

Multimodal Prompt Injection Attacks: Risks and Defenses for Modern LLMs

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Abstract

Large Language Models (LLMs) have seen rapid adoption in recent years, with industries increasingly relying on them to maintain a competitive advantage. These models excel at interpreting user instructions and generating human-like responses, leading to their integration across diverse domains, including consulting and information retrieval. However, their widespread deployment also introduces substantial security risks, most notably in the form of prompt injection and jailbreak attacks.

To systematically evaluate LLM vulnerabilities—particularly to external prompt injection—we conducted a series of experiments on eight commercial models. Each model was tested without supplementary sanitization, relying solely on its built-in safeguards. The results exposed exploitable weaknesses and emphasized the need for stronger security measures. Four categories of attacks were examined: direct injection, indirect (external) injection, image-based injection, and prompt leakage. Comparative analysis indicated that Claude 3 demonstrated relatively greater robustness; nevertheless, empirical findings confirm that additional defenses, such as input normalization, remain necessary to achieve reliable protection.

Keywords: Large Language Models, Prompt Injection, AI Security, Jailbreaking, Adversarial Attacks

1 Introduction

Large Language Models (LLMs) are generative AI systems trained on massive datasets to understand and produce human-like text. Their ease of use and ability to deliver information faster than traditional search methods have fueled widespread adoption across industries. However, despite extensive training, LLMs remain vulnerable to exploitation. A key weakness lies in their tendency to prioritize the most recent instructions in the context win-

dow. While useful during training, this behavior makes them susceptible to manipulation once deployed. Critically, LLMs cannot inherently distinguish between system prompts (which define the model’s task) and user prompts (which query the model). Without robust mechanisms to separate these inputs, malicious actors can hijack model behavior [18].

Prompt injection exploits this vulnerability by manipulating inputs so that the LLM abandons its original instructions. Attackers most often pursue two objectives: instruction hijacking and data exfiltration. Instruction hijacking forces the model to generate responses outside of its intended scope, such as producing disallowed or misleading content. Data exfiltration, however, poses a more severe threat, as it seeks to extract proprietary or protected information stored or referenced within the system. This may include leaking system prompts, training data, or API keys, with potentially irreversible consequences. Once such information is exposed, it can be disseminated widely, enabling large-scale exploitation.

In enterprise and healthcare contexts, exfiltration is particularly dangerous. An LLM leaking patient data, trade secrets, or compliance records could violate privacy laws such as HIPAA or GDPR, resulting in litigation and loss of user trust. Beyond legal implications, successful exfiltration undermines the technical credibility of LLMs, as it reveals structural weaknesses in how they separate user input from system-level instructions. Attackers may also chain exfiltration with other exploits, such as using stolen API keys for unlimited queries or leveraging leaked configuration details to access internal databases. Unlike instruction hijacking, which primarily alters outputs, exfiltration compromises confidentiality and integrity directly.

Remediation after exfiltration is exceptionally difficult: keys must be rotated, prompts rewritten, and compromised datasets quarantined, yet leaked content cannot be fully removed from public circulation. For critical infrastructure, such as government agencies or defense contractors, the stakes are even higher, as adversarial




Figure 1: Illustrative data-exfiltration pathway from prompt injection in a hospital LLM workflow.

groups could siphon classified data or technical schematics. Even in less sensitive domains, leaked training artifacts may expose customer behavior, trade secrets, or workflow processes, creating cascading vulnerabilities across supply chains. As LLMs become further integrated into enterprise and mission-critical systems, the risks associated with prompt injection—particularly data exfiltration—scale proportionally, underscoring the urgent need for proactive safeguards.

As shown in Figure 1, even small actions in AI-integrated systems can result in significant regulatory violations and loss of trust. This scenario underscores the need for continuous evaluation of LLM vulnerabilities. As new injection techniques emerge, even the most secure models remain at risk, reinforcing the importance of ongoing testing, monitoring, and defensive strategies. The present work highlights these vulnerabilities and introduces a structured framework for their categorization.

Vulnerability Testing A series of experiments were conducted across multiple LLMs deployed on diverse infrastructures to systematically evaluate weaknesses associated with different injection methods. This analysis provided empirical evidence of susceptibility to adversarial manipulation.

Classification The injection techniques explored in

this study were organized into a structured classification framework. This taxonomy captures the shared objectives of attacks while ensuring reproducibility and enabling independent validation in future research.

Application and Implications Building on the identified vulnerabilities, the study examined potential real-world risks in domains where LLMs are increasingly deployed, such as healthcare and enterprise systems. The findings point to critical implications, including regulatory violations (e.g., privacy breaches), erosion of user trust, and broader security threats in contexts where LLM reliability and compliance are essential.

