Behind Closed Doors:
Informal Governance and Agenda-Setting in the United Nations Security

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Abstract

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the world body charged with maintaining international peace and security, is probably the most recognized global decision-making body. It is also profoundly misunderstood and undervalued in its efforts to promote peace and security. Council decision-making evolves around issues already on the Council's agenda, often avoiding addressing new or escalating conflicts in the international system, even when they present concrete threats to international peace and security. This project presents the conditions under which the UNSC sets its agenda and when it uses informal governance alone or in conjunction with formal ones to achieve its policy goals. Using a multinomial logit regression model, I find that factors such as agreement among non-permanent member states, information availability, and the urgency to respond to crises paired with states' preferences can shift the Council's work from public to private and from formal to informal settings. In presenting a new understanding of how the UNSC decides which issues end up on the formal agenda, we gain insight into the policies the Council entertains, not just those appearing on its public record.

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Chapter 1

The project investigates the conditions under which states choose one meeting type over another, influencing what ends on the formal agenda. Scholars have attributed formal meetings to the interests of the permanent members, neglecting the influence of non-permanent members and the UN's institutional rules, which do not give veto power to the permanent members for procedural matters. Scholars might have avoided investigating governance as a driving force of agenda setting, as the UN Charter only recognizes formal meetings as Council action, and comprehensive data is not readily available. This chapter takes a new approach to study agenda-setting in the UNSC. First, I reiterate the main assumptions established in chapter **??**. In the second step, I provide a descriptive data analysis. In the third step, I discuss the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables before presenting a multinomial regression model of 5,087 observations. I will conclude the chapter by discussing how the empirical results relate to the previously established theoretical assumptions.

A caveat remains, however. In international relations, it is almost impossible to establish a finite list of issues that should be considered and from which they can pick a matter, as known by the US Supreme Court system. Moreover, the international system is too volatile to have an accurate list of security-related issues the UNSC should tackle at all times. Consequently, the focus here remains on efforts to establish a pattern of what makes it more or less likely that the Council

chooses one setting over another. Despite some limitations, the results provide critical insight into an institution that formally discusses only a few dozen matters each calendar year yet holds about 40% of all its sessions in informal and, most of the time, behind closed doors.

In January 2023, the United Nations Security Council passed three legally binding resolutions: one on the peace process in Colombia (S/RES.2673), one on humanitarian assistance in Syria under cover of "The Situation in the Middle East" (S/RES.2672), and one on the settlement dispute in Cyprus (S/RES.2674). The effectiveness of the UNSC is often evaluated based on the number of binding resolutions it produces. Still, the process by which Council members arrive at the horseshoe table and cast their votes is rarely examined in the literature.

The United Nations Security Council is a complex decision-making institution comprising fifteen members from its five world regions. Despite their regional affiliation, member states may have interests that do not necessarily align with the interests of their region or other countries on the Council. This is not a novel assumption. Countries are known to have unique geopolitical and economic interests, which they seek to protect and promote.[1]

It is also true that the permanent five hold significant influence and power in driving the Council's agenda due to the anticipated veto at the substantive decision-making stage. However, the P5 do not have a veto at the procedural agenda-setting stage. In other words, even if a permanent member state does not want to entertain an issue at the horseshoe table, vetoes do not apply. Consequently, it would be a mistake to reduce the importance of UNSC agenda-setting to the power of its permanent members.

The agenda-setting process of the United Nations Security Council is crucial as it determines which issues are formally discussed and potentially resolved by the Council. In doing so, the process acts as a gatekeeping mechanism, as issues not on the agenda cannot be formally addressed or decided upon by the Council. Per its rules and procedures, nine affirmative votes are needed for an issue to be added

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[1] **empty citation**.

to the formal agenda. To receive informal consideration, no such hurdle exists, and states are free to discuss issues even when they do not receive majority support. This means that the rotating member states can use procedural maneuvers to influence the Council's agenda in favor of their interests and goals. And while the matter does not make it to the formal agenda, informal considerations can shape international policies and affect outcomes in ways previously ignored in the literature. Suppose we want to understand the UNSC's global reach and influence. In that case, we must move away from a zero-sum assumption of binding resolutions and take a comprehensive look at issues the Council discusses in formal and informal sessions. As a result, this project argues that the overall composition of the Council and the level of interest homogeneity among them is critical at the agenda-setting stage of the policymaking process due to the power of numbers rather than vetoes.

Proposition 1 (P1): We can expect that for years in which Council members' overall preferences are closer aligned (homogeneity $\geq$ 60%), formal issue consideration is more likely. When Council members' preferences diverge (homogeneity $\leq$ 60%), the Council is expected to remain informal and only add the matter to the formal agenda should preferences sufficiently realign.

Member states are conscientious about formal agenda space and meeting time scarcity and are unlikely to 'waste their time' in formal sessions when information is unavailable, restricted, or uncertain. International peace and security issues are constantly evolving; new conflicts occur, old ones re-ignite, and current ones change.

States have little interest in presenting a situation to the rest of the world, not knowing what it entails. In particular, we can assume that countries are risk-averse and avoid formal Council meetings without a good sense of the situation and knowing what they would get into should they open pandora's box. In the worst case, the issue gets discussed in a formal meeting, is pushed toward a draft resolution vote, and states have to take a stance on the issue - on record.

Informal issue consideration allows member states to gather and exchange infor-

mation and, if needed, do so behind closed doors, without formal records. Should uncertainty over the situation decline, the Council will reappear in the public eye and add the matter to the formal agenda. For example, hours after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Council met in ICW to hear from the USA when uncertainty over the state of the world was high, and it was not clear how the Council should proceed. Once the direction was clear, the Council quickly emerged in a formal public session. It adopted a resolution that allowed the US all means necessary in the name of the country's self-defense.

Proposition 2 (P2): When information is available, and uncertainty over what can and will be decided is low, the Council is more likely to gather in formal sessions, often sharing the information they hold with the world. Should they, however, lack information and uncertainty over outcomes is high, they are more likely to meet informally.

Because states are uncertain about the consequences of formal issue consideration does not mean they wish to disregard the matter and not discuss it. Instead, the Council has tools available to address a particular matter without being too specific: umbrella items and region-focused issues (both terms will be described in more detail shortly). For now, the focus rests on the assumptions we can make about the Council's decisions to entertain issues without identifying specific actors or countries. In line with the logic of P2, states have to navigate a system of uncertainty mixed with states' interests, outside pressure, and institutional limitations. Therefore, it is easier for the Council to address matters broadly in formal sessions to reduce the pressure for actor-specific solutions while gaining sufficient support. Instead, the Council entertains matters through umbrella-items and region-specific agenda items, killing two birds with one stone. First, discussing the issue formally creates broader support and awareness while keeping geopolitics confined, especially in public. Second, nothing permits Council members to address a particular situation or incident when in formal session. For example, should the agenda item be *Civilians in Armed Conflict*, member states can still discuss the treatment of Ukrainian civilians by the Russian military. However, most states are unlikely to

vote in favor of a country-specific agenda item *Russia's Violations of Humanitarian Law* to the formal agenda, where states and invited speakers publicly and on record shame a particular actor. On the other side, some issues are, by definition, a matter of wider international concern, like the threat of rising sea levels, for which we can expect little resistance to formal issue consideration. Conversely, informal issue consideration becomes more likely should a topic be country-specific and accompanied by rising geopolitical tensions. Informal and private meetings are the best setting for dealing with country-specific issues.

Proposition 3 (P3): Formal issue consideration is more likely to occur for umbrella-items and region-specific topics. Informal issue consideration is more likely for country-specific considerations, especially private ones.

We consider seeing the Council at the horseshoe table a sign of effective governance. If nothing else, informing the international community of dangers to the maintenance and security of pace is a core function of the UNSC, and preventing (or at least easing) human suffering lies at the core of the UN's missions. The world looks to the UNSC for guidance and actions when violence against civilians and devastation occurs. However, previous research has also shown that the Council does not act every time it should, at least not formally. The Council has historically been slow to respond to crises like the genocides in Rwanda or Darfur or escalating violence in the Middle East.[3]

The organization's ever-existing weakness is failing to adopt resolutions in unity, cooperating when a crisis hits, and putting national interests aside. A common criticism of the UNSC's ability to maintain peace and security has been linked to the national interests of Council members, particularly the permanent five. If they do not wish to discuss a matter, such discussion will not occur and the crisis will go unaddressed. As a result, the urgency of crises alone does not lead to formal issue consideration. Suppose a situation is indeed urgent and requires a swift response, but is also in the interest of Council members. In that case, we expect formal meetings to occur, often seeing states pushing for formal statements and resolutions.

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[3]**empty citation**.

And even when matters are not urgent but in the states' best interest, formal meetings are expected to occur. After all, countries serve on the Council to advance their interests, whether they are tied to an urgent situation. Both scenarios are rarely disputed and widely accepted.[4]

But existing literature has often brushed off situations in which urgency is high but state interests do not align and formal agenda space is unlikely. This does not, however, automatically mean that the issue does not receive any consideration. What has often been ignored is the possibility that the Council entertains an urgent matter informally, thereby considering it without anchoring it on the formal agenda. In keeping an issue in informal settings, Council members are freer to engage with the issue, engage with the affected parties and/or perpetrators, and think through potential policies without public interference and pressure to produce draft resolutions and votes. Such informal deliberations are assumed to send a signal to the involved actors and ease tensions and suffering, but without involving the broader international community.

