

PQ DNSSEC with MTL Mode Metrics and Observations

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MTL Mode Specifications

| Document | Version | URL |
|---|---------|---|
| draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode | 04 | https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode/ |
| draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode-considerations | 00 | https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode-considerations/ |
| draft-fregly-dnsop-slh-dsa-mtl-dnssec | 03 | https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-fregly-dnsop-slh-dsa-mtl-dnssec/ |

MTL Mode Open Source

| Application | Repository |
|--|---|
| Keygen/Zone Signing/Zone Verifying with MTL mode | https://github.com/verisign/mtl-mode-ldns |
| NSD Authoritative with MTL Mode Support | https://github.com/NLnetLabs/nsd/pull/397 |
| Unbound with PQC MTL Validation | https://github.com/Verisign/mtl-mode-unbound |
| MTL Reference Library | https://github.com/verisign/mtl |

Intellectual Property


- Verisign announced a public, royalty-free license to certain intellectual property related to the Internet-Drafts
- IPR declarations 6174-6176, 6240-6242, and 6501 give the official language

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?submit=draft&id=draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode>

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?submit=draft&id=draft-harvey-cfrg-mtl-mode-considerations>

<https://datatracker.ietf.org/ipr/search/?submit=draft&id=draft-fregly-dnsop-slh-dsa-mtl-dnssec>

Test Environment Setup



Signed Zone Files

(one per algorithm)

- RSA
- ECDSA
- FL-DNSA-512
- ML-DNSA-44
- SLH-DNSA-SHA2-128
- SLH-DNSA-SHAKE-128
- SLH-DNSA-MTL-SHA2-128
- SLH-DNSA-MTL-SHAKE-128

Signer and NSD Host Configuration

CPU: 4 core Intel Xeon – 2.30 GHz

Ram: 32 GB

OS: RedHat 8.10

Compiler: Gcc version 13.3.1

with optimizations -O2 enabled

Test Signing Scripts

- Generate a key for each algorithm
- Sign the test zone
- Verify the test zone
- Collect metrics on time, size, and validity

Test Query Scripts

- Warmup query
- One set of tests per algorithm
- Collect metrics on response time, size, and messages

Zone File Signing And Verifying

Zone File Signing And Verifying

Sample zone with 1500 Delegated Sub-Domains

| Algorithm | Time to Sign (seconds) | Time to Verify (seconds) | Signed Zone Size (MB) | Public Key Size (bytes) |
|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|--------------------------|----------------------------|
| RSA | 2.4 | 0.4 | 2.72 | 260 |
| ECDSA | 0.4 | 0.7 | 2.06 | 64 |
| FL-DSA-512 | 1.5 | 0.6 | 4.36 | 897 |
| ML-DSA-44 | 0.7 | 0.9 | 11.13 | 1312 |
| SLH-DSA-SHA2-128 | 534.5 | 2.7 | 32.15 | 32 |
| SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128 | 1058.4 | 3.1 | 32.22 | 32 |
| SLH-DSA-MTL-SHA2-128 | 0.8 | 0.4* | 2.96* | 32 |
| SLH-DSA-MTL-SHAKE-128 | 1.2 | 0.4* | 3.04* | 32 |

* - Two full signatures, one for DNSKEY (with KSK) and one for the SOA record (with ZSK). All other signatures are condensed.

Zone File Signing And Verifying

Sample zone with 1500 Delegated Sub-Domains

Observations

- 1 ECDSA is the most efficient algorithm for signing, although the MTL based signatures are not far behind.
- 2 MTL based signatures largely mitigate the larger elements of the SLH-DSA algorithms while keeping the beneficial small public key sizes.
- 3 ML-DSA is popular right now for WebPKI, although the public key size means that the ZSK or KSK will not fit in a UDP DNS response (based on MTU).
- 4 DS records support SHA256 hashes but do not support SHAKE.

Query/Response With PQC DNSSEC

Query/Response With PQC DNSSEC

| Protocol | Algorithm | Record | Message Size | | Truncated | EDNS(0) MTL Full Signature | Query Time (10 samples) | | | RR Count in response | | | | |
|----------|----------------------|--------|------------------|---------------------|-----------|-------------------------------|-------------------------|----------------|---------------|----------------------|----|---|----|------|
| | | | Query (bytes) | Response (bytes) | | | Average (ms) | Median (ms) | Stdev (ms) | RRSIG | NS | A | DS | AAAA |
| UDP | RSA | NS | 54 | 715 | | | 1.53 | 1.50 | 0.10 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| TCP | RSA | NS | 54 | 715 | | | 2.21 | 2.18 | 0.25 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | ECDSA | NS | 56 | 527 | | | 1.59 | 1.58 | 0.08 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| TCP | ECDSA | NS | 56 | 527 | | | 2.24 | 2.31 | 0.17 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | FL-DSA-512 | NS | 57 | 1120 | | | 1.54 | 1.52 | 0.06 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| TCP | FL-DSA-512 | NS | 57 | 1120 | | | 2.30 | 2.40 | 0.22 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | ML-DSA-44 | NS | 60 | 150 | TRUE | | 0.82 | 0.84 | 0.07 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TCP | ML-DSA-44 | NS | 60 | 2891 | | | 1.77 | 1.71 | 0.15 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128 | NS | 62 | 152 | TRUE | | 0.82 | 0.81 | 0.05 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TCP | SLH-DSA-SHA2-128 | NS | 62 | 8331 | | | 1.80 | 1.75 | 0.13 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128 | NS | 64 | 154 | TRUE | | 0.92 | 0.81 | 0.25 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TCP | SLH-DSA-SHAKE-128 | NS | 64 | 8335 | | | 1.86 | 1.85 | 0.06 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | SLH-DSA-MTL-SHA2-128 | NS | 58 | 684 | | | 1.68 | 1.69 | 0.10 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| UDP | SLH-DSA-MTL-SHA2-128 | NS | 62 | 148 | TRUE | TRUE | 0.85 | 0.86 | 0.06 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TCP | SLH-DSA-MTL-SHA2-128 | NS | 58 | 684 | | | 1.70 | 1.59 | 0.28 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |
| TCP | SLH-DSA-MTL-SHA2-128 | NS | 62 | 8700 | | TRUE | 1.73 | 1.73 | 0.09 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 1 | 5 |

Queries are for a NS record using the network default MTU of 1232 bytes.

Query/Response With PQC DNSSEC

Observations

- 1 Assuming the default MTU of 1232 the following algorithms work over UDP and TCP: Classical (RSA, ECDSA) and PQC (FL-DSA-512, SLH-DSA-MTL-SHAXX-128)
Note: NSEC3 requires multiple signatures in the response which may result in truncated responses, even if normal responses fit.
- 2 MTL does have a retry cost when a condensed signature does not have a cached ladder. The query for the full signature over UDP will always be truncated and need to be requested over TCP.
- 3 UDP truncated full signatures take less processing time and are smaller than condensed signatures over both UDP and TCP responses, which reduces potential attacks. (e.g. less memory lookups and less to transfer over wire)

Open Questions

- How can we best optimize MTL for small response sizes and minimal retries?
- How do other resolvers perform with these zones?
- What impact do forwarding proxies have on this model?
- What are the impacts on resource consumption and DoS resilience?