2 Related Works

Prompt injection has emerged as one of the most effective methods to hijack large language models (LLMs), presenting major security challenges. Prior research examines vulnerabilities, attack strategies, defenses, and real-world scenarios. This section reviews the literature in five categories: (1) LLM vulnerabilities and alignment, (2) direct prompt injection attacks, (3) indirect prompt injection attacks, (4) defense and sanitization measures, and (5) real-world instances.

2.1 LLM Vulnerabilities and Alignment

Studies of LLM behavior show that models often prioritize the most recent instructions in their context window, including user inputs, making them vulnerable to manipulation. Yao et al. [10] identified prompt injection as a persistent yet under-emphasized issue in LLM security. Gokcimen [1] proposed architectural adjustments to strengthen models against exploitation, though noted that trade-offs limited effectiveness. Guo and Cai [2] analyzed *system prompt poisoning*, where malicious content injected into system-level prompts persists across sessions. These findings underscore that prompt injection exploits a fundamental LLM design principle, making it difficult to eliminate through training or alignment alone.

2.2 Direct Prompt Injection

Direct prompt injection involves inserting malicious instructions directly into the conversation interface to override safeguards. Liu et al. [3] demonstrated that even heavily aligned models remain vulnerable, often producing prohibited content. Yao et al. [5] introduced *Poison-Prompt*, an attack leveraging trigger sequences to alter model behavior. Zhang [6] proposed *goal-guided injections*, which pursue broader malicious objectives rather than single outputs. Collectively, these works highlight

the adaptability of direct injection techniques, which continue to bypass existing defenses.

2.3 Indirect Prompt Injection

Indirect prompt injection leverages third-party content rather than direct user input. Grenshake et al. first demonstrated that malicious instructions could be embedded in HTML metadata or linked resources, enabling applications to execute them unknowingly. Lee and Tiwari [4] extended this concept to *prompt infection* in multi-agent systems, where a single compromised resource propagates malicious instructions across agents. Benjamin [7] further showed that architectural diversity across LLMs does not guarantee resilience against such attacks. These studies demonstrate the scalability and persistence of indirect injection threats.

2.4 Defense and Sanitization Measures

Defensive strategies have been proposed but remain limited in scope. The OWASP LLM01:2025 guidelines [11] recommend layered defenses, including input sanitization, context isolation, and privilege separation. Khan et al. [9] reviewed countermeasures and noted that most rely on pattern matching rather than context-aware threat recognition. Lee [8] demonstrated that multimodal injections, such as image-based prompts, can bypass text-only filters, raising concerns for domains like healthcare where LLMs analyze non-textual data. These findings suggest that current defenses remain reactive and struggle to anticipate novel injection methods.

2.5 Real-World Instances

Real-world incidents highlight the urgency of mitigating prompt injection. Greenberg [12] reported that a poisoned document caused ChatGPT to leak proprietary data during a Black Hat demonstration. Another investigation described how Gemini AI was hijacked through a malicious calendar invite, enabling control of smart home devices [13]. The *Financial Times* documented widespread “jailbreak” campaigns against chatbots [17], while other studies reported AI “worms” spreading through prompt injection [15]. These cases reinforce that prompt injection is not merely theoretical but an active and growing security concern.

3 Methodology

To evaluate vulnerabilities, each model was tested against the two primary objectives of prompt injection: *injec-*

tion hijacking and *data exfiltration*. A successful attack was defined as the model acknowledging or executing the malicious instruction rather than adhering to its original system prompt.

3.1 Attack Goal




Figure 2: LLM processing pipeline. Injection risks are most significant at the context assembly phase, where user input merges with trusted sources.

As illustrated in Figure 2, malicious inputs modify the context assembly. If filtering mechanisms fail to detect injected instructions, they become entangled with the system prompt, leading the model to fulfill the adversarial request.

3.2 Experiment Setup

Eight LLMs were evaluated: GPT-4o, Claude 3, Kimi-K2, Mistral-Saba-24B, GPT-3.5-Turbo, LLaMA-3-8B, LLaMA-3-70B, and Gemma. Each model was accessed via its official API and integrated into a unified testing framework implemented in Visual Studio Code. Two chatbot variants were developed: one for testing direct injections and another for external (indirect) injections.

To ensure consistency, all models were initialized with the same baseline system instruction:




Figure 3: Diagram of intended experiment that utilizes external prompt injection on multiple LLM’s whose original goal is to summarize webpages

“You are a helpful assistant that summarizes webpage or document content to save the user time. Include image context if available. Summarize the following.”

This instruction directed models to summarize extracted webpage or file content, incorporating image context when available. A controlled website simulating a Korean cultural heritage portal served as the testing environment, with malicious prompts embedded that correspond to four types of injection.

Text was collected using a Python scraper built with `requests` and `BeautifulSoup`. Extracted content was lightly sanitized via regex filters to remove HTML comments and common adversarial phrases (e.g., “ignore all previous instructions,” or role tags such as “system:”). Sanitized text was truncated to 4,000 characters for API compatibility. If available, one valid image source was also provided to multimodal models.

All models were registered in a central model registry and called sequentially under identical conditions. Default decoding parameters (temperature, top-p, penalties, seeds) were preserved unless otherwise specified. Explicit constraints included a maximum of 400 tokens for Claude 3 and 300 tokens for LLaMA-3-8B, LLaMA-3-70B, and Mistral-Saba-24B. An injection was labeled successful if the model prioritized the injected instruction over its summarization task—for example, revealing hidden system prompts or appending injected content.

Responses that deviated from the baseline summarization prompt—such as revealing hidden instructions, ap-

pending injected markers, or generating disallowed content—were labeled as successful injections. Outputs that strictly adhered to the summarization task were recorded as refusals. Ambiguous cases were manually adjudicated with success, requiring clear evidence of instruction hijacking.

As shown in Figure 3, identical malicious instructions were used across each injection type. In one case, the injected narrative described three objects, the last being a weapon, and prompted the LLM to explain its construction. For the prompt leakage test, a modified instruction was used to extract the system prompt. To validate system functionality, an unaltered file containing information on Korean customs was also tested; all models successfully summarized this file, confirming that the code and environment operated as intended.

Future replications should document model versions and provider defaults for decoding parameters, as these are subject to change. Explicit logging of API responses and SDK versions is recommended to reduce drift in LLM behavior. The experimental environment was controlled to keep variables consistent across models:

- **Environment variables:** API keys for OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Hugging Face, and Groq loaded via `python-dotenv`.
- **Truncation:** Fixed at 4,000 visible characters (not token-aware).
- **Image handling:** At most one image passed per input when supported by the LLM.




Figure 4: Variations of the base prompt were utilized to test prompt injection behaviors. Artifact 3 was designated as the injected content for evaluation.

- **Logging:** Primary outputs printed to console, with optional structured logging to JSONL for reproducibility.

3.3 Prompt Injection Types

Figure 4 illustrates the variations of the base prompt used across all experiments. To evaluate the capacity of LLMs to resist adversarial manipulation, four types of prompt injections were tested:

1. **Direct injection.** Malicious instructions are embedded directly into the input interface. As the most common and well-studied form of attack, direct injection provided a baseline for assessing how effectively models could sanitize inputs without additional safeguards [3, 5, 6].
2. **External (indirect) injection.** The primary focus of this study, external injection, which hides malicious instructions within third-party content such as webpages or PDF files. When tokenized and processed by the LLM, these hidden instructions can bypass sanitization and execute during context assembly [2, 4].
3. **Visual injection.** Although only two models tested supported multimodal input, this method inserted adversarial content into images. Testing was motivated by potential implications for fields such as radiology, where adversarial image instructions could compromise clinical decision support [8].

4. **Prompt leakage (data exfiltration).** This attack aimed to extract guarded information, including system prompts or hidden chatbot instructions. Prompt leakage illustrates the risk of exfiltrating proprietary or confidential data from within an LLM session [18, 11].

3.4 Criteria for Success

Injection outcomes were classified into three categories:

- **Successful:** The model fully disregarded the baseline instruction to summarize content and instead complied with the adversarial request (e.g., providing instructions on weapon construction).
- **Partially successful:** The model acknowledged or attempted to process the malicious instruction but refused to output restricted content. For example, recognition of the injected weapon request without generating explicit instructions.
- **Unsuccessful:** The model ignored the injected instruction entirely and adhered strictly to the original system prompt of summarizing webpage content.

4 Results

4.1 Success Across Four Methods

Because of limited logging in early runs, reported success rates are based on partial reconstructions and should be interpreted as indicative rather than exhaustive. Table 1 summarizes model outcomes across the four injection methods.

Direct prompt injection. Successful attacks were observed in GPT-4o, Kimi-K2, GPT-3.5-Turbo, LLaMA-3-8B, LLaMA-3-70B, and Gemma. Claude 3 and Mistral-Saba-24B resisted direct injection attempts.

External prompt injection. Successful attacks were achieved in GPT-4o, Mistral-Saba-24B, GPT-3.5-Turbo, and LLaMA-3-70B. Claude 3, Kimi-K2, LLaMA-3-8B, and Gemma resisted external injection.

Image-based injection. Two multimodal models, GPT-4o and Claude 3, were tested. GPT-4o was successfully injected, while Claude 3 demonstrated only partial susceptibility.

Prompt leakage. Successful exfiltration occurred in GPT-4o, Claude 3, GPT-3.5-Turbo, LLaMA-3-8B, and LLaMA-3-70B. Mistral-Saba-24B showed partial success, while Kimi-K2 failed.

Table 1: Results of various prompt injection methods on the selected LLMs. Symbols: ✓ = Success, ✗ = Failure, △ = Partial, – = Not Applicable.

Model	Direct	External	Image	Leakage	Model	Direct	External	Image	Leakage
GPT-4o	✓	✓	✓	✓	GPT-3.5-Turbo	✓	✓	–	✓
Claude 3	✗	✗	△	✓	LLaMA-3-8B	✓	✗	–	✓
Kimi-K2	✓	✗	–	✗	LLaMA-3-70B	✓	✓	–	✓
Mistral-Saba-24B	✗	✓	–	△	Gemma	✓	✗	–	✗

4.2 Understanding the Results

As shown in Table 1, Claude 3 proved to be the most resilient, exhibiting only partial susceptibility through image-based injection. Nonetheless, all other models demonstrated vulnerabilities in at least one category. These findings indicate that even highly aligned models—those explicitly trained to detect adversarial instructions—remain imperfect and can be compromised without sufficient sanitization. Partial success was also seen in some models in which the model would acknowledge refusal to go through with the injected prompt. This can still be seen as success as it provides a potential hindrance for the user.

Additional sanitization measures, such as regex filtering or input normalization, can significantly strengthen model defenses, turning otherwise vulnerable systems into ones that resist prompt injection more consistently. This highlights the necessity of layered security approaches to mitigate evolving threats.

5 Discussion

The experiments revealed that the tested models exhibited limited tolerance to prompt injection, underscoring the urgent need for stronger and more systematic input sanitization. In particular, image-based injection proved highly effective, raising serious concerns for domains such as business, finance, and healthcare, where maliciously embedded visual prompts could compromise not only model safety but also compliance with regulatory frameworks. Unlike purely textual attacks, multimodal threats often evade existing defenses because they exploit additional preprocessing and encoding stages that are less well studied.

While models can be trained against known forms of injection, novel techniques continue to emerge at a rapid pace, highlighting the evolving nature of this security challenge. The dynamic landscape of adversarial prompting suggests that static defenses—those based solely on alignment or pattern recognition—are insufficient. Instead,

ongoing research emphasizes the importance of layered and adaptive defense strategies, integrating multiple safeguards across the model lifecycle.

Defensive measures that may mitigate these risks include robust input handling and sanitization, context isolation, privilege restriction, output validation, and resilient prompt engineering. Each of these mechanisms targets a different stage of the input–processing–output pipeline, thereby strengthening overall system resilience. Importantly, deploying them in isolation is unlikely to yield durable protection; rather, their effectiveness lies in their complementary nature.

Another crucial insight from this work is the trade-off between accessibility and security. Current commercial LLMs prioritize ease of integration and user experience, which can inadvertently widen the attack surface. Security-focused design—such as stricter sandboxing of external inputs or stronger role separation between system and user prompts—will be essential for long-term deployment in sensitive domains.

A key limitation of this study was the restricted access to newer commercial LLMs. Due to substantial paywalls, several models could not be included, which may have led to an overrepresentation of vulnerabilities in the models that were available for testing. Future research should therefore aim to expand the range of evaluated systems and investigate how injection resilience evolves as models and alignment strategies mature.

Beyond technical design, there is also a growing need for standardized benchmarks and evaluation protocols for prompt injection resilience. At present, most testing is ad hoc, making it difficult to compare results across studies or track progress over time. The establishment of public benchmarks, similar to those used in NLP tasks such as GLUE or MMLU, would enable more systematic measurement of vulnerabilities and foster a shared understanding of defense effectiveness.

Finally, operational considerations cannot be overlooked. Even the strongest static defenses will degrade as models drift or as attackers innovate with new injec-

Table 2: Stages of Vulnerability and Defenses

Stage	Vulnerability	Defenses
Ingestion (User / Tools)	Malicious input enters directly or via external data	Input sanitization, MIME/domain allowlists, provenance tags, pre-screen filters
Preