas in “robust\_links.m” and “def.m” accordingly.

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