Negotiating civilian protection: Who shapes the language of United Nations Security Council resolutions (1990-2019)?

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Abstract

Recent studies have examined the benefits that states derive from membership in and action through international organizations (IOs). However, it is not clear whether states are indeed successful in securing their desired policy outcomes despite the bargaining and negotiation processes associated with IOs. This question is particularly contentious in the case of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), which is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Instead of relying on traditional voting data, this article estimates state preferences based on 20,0000 UNSC speeches delivered on complex humanitarian emergencies between 1990 and 2019. By matching these speeches with the corresponding resolutions, it composes a Cosine similarity index that measures each speaker's influence on the language adopted final document. The significance of six systemic factors possibly linked to the unequal power distribution among speakers is tested in a series of regressions. The results highlight that the five permanent members of the Council (P5) wield considerable influence over the content of the resolutions, but that the relative leverage of the elected ten members (E10) has increased over time. Moreover, penholders, representatives of the countries discussed in the meetings and (multi-)state delegates are more likely to see their priorities reflected in the resolutions. Contrarily, these prospects are limited for Presidents, civil society invitees and IOs. By presenting new empirical evidence on Council decision-making and proposing theoretical mechanisms that evidence individual courses of influence through systemic factors, this research advances existing works on the inner life of IOs.

Keywords

United Nations; International organizations; Power politics; Cosine similarity; Quantitative text analysis

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Introduction

> "There is nothing fundamentally wrong with the United Nations, except its members".
> Lord Caradon (1970, cited in Rochester 1993)

The United Nations (UN) is what Buzan (1991, 177) famously called a mature anarchy, namely an "organization that both edifies the sovereignty of its member states and shapes the behaviours of those sovereign states in the direction of fostering mutual peace". With 195 members (193 states plus Palestine and the Holy See as observers), the UN stands as the most influential global platform for political decision-making. At its core, the Security Council (UNSC) has evolved into the primary body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. Despite persistent calls for reform, the composition of the UNSC has remained largely unchanged since its inception. On the one hand, the five victorious nations of World War II - China, France, Russia the United Kingdom and the United States - have secured both the permanent five (P5) seats on the Council under Article 23(1) of the UN Charter and the veto power under Article 27(3). On the other hand, ten rotating seats (E10) are elected by the General Assembly for a two-year term and allocated based on a region distribution: five seats for Africa and Asia, one for Eastern Europe, two for Latin America with the Caribbean states and two for Western Europe.[1]

A substantial body of International Relations (IR) literature - from realist, liberal and constructivist scholars alike - has explored the benefits that even the most powerful states in the global arena draw from membership and action through international organizations (IOs) rather than pursuing their national objectives unilaterally (e.g., Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Chapman 2007; Hurd 2007; Ruggie 1993). However, little attention has been paid to the extent to which policy outcomes of these bargaining processes genuinely serve the interests of the involved stakeholders. In other words, do states effectively achieve their objectives by engaging in IOs or do negotiations inevitably lead to compromises that dilute the perceived national utility of the policies? This gap stems largely from a measurement problem, namely on how to accurately assess foreign policy priorities. Currently, state preferences are frequently estimated through voting data (Allen and Yuen 2022; Kim 2022; Voeten 2001). While this approach provides valuable insights into the juncture of ultimate decision-making, it also overlooks the earlier stages of the policy process that leads up to the assemblage of the resolution's content. As a result, the full dynamics and evolution of state preferences throughout the negotiation procedure remain unexplored.

[1] The last major reform was conducted in 1965, when the number of elected states was increased from five to ten to ensure greater geographical representation.

To address this gap, this article takes a novel approach that leverages text data. The formal outcomes of negotiations among the fifteen states serving the Security Council are formalized in resolutions, which serve as the operative basis for all subsequent mandates. Accordingly, all actors should have an incentive to shape the content to align with their preferences (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Benson and Kathman 2014; Caro-Burnett and Weese 2023; Eckhard et al. 2023). But the secretive nature of the negotiation process, which takes place in the corridors rather than the committee rooms of the UN, renders it difficult to disentangle the priorities that individual states bring to the discussion table. Accordingly, the UNSC is often considered a "black box" for quantitative research. Drawing on recent works from text analysis (e.g., Baturo et al. 2017), this study uses the content of high-level speeches as a proxy for the policy priorities of the speakers. It constructs an original dataset that correlates over 20,000 Council speeches by various entities (including states, representatives of IOs and non-governmental organizations (NGOs)) on *complex humanitarian emergencies* (Everett 2017, 22) between 1990 and 2019 with the corresponding resolutions. By measuring the alignment between these documents using Cosine similarity, it identifies actors with major authority to influence the negotiations and ensure that their priorities are reflected in the output document. Additionally, this research design tests the relevance of seven predictor variables connected to system-specific factors that set this power distribution in a series of regressions. Does the structural framework of the United Nations favor some states over others?

To summarize, the article finds that the P5 are the most successful actors in getting their priorities reflected in resolutions. However, a negative and statistically significant interaction effect points to the increasing influence of the E10 over time. This suggests that non-permanent members have gained prominence and assertiveness in shaping the content of official policy in the multipolar climate of the 21st century (Badache et al. 2022; Call and de Coning 2017; Paris 2014). Moreover, the study highlights the positive impact of the early involvement of penholders and increased interest of self-referential speakers. Conversely, meeting Presidents are less likely to see their priorities translated into final resolutions. This discrepancy contradicts recent findings on agenda-setting (Allen and Yuen 2022; Kim 2022) and can be attributed to the varying degrees of authority wielded by Presidents at different stages of the negotiation process. Finally, the type of speaker also affects the outcome variance. (Multi-)state arrangements exhibit considerable authority in the Council negotiations, which may be related to their voting status. This is contradicted by low levels of reported influence for NGOs and inconclusive results for IOs, which require additional disaggregation in future studies. This analysis contributes to the existing literature by (1) proposing an innovative study design that offers new evidence on the decision-making behind "closed doors"

of the Council, as the drafting of mandates is currently not analyzed by the literature on the life cycle of IOs (see Gray 2020), (2) zooming into the authority of individual states, countering perspectives of the UNSC as a unitary actor and (3) examining mechanisms through which the UN system contributes to an unequal distribution of power among its members. These questions gain importance in the context of ongoing debates about the legitimacy and need for reform of the UN.

The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. The next section briefly reconstructs the literature that connects the decision-making of IOs to the influence of their member states. Section 3 outlines a theoretical framework that identifies six systemic mechanisms through which states can determine the content of resolutions. Section 4 details the data and methods used in the paper. Section 5 discusses the results of preliminary analyses. Finally, the conclusion wraps up the findings.

The Security Council as a global power arena

Drawing on realist, liberal and constructivist scholarship alike, an extensive literature strand has sought to unravel the intricate relationship between IOs and their member states. Within the context of the United Nations and its Security Council, this discourse has been structured around two primary axes of inquiry. Firstly, scholars have calculated the benefits that individual states gain from UNSC membership. Specifically, they have shown that campaigns for Council seats are rationalized by the ability to influence the global agenda based on national interests and security concerns associated with such positions (Allen and Yuen 2022; Carnegie and Mikulaschek 2020; Chapman 2009; Chapman and Wolford 2010; Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009; Fang 2008; Mikulaschek 2018; Voeten 2001, 2005). Once members, the second aspect explores the strategic, reputational and economic gains for even the most powerful states of the international arena when choosing to act through IOs rather than unilaterally. Existing research provides compelling evidence that engagement through multilateral institutions like the Security Council increases legitimacy and efficiency through collective action while simultaneously reducing the costs for individual members (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Gruber 2000; Hurd 2007; Ruggie 1993; Voeten 2005).