Proposition 4 (P4): The Council indeed understands its responsibility and the need to investigate political developments as they could further escalate and, down the road, affect their own interests. In keeping such discussions informal, however, the pressure to navigate states' interests and end up in stalemate while in the limelight are limited. Should urgency and state preferences be high, formal consideration is to occur. Informal consideration becomes more likely if urgency is high, but states' interests are low.

1.1 Descriptive Analysis

The staggered introduction of meeting formats throughout the 1990s and 2000s and the limited access to reliable and reproducible data complicate a long-term comparison of governance settings. While the information on most, but not all, meeting types existed before 2008, the numbers are incomplete, and any comparison, as a

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[4]**empty citation**.

Figure 1.1: Meeting types over time

result, would be tainted (see figure 1.1). As a result, the study's scope has been reduced to meetings since 2008, when formal and informal meetings have been recorded reliably. For the 2008-2020 period, the Security Council met 5,053 times, of which 3,345 (66.2%) sessions were formal and 1,708 (33.8%) informal, respectively. The following section first presents a coherent and descriptive framework of the UNSC's governance mechanisms states use before I proceed with operationalizing the variables used to test the previously established hypotheses through a multinomial logit model. Since no comprehensive list exists, the information was collected through primary and secondary sources.

Governance Settings

A first look at the data identifies formal-public meetings and ICWs, which are informal and private, as the dominant meeting types. In contrast, formal-private meetings have consistently been rare until 2019 and are mostly used for meetings with troop-contributing countries (TCC). In 2020, the Council broke its pattern and significantly increased the number of formal private meetings. The assumption here is that this is in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent move to virtual Council sessions when the United Nations closed its physical doors to the world.[5] The discrepancy between the low number of formal private meetings and

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[5]Research on how the UNSC has adjusted to online meeting formats during the COVID-19 pandemic is outside the scope of this study.

the high number of ICW is worth mentioning. Formal private and ICWs provide similar meeting frameworks: holding private meetings away from the horseshoe table in a closed circle without public statements or document release. However, despite structural similarities, private meetings are formally anchored on the agenda and the Summary Statement, while ICWs do not lead to formal UNSC space. Arria-formula meetings and IIDs have slightly increased over time but remain overall low. For the purpose of this study, they have been combined into one category, which will be further discussed in subsection 1.2.

The issues the UNSC discusses can be classified as country-focused, regional-specific, and problem-specific. Agenda items are considered country-focused when they can be unequivocally attributed to a single state. For example, meetings like *The Situation in Libya* or *The Israel/Palestine conflict* appear as such on the working program and the Summary Statement. A significant share of the UNSC's work occurs on such country-specific matters (61.5%). A comprehensive list of countries discussed can be found in Appendix **??**. The Council also deliberates on regional matters like *The Central African Region* and *The Situation in the Middle East*. Such matters are vague, allowing the Council to include (or exclude) some countries from the discussion but not others. For example, adding *Syria* as an agenda item restraints what can be discussed. If the situation in the Middle East is on the table, Syria can but does not have to be included in the discussion.

Problem-specific situations like *Children in Armed Conflict* or *Nuclear Non-proliferation* are so-called *Umbrella items*, a term that UN officials use, even if not officially, for matters of general description.[6] In using generic agenda item terminology, the Council is free to discuss a problem without attributing the matter to a single country or actor but concentrate on the problem that needs solving.

Of all ICWs recorded, about 79% take place on country-specific agenda compared to 51% in formal-public items. UN government officials have confirmed a pattern of letting informal consultations follow formal public briefings. This, however, is no hard and set rule and can be adjusted, which the Council has done for

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[6]Interviews May 19

Category	Arria-IID	ICW	Form.-private	Form.-public	Total
Country-focused	105	1,189	221	1,577	3,092
	(3.40%)	(38.45%)	(7.15%)	(51.00%)	100%
Umbrella-item	88	124	59	850	1,121
	(7.85%)	(11.06%)	(5.26%)	(75.83%)	(100%)
Region-specific	4	177	24	607	812
	(0.49%)	(21.80%)	(2.96%)	(74.75%)	(100%)
Total	197	1,490	304	3,034	5,025
	(3.92%)	(29.65%)	(6.05%)	(60.38%)	(100%)

Table 1.1: Categorization of agenda items

Lebanon and Cyprus, which almost exclusively meet behind closed doors.[7] In contrast, a minimal share of country-specific meetings takes place in Arria/IIDs (3%). Umbrella items make up the second largest issue category, most often discussed when in the Arria-IID governance setting (44%) and least likely when in ICW (8%). Regional matters, as the smallest category of issue items, are by far most often discussed in formal-public settings (74%), followed by ICW (21%), formal-private (2%), and Arria-IID (0.04%), see Table **??**.

Country-specific Governance

Not all countries (and regions) experience the same level of conflict – and not all countries (and regions) receive the same amount of attention from the Council – or in the same settings. A total of 52 countries have been considered during the time frame of this study. A full list of countries considered in the governance setting in which they take place can be found in Appendix **??**. The graphic presentations in Figures 1.2 and 1.3 of all meeting categories reveal several important findings. For example, no country received more meetings than Sudan, with 460 formal and informal meetings. 271 times did such meetings take place in a formal-public setting. Syria, riddled with civil war and mass atrocities for over a decade, received 314 considerations, with 244 held behind closed doors in ICW and another 20 in formal privacy. On the flip side, it also received the highest number of considerations in the highly public and open-format Arria-IID (25). As a result, Syria has

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[7]Interview 05.13.2019

been discussed 91% of the time behind closed doors and 85% of the time through informal settings. Yemen experienced a similar faith. Almost 80% of the mere 84 discussions occurred in ICW (66 meetings), and only seven times did the Council meet in formal-private and formal-public sessions. These numbers contradict what UN subsidiary bodies and programs call the war in Yemen "the world's worst humanitarian crisis."[8] And finally, the hope that the Council targets the most urgent conflicts to maintain peace and security questions the very low number of meetings on the situation in Myanmar. Only in 25 meetings did the Council devote its time to the alarming numbers of refugees and reports of violence and claims of ethnic cleansing in a conflict that has steadily intensified for the past four years.

Some countries[9] have been discussed exclusively in formal-public meetings. Others have not even once been added to the formal agenda. For example, Belarus, Egypt, India, Israel, Palestine, and Sri Lanka received a formal meeting, neither privately nor publicly, and are therefore absent from the formal agenda.

Figure 1.2: Formal-public and formal-private meeting count

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[8] **https://www.unrefugees.org/news/yemen-crisis-explained/**.

[9] Guinea-Bissau (59), Bosnia and Herzegovina (36), Kosovo (29), Rwanda (21), Chad (20), Nepal (18), Eritrea (5), Brazil (1), Pakistan (1), Republic of Korea (1), Sahel (1), Senegal (1).

Figure 1.3: Arria-IID and ICW meeting count

We could argue that there was no need to take up valuable agenda space for some of these issues and that considerations in informal settings suffice for others. We could also argue that a well-functioning Council should not give every country equal attention since situations evolve, worsen, improve, or sometimes do not change. Therefore, it only makes sense that patterns vary. While all this is true, we can only speculate what drives the Council to discuss the situation in Syria almost entirely in ICW, Sudan over 70% of the time in formal-public sessions. The comprehensive statistical analysis below will address this in more detail and establish cause and correlation for the country-centric patterns we observe.

Issue-specific Governance Settings

The UNSC entertains matters that do not neatly align with individual countries or regions. These umbrella items range from concerns over protecting civilians in conflict to terrorism, non-proliferation, and illicit arms trade. For easier presentation, meetings are placed into 20 overarching categories. Of these umbrella issues, some have been in the sphere of the Security Council for decades, while others have been added in recent years. For example, discussions on sanction regimes, working groups, and peace-building are a landmark on the agenda, while the COVID-19 pandemic became a new addition to the list in 2020. Each informal and formal meeting type will be discussed separately for easier representation.

The Council uses Arria-IID meetings most often for 'soft' issues like the protection of civilians, which includes all matters related to non-combatants like women, children, religious minorities, LGBTQ+, and journalists. Next in line are broad geopolitical issues like terrorism, piracy, cyber-, and hybrid wars, followed by discussions on protecting peace-building efforts and human rights. Even matters not traditionally in the purview of the Council's work, like food and water crises and the environment, are discussed in Arria-formula and/or IIDs. These discussions occur publicly, with input and support from non-government organizations and experts, and are accessible to the broader community via media stream.

Thematic ICWs, on the other side, are most often used to facilitate private expert

(a) Arria-IID   (b) ICW

Figure 1.4: Informal meetings - thematic

briefings from the International Court of Justice (ICJ), UN subsidiary bodies, and organizations like the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Here, actors can relate information that might be general yet sensitive to current global affairs due to the high degree of privacy in this setting. The Council also utilizes ICWs to discuss maintaining peace and security, terrorism threats, and mission-specific information.

The Council does not shy away from discussing thematic issues in formal sessions. As the flagship body responsible for protecting global peace, it spends most of its thematic meetings discussing maintaining peace and security on the world stage. Addressing international challenges publicly can signal to the international community that the Council fulfills its duty and works on maintaining peace. The Council has consistently avoided calling formal private meetings on umbrella items. It has done so only in 6% of all thematic discussions, with mission-related meetings, expert briefings, and discussions on reforming the UNSC working methods being the only noteworthy exceptions, see Figure 1.5.

Region-specific Governance

By far, the UNSC pays most regional attention to issues in Asia and Africa and does so 72% of its time in formal-public sessions (see Table 1.2). Many regional matters affect countries not currently serving on the Council, being involved in

(a) Formal-public   (b) Formal-private

Figure 1.5: Formal meetings - thematic

territorial disputes. The situation in the Middle East surpasses any other regional conflict, with 55% of all meetings and about 83% of them in formal public settings. The conflict in Sudan and South Sudan lags with 23% meetings overall and 62% in formal public sessions. These numbers confirm an earlier established pattern; broader issues are more likely to see formal public consideration as they can signal issue consideration for dire situations without singling out member states. Arria-IID meetings are generally not used for regional matters; only 14 - or about 1% - of regional matters receive informal public consideration. The assumption here is that the format and purpose of such meetings are unappealing for states when they try to find solutions to geopolitical crises. Formal private meetings are equally avoided for such discussions, only discussing regional matters a total of 26 times, or 2% of all regional meetings, respectively.

llllllll Regional Groups (UN)	Arria-IID	ICW	Form.-Private	Form.-Public
African	13	145	21	307
Asia & the Pacific	–	122	7	512
Eastern European	–	–	–	3
West. Europe & Other	1	–	–	–
Total	14	267	28	822

Table 1.2: Regional matters discussed

Summary

The descriptive statistics provide a first glimpse at the basic characteristics of formal and informal UNSC agenda items and the governance settings in which they are discussed. This provides new insight into the working mechanisms of the UNSC. Until now, the UNSC has been evaluated by the resolutions it adopts (or fails to adopt) and the Council's appearance in public. We can already see that distinct patterns appear in the data. While condensed and somewhat simplified, the presentation of the data provides a solid starting point for the advanced statistical analysis which follows next. Before digging deeper into what drives the Council to pursue issues in one setting and not another, several findings are worth recapturing.

First, the Council discusses country-focused issues far more than anything else, 61.5% of the time to be precise. Meetings on umbrella items (22%) and region-specific issues (16.5%) comprise a significantly smaller share of the institutional agenda. In a global system where states still value and protect their sovereignty, and geopolitical tensions remain high, it is remarkable that the Council manages to discuss critical matters of international peace in connection with individual countries and not hide behind the disguise of regional matters or umbrella matters. Digging deeper, the data reveal that the Council discusses different countries in different settings without being tied to conflicts most deserving of attention. Some countries are purely discussed formally or informally, respectively. In doing so, the official UNSC agenda does not accurately reflect the matters the Council considers.

Second, umbrella items are all broad in reach yet often tied to a particular governance setting. For example, the data has shown that the protection of civilians is mainly discussed in public, formally and informally. Expert briefings, on the other side, take place behind closed doors in either formal-private meetings or ICW. Formal-public meetings, the poster child of the UNSC, often discuss matters at the core of the body's mission: Maintenance of peace and security, discussions on threats to said peace, and other fairly traditional matters of international affairs like international law, non-proliferation, and warfare related discussions.

And finally, region-specific meetings are also unevenly distributed, which should

be expected. Some regions of the world face more conflict than others. However, while conflict lures in Eastern Europe, it only got attention in three meetings for the 12 years of the study. However, Asia and the Pacific region far outnumbered any other region, with almost 80% taking place in formal-public sessions with a total of 641 compared to the African region (486), which has remained the hotspot of intra- and interstate conflict throughout the decades. An explanation here might be that instead of discussing regional matters, the Council went right to the core of the conflict and discussed particular countries on the African continent. The following analysis aims to shed light on the assumptions established here.

1.2   Data and Operationalization

DEPENDENT VARIABLE:

The dependent variable, *Governance Choice*, is a newly constructed categorical variable of formal and informal governance settings available to the UNSC. So far, only a limited number of studies on UNSC agenda-setting look at the role of meeting types. Most of the time, they only include the two meeting settings identified in the organization's Rules and Procedures: formal-private and formal-public.[10] Information on the Council's formal meetings is available through the UNSC's Monthly Working Programme published in the UN *Journal* and includes details on the day, session type (adoption, debate, briefing), and the subject title for each formal meeting from 2011 onward.

The literature has identified three informal governance settings, which the UNSC uses, in addition to the formal ones, to discuss the world's crises: *Informal Consultations of the Whole (ICW), Arria-formula meetings* and *Informal Interactive Dialogue (IID)*.[11] Since 1993, ICW have been included in the UN's formal reporting mechanism after growing concerns about the Council's lack of transparency and isolation from the rest of the UN community.[12] Information on Arria-formula

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[10]The unique characteristics have been previously discussed in chapter **??**.

[11]**SieversBailey**.

[12]**SieversBailey**.

meetings and IID comes from the Security Council Report. This independent and impartial organization provides information on the Council's work to increase transparency about its workings and decisions.[13] Both sources have been combined to create a comprehensive list of UNSC meetings between 2008 and 2020, leading to a data set with 5,053 observations.

In the second step, Arria-formula and Informal Interactive Dialogue are merged into one category since they are very similar in meeting characteristics. A Wald test for combining alternatives has been performed, confirming that these two groups are statistically indistinguishable, with a p-value of 0.489. As a result, member states choose between four distinct settings through which they govern (see table **??**).

	formal	*informal*
public	formal-public	Arria-formula & IID (Arria-IID)
private	formal-private	Informal Consultation of the Whole (ICW)

Table 1.3: UNSC Meeting Types

As presented here, conceptualizing governance settings provides several advantages. First, the structure of the dependent variable is, in part, driven by data availability. Some elements of Council interactions are too informal (e.g., corridor or water cooler talks) to be accurately measured. They are therefore excluded. I argue, however, that such exclusion does not take away from the findings since the study focuses on how states use structured interactions to set the agenda or prevent issues from being considered. And second, scholars like Owens[14] and Perry[15] have repeatedly shown that what is not on the agenda cannot be discussed and that adding items to the agenda is a strategic process. Representatives chatting in the hallways of the United Nations might help them exchange their views or information. However, such exchange lacks the structural component necessary when setting the agenda of international organizations.

The data selection choices come with some limitations, however. Not all meet-

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[13]**https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/**.

[14]**Owens2008**.

[15]**Perry2009**.

ing types have been introduced simultaneously, but they have been created over time, which could create some path dependency of settings in which specific issues are discussed. Further, due to the privacy setting of formal-private and ICW, information on what states discuss during meetings is not easily accessible. However, while this study has to do without meeting transcripts or video recordings, the Security Council Report, and representatives present in such meetings, often share information once the meeting has convened. Using secondary literature where primary documents are unavailable presents a, even if not perfect, alternative.

Despite its data limitations, the conceptualization of using meeting types as a proxy for formal and informal governance presents a novel opportunity to examine an equally large and significant share of states' institutional interactions that have previously been ignored. In doing so, the analysis goes beyond power differentials enshrined in Security Council. Instead, it acknowledges that non-permanent member states, in conjunction with permanent members, can influence which issues make it to the horseshoe table and those that remain behind closed doors.

<div align="center">KEY INDEPENDENT VARIABLES:</div>

The empirical analysis relies on several key independent variables: homogeneity, time until consideration, urgency, and state preferences. The operationalization and expected outcomes will be discussed for each variable below and will are summarized in table 1.4.

Homogeneity:

The first key independent variable, *Homogeneity*, operationalizes the degree of policy agreement among UNSC member states per year. The homogeneity score reflects, in the aggregate, how UNSC member states' preferences align, no matter if this means voting in favor, against, or abstaining. Due to the ever-changing membership constellation of the UNSC, it is not possible to derive a solid measurement of preference homogeneity from past voting results in the Security Council. Some countries serve for the first time on the UNSC and are therefore not providing a useful reference point. Instead, the raw data come from Eric Voeten's United Nations General Assembly Voting Data (Version 29), which is available for all years

between 2008 and 2019. Data for 2020 was not yet available at the time of the analysis and is therefore coded as missing.

After calculating the agreement among each member state's pairs, a homogeneity score for the overall Council was calculated. Scores are presented as percentages, with 0 indicating no agreement (full preference heterogeneity) and '1' indicating unanimity (full preference homogeneity). I assume the preference score to be consistent throughout the year (before and after voting), as states' preferences are generally considered stable.[16] Critics might argue that due to the power asymmetries in the Council between permanent members and NPMs, the preferences of those leaving after two years matter little.[17] Therefore, I also calculated individual scores for agreement amongst the E10 (*Homogeneity_E10*) only and amongst the P5 (*Homogeneity_P5*), respectively.

The data come with some drawbacks. For example, scores only vary between the years but are otherwise fixed. The score does also not reveal if homogeneity or heterogeneity, respectively, follows from agreeing, disagreeing, or abstaining from issue consideration. When setting the agenda, it is of less interest what the desired policy outcome will be. What matters for states at that stage is the uncertainty that results from a heterogeneous Council. There is also truth to the argument that powerful states' preferences outweigh the interests of weaker states. However, this equally applies to the substantive stage of the policy process, where legally binding decisions are made in the case of the UNSC. Since the permanent five have no veto power at the procedural agenda-setting stage, the motto 'one state, one vote' applies. I acknowledge that even for decisions based on equal voting rights, some states exert influence through pressure, vote buying, or allegiance.[18] For this project, states' preferences are seen as given. For the sake of this study, it does not matter how these preferences came about. It only matters what they are. Scholars have also argued that since countries are representatives of their regions and undergo an expensive election campaign (and might wish to be reelected), they are beholden to

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[16]**CITE**.

[17]**CITE**.

[18]**CITE**.

their regions, and preferences and concerns within regions vary little.[19] However, I have found no evidence that this is true for states serving on the UNSC.

The heatmap (Figure **??**) produced from Voeten's raw data, confirms that there is observable variation in homogeneity levels across years and within regions. Therefore, I argue that the way the homogeneity score is operationalized provides a decent measure of agreement amongst Council members, given the restrictions of Council membership. First, using UNGA voting data as a proxy for states' foreign policy positions is commonly used in the literature.[20] Second, UN General Assembly data provides information on all states in the UNSC, mitigating the fact that some states might serve on the UNSC for the first time, and we need a proxy from their voting behavior in other settings to infer preferences. Second, while it would be preferable to have voting data specifically on UNSC matters, the UNGA discusses a wide range of issues, most of which cover matters also discussed in the UNSC. For example, the body discusses global counter-terrorism strategies, Russia's war in Ukraine, and disarmament and has often created specific committees to work on these issues. And while the specific content varies, we can safely assume that states hold similar preferences across subsidiary UN decision-making bodies.

The homogeneity score is then used to test hypothesis 1 (H1). This study assumes that the overall homogeneity among Council members drives their governance choice, all else equal. Therefore, we should expect states to meet in informal settings for homogeneity scores close to zero and see the Council move to or remain in formal session for scores closer to 1.

Time Until Consideration:

The *Time* variable operationalizes the assumption that formal issue consideration is a function of time that passes between the origin of an event and the time that passes until the Council discusses it through the institutional setting of the Security Council, formally or informally.

Interviews with UN representatives confirmed that states are hesitant to enter a

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[19]**CITE**.
[20]**CITE**.

meeting without knowledge about the agenda item, at least to a certain degree. Appearing at the horseshoe table without a basic understanding of what should and will be discussed is very unlikely.[21] For example, right after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Council met in informal consultations *before* they appeared in formal session to vote on the US-introduced resolution. In other words, before states appear publicly, they seek information first to lower some uncertainty about the issue under consideration.[22] We can assume that states have a general understanding of the matters that land on their tables. Even for non-permanent member states, the UN introduced new measures that allows upcoming Council members to observe, without voting rights, the Council's work in the six months prior to their membership. In doing so, some of the information gaps are expected to be lower.[23]

The more time passes between an event and its consideration, the more time and opportunities Council members have to gather information. The *time* variable addresses this assumption. For example, the months between an event and its consideration should be short for informal considerations and longer for formal ones. Informally discussing a matter can then be used to either facilitate the information gathering or pre-select which issues should be addressed later and discussed formally now that the Council members have more information available. MORE

The underlying data comes from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).[24] The database records global state-based, non-state, and one-sided conflicts and provides data for all years between 2008 and 2020. The data records each event separately, listing the date each event started and ended - if that is the case. While active in 2008, some conflicts started earlier and are also included.

To obtain a measure that reflects the time between an event and the time something gets considered by the Council, I had to construct a new variable that builds on the date and country information from UCDP's raw dataset. First, I collapsed events to a monthly level. It is generally unlikely that the UNSC picks up an agenda item in response to a single event. Exceptions to that rule exist if the situation is

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[21]**Interview notes**.

[22]**empty citation**.

[23]**CITE**.

[24]**UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset Version 21.1.**.

extreme enough, as in the case of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. In general, however, the assumption is that a monthly indicator of events is sufficient to measure time in the context of this study. Second, I used the monthly entries and looped them into the records on governance settings. In doing so, I created a new measure of discrete data that counted the months between events and Council consideration.

In addition to the *Time* variable, I included its second-order and third-order polynomials, *Time2* and *Time3* as independent variables in the model. I do so to capture a potential complex nonlinear relationship of time until consideration. In other words, there might be a situation where formal issue consideration is more likely, the more time has passed between the event's first occurrence and the meeting. It is also possible, however, that at a certain point, the relationship reverses and informal meetings become more likely - almost as if the Council 'misses' the window to discuss the matter formally.

The variable, as constructed here, comes with some drawbacks. First, it is generally hard to pin down when an international event starts and ends. Does a war start with the first shot fired or earlier? Does it end when the last shot is fired or when the peace agreement is signed? Recording the exact date when violent events occur is more of an exercise of best estimates, which I argue is not ideal yet sufficient. Second, in collapsing the variable to a monthly level, some information attached to individual incidences gets lost, like information on parties involved and the type of events (terrorist attacks, a government crackdown, etc.). While this is unfortunate and could lead to further analysis of who is involved, it is less important at the agenda-setting stage. For example, should violent events occur in Afghanistan, it is of lesser importance who exactly ignited the incident. For the Security Council, it should not matter if the government attacked its people or if the people attacked the government. In both cases, it warrants the attention of the Council.

Second, while the UCDP data is incredibly detailed, it only reports events that fit into the categories of violent events. Incidences like natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes or floods) or political events like national elections are not included. Here, the same rationale applies. Should a national election lead to turmoil, we can expect that this is caught as a violent event and is, as such, reflected in the data. If my hy-

pothesis is correct, we should expect, all else equal, less time between an incidence and informal consideration and more time between an incidence and formal issue consideration.

Topics:

There is no template for how an international organization's agenda should look or how the issues should be titled. In the case of the United States Supreme Court, for example, the discussion list lists all cases the chief justice believes to have merit.[25] Decision-making bodies within the European Union (EU) base their work on a strategic agenda, which lists a handful of key issue areas they wish to discuss the following year(s).[26] For the UNSC, the agenda is the list of items the Council seizes and considers. The individual agenda items are a list of identified problems, broad or narrowly defined.[27] UNSC agenda items fall into one of three categories: country-specific, issue-specific, or regional-specific (see chapter **??**).

How the Council classifies an agenda item is tied to the degree of available information and its level of uncertainty. Such uncertainty is generally hard to measure. For the UNSC, the assumption is that the Council is less likely to entertain matters with a narrowly defined framework. Countries might feel uneasy about what would be discussed and the extent to which such agenda issues could serve as precedence for similar cases. Within the diplomatic setting of the UN, it is not uncommon to avoid targeting countries as an agenda item and instead use a broader approach to the problem.[28]

I operationalize this assumption using two indicator variables: *Umbrella item* and *region-specific*. The baseline assumption here is that the UNSC discusses issues related to country-specific crises. Threats to international security are situation specific and should be attributed to a particular country. Should the agenda item be an *Umbrella item* instead, it is coded as 1 and 0 otherwise. The same is applied to *region-specific* agenda items, which are coded as '1' if the matter falls in this

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[25]Caldeira and Wright, 1990, p. 810.
[26]**https://european-union.europa.eu/**.
[27]**See Light**; **1982:3**.
[28]**interview051919**.

category and 0 otherwise. Both indicator variables reflect discussions on broader issues without targeting individual actors or countries.

Classifying agenda items this way is a new approach. Existing scholarship predominantly looks at UNSC resolutions and not at what it discusses if no concrete outcome is produced. If we want to understand the fundamental elements of UNSC workings, we have to take a closer look at the topics it considers *and* the setting in which they do. There are several advantages to operationalizing the lack of information and resulting uncertainty in this way. First, umbrella items are a UNSC internally recognized group of agenda items.[29]. Ignoring such practical implementation would weaken our conclusions from the assumptions tested here. Second, classifying agenda items into three broad categories allows me to investigate the effects of *what* the Council discusses on *how* it discusses it. The caveat, however, is exactly the broad classification of discussed issues. A more fine-grained measure could provide insight into a sub-level driver for meeting choice. The problem that arises from a detailed classification is that it is not always clear what the sub-level discussions are. To gather this information, one might need to code each formal and informal meeting in that respect. Since two meeting types, formal-private and ICW, do not provide information beyond the title and, at times, a press release or member statement, the approach is unfeasible at best. Therefore, I argue that a simpler categorization suffices and still provides information about the governance setting in which states are comfortable discussing the topic.

As a result, we should expect formal issue consideration for umbrella and regional issues, all else equal. Country-specific considerations are more likely to take place in informal governance settings as they keep the matter off the formal agenda, thereby reducing uncertainty over unwanted binding outcomes.

Urgency

The ultimate threat to peace and security is the loss of human lives. I use the number of monthly deaths, military and civilian, recorded per country to operationalize the urgency of a situation. The UNSC's ultimate mission is to maintain international

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[29]**interview**.

peace and security. A higher number of deaths indicate higher levels of instability, violence, and human suffering, making it pivotal for the Council to address the situation and prevent further escalation. Data are retrieved from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (see *Time* variable). Deaths are recorded as a continuous count of best-estimated fatalities for each violent incident reported between 2008 and 2020, which collapsed to a monthly count. The rationale to register not only civilian casualties but also include military ones is two-fold. First, military deaths can indicate the systematic involvement of the government, reflecting political instability. And second, despite UCDP's detailed accounts, it is hard to distinguish military from civilian casualties. To avoid inconsistencies, both are included in one measure.

Measuring recorded deaths as a function of urgency causes some weaknesses worth mentioning. Not every violent event that causes casualties can be recorded, no matter how careful the approach is, which means that some conflicts fall off the plate and are not included in the data. And even if this could be achieved, and every single violent crisis is included, the measure collapses the number of deaths to a monthly number. In the process, we lose qualitative information, like who the actors are or their goals and means. In addition, casualties are not the sole driver of urgency. For example, UNHCR reports that the humanitarian crisis in Yemen is one of the worst disasters the world has seen, affecting the lives of over 20 million people, with several million forced to flee their homes and the majority facing severe threats of famine.[30] In limiting urgency to deaths only, other aspects of urgency are neglected even as they could drive the Council's decision to entertain the matter. Considering these limitations, the variable serves as a proxy for issues the UNSC should entertain and not as an absolute measure of what defines a critical situation. However, due to data availability and potential measurement inconsistencies, UCDP provides a robust resource for this project.

The Council has repeatedly been criticized for its slow or nonexistent response to prevent the escalation of violence - or at least intervene and mitigate it. Practically, the Council cannot attend to every conflict the moment a few deaths are

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[30]**https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/yemen/**.

recorded. I expect a threshold of lives lost before the situation turns urgent enough for the Council to formally engage with the matter. All else equal, we should observe that higher numbers of recorded deaths increase the likelihood that the Council will entertain the matter formally (hypothesis 4). In contrast, less urgent matters are more likely to be discussed in informal settings.

To address the criticism about what makes a situation urgent, I introduce *Events* as an alternative measure for urgency. Also extracted from the UCDP data set, *Events* is a discrete count of individual violent events between 2008 and 2020, also collapsed to a monthly count. In contrast to the number of deaths, *Events* are recorded even if no fatalities are reported. For example, terrorist attacks or violent government crackdowns can increase instability and turmoil even when no fatalities are corded. Similar to the prediction about casualties, we should expect the Council to meet in a formal session in response to larger counts of events. For a lower number of events, we should expect the Council to remain informally and monitor the situation before they move the issue to the formal agenda.

State Preferences:

At times, urgency is not enough to move the needle toward formal issue consideration. In a decision-making body composed of countries that serve their own interests first, we should expect that at least one member state has the preference to discuss the matter and initiate the agenda consideration process. This assumption differs from the *Homogeneity* claims established above. We can expect the Council to be more likely to push for issue consideration, all else equal, if at least one member is currently involved in a dispute with a potential agenda 'item.' In other words, country A is more likely to push for issue consideration on country B if they are currently involved in a broadly defined dispute that affects at least some aspects of international peace and security.

For the study, we can be less concerned about what states want to include or exclude in a resolution once they get to the drafting stage. Instead, states hold individual preferences on issue consideration, even if a binding outcome is unlikely due to anticipated vetoes or expected stalemate. For example, should country A

already be engaged in a dispute with country B, we should expect that country A is interested in moving the matter to the agenda even if a binding policy decision is unlikely. States are nonetheless interested in formally anchoring an issue on the Council's agenda, signaling that it is now a matter seized and considered on the world stage.

I operationalize the assumption that preferences ignite issue consideration through a measure of active sanction regimes. Instead of outright military conflict, sanctions tend to precede military escalations and serve as a good measure for states' interest in pushing an issue onto the agenda. Governments apply sanctions to achieve foreign policy goals and address challenges in the international system, including systematic human rights violations, militarization, breach of borders, and state aggression. In doing so, states signal, coerce, constrain, deter, or punish actors without (or before) putting boots on the ground.[31] Since sanctions are not costless[32] for the sanctioning state, we can expect states to not take sanctioning lightly, strengthening the concept that it is a proper proxy for states' preferences.

The Global Sanctions Database Project (GSDB)[33] traces sanction cases (bilateral and multilateral) for the 2008 to 2020 time frame of this study. The project also provides classifications on the sanctions applied (e.g., arms, military, trade, financial, travel). The project's assumptions here do not distinguish what kind of sanction drives the agenda. As a result, a sanction is coded as active if any sanction is applied. I derived three indicator variables from the data set: one indicating if at least one UNSC member (*PreferenceUNSC*) has active sanctions, one for only the P5 (*PreferenceP5*) to address concerns that the preferences might be driven by vetoes down the road, and a measure for sanctions administered by one of the non-permanent member states (*PreferenceNPM*). All variables are coded as '1' if at least one state has active sanctions; otherwise, it is coded as '0'.

Measuring state preferences is inherently difficult, and the changing membership constellation of the UNSC complicates this even further. It might be unlikely

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[31]**Doxey 1996b**; **54âĂŞ55**; **Giumelli2011**.

[32]**empty citation**.

[33]**Kirilakha2021**; **Felderbmayr2020**; **Syropoulos2022**.

that an issue makes it to the agenda only because a UNSC member initiated sanctions. However, when *Preferences* and *Urgency* interact, the scale is expected to tip in favor of formal issue consideration. In other words, we should expect that formal issue consideration is more likely when higher levels of urgency align with at least one member state's active sanction regime. We should also expect that even as urgency remains low, but sanctions are active, formal issue consideration is more likely. When state preferences are low (no sanction), the degree of urgency alone does not predict a higher likelihood of formal issue consideration, and matters are likely to remain informal. These assumptions are anchored in the model through the interaction term.

A few caveats should be briefly addressed. First, umbrella issues are, by definition, not tied to a particular country, and no sanctions can be matched accordingly (coded as missing). The decision to ignore that countries can receive sanctions from more than one actor and/or several kinds from the same actor might conceal which of the sanctions is the driving force. The rationale for accepting this shortcoming is tied to the original assumptions. There has been no theoretical reason to expect that different sanction types lead to different preferences. Second, the measure is monetary, and not all preferences carry a price tag. This is true and makes the measure proposed here a proxy for preferences and not an absolute marker. However, monetary indicators like sanctions are used in the literature as a robust indicator for states' geopolitical engagement, and in the absence of better data, this one has to suffice.[34]

CONTROL VARIABLES

I include several control variables to increase the internal validity of my findings: experience of non-permanent Council members (*Experience*), the possession of nuclear weapons for the country in question (*Nukes*), the overall vulnerability of the country in question (*Fragility*). The usual control variable of permanent members (*Veto*) is irrelevant here since a first look at the data reveals that only in one instance has an issue been discussed that was directly tied to (and introduced by) a

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[34]**xx?**.

permanent member state.

Interviews with country representatives revealed that serving on the Council for the first time brings unique challenges. According to a political coordinator, state delegations face logistical challenges, jokingly saying, "in the first year, you just figure out the subway system and how to get to work".[35] While this might be more a metaphor than reality, states face extra work when their delegations arrive at New York City's headquarters. Over the past years, the UN Secretariat made a conscious effort to ease the transition, including workshops and a longer transition time, allowing those serving next to observe the Council works for the six months prior to their assignment.[36] Another member state delegate also confirmed that it appears easier to promote an agenda item as a repeated member of the Council.[37].

A count variable is included in the model to account for the possibility that more experienced Council members push issues onto the formal agenda. We can expect that Council members who have repeatedly served on the Council, hold (at least some) institutional knowledge, might understand the rules of the game better, and are overall countries more involved in the workings of the UNSC. Younger Councils are expected to be more willing to follow precedence and even follow the lead of the permanent five. The interviews also revealed that due to the high personnel turnover within a delegation, gaps of more than ten years erase institutional knowledge, and countries start 'from scratch.'[38] *Experience* is then the sum of years non-permanent member states have Council experience. If they have served within the past ten years, their experience is added up; if it was more than ten years ago, the experience is not included. For example, Germany served on the Council in 2011-2012 and 2019-2020. In 2020, the country's experience was 4 years (including the one serving). Conversely, Egypt served in 1996-1997 and 2016-2017. In 2016, the country was coded as having one year of experience since too much time has passed since their last tenure. *Experience* then reflects its rotating members' accumulated

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[35]**Interview**.

[36]This is up from the general rule of three months. Member states are allowed to observe but not vote.

[37]**Interview**.

[38]**Interviews**.

years of experience. Data comes directly from the UN Security Council.

Despite the fact that only nine countries hold (confirmed) nuclear weapons[39], it is useful to control for their potential influence (*Nukes*). Should the issue under consideration be in relation to a nuclear power holder, the observation is coded as '1' and '0' otherwise. As a rationale, Council members might be more or less likely to discuss matters in formal meetings if one of the nine states is under discussion. It could go either way - the Council is more likely to address the matter formally to shine a light on the country. Or, the sensitive nature of nuclear weapons makes informality the safer choice.[40] And finally, in a perfect world of endless resources, we would see Council addresses the most fragile situations to prevent or end conflict right at the epicenter. To control for the most vulnerable situations in the world, *Fragility* is operationalized through data from the Fragile State Index (FSI), which measures states' risk of collapsing. The FSI score reflects a country's level of stability and how fragile its institutions are. The variable is a discrete measure of issue severity on a scale from 0-120, where lower numbers indicate stable and higher numbers indicate failing states.[41] If the Council's decision to entertain an issue formally paths the way to legally binding policies, we should see countries with higher scores (more fragile) being discussed in formal sessions and lower the score (less fragile) to remain in an informal session with the rationale that no formal actions are needed at that time.

1.3 Model Choice and Specification

The empirical results provide insight into which meeting setting the Council chooses, given the conditions presented in subsection 1.2.[42] *Governance Choice* is an unordered categorical variable whose individual categories' likelihood of being chosen is a function of five key independent variables. While an argument could be

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[39]The United States, Russia, France, China, the United Kingdom, Pakistan, India, Israel, and North Korea.

[40]**International Panel on Fissile Materials**; **and Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.**.

[41]**Fragile State Index**.

[42]**DowEndersby2004**.

1	1	1 Variable	Definition	Measurement & Coding	Hypothesis
Dependent variable					
Governance	Choice	Meeting type	Arria-IID (1), ICW (2), formal-private (3), formal-public (4)	H1-H4
Key Variables					
Homogeneity UNSC	Homogeneity among UNSC	Agreement, where 0 = no agreement & 1 = unanimous	H1, b> 0.6
Homogeneity_E10	Homogeneity among NPM	Agreement, where 0 = no agreement & 1 = unanimous	H1, b> 0.6
Time	Information Availability	Months between incidence and Council consideration	H2, $b_{informal} < b_{formal}$
Umbrella item	Agenda item category	Item is topic related = 1, 0 otherwise	H3, b = 1
Region-specific	Agenda item category	Item is region-specific = 1, 0 otherwise	H3, b = 1
Urgency (deaths)	# of people killed	Discrete count of fatalities	H4, b≠ 0
$Urgency(Events) \# of violent events$		$Discrete count of events$	H4, $b \neq 0$
Preference UNSC	UNSC Sanctions	at least one UNSC has active sanction(s) = 1, 0 otherwise	H4, b = 1
Control variables					
Experience_NPM	Experience of NPM	Number of years of NPM experience in the UNSC	–
Nukes	Nuclear Weapons	Possession of nuclear weapons = 1, otherwise 0	–
Fragility	Regime Stability	Score 0-120, 0 = fully stable, 120 = entirely unstable	–

Table 1.4: Variable Summary

made that meeting types have an inherent hierarchy, meaning formal meetings are higher ranked than informal ones, the core argument of this study claims that states choose the meeting type that serves them best in any given situation, thereby negating the idea that there is an inherent order in those choices. As a result, a multinomial logit model (MNLM) with a polychotomous dependent variable of four categories (formal-public (4), formal-private (3), ICW (2), and Arria-IID (1)) provides the best fit.[43] Each observation in the data set represents an individual meeting between 2008 and 2020 in either or several of these categories. Each UNSC selects a meeting type from a set of unordered alternatives as a function of the UNSC attributes and the given choices' characteristics. Each meeting type is unique in the advantages and disadvantages it provides to decision-makers. Derived from utility maximization theories, the model estimates the probability that the Council chooses one government setting from a fixed set of alternatives, assuming independence across the alternatives provided. The assumption that independence between meeting choices can be assumed was derived directly from people familiar with the UNSC's workings. Long-term UN staff confirmed that UNSC member states indeed 'jump' between meeting types, and while there is consistency and routine in what governance settings they meet, the settings are seen as independent choices.[44]

The Council *i's* utility for choosing a particular meeting type *j* is a function of the Council's properties, the meeting's characteristics, and a stochastic error term.[45] The model can be expressed through the following equation:

$$Pr(Y_i = 1 \mid X_i) = \frac{exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \frac{(\beta_4 X_4 * \beta_5 X_5) + \beta_6 X_6 + \beta_7 X_7 + \beta_8 X}{1 + exp(\beta_0 + \beta_1 X_1 + \beta_2 X_2 + \beta_3 X_3 + \frac{(\beta_4 X_4 * \beta_5 X_5) + \beta_6 X_6 + \beta_7 X_7 + }{}}}$$
(1.1)

Where Pr is the probability that the Council selects a particular meeting type and α is the constant, the independent variables are:

$\beta 1$ = Homogeneity

$\beta 2$ = Time

[43] **Long1997**; **The alternative of using a multinomial probit model does not provide a reasonable advantage he**
[44] **Interviews**.
[45] **Maddala1983**; **PowersXie2000**; R. M. Alvarez and Nagler, 1998.

$\beta 3$ = Topic

$\beta 4$ = Urgency

$\beta 5$ = Preferences

$\beta 6$ = Experience

$\beta 7$ = P5

$\beta 8$ = Nukes

$\beta 9$ = Fragiliy

Per the UN charter, formal public meetings are the default way to meet. Therefore, any other meeting type presents an *alternative* or *choice* to deviate from that governance setting. The discrete choice model used here rests on the assumption that the UNSC chooses the governance setting which maximizes its utility.[46] Should the utility of meeting in a setting other than public formal be higher than remaining in said setting, the Council, as a unitary actor, is expected to choose the alternative. If the utility does not increase – or even decrease, the Council is expected to remain in formal public session accordingly. The Council's utility can be expressed as

$$U_{ic} = \mu_{ic} + \epsilon_{ic} \tag{1.2}$$

where μ_{ic} reflects the utility associated with the governance choice *c* by the Council *i*, and ϵ_{ic} as the random error associated with that choice. The multinomial logistic regression offers predictions on the independent variables outlined above. For example, a higher level of homogeneity makes formal issue consideration more likely (H1). We should expect low levels of homogeneity, especially for Arria-IID, and high levels for formal-public issue consideration. If hypothesis 2 is true we should see shorter time spans between a violent situation and informal issue consideration as uncertainty over outcomes is high, and a longer time span for formal issue consideration leads to higher levels of certainty. The model also suggests that states' preferences are driving the agenda, which should produce positive and statistically significant coefficients alone or when interacting with higher levels of urgency.

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[46]**Long**.

1.4 Results

The results presented here consist of a multinomial logistic regression with the dependent variable constructed of the four meeting choices available to the Security Council, five key independent variables, and three control variables, as discussed above. This means that all outcomes are measured in reference to that category. The model (Table 1.5) uses *formal-public* meetings as the reference group.[47] First, I will briefly discuss the overall model and the significance of individual variables for each meeting alternative. In the second step, I provide predicted probabilities to express the likelihood that the Security Council entertains a matter in a setting other than formal-public with a probability between 0 and 1 given the variables under discussion. The lower the predicted probability, the lower the chance the Council meets away from the horseshoe table. Confidence Intervals are set to the standard of 95% for a two-tailed test statistic. Most variables in the equation are continuous, which produces a long list of predicted probabilities. Therefore, most results are presented in graphic form for easier presentation. A table of the model, including the confidence intervals and exact p-values, can be found in Appendix XYZ. Outcome categories are only included in the graph if statistically significant for easier presentation.

ARRIA-IID

For Arria-IID, the highly informal and public governance choice, three of the six key independent variables are statistically significant, with two in the predicted direction. *Urgency* and *Time Counter* (and its cubic polynomial *Time Counter*^{3}) are positive, as expected.[48] The urgency-preferences interaction term is statistically significant but not in the predicted direction. Of the control variables, a country's possession of nuclear weapons (*Nukes*) is also statistically significant with the expected sign. This means, however, that the assumption that as the *Homogeneity*

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[47] Any category can be used as the reference group. It will yield the same results. Formal-public meetings are the standard governance setting for the UNSC, so the category is used accordingly.

[48] *Time Counter*^{2} *is negative*

Gov. Choice	Arria-IID	ICW	Formal-private
Key Variables			
Homogeneity	-1.683	0.512	2.544
	(4.163)	(1.566)	(3.396)
Time Counter	0.095***	0.095***	-0.032
	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.021)
Time Counter^2	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time Counter^3	0.000***	0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Umbrella item	-13.586	-13.068	-14.338
	(1,938.510)	(569.330)	(1,530.525)
Region-specific	0.204	-0.631***	-2.960***
	(0.365)	(0.156)	(1.011)
Urgency (deaths)	0.000***	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Preferences	0.224	0.277**	0.874***
	(0.327)	(0.130)	(0.252)
Urgency*Preferences	-0.000**	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Control Variables			
Experience	-0.029	0.022**	0.024
	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.020)
Fragility	-0.004	-0.000	-0.017***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Nukes	2.254***	0.214	-0.796
	(0.637)	(0.586)	(1.064)
Constant	-2.993***	-3.855***	-1.541
	(1.109)	(0.523)	(1.060)
Observations	2,764	2,764	2,764

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.5: Model 1 - Multinomial Logist Regression with Governance Choice as Dependent Variable (M1)

level decreases, the Council shift from formal-public to Arria-IID is not statistically significant, even as the sign is in the predicted direction. Equally so, neither the *topic* variable nor *preferences* are statistically significant.

ICW

Three key independent variables are statistically significant and with the predicted signs: *Time Counter* (and its squared and cubic polynomial *Time Counter*^{2} and *Time Counter*^{3}), region-specific matters, and Council preferences. Time until consideration and preferences positively correlate with a shift from formal-public to ICW. At the same time, it is less likely that the Council discusses regional issues in this setting, which was also predicted. Here, we can again observe that the *Homogeneity* effect on meeting choice is, contrary to expectations, not statistically significant, with the sign being in the expected direction. Neither the umbrella item predictor nor the interaction term is statistically significant. Regarding the control variables, NPM's Council experience is the only statistically significant variable, in the expected positive direction.

FORMAL-PRIVATE MEETINGS

The last meeting category, formal-private, produces only two statistically significant key variables: preferences and regional matters. All other key independent variables are insignificant in the way they are operationalized here. As predicted, the Council is more likely to entertain matters in formal privacy as preferences increase and is less likely to discuss regional matters in this setting. The control variable *Fragility* is significant but with a negative sign, contrary to predictions. Time until consideration does not reach the level of significance and must therefore be rejected as playing a role in choosing formal-private meetings over their formal counterpart. Homogeneity also appears insignificant for this setting.

Robustness check and adjusted models

In addition to Module 1, three additional models have been executed as robustness checks. Model 2 (M2) replaces the underlying measure of *Urgency*, which is the number of deaths with the number of violent events, all else equal. Model 3 (M3) uses *Heterogeneity* for the E10 (instead of the entire UNSC), all else equal. Model 4 (M4) uses E10 homogeneity *and* events (instead of deaths) to measure *Urgency*.

Compared to M1, Model 2 (M2) uses event count as a function of *Urgency* and shows significant results with positive signs for ICW and Arria-IID. Two key independent variables (*homogeneity E10, urgency*) achieve significance in Model 3 (M3) for ICW. Heterogeneity was not statistically significant for any meeting types when measured as the level of agreement for the entire Council. When measured only as the agreement for the rotating member states, the results are statistically significant for ICW at p<0.01. This suggests that something unique to the agreement level among the E10 members gets 'diluted' once the veto powers are thrown into the mix and are most effective for ICW. The need to act also provides statistical results with a positive sign for ICW, compared to M1. Homogeneity of the E10 and urgency remain significant and positive for ICW in Model 4 (M4). Overall, the results remain robust even when using alternative measures, and signs are in the predicted direction.

1.4.1 Predicted Probabilities of Key Independent Variables

The multinomial logistic regression model provides useful information on the overall significance of the variables and their signs. Beyond that, the estimated parameters cannot be intuitively interpreted, as coefficients are presented in log-odds scale. For example, the *Homogeneity* coefficient is the effect of Council cohesion on the log-odds of governance choice. This, however, tells us little about the actual probability of how the likelihood of choosing meeting type A over meeting type B changes in response to increases/decreases in any of the model's variables. Neither can it tell us much about the magnitude of the effect. Therefore, we will now take a closer look at marginal effects, which are useful for presenting results as the instantaneous rate of change of any independent variable (β), thereby providing detailed information on how probabilities might differ at different levels. I will discuss the generated predicted probabilities for the key independent variables in the order presented in Table 1.5, all set to the standard confidence interval of 95%. I hold other continuous variables at their mean and factor variables as 'present' (coded as 1).

Homogeneity has produced results that do not allow rejection of the null hypoth-

esis. In addition, the marginal probabilities are so small that we cannot draw any conclusion about the influence of Council cohesion on governance choice. These results are unfortunate in light of Figure 1.6, which suggests that the yearly changing Council composition produces distinguishable preference constellations.


Figure 1.6: Council Homogeneity UNGA Voting results in the multidimensional space.

Moving on to the role of time until consideration (*Counter*^{2}). I am presenting the results for the logged counter variable, which reduces the skewness of the original data and provides an easier presentation of the patterns observed. Arria-IID start with a 53% predicted probability, the highest of all four categories, followed by ICW with a starting probability of 29%. Both informal settings experience a decline, the more time passes. Arria-IID, for example, are 25% less likely to be the chosen governance format three time intervals later. On the other side, formal-public meetings have a predicted probability of 15% as the meeting type in which a matter gets discussed for the first time. For formal-private meetings, and the probability is almost non-existent for formal-private meetings (0.15%). As time

progresses, the pattern shifts and informal meetings have smaller predicted probabilities while formal meetings become increasingly likely.


Figure 1.7: Predicted Probability for the logged *Time Counter*[2]

Regional matters also present a distinct pattern (see Figure 1.8) regarding the meeting settings in which they are discussed. Regional issues have a 63% predicted probability of occurring in formal-public meetings, while only a 5% for Arria-IID and 4% for formal-private meetings. With 30%, ICW are the second most likely governance choice for regional issues.[49]

Urgency is here operationalized as the number of accumulated casualties from violent political conflicts within the last twelve months. Deaths are projected in intervals of 10,000, with a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 81,119 (std. 3843.743, mean 12671.69). Overall, formal-private meetings are the least responsive to urgent matters. At 10,000 deaths within twelve months for a specific agenda item, formal-private meetings have a meager probability of 1% to be chosen. For any increase in urgency, the probability is rapidly approaching zero. ICW are also only marginally responsive to increases in urgency, indicated by its minimal slope. On the other side, Arria-IID have a low probability of occurring when urgency is at its lowest, 2% to be precise. However, as urgency increases to 20,000 and 30,000

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[49]Umbrella items appeared as not statistically significant and will not be further discussed in this section.

Figure 1.8: Predicted Probability for region-specific issues

deaths, its probability rises to 12% and 21%, respectively. Once urgency reaches 40,000 deaths, the marginal predicted probability starts mellowing out (26%). As a result, both informal meeting types have positive marginal predicted probabilities of occurring, while formal-private and formal-public show negative trends. Formal-public meetings, in particular, are most responsive to shifts in urgency but opposite to what we might hope. For example, as urgency increases from 0 to 10,000, the marginal predicted probability drops about 10% from 56% to 46% and plops to 31% by the time urgency reaches 20,000 (see Figure 1.9), making it less likely that the Council entertains the issue as urgency increases.

Before investigating the interaction between urgency and state preferences, it is worth looking at the predicted probabilities of member states' preferences. Member state preferences are expressed through active sanctions (as elaborated on earlier). Since this is a binary variable, we can observe four predicted probabilities - one for each meeting choice (see Figure 1.10). State preferences play no real role in selecting Arria-IID and formal-private meetings, each having a predicted probability of approximately 5%. However, state preferences play a significant role in selecting ICW and formal-public meetings. From the data, ICW have a predicted probability of being chosen when state preferences exist (37%). And no other meeting type

Figure 1.9: Predicted probabilities for *Urgency*

has been shown to be as affected by state preferences as formal-public meetings (51%).In other words, a predicted probability of 51% to choosing a formal-public meeting exists when state preferences are 'active.' Model 1 has produced only significant results for Arria-formula meetings, with a negative sign. But what happens when states' preferences collide with more (or less) urgent matters at different levels of urgency?

The interaction between issue urgency and state preferences (present/absent) produces distinct results and marginal predicted probabilities. Arria-IID start with the same probability when preferences 'are turned on' (1) as when they are 'turned off' (0), hovering around 2%. As urgency increases, the predicted probability of being discussed through this governance choice slowly but steadily increases in increments of 2% for each 10,000 recorded deaths. It reaches a maximum of 18% predicted probability when urgency is the highest. However, when preferences are turned off, the probability of Arria-IID occurring as urgency increases is significant. For example, with 20,000 deaths, which is overall low on a scale from 0 to 83,000, Arria-IID have a probability of 38% to be chosen compared to 6% if preferences did exist. At 40,000, there is a 93% chance of consideration in this setting. ICW produce a different pattern in which sanctions appear to be the driving force.

Figure 1.10: Predicted probability of *State Preferences*.

Should state preferences be absent, the marginal predicted probability of consideration in this governance setting drops from an overall low 29% at the 20,000 death marker to a meager 14% for 30,000, approaching zero probability at around 50,000 deaths. When interacting with increasing urgency to act, state preferences increase the marginal predicted probability by 41% from when urgency is at its lowest (34%) to 79% at 50,000 deaths within the previous twelve months. And last, the Council's official default meeting type, formal-public, early on drops if no preferences are active. Within the first three increments, the probability of issue consideration is cut in half, dropping from 62% (for no urgency) to 31% at 20,000 deaths. The overall trend is the same should preferences apply, and the more urgent the issue becomes, the lower the marginal predicted probability to be discussed through the formal-public setting. What starts with a probability of 54% drops into the single digits once urgency reaches 50,000 deaths. Formal-private meetings are approaching 0% at the 10,000 death marker, regardless of whether preferences are present. However, they do so with a small predicted probability of being chosen initially (4% when absent and 8% when present).

Figure 1.11: Predicted probability of interaction term *Preferences x Urgency*.

1.5 Discussion of Results

In this study, I examined the relationship between Council homogeneity, the time between the first occurrence and issue consideration, topic characteristics, urgency, and state preferences. The large-N study shows that the UNSC agenda is driven by Council characteristics and outside circumstances. This greatly expands the literature on IO agenda-sitting and introduces the argument that agenda-setting power is not only in the hands of powerful states. Rather, formal and informal agendas result from internal and external conditions which sometimes go against the most powerful members. Several important conclusions can be drawn from the statistical analysis provided here. Table 1.6 summarizes the conclusions drawn for each of the tested hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1 suggested that overall Council homogeneity drives the setting where states do UNSC business. It is important to note that while overall Council homogeneity is not statistically significant, the agreement among non-permanent members is. This suggests that the influence of homogeneity on agenda-setting is not uniform across the Council, and the dynamics within the non-permanent member group may be more critical in driving the selection of agenda items. Addi-

tionally, the result suggests that the power dynamics within the UNSC are more complex than previously thought and that even rotating members can significantly impact the agenda-setting process. Overall, this finding highlights the importance of considering the diversity of interests and perspectives within the UNSC and how they interact to shape the selection of issues for formal consideration. The result also support insight gathered from the elite interviews and the case study (see chapter **??**). As agreement among the E10 increases, formal issue consideration becomes more likely as the UNSC tries to prevent public expressions of a divided Council. This result contradicts traditional arguments that agenda-setting is only in the hands of the most powerful states, and rotating members have little leverage to pursue (or prevent) the items added to the formal and/or informal agenda. Therefore, councils with homogeneous interests make formal issue consideration more likely. Dispersed interests, however, make informal consideration more likely, which can still lead to effective policy influence no matter the formal agenda space.

The statistical results for Hypothesis 2 suggest that limited access to information does indeed make formal issue consideration less likely, due to higher uncertainty about the situation and future outcomes. The results show that the Council is more likely to meet in informal settings when the time between an incident and the meeting is shorter. This suggests that in situations where there is limited information available, the Council prefers to meet in informal settings to gather additional information and gain a better understanding of the situation.

As more information becomes available and uncertainty decreases, the likelihood of the Council meeting in formal settings increases. This suggests that formal meetings are preferred when there is greater certainty about the situation and its outcomes. This is likely because formal meetings provide a more structured and organized way to discuss and address the issue, as well as to reach binding outcomes. Overall, these results support the idea that informal space is preferred if uncertainty is high and that as more information becomes available, the Council is more likely to meet in formal settings. This highlights the importance of access to information in the decision-making process and suggests that the Council's meeting choices are influenced by the level of uncertainty and available information surrounding a given

issue.

The mixed statistical results for H3 suggest that the relationship between issue specificity and meeting type is more complex than initially anticipated. While umbrella items, or broadly defined issues, were expected to be more likely in formal settings due to their less politically charged nature, the results did not produce clear patterns. However, region-specific issues were statistically significant and produced distinct patterns. For example, states are less likely to entertain region-specific agenda items in Arria-IID and formal-private settings, which are characterized by high/low publicity and low/high formality, respectively. This may be because these settings focus more on urgent but broad matters and national interests rather than regional conflicts.

In contrast, region-specific issues are most likely to be discussed in the formal-public setting, which has both high formality and high publicity, and in the ICW setting, which is characterized by low formality and low publicity. These findings suggest that regional matters may be more suitable for settings that allow greater engagement and public awareness. Overall, the results suggest that the relationship between issue specificity and meeting type in the UNSC is complex and influenced by a range of factors, including the nature of the issue, the specific region involved, and the level of formality and publicity of the meeting. Further research is needed to better understand the nuances of this relationship and to identify additional drivers of agenda space in the UNSC.

The mixed results regarding the influence of urgency and preferences on meeting choice highlight the complexity of the agenda-setting process in the UNSC. The finding that Arria-IID meetings are the only category that is statistically significant with respect to the influence of urgent matters on meeting choice suggests that this type of meeting may be particularly effective for raising awareness about urgent issues without being subject to formal procedures or legal consequences. On the other hand, the finding that preferences drive the selection of ICW and formal-private meetings suggests that these types of meetings are focused more on protecting national interests and meeting political needs than on informing the international community about a crisis. This highlights the importance of understanding

the motivations behind different types of meetings in the UNSC.

The interaction of urgency and preferences is predicted to establish issues on the formal Council agenda, but the mixed results suggest that this is not always the case. One possible explanation for this is that when urgency and state preferences are high, the Council may prefer to remain in the formal-public setting to demonstrate their engagement with the issue and to ensure that their preferences are translated into binding outcomes. Moreover, the findings suggest that the UNSC agenda-setting process is influenced by a range of factors, including urgency, preferences, and the type of meeting being held. Further research is needed to better understand the complexities of this process and to identify additional drivers of agenda space.

It is important to conduct further statistical analysis to better understand the data and identify any potential limitations in the study. In this case, exploring the homogeneity of non-permanent member states and identifying underlying traits that predict the most successful makeup of states could provide even more valuable insights into the agenda-setting process in the UNSC. Additionally, identifying the threshold or shift when urgent issues become national preferences is important to understand how issues move from informal discussions to formal agenda space. It may also be helpful to examine other variables that could be driving the agenda-setting relationship in the UNSC, such as economic or political factors. Overall, continuing to analyze and explore the data can help provide a comprehensive picture of the agenda-setting process in the UNSC and help identify areas for further research and analysis.

	Hypothesis	Decision	
H1a	Homogeneity UNSC	Fail to reject H_0	–
H1b	Homogeneity NPM	Reject H_0	✓
H2	Information availability	Reject H_0	✓
H3a	Topic characteristics: Umbrella item	Fail to reject H_0	–
H3b	Topic characteristics: Region-specific	Reject H_0	✓
H4	Urgency*Preferences	Reject H_0	✓

Table 1.6: Summary results - hypothesis testing

Gov. Choice	Arria-IID	ICW	Formal-private
Key Variables			
Homogeneity	-2.000	0.105	3.049
	(4.161)	(1.563)	(3.390)
Time Counter	0.093***	0.095***	-0.032
	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.021)
Time Counter^2	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time Counter^3	0.000**	0.000***	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Umbrella item	-13.949	-13.506	-14.833
	(2,492.356)	(730.650)	(1,965.489)
Region-specific	0.135	-0.641***	-2.982***
	(0.365)	(0.155)	(1.011)
Urgency (events)	0.003***	0.001**	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Preferences	0.417	0.390***	0.848***
	(0.348)	(0.136)	(0.255)
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Urgency*Preferences	-0.003***	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Control Variables			
Experience	-0.028	0.022**	0.023
	(0.022)	(0.009)	(0.020)
Fragility	-0.005	0.000	-0.017***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Nukes	2.162***	0.188	-0.792
	(0.641)	(0.588)	(1.064)
Constant	-3.087***	-3.866***	-1.540
	(1.115)	(0.522)	(1.061)
Observations	2,764	2,764	2,764

Baseline category is formal-public meeting. Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.7: M2 - Homogeneity all deaths

Gov. Choice	Arria-IID	ICW	Formal-private
Key Variables			
Homogeneity E10	-0.487	8.544***	-2.023
	(4.370)	(1.718)	(3.267)
Time Counter	0.094***	0.077***	-0.026
	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Time Counter^2	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time Counter^3	0.000**	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Umbrella item	-13.594	-12.943	-14.366
	(1,943.860)	(565.940)	(1,531.789)
Region-specific	0.207	-0.646***	-2.959***
	(0.365)	(0.156)	(1.011)
Urgency (deaths)	0.000***	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Preferences	0.219	0.240*	0.877***
	(0.329)	(0.131)	(0.252)
Urgency*Preferences	-0.000**	0.000	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Control Variables			
Experience	-0.026	0.020**	0.014
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Fragility	-0.004	0.000	-0.017***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Nukes	2.279***	0.178	-0.801
	(0.637)	(0.591)	(1.065)
Constant	-3.324***	-4.870***	-0.618
	(0.948)	(0.484)	(0.921)
Observations	2,764	2,764	2,764

Baseline category is formal-public meeting. Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.8: Model 3 - Homogeneity E10 deaths

Gov. Choice	Arria-IID	ICW	(Formal-private)
Key Variables			
Homogeneity E10	-0.832	8.155***	-1.986
	(4.382)	(1.712)	(3.285)
Time Counter	0.092***	0.077***	-0.026
	(0.028)	(0.012)	(0.022)
Time Counter^2	-0.001***	-0.001***	0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Time Counter^3	0.000**	0.000	-0.000
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Umbrella item	-13.712	-13.140	-14.613
	(2,204.851)	(641.419)	(1,735.521)
Region-specific	0.138	-0.655***	-2.975***
	(0.365)	(0.156)	(1.011)
Urgency (events)	0.003***	0.001*	-0.002
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Preference	0.414	0.351**	0.849***
	(0.349)	(0.137)	(0.255)
Urgency*Preferences	-0.003***	-0.001	0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Control Variables			
Experience	-0.024	0.020**	0.012
	(0.021)	(0.009)	(0.018)
Fragility	-0.004	0.000	-0.017***
	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.006)
Nukes	2.186***	0.153	-0.803
	(0.640)	(0.594)	(1.065)
Constant	-3.426***	-4.896***	-0.509
	(0.958)	(0.482)	(0.924)
Observations	2,764	2,764	2,764

Baseline category is formal-public meeting. Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 1.9: Model 4 E10 and events

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