For this calculus to be effective, however, states must be confident that their objectives will ultimately be secured despite the complexities of negotiation and bargaining inherent to Council action. Indeed, presenting an issue before the Council may require persuading peers with divergent preferences and reaching a compromise solution that can bring significant adjustments to the original policy proposals. In these events, it might be more rational to persist with individual action despite the higher costs involved. Surprisingly, though, there is limited empirical evidence of the success of this endeavor. This research gap is related to the difficulty of assessing the preferences

that Security Council members bring to the table through quantitative tools. In the absence of clear indicators, existing studies have often resorted to voting behavior as the ultimate expression of a state's foreign policy priorities, relying on indicators such as S-scores, affinity values and ideal points to gauge the heterogeneity and distribution of preferences (Allen and Yuen 2022; Kim 2022; Voeten 2001). However, voting represents merely the final stage of a bargaining process and may thus overestimate the influence of the veto powers on decision-making. For a comprehensive understanding of the states' priorities, also earlier stages of the policy cycle must be considered.

In the past years, resolutions have been increasingly exploited to approximate the international community's understanding of specific conflicts (e.g., Hanania 2021; Schönfeld et al. 2018; Watanabe and Zhou 2022). This selection is justified by the institutional standing of these documents. Because all UNSC mandates must be formalized through resolutions, delegations have a vested interest in shaping the content according to their respective worldviews (Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Benson and Kathman 2014; Binder 2022; Caro-Burnett and Weese 2023). However, using resolutions as a proxy for preferences is complicated by the working procedures of the United Nations. Resolutions always result from compromise, which involves "creative diplomacy and behind-the-scenes bargaining" (Dunton et. al 2023). As a result, individual policy preferences of states are obscured in the final product. By the time a draft resolution is voted on, consultations have often already occurred in the corridors of the UN (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014; Bailey et al. 2017; Farrall et al. 2020; Hurd 2007). Accordingly, resolutions merely express the preferences and sentiments of the Security Council as a collective and do not necessarily mirror the beliefs of its individual members (Benson and Tucker 2022). It becomes thus challenging to determine which delegation has advocated for the inclusion of which content elements in the text of the resolution.

This methodological difficulty can be partially overcome by comparing the speeches delivered by Council members during meetings with the final language adopted in the associated resolution.[2] Importantly, speaking time in the Council is limited to five to ten minutes depending on the session.[3] This constraint compels delegates to focus on their most crucial points. Resulting of this selection process, high-level speeches are often considered suitable proxies for understanding the states' existing policy priorities (Baturo et al. 2017; Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021). Moreover, existing research also assumes that word choices in speeches are made strategically (e.g., Scherzinger 2023). By analyzing the content similarity between speeches and final resolutions, this

[2] Scherzinger (2023) has also recently attempted to match speeches with Council resolutions, but focuses only on direct correspondence and overlooks thus meeting sessions that have not immediately resulted in a resolution.
[3] This limit is not valid for external briefers, which is why the length is controlled for in the regression.

approach identifies thus speakers with the most evident ability to advocate for their priorities and make sure that they are reflected in the resolutions. For instance, this State A centers its speech on migration and State B on climate change, while the UNSC resolution predominantly addresses migration-related issues, it suggests that State A was more successful than State B in advancing the formalization of priorities.

To validate this consideration, two key assumptions must be made: states will openly express their priorities in high-level speeches. This consistency may be questioned, but finds support for two reasons. First, although work on text similarity is relatively unexplored in IO research (see Gray and Baturo 2021 for a notable exception), similar designs have been used successfully in other areas of political science (for instance by Ceron and Greene 2019, who benchmark the contents of political speeches against party manifestoes to identify the most influential speakers). This suggests that similar research methods can yield valuable insights also for the study of IOs. Second, existing bureaucratic procedures within the UN offer member states the option to maintain secrecy around their position. These mechanisms include, for instance, the possibility to remain silent (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021; Panke 2017) or the holding of closed consultations and *Arria*-formula meetings where no verbatim statement is published (Farrall et al. 2020; Hurd 2007; Sievers and Daws 2014). A count by (Allen and Yuen 2022, 1) revealed that the Council held 131 closed-door compared to 281 public meetings between 2017 and 2019 alone, demonstrating the extensive use of these instruments by its members. Holding a public Council meeting is thus a deliberate decision aimed at sending a message to the wider international community, which should render states more open to sharing their genuine positions in these sessions (Gray and Baturo 2021).

Six mechanisms: Shaping the language of UN resolutions

The theoretical underpinnings of this article are built on the premise that the Security Council does not operate as a straightforward majoritarian institution, but that certain conditions grant some states a power advantage over others (Chapman 2022; Sievers and Daws 2014; Voeten 2005). Previous studies have often centered on the characteristics of the speaker (i.e., wealth and interest in the conflict) or the target country (i.e., conflict severity and lootable resources) to explain this variation. Contrarily, this analysis focuses on six systemic mechanisms inherent to the United Nations' operating procedures that may influence this power distribution. This design helps to evidence specific trajectories within the organization that account for different levels of authority in drafting and negotiating the content of resolutions within the Council. The remainder of this section presents the six mechanisms and the related hypotheses.

First, international organizations are often perceived as policy playgrounds or vessels for manipulation by their most powerful members (Mearsheimer 1994; Waltz 1979). In the context of the UNSC, this role is undertaken by its permanent member. The P5 are commonly portrayed as an "elite club" (Voeten 2005) or "concert" (Bosco 2014) with unparalleled influence on international politics (Allen and Yuen 2022; Beardsley and Schmidt 2012; Passmore 2020). Early studies have primarily centered on the veto power as an indicator of the explicit preferences of these "five global policemen" (e.g., Bosco 2009; Kelsen 1946; Koremenos et al. 2001; McDougal and Gardner 1951). The Council as an institution "monopolized by the permanent five" (Hurd 2007, 119) is particularly consolidated when they act in unison (Binder and Golub 2020; Kim 2022; Krisch 2010; Sievers and Daws 2014; Voeten 2001). Accordingly, some suggest that "a fair approximation as far as voting is concerned is that the Council has five members" (O'Neill 1996, 235).

Recent studies have sought to move beyond this explanation, recognizing that the veto represents only the final stage of the bargaining process. Due to prior consultations, vetoes are mostly anticipated and are often exploited strategically to "make a public case" (Allen and Yuen 2022, 2). Consequently, various works have identified factors beyond the veto that grant the P5 power advantages over their elected counterparts (Binder and Golub 2020; Gilligan and Stedman 2003; Hurd 2007; Hwang et al. 2015). Permanent members, especially the P3 (Krisch 2010, 141),[4] face fewer financial constraints, possess a greater familiarity with the institutional rules of the UN system and boast stronger diplomatic traditions in New York (Farrall et al. 2020; Haugevik et al. 2021; Vlcek 2023). In contrast, the presence of the elected members is often seen as purely symbolic (Hurd 2007). Whether through formal or informal mechanisms, these mechanisms translate into the P5 having greater control over the UNSC's proceedings and thus exerting a higher authority on the language adopted.

H1: *The P5 have a higher influence on the language in resolutions than non-permanent members.*

Second, recent scholarship has increasingly questioned the centrality of the permanent members (Farrall et al. 2020; Langmore and Farrall 2016; Langmore and Thakur 2016; Pay and Postolski 2022). Despite the brevity of their terms, small states and middle powers can exert influence on the global political agenda through leadership, diplomatic skills and political capital (Farrall et al. 2020; Keating 2015; Martin 2020; Rodiles 2013; Sievers and Daws 2014; von Einsiedel et al. 2020). Because of their changing composition, elected members "often determine the character of the Council in a particular year" (Greenstock 2010, 251). A notable example of such advocacy was

[4] The term "P3" refers to the three Western states of the P5: France, the United Kingdom and the United States.

seen during Canada's 1999-2000 Council term, when its diplomats brought the concepts of human security to the international agenda (Oksamytna 2023; Weiss 2004). Moreover, since the 1965 Council reform at least nine affirmative votes are required to pass a UNSC resolution. This means that elected members can impede any P5 proposal when voting as a bloc and that, in return, at least some of them must be persuaded to enable action. As a result, scholars now refer to a "double veto" that both the P5 and the E10 can draw (Allen and Yuen 2022, 19).

Nonetheless, this emergence of the E10 "as a construct and a more cohesive coalition on the Security Council" constitutes a comparatively recent development (Boutellis 2022). It is particularly the prevailing climate of multilateralism and multipolarity of the 21st century that provides a fertile ground for this perceived diversification of authority (Badache et al. 2022; Call and de Coning 2017; Haugevik et al. 2021; Paris 2014). For instance, recent years have witnessed the mounting influence of the so-called "rising powers" such as the BRICS countries (with Brazil, India and South Africa as non-permanent Council members) in their respective regions. In addition, Hurd (2007) evidences how even states not currently serving the Council have found regular ways to interact with Council stakeholders (e.g., through budget or peacekeeping contributions). As a result of these dynamics, the weight of representatives from the E10 and members without formal Council seats could have grown over the past decades – although it may still not reach the level of the P5.

H2: *The influence of non-permanent members on the language of resolutions compared to the P5 increases over time.*

Third, there is a substantive scholarship exploring the importance of chairmanship in IOs (Bailey and Daws 1995; Sievers and Daws 2014). Within the Council, this function is vested in the meeting President. The chair rotates on a monthly basis in English alphabetical order, ensuring that both permanent and elected members have the opportunity to steer the UNSC's work. As per the rules of procedure, the President not only has the authority to convene meetings and mediate between the parties, but also sets the provisional agenda and decides on the nature of the meeting (open or closed). While presidents are traditionally seen as impartial figures, these leaders can also assume more self-interested roles (Blavoukos and Bourantonis 2013; Tallberg 2003). According to Allen and Yuen (2022), states often exploit their presidency to advance national goals. Consequently, presidential preferences significantly impact the topic selection of Council meetings (Kim 2022). Due to this influential role in the early stages of the negotiations, Presidents might hold an institutional reservoir of power that helps them exercise their authority during the drafting process.

H3: *Presidents have a higher influence on the language of resolution than ordinary member states.*

Fourth, not all delegations are equally involved in the drafting process. While some states express their interests only through the cast of voting, others take on a more active role by initiating the text of the resolution to be negotiated among members. It is crucial to note that the drafting process has undergone significant changes since the end of the Cold War. Until 2009, the process of writing the first version of a resolution was not formalized and was primarily undertaken by the P3 (Haugevik et al. 2021). Since then, efforts have been made to distribute the work more evenly among members. The so-called *penholding* refers to the "practice of continuous, individual or collective, leadership in the Council of particular members on specific issues on the Council's agenda" (Pay and Postolski 2022, 5). Holding the pen implies taking responsibility for a particular issue: drafting documents, leading negotiations, calling meetings, scheduling debates and maintaining public attention on the issue in the midst of the Council's busy schedule (Haugevik et al. 2021; Loiselle 2020). However, being a first drafter comes with its own costs and is thus often undertaken by states with an elevated interest in the resolution's outcome (Gregory 2023; Mesquita et al. 2022). Due to their central role in the negotiation, as these nations have the crucial task of translating the priorities of the consulting parties into a written format, first drafters may preserve a relative power advantage throughout the drafting process and thus exert greater influence on the final language.

H4: *Initial drafters have a higher influence on the language of resolutions than member states not participating in the drafting process.*

Fifth, while the Council is the domain of states when it comes to voting, other actors have also gained access to its meetings to address the international public. This article focuses on three different types of actors: (1) delegates of international organizations – both within and outside the UN system – are often invited to brief the states during the meetings, but their role is mainly intended to open the floor rather than providing novel information. Because of their missing voting capacity, their influence on the content of the resolution is expected to be minimal, (2) representatives of NGOs and civil society perform a similar function to delegates from IOs, but add a bottom-up and localized voice to the discussion (Binder 2008). Despite this unique perspective, their influence is expected to be equally contained and (3) in some cases, states create informal networks of collaboration to conserve resources and present a united front with like-minded states. These arrangements also ensure continuity despite changing Council membership (i.e., in the case of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM)). In this sense, one representative may speak on behalf of several states in the network (referred to here as a multi-stage arrangement). This is often the case, for instance, for the Nordic states (e.g., S.PV/5851 on Afghanistan) or the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (e.g., S.PV/7237 on DR Congo). Because of their state-like character and

the voting rights of their members, which represent differences to IOs and NGOs, these networks are likely to have a similar or even stronger influence on the resolution than individual states.

H5a: *IOs have a low influence on the language of resolutions than states.*
H5b: *NGOs have a lower influence on the language of resolutions than states.*
H5c: *Multi-state arrangements have a higher influence on the language of resolutions than states.*

Sixth, politicians often employ speeches as a means of influencing international perceptions of their government. State officials invited to speak about a conflict occurring within their own national borders may have a particularly strong incentive to deter negative external visions of their country. The criteria for case selection in this article, where state authorities play at least a passive role of indifference but may even be active sources of violence against civilians (more below), further accentuates this need. As a result, these states may be under particular pressure to defend and publicly justify their state authorities. Existing literature on contestation studies, for instance by Ducci and Lucenti (2022) on the International Criminal Court (ICC), has shown that IOs are often exploited for this purpose. As using *exit* in Hirschman's (1979) sense is rare (Debre and Dijkstra 2021, 2022), "delegitimization through discourse is a key avenue available to challenger states" (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021, 746). Conflict-affected states may seek to present an alternative vision that is unlikely to be included in the official narrative presented in the resolutions, leading to a divergence between their perspective and the established diplomatic discourse.

H6: *Self-referential speeches have a lower influence on the language of resolutions.*

Data and methods

These hypotheses were tested using an original dataset of so-called *complex humanitarian emergencies* between 1990 and 2019. Widely used in policy-making, this term has been circumscribed by Everett (2017, 22) to "violent events that result from political violence, involve large-scale and intense civilian suffering and in which the local authorities are unable or unwilling to shield the population". This limitation of scope builds on the understanding that decisions related to civilian protection are politically contentious among members, rendering them intriguing case studies. Influencing these decisions may thus represent a priority for many nations, as actions taken by the international community (e.g., peacekeeping missions, sanctions or military interventions) may touch on politically contentious topics like national sovereignty or the use of force. In this article, complex humanitarian emergencies were operationalized by identifying all countries-years that reported a minimum of 50 annual civilian casualties according to the Uppsala Conflict Data

Program (Sundberg and Melander 2016) and at least one incident of targeted mass killings over the entire period (Butcher et al. 2020).[5]

For these 580 cross-sectional data points, all relevant session files were obtained from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library. These records were divided into 20,187 individual speeches, delivered not only by the seventy states that have served the Council since 1990 but also by non-state actors (e.g., IOs or NGOs) and states from outside the Council. Under Article 32 of the UN Charter, also non-members can be invited to attend a meeting without voting rights if (1) they are parties to the dispute under discussion or (2) the Council deems that their interests are affected. To ensure analytical consistency, all documents were cleaned (e.g., removal of stop words) and fixed multi-word concepts compounded (e.g., human rights). In addition, words were stemmed to ensure the correspondence between macro-topics rather than the exact wording.[6] More details on the coding procedure can be found in the online appendix. The sampled speeches were then matched with the respective resolutions. In some cases, resolutions were derived directly from the discussion (i.e., published on the same day).[7] However, not all debates had formalized outcomes. In these events, the speeches were matched against the temporarily closest resolution with the corresponding subject. The overview matrix of this procedure is included in the supplementary material.

The similarity between the matched documents was obtained using Cosine Similarity, which converts texts into a sparse document-frequency matrix and computes the angle of the Euclidean distance between two vectorized objects in a multi-dimensional space. Commonly used in text mining and natural language processing (NLP), this measure has the advantage of controlling for the different text lengths between the documents. This was important because of the displayed variance in the discourse length across speakers (maximum 1,294.42 words for the UN and minimum 140.5 for the Marshall Islands) and target countries (maximum 2,175.75 meetings on peace in Africa and minimum 167.52 on Azerbaijan) in this sample. The interpretation of the outcome value is straightforward, falling within a range of -1 to 1. In simple terms, more similar documents with similar counts of the same terms in similar proportions will yield a higher Cosine score. As summarized by Han et al. (2012, 78), "a cosine value of 0 means that the two vectors are at 90 degrees to each other (orthogonal) and have no match. The closer the cosine value to 1, the smaller the angle and the greater the match between vectors." Conversely, a value close to -1 indicates strongly dissimilar vectors. For the speeches in this sample, the calculated Cosine value

[5] This scope restriction builds on the understanding that debates on civilian protection are not necessarily triggered by heightened casualty rates alone, but augmented by the intentional and systematic targeting of civilians.
[6] For instance, based on stemming procedures, words like "migration" and "migrant" are reduced to "migr".
[7] When a meeting is directly linked to more than one resolution, the procedure was multiplicated for each combination.

ranged from 0.014 (China in S.PV/7797) to 0.808 (Iraq in S.PV/5808). These scores serve as the independent variable (*Outcome*) for the subsequent analysis.

The outlined hypotheses were tested with a series of regression models with seven independent variables. *Date* refers to the year of publication of the individual speeches.[8] Information on *Penholdership* was extracted from the meta-information of resolutions in the Dag Hammarskjöld Library. As a binary variable, it identifies countries explicitly pinpointed as resolution drafters. If no penholder was mentioned, a value of 0 was coded for all speakers, assuming that no state held a leadership position in the negotiation.[9] The identity of the *President* of the meetings (binary) was derived from the Index to Proceedings for the Security Council.[10] The variable *P5* indicates whether (1) or not (0) the speaker in question is a permanent member of the Council. Because of the expected increase in the influence of the E10 over time, this variable will include an interaction effect. *Type* includes information on the identity of the speaker classified into four categories: states, international organizations based on the classification of the Correlates of War (COW) 3.0 dataset,[11] informal multi-state arrangements that do not meet the IO criteria as well as NGOs/civil society. The binary variable *Self-referential* is based on a match between the speaker and the target country, indicating whether speakers refer to a conflict in their own nation. Speeches by Palestine about Israel and by Timor-Leste about Indonesia (before 2002) were also coded as self-referential. Finally, *Length* controls the number of words in a speech. The focus of this article is on the characteristics of the speaking agents, rather than the issues being debated. Issue-related variables (i.e., derived from literature on foreign intervention) could be addressed in a separate paper.

Results

Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of average Cosine scores, giving indications of variations in content alignment among the 217 individual speakers in the sample. Remarkably, some stand out for their high degree of similarity to the language of the associated resolutions. The top-performing actors include the Gulf of Guinea Commission (GGC, 0.58), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 0.58), the Gulf of Cooperation Council (GCC, 0.578), the Collective Security Council Cooperation (CSTO, 0.556) and Suriname (0.546). In contrast, below-average values are reported

[8] Although the official period of analysis goes between 1990 and 2019, no meeting record met the mentioned and in the online appendix elaborated selection criterion. This means that in practice, the analysis started in 1991.
[9] For instance, in draft solution S/1994/115 on Somalia there is no mention of the penholders. The Security Council Repertoire on Somalia states that "the text of a draft resolution that had been prepared in the course of the Council's prior consultations".
[10] https://www.un.org/en/library/page/index-proceedings-security-council.
[11] According to COW, IO must consist of at least three states, hold plenary sessions at least every ten years and must possess a permanent secretariat with corresponding headquarters.

by Bhutan (0.106), the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO, 0.108), the Marshall Islands (0.177), Armenia (0.181) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE, 0.186). Extreme values, both positive and negative, are thus predominantly occupied by small states and IOs that exhibit a wider range of outcomes compared to larger states or other organizations.



Figure 1. Distribution of the average Cosine scores by the speakers

The variation in Cosine scores among the individual speakers raises questions about the factors contributing to such disparities. To transition from descriptive to explanatory design, this article uses five different regression models as shown in **Table I**: (1) a linear base model, (2) a k-nearest neighbor matching based on propensity scores (comparing below-average with above-average observations) to control for unobserved variables, (3) a multi-level regression with fixed effects clustered by speaker, (4) a multi-level regression with fixed effects clustered by meeting and (5) a multi-level regression with fixed effects clustered by target country. The adoption of the three multidimensional models stems from a theoretical perspective, as possible violations of independence between the observations are expected. Because of their "stickiness", certain speakers may consistently exhibit higher or lower Cosine scores over time or regarding specific meeting subjects. The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) demonstrated that Model 3 yields the most favorable results, but the findings are essentially replicated in all five models. To check for robustness, the analysis is replicated in the appendix while controlling for the effect of exogenous factors that influence the position of states in the UN system (e.g., nuclear stockpile, wealth or contributions to peacekeeping missions) and voting data.

Table I: Regression models

	Model 1: Base (linear regression)	**Model 2: Linear with matching**	**Model 3: Multilevel (speaker)**	**Model 4: Multilevel (meeting)**	**Model 5: Multilevel (target)**
Penholder	0.006*	0.007*	0.003	0.011***	0.023***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)
President	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	0.001	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Date	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
P5	2.039***	2.046***	3.644***	0.341	1.368**
	(0.000)	(0.521)	(0.540)	(0.257)	(0.443)
Type: Group of states	0.012	0.012	0.016	0.014**	0.031***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.017)	(0.005)	(0.009)
Type: IO	-0.022	-0.003	-0.024	0.003	0.006
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Type: NGO/civil society	-0.075***	-0.075***	-0.083**	-0.068***	-0.077***
	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.009)	(0.015)
Self-referential	0.010*	0.010*	0.018**	-0.000	0.018***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Length	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Date * P5	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.000	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	4.223***	4.218***	2.660***	3.732***	-1.159**
	(0.264)	(0.264)	(0.312)	(0.745)	(0.360)
N	*2187*	*2184*	*2187*	*2187*	*2187*
N (multilevel)			*217*	*1784*	*120*
Variance random effect			*0.001*	*0.014*	*0.008*
AIC	*-23395.35*	*-23392.28*	*-23827.47*	*-47870.76*	*-29701.08*
BIC	*-23300.4*	*-23297.33*	*-23724.61*	*-47767.9*	*-29598.21*
R^2 *(adjusted)*	*0.038*	*0.038*			
R^2 *(fixed)*			*0.033*	*0.031*	*0.02*
R^2 *(total)*			*0.104*	*0.786*	*0.398*

Standard error in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Regarding *H1*, the findings reveal a strong correspondence between the content of the resolutions and the speeches delivered by P5 representatives (coefficients between 0.34 to 3.6). These results are consistent with previous studies that have underscored the substantial power wielded by the permanent Council members in international affairs (e.g., Allen and Yuen 2022), which can be

explained by both formal and informal factors of influence as predicted in the theoretical section of this article. However, the interaction dynamic regarding the temporal effect on the influence of the E10 displays negative coefficients (*Date * P5*). As exhibited in **Figure 2**, the overall decrease in the Cosine index over time is more pronounced for the P5 than for the E10. In other words, this indicates that non-permanent members increased their influence on the content of the resolutions over time compared to the P5 and report higher predicted values since the early 2000s (*H2*).



Figure 2. Interaction effect of outcomes between E10 (0) and P5 (1) over time

Mixed results are observed regarding the role of the President (*H3*), as results spike in both directions (coefficients between -0.002 and 0.001) but are never statistically significant. This suggests that while Presidents hold authority over agenda-setting and meeting type, as evidenced in previous studies (Kentikelenis and Voeten 2021; Kim 2022), they wield relatively little power in driving language decisions in resolutions. This insight adds to the existing literature by highlighting the different moments of influence along the policy chain. Possible explanations for the limited influence of the Presidents on language decisions may lie in the nature of their role within the Council. As a rotating position, Presidents hold the chairmanship for a limited period of time, which may restrict their capacity to drive substantive changes in the language of resolutions. In addition, the President's role is largely procedural. But as these bureaucratic elements (e.g., speaking on behalf of the entire Council) have been excluded from the analysis, where only speeches on behalf of the national capacity were sampled according to the criteria evidenced in the appendix, the authority of the President cannot be distinguished from the influence of ordinary Council members.

Contrastingly, penholders exert a statistically significant and moderately high influence on the language of the resolutions as predicted by the related hypothesis (*H4*). This is caused by their involvement already at the early stage, providing them with more time and opportunity to shape the

language and content. Their vested interest in the outcome motivates them to actively engage in negotiations and consultations with other Council members in garnering support for their proposed language (Gregory 2023; Loiselle 2020). Nevertheless, this variable also obscures the effect that joining the penholders during different moments of the drafting process can have (Mesquita et al. 2022). Future studies can incorporate this temporal dimension into the analysis. Contrarily, the results for *H5* present a mixed picture. Compared to states as the reference class, NGOs/civil society exhibit decreased (*H5a*) and multi-state arrangements increased values (*H5c*). Both results align with the expectations formalized in the relative hypothesis. However, the outcomes for IOs are inconclusive (coefficients from -0.02 to 0.01) and fail to reach statistical significance (*H5b*). This lack of clarity may be attributed to the diverse nature of IOs encompassed in this category. As evidenced in the descriptive analysis in **Figure 1**, IOs scored both extremely high (GGC, NATO, GCC and CSTO) and low average Cosine values (FAO and OSCE). Nevertheless, these bodies display important differences in terms of geographical scope (regional vs. international), function (e.g., financial, military or economic) and bureaucracy (e.g., resources, diplomatic networks and staffing) that may influence their ability to actively engage in the resolution-making process and shape language choices. This difference is obscured by the macro-classification of the research design. To gain more comprehensive insights into the influence of IOs, future analysis could strive to disaggregate the IO bulk to enable a more fine-grained understanding of the impact of specific types of IOs on the language of resolutions.

Finally, contrary to the direction predicted in *H6*, the coefficients for self-referential speeches are positive and statistically significant in four models (coefficients between 0.01 and 0.02). These findings indicate that delegates from countries experiencing conflict, where governments are often actively involved in the violence, do not exhibit a significantly decreased connection to the content of the resolutions nor engage in the contestation of the UN. This result is even more surprising considering that these representatives are often invited to the Council as parties to the conflict under Article 32 of the UN Charter and not as ordinary members,[12] which means that their authority is not underpinned by formal voting power. This alignment with the content of the resolution could indicate a continued willingness to engage constructively with the UN and actively participate in its conflict resolution processes. This dynamic is also observable in the self-referential speech with the highest Cosine score (S.PV/5808), where the Iraqi representative widely supported the international community's peace efforts in his country. However, it is crucial to acknowledge that the language

[12] Dreher et al. (2014) find that the prospects of being voted to the Council are increased for rich and democratic countries, but decreased for countries currently in conflict.

model employed in the analysis may not fully capture the intricacies of the language used by these states. Self-referential conflict speeches may exhibit nuances that may not be readily apparent to the Cosine algorithm (e.g., differences in tone and sentences with a negation structure), leading to potential limitations in interpreting the results.

Conclusion

The United Nations Security Council stands as a critical pillar of global governance, entrusted with the maintenance of international peace and security. However, its decision-making does not follow the trajectories of a straightforward majoritarian institution. Various factors have contributed to an uneven distribution of power among members, granting some greater influence in decision-making influence than others (Chapman 2022; Sievers and Daws 2014; Voeten 2005). This inequality has significant implications when drafting resolutions. As they represent the operative basis for any mandate, formalizing one's priorities in resolutions means directly shaping the Council's actions in conflict-ridden regions. This article reveals that while there is some actor-specific consistency, as 1.4% of the variance can be attributed to the fixed effects when grouping speakers, systemic factors within the UN system also play a role in determining the level of authority that states possess. In particular, members of the P5, penholders, delegates speaking about conflicts within their own borders, states and multi-stage arrangements all possess an increased authority over the language of the resolutions. Presidents, NGOs and IOs report instead negative outcomes.

In sum, this innovative study design using Cosine similarity furnishes a rare glimpse into the concealed realm of UNSC decision-making. This is particularly relevant during a time when calls for increased transparency (Tørstad 2023) and institutional reform (Dörfler and Hosli 2013) are gaining momentum especially in the wake of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine. Understanding the trajectories that contribute to the unequal power distribution within the Council can both inform targeted proposals for adjustment, but also support states to increase their influence through bottom-up strategies (e.g., through involvement in penholding when serving on the Council).

The findings of this analysis open up avenues for future research on the UNSC and its decision-making. Below, three proposals for further investigation are highlighted. First, the article underscores the importance of informal diplomacy during the resolution drafting. Exploring the role and impact of informal diplomatic engagements, where key actors engage in back-channel negotiations and discussions outside of official Council meetings, could provide a richer understanding of how compromises are reached within the organization. Second, the focus on

individual actors draws attention to the diverse interests and perspectives that UNSC members bring to the table. Investigating the challenges and opportunities that especially the E10 face in shaping decisions would offer valuable policy insights that strengthen their role within the organization. Third, conducting comparative analyses of resolution drafting across different issue areas can yield significant insights into the evolving dynamics of the UNSC. By examining how the Council addresses specific topics, such as humanitarian issues versus security-related matters, helps to identify patterns and trends that shape the Council's responses. Such comparative studies inform efforts to improve the UNSC's effectiveness and legitimacy in addressing global challenges.

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Online appendix

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Sampling

Table AI. Sampled countries-years with data on civilian casualties taken from UCDP. Years with fewer than 50 civilian casualties were included if they are both preceded and followed by a year meeting the outlined threshold criterion.

Country	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	Sum
AFG	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	30
AGO	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																	14
AZE			X	X																											2
BDI						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X									X	X	X	X	X	17
BFA																													X	X	2
BGD		X	X																												2
BIH			X	X	X	X																									4
CAF																	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	14
CHN																			X												1
CIV											X	X	X	X	X							X									6
CMR					X																				X	X	X	X	X	X	7
COD	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	30
COG				X				X	X	X																					4
COL	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X											X		19
EGY						X	X	X								X										X	X	X	X	X	9
ERI										X																					1
ETH	X	X												X	X	X	X	X					X			X	X	X	X	X	13
GEO				X		X													X												3
GTM	X	X	X	X	X	X																									6
HRV				X		X																									2
IDN	X	X							X	X	X	X	X	X	X																9
IND	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	30
IRN					X																									X	2
IRQ		X	X	X	X	X	X							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	23
ISR					X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X						15
KEN																		X	X					X	X	X	X	X			7
LBN	X						X										X						X	X							5
LBY																						X			X	X	X	X	X	X	7
LKA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X						X	X	X	X										X	16
LBR	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X																	12
MEX																					X	X									2
MLI	X	X	X		X																			X			X	X	X	X	9
MMR		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X			X	X	X	X	X	25
MOZ	X	X	X																										X	X	5
NER	X								X																	X			X	X	5
NGA	X				X					X	X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	20
PAK									X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	20
PER	X	X	X	X	X																										5
PHL	X	X									X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	17
RUS					X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X						X									11
RWA	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X																						9
SDN	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	30
SEN			X	X				X	X																						4
SOM	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X					X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	24
SRB		X	X						X	X																					4
SSD																							X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	8
SYR																						X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	9
TCD			X	X	X				X							X	X	X								X					8
THA															X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X							10
TUR	X	X	X	X	X	X																X				X	X	X			10
UGA	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X				X										15
UKR																									X	X	X	X	X		5
YEM						X																X			X	X	X	X	X	X	8
ZAF	X	X	X	X	X																										5
Sum	23	24	24	24	24	22	18	14	18	19	18	18	17	19	18	15	17	17	17	13	13	19	15	16	18	24	23	23	25	25	

Document coding

UNSC documents on the sampled countries-years were manually downloaded from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (all last visited on 12th July 2023):

- Meeting records: https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2020
- Resolutions: https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/resolutions-0

The documents were coded based on the following metadata:

- type of document: “RES” for resolutions, “PV” for procès verbaux (drafts and speeches)
- document number
- year of publication
- exact date of publication (*yyyy-mm-dd*)
- target country: country that is being treated in a specific meeting or resolution based on the title or its primary content. This scope restriction was necessary to focus on the country-specific dimension that excludes broad thematic documents.
- speaker: identity of the speaker (only for the meeting minutes)

Special coding procedures:

(1) When a specific document targeted more than a single country, this was reflected in the coding (i.e., S/RES/2104/2013 was coded for both Sudan and South Sudan).

(2) Also countries that were not mentioned in the title but featured prominently in the rest of the document were identified (i.e., in meeting S/PV.5816 Pakistan was discussed).

(3) Regional documents (i.e., S/RES/1653/2006 concerning the Great Lakes area) were included if the target countries could be clearly identified by an explicit mention of the country names in the title or repeated mentions in the document.

(4) Documents with the title “The situation in the Middle East, particularly the Palestinian question” (i.e., S/RES/1860/2009) were coded only for Israel. When the title read “Situation in the Middle East”, the document was coded based on the dominant country mentioned in the document (i.e., S/PV.8439 regarding Yemen).

(5) The “Great Lakes Region”, the boundaries of which are estimated diverging by different sources, was coded to include the following countries based on the United Nations Security Council Resolutions Search Engine (http://unscr.com/en): Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.

(6) Documents on terrorism where not included if there was not specific reference to a country or terrorist group in the title (as it is the case in S/PV.4607), as these discussions usually span across multiple issues that cannot be easily disaggregated.

(7) For speeches, documents were coded based on the overall theme of the meeting. This does not mean that member states do not speak about other country situations in their individual speeches, which could not be reflected in the coding system.

(8) Speeches voices by the Presidents of the meetings were not included, if they did not speak in their national capacity. Whether or not a President speaks in his institutional or national capacity is clearly stated. Moreover, also introductory and concluding institutional remarks as well as interventions on bureaucratic procedures (i.e., reading a resolution without further discussion, such as in S/PV.2904 on Afghanistan) were eliminated.

(9) Closed meetings (i.e., S/PV.6252 on Sudan) were excluded, as from these meetings only press statements are available.

(10) Merely personal speeches (i.e., condolences, farewell or initiation speeches) were excluded. These were identified by their structural placement before the formal adoption of the agenda.

(11) Content from multi-media sources was eliminated (i.e., the USA played an audiotape in S/PV.4701 on Iraq).

(12) If an actor spoke more than once in a single meeting (i.e., Israel in S/PV.4357), which is often used to further clarify one's position or react to the comment of a colleague, this was merged into a single document.

(13) In some cases, state representatives did not speak on the behalf of their nations but some third parties (i.e., regional representations or multi-stage arrangements). This was coded accordingly. The relative patterns were identified through "on behalf of", "in my capacity as" and "for the Presidency of" at the outset of the speech. The same procedure was also followed when a diplomat spoke on behalf of the penholders.

(14) UN representatives were coded as "UN", as a segregation into the individual level was not possible at this stage. This means that the related category comprises number of different entities. When representatives of member states spoke in the capacity of a UN function, this was also coded as "UN" as it does not reflect their national opinions. This was for instance the case for Joanna Wronecka, Permanent Representative of Poland, in her capacity as Chair of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to S/RES/1591/2005 concerning the Sudan. The same is also true if a specific person had not a direct UN mandate but engaged in UN activities (i.e., Harald Braun as Special Representative of the German Government for the training of the Afghan police force).

Table AII. Country abbreviations based on 3-digit ISO code

Acronym	Name	Comment
AFG	Afghanistan	
AGO	Angola	
ALB	Albania	
ALG	Algeria	
ARE	United Arab Emirates	
ARG	Argentina	
ARM	Armenia	Independence in 1991
AUS	Australia	
AUT	Austria	
AZE	Azerbaijan	Independence in 1991
BDI	Burundi	
BEL	Belgium	
BEN	Benin	People's Republic of Benin before 1990
BFA	Burkina Faso	Burkina before 2013
BGD	Bangladesh	
BGR	Bulgaria	
BHR	Bahrein	
BHS	Bahamas	
BIH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Independence in 1992
BLR	Belarus	Independence in 1991
BLZ	Belize	

BOL	Plurinational State of Bolivia	
BRA	Brazil	
BRN	Brunei Darussalam	
BTN	Bhutan	
BWA	Botswana	
CAF	Central African Republic	
CAN	Canada	
CHE	Switzerland	
CHL	Chile	
CHN	China	
CIV	Côte d'Ivoire	
CMR	Cameroon	
COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo	Zaire before 1997
COG	Republic of the Congo	People's Republic of the Congo before 1992
COL	Colombia	
COM	Comoros	
CPV	Cabo Verde	Cape Verde before 2014
CRI	Costa Rica	
CUB	Cuba	
CYP	Cyprus	
CZE	Czechia	Installment in 1993
DJI	Djibouti	
DNK	Denmark	
DOM	Dominican Republic	
ECU	Ecuador	
EGY	Egypt	
ERI	Eritrea	Independence in 1993
ESP	Spain	
EST	Estonia	Independence in 1991
ETH	Ethiopia	
FIN	Finland	
FJI	Fiji	
FRA	France	
FSM	Federated States of Micronesia	
GAB	Gabon	
GBR	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	
GEO	Georgia	Independence in 1991
GER	Germany	
GHA	Ghana	
GIN	Guinea	
GMB	Gambia	
GNB	Guinea-Bissau	
GNQ	Equatorial Guinea	
GRC	Greece	
GTM	Guatemala	
GUY	Guyana	
HND	Honduras	

HRV	Croatia	Independence in 1991
HUN	Hungary	
IDN	Indonesia	
IND	India	
IRL	Ireland	
IRN	Islamic Republic of Iran	
IRQ	Iraq	
ISL	Iceland	
ISR	Israel	
ITA	Italy	
JAM	Jamaica	
JOR	Jordan	
JPN	Japan	
KAZ	Kazakhstan	Independence in 1991
KEN	Kenya	
KGZ	Kyrgyzstan	Independence in 1991
KHM	Cambodia	
KOR	Republic of Korea	
LAO	Lao People's Democratic Republic	
LBN	Lebanon	
LBR	Liberia	
LBY	Libya	
LIE	Liechtenstein	
LKA	Sri Lanka	
LSO	Lesotho	
LTU	Lithuania	Independence in 1990
LUX	Luxembourg	
LVA	Latvia	Independence in 1991
MAR	Morocco	
MDV	Maldives	
MEX	Mexico	
MHL	Marshall Islands	
MKD	Republic of North Macedonia	Independence in 1991
MLI	Mali	
MLT	Malta	
MMR	Myanmar	Burma before 2019
MNG	Mongolia	
MOZ	Mozambique	
MRT	Mauritania	
MUS	Mauritius	
MWI	Malawi	
MYS	Malaysia	
NED	Netherlands	
NER	Niger	
NGA	Nigeria	
NIC	Nicaragua	
NMB	Namibia	Independence in 1990
NOR	Norway	
NPL	Nepal	Republic in 2008

NZL	New Zealand	
OMN	Oman	
PAK	Pakistan	
PAN	Panama	
PER	Peru	
PHL	Philippines	
PNG	Papua New Guinea	
POL	Poland	
PRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea	
PRT	Portugal	
PRY	Paraguay	
PSE	State of Palestine	Observer to the UN
QAT	Qatar	
ROU	Romania	
RUS	Russian Federation	Installment in 1991
RWA	Rwanda	
SAU	Saudi Arabia	
SDN	Sudan	
SEN	Senegal	
SGP	Singapore	
SLE	Sierra Leone	
SLV	El Salvador	
SMR	San Marino	
SOM	Somalia	
SRB	Serbia	Serbia and Montenegro before 2006
SSD	South Sudan	Independence in 2011
STP	Sao Tome and Principe	
SUR	Suriname	
SVK	Slovenia	Independence in 1991
SVN	Slovakia	Installment in 1993
SWE	Sweden	
SWZ	Swaziland	
SYC	Seychelles	
SYR	Syrian Arab Republic	
TCD	Chad	
TGO	Togo	
THA	Thailand	
TJK	Tajikistan	Independence in 1991
TKM	Turkmenistan	Independence in 1991
TLS	Timor-Leste	Independence in 2002
TTO	Trinidad and Tobago	
TUN	Tunisia	
TUR	Turkey	
TZN	United Republic of Tanzania	
UGA	Uganda	
UKR	Ukraine	Independence in 1991
URY	Uruguay	
USA	United States of America	
UZB	Uzbekistan	Independence in 1991

VEN	Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela	
VNM	Viet Nam	
YEM	Yemen	Installment in 1990
ZAF	South Africa	
ZAM	Zambia	
ZWE	Zimbabwe	

Table AIII. Abbreviation of international and regional organizations as well as multi-national arrangements

Acronym	Name	Comment
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	10 members
AU	African Union	55 members (established 2002)
CARICOM	Caribbean Community	15 members
CENSAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States	29 members (established 1998)
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organisation	ARM, BLR, KAZ, KGZ, RUS, TJK (established 1992)
EAC	East African Community	BDI, COD, KEN, RW, SSD, TZN, UGA (established 2000)
ECCAS	Economic Community of Central African States	11 members
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States	15 members
EU	European Union	27 members (established 1993)
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization	
G5	G5 Sahel	BFA, MLI, MRT, NER TCD (established 2014)
GAFS	Group of African States	54 members
GAS	Group of Arab States	
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council	ARE, BHR, KWT, OMN, QAT, SAU
GGC	Gulf of Guinea Commission	AGO, CMR, COD, COG, GNQ, NGA, STP (established 2001)
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency	176 members
ICC	International Criminal Court	123 members (established 2002)
ICGLR	International Conference on the Great Lakes Region	19 members (established 2008)
ICRC	International Commission of the Red Cross	
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development	DJI, ERI, ETH, KEN, SDN, SOM, SSD, UGA
IMO	International Maritime Organization	175 members
Interpol	International Criminal Police Organization	195 members

LAS	League of Arab Nations	22 members
LCR	Lake Chad Region	CMR, NER, NGATCD
LKP	Observer States of the Lusaka Protocol	PRT, RUS, USA (established 1994)
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur	ARG, BRA, PRY, URY (established 1991)
MNF	Multi-National Force	AUS, ESP, GBR, ITA, POL, USA, (established 2004 – terminated 2009)
NAM	Non-Alignment Movement	120 members
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization	31 members
NGO	Non-government organization	All NGOs and civil society
NRD	Nordic Countries	DNK, FIN, ISL, NOR, SWE
OAS	Organization of American States	35 members
OAU	Organization of African Unity	32 members (terminated 2002)
OCE	Oceania	
OIC	Organization of Islamic Countries	56 members
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe	57 members
PEN	Penholders	Costum since 2009
PIF	Pacific Island Forum	18 members
REL	Religious actors	Holy Seat, religious NGOs
RIO	Rio Group	24 members
SADC	Southern African Development Community	16 members (established 1992)
UN	United Nations	193 members
UNDP	United Nations Development Program	
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund	
WB	World Bank	189 members
WFP	World Food Program	
WHO	World Health Organization	

Results

Table AIV. Average Cosine value by speaker

Ranking	Speaker	avg_Outcome
1	GGC	0.579922
2	NATO	0.57965
3	GCC	0.578404
4	CSTO	0.556349
5	SUR	0.546012
6	AFG	0.524339
7	HND	0.514137

8	TJK	0.499291
9	LBR	0.497141
10	SWZ	0.483726
11	TTO	0.478188
12	LSO	0.472026
13	BWA	0.470415
14	TKM	0.470331
15	ECOWAS	0.469986
16	UZB	0.465899
17	STP	0.465744
18	MNF	0.46561
19	GNB	0.461932
20	CENSAD	0.460861
21	OCE	0.45723
22	BDI	0.449783
23	KGZ	0.44709
24	IRQ	0.442733
25	EST	0.440025
26	FIN	0.438782
27	OMN	0.438198
28	MOZ	0.434887
29	AZE	0.434413
30	IND	0.433502
31	OAU	0.431222
32	EU	0.431116
33	AUS	0.428978
34	MMR	0.428764
35	PRT	0.426887
36	CAN	0.423843
37	ICGLR	0.422165
38	NAM	0.419018
39	PAK	0.417799
40	UGA	0.416613
41	SOM	0.415966
42	HUN	0.415451
43	NGA	0.415015
44	MLI	0.414395
45	CARICOM	0.413255
46	KEN	0.412524
47	PSE	0.408394
48	BFA	0.408188
49	COD	0.406824
50	SVK	0.406565
51	VNM	0.405817
52	AUT	0.404408
53	KOR	0.40423

54	TUR	0.403486
55	IRN	0.403453
56	TLS	0.403013
57	OIC	0.402832
58	MWI	0.401752
59	UN	0.400081
60	BRA	0.399255
61	DNK	0.39911
62	ZMB	0.398746
63	UNDP	0.398532
64	LUX	0.398316
65	GHA	0.397769
66	SRB	0.397354
67	RIO	0.396152
68	IDN	0.395182
69	LVA	0.394634
70	PRK	0.393438
71	GAB	0.393005
72	GUY	0.391665
73	TGO	0.391295
74	GAS	0.389745
75	EGY	0.389592
76	ZWE	0.389117
77	NMB	0.389049
78	TZN	0.389018
79	JPN	0.388662
80	GMB	0.388222
81	BIH	0.386547
82	MERCOSUR	0.386439
83	ESP	0.38605
84	HRV	0.385727
85	BLZ	0.385547
86	AU	0.384127
87	ITA	0.38401
88	CPV	0.382319
89	LKA	0.381918
90	RWA	0.380211
91	LAS	0.380185
92	IAEA	0.380006
93	CZE	0.379994
94	SVN	0.379892
95	GER	0.379349
96	ZAF	0.378246
97	ARE	0.376421
98	NER	0.376258
99	MYS	0.376257

100	ECU	0.374932
101	ARG	0.374694
102	LTU	0.374441
103	JAM	0.373734
104	MEX	0.372246
105	NOR	0.371685
106	NZL	0.370889
107	BEN	0.37087
108	SDN	0.370768
109	SEN	0.370367
110	ISL	0.369664
111	CHL	0.369621
112	PEN	0.369447
113	GTM	0.369206
114	VEN	0.369062
115	RUS	0.368922
116	SWE	0.367547
117	ASEAN	0.367371
118	AGO	0.366285
119	NRD	0.36602
120	GAFS	0.365456
121	QAT	0.364366
122	PHL	0.36415
123	CRI	0.363755
124	NPL	0.36346
125	FJI	0.362842
126	FRA	0.36281
127	USA	0.362781
128	CAF	0.361724
129	LBY	0.361001
130	G5	0.3602
131	GRC	0.358422
132	SYC	0.358196
133	DJI	0.357608
134	COG	0.357532
135	COL	0.35704
136	MRT	0.357006
137	ROU	0.356896
138	GBR	0.356831
139	JOR	0.356596
140	UKR	0.356301
141	TCD	0.356268
142	MUS	0.356118
143	ALG	0.355898
144	CHN	0.355341
145	SSD	0.354995

146	KHM	0.354213
147	TUN	0.353396
148	MLT	0.352435
149	ETH	0.35112
150	NED	0.350402
151	BHR	0.350028
152	LCR	0.347376
153	MAR	0.346914
154	KWT	0.345947
155	SLE	0.345441
156	ALB	0.345337
157	CUB	0.344703
158	KAZ	0.344626
159	IRL	0.344312
160	POL	0.342624
161	BGD	0.342329
162	LBN	0.34005
163	NIC	0.339924
164	SGP	0.339676
165	SLV	0.336844
166	YEM	0.335619
167	MNG	0.33514
168	CMR	0.334577
169	PAN	0.333819
170	IGAD	0.333134
171	SYR	0.331805
172	THA	0.330571
173	SAU	0.33026
174	CIV	0.327937
175	BEL	0.326075
176	INTERPOL	0.322353
177	BOL	0.32008
178	GIN	0.319188
179	URY	0.31862
180	FSM	0.318551
181	BRN	0.315846
182	ICC	0.314412
183	PER	0.312341
184	GNQ	0.310759
185	ECCAS	0.310595
186	ERI	0.310009
187	MDV	0.306873
188	SADC	0.30664
189	ICRC	0.305773
190	AU/UN	0.304704
191	MKD	0.302666

192	NGO	0.301435
193	COM	0.299769
194	WB	0.299494
195	BGR	0.295621
196	LIE	0.292878
197	ISR	0.284803
198	DOM	0.280817
199	PIF	0.280398
200	REL	0.279556
201	PNG	0.279521
202	CHE	0.276304
203	CYP	0.273513
204	LAO	0.268188
205	UNICEF	0.262277
206	BLR	0.255342
207	IMO	0.246279
208	GEO	0.236719
209	BHS	0.23647
210	PRY	0.218752
211	WFP	0.204714
212	WHO	0.185987
213	OSCE	0.185762
214	ARM	0.181647
215	MHL	0.177282
216	FAO	0.108493
217	BTN	0.105895

Figure A1. Average yearly Cosine score for the P5 (CHN, FRA, GBR, RUS, USA)



Robustness test

To test the robustness of these findings, the five regression models (linear, linear matching, multilevel clustered by speaker, multilevel clustered by speaker and multilevel clustered by target) were replicated by including additional control variables that hint at other possible factors of influence. These were not included in the models printed in the article, as they contain an elevated number of missing variables, but they nonetheless confirm the gained results. Because of the properties of the variables, these have only been tested on speakers representing states (not group of states, IOs or NGOs). All data refers to the identify of the speakers, not the conflict being discussed:

- GDP per capita based on data from the World Bank in current US$ (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD). The variable has a variance from 22.85 (Iraq in 1991) to 158,603.60 (Liechtenstein in 2011) with a mean of 16988.55. For normalization, the log value of this variable is used.
- Macro-region of the speaker based on World Bank data: East Asia and Pacific (12.26% of the observations), Europe and Central Asia (31.96%), Latin America and Caribbean (10.60%), Middle East and North Africa (11.32%), North America (5.6%), South Asia (3.47%) and Sub-Saharan Africa (17.7%) (https://datatopics.worldbank.org/world-development-indicators/images/figures-png/world-by-region-map.pdf). Europe and Central Asia is used as the reference category for the regression. For multi-state arrangements with members from more than one macro-region, the outcome was coded based on the belonging of the dominant state (i.e., USA for the Multi-National Force in Iraq) or the majority of members (i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa for the African Union). If this was not possible (i.e., the Non-Alignment Movement), the observation was coded as Global (7.08%).
- Number of personnel peacekeeping contributions including based on United Nations data in the month of December during each year (https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors). For 1999, the latest data available was published in November. Included are troops, civilian police and military observer. The maximum contribution was the one of 11,135 by Pakistan (2008), while there exist also 501 observations without contribution. The mean of this variable is 731.5.
- Nuclear stockpile denotes the estimated number of nuclear warheads in the stockpiles of the nuclear powers. Stockpiles include warheads assigned to military forces, but exclude retired warheads queued for dismantlement. Data was retrieved from Rosner et al. (2023) in OurWorldInData (https://ourworldindata.org/nuclear-weapons). The maximum value amounts to 29,154 (Russia in 1991), while there are 13,071 observations without nuclear stockpiles. The mean is 835.73.
- The voting outcome of the draft resolution, retrieved from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library (https://research.un.org/en/docs/sc/quick/meetings/2020). The variable counts the number of positive votes for the resolution (maximum 15 for all UNSC members). The distribution amounts to the following: 74.81% unanimous votes, 4.28% with 14 positive votes, 2.92% with 13 positive votes, 0.42% with 12 positive votes, 1.26% with 11 positive votes, 0.52% with 10 positive votes, 0.13% with 9 positive votes, 3.28% with 8 positive votes, 0.38% with 7 positive votes, 0.41% with 6 positive votes, 0.16% with 5 positive votes, 0.74% with 4 positive votes, 0.3% with 3 positive votes and 0.43% with 2 positive votes. Resolutions vetoed by a P5 stated were coded with the number 0 (9.95%), while proceedings established without voting have missing values.
- Conflict observation: Binary variable describing whether a speaking nation was experiencing itself a complex humanitarian emergency within its borders during the moment of the speech

(2,961 observations). This information was derived from the sampling criterion contained in Table AI.

AV. Regression analysis with alternative explanations as robustness tests

	Model 1: Base (linear regression)	**Model 2: Linear with matching**	**Model 3: Multilevel (speaker)**	**Model 4: Multilevel (meeting)**	**Model 5: Multilevel (target)**
Penholder	0.006*	0.006*	0.003	0.012***	0.0234***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)
President	-0.002	-0.002	-0.002	0.002	-0.001
	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Date	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.002***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
P5	2.275***	2.294***	3.298***	0.568*	1.364**
	(0.531)	(0.531)	(0.571)	(0.265)	(0.453)
Self-referential	0.002	0.002	0.018*	-0.006*	0.016**
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)
Length	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***	0.000***
	(0.005)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log(GDP per capita)	0.005***	0.005***	0.019***	-0.002**	0.004***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Region: EA/P	0.013***	0.013***	0.014	0.004**	0.012***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.014)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Region: LA/C	-0.010*	-0.010*	0.010	-0.007***	-0.002
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Region: MENA	-0.011*	-0.011**	-0.001	-0.002	0.001
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.013)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Region: NA	0.002	0.002	-0.004	0.002	-0.002
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.032)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Region: SA	0.068***	0.068***	0.085***	0.016***	0.038***
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.019)	(0.004)	(0.006)
Region: SSA	0.007	0.007	0.051***	-0.001	0.014***
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.012)	(0.002)	(0.004)
log(Peacekeepers)	0.001***	0.001***	0.001**	0.000***	0.001***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
log(Nuclear stockpile)	-0.002***	-0.002***	-0.000	-0.001***	-0.002***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.000)

Vote	0.003***	0.003***	0.003***	0.005***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Conflict observation	0.014***	0.014***	0.003	0.003	0.011**
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Date * P5	-0.001***	-0.001***	-0.002***	-0.000*	-0.001**
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Intercept	4.193***	4.182***	4.724***	3.708***	-0.338
	(0.301)	(0.301)	(0.406)	(0.767)	(0.392)
N	*17810*	*17809*	*17810*	*17810*	*17810*
N (multilevel)			*169*	*1473*	*112*
Variance random effect			*0.017*	*0.014*	*0.008*
AIC	*-21309.27*	*-21312.57*	*-21464.43*	*-42517.6*	*-26628.06*
BIC	*-21153.52*	*-21156.82*	*-21300.89*	*-42354.07*	*-26464.52*
R^2 *(adjusted)*	*0.067*	*0.067*			
R^2 *(fixed)*			*0.071*	*0.06*	*0.023*
R^2 *(total)*			*0.157*	*0.788*	*0.403*

Standard error in parentheses. * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$ * $p < 0.001$. EA/P = East Asia and Pacific, LA/C = Latin America and Caribbean, MENA: Middle East and North Africa, NA = North America, SA = South Asia, SSA = Sub-Saharan Africa (Europe and Central Asia used as reference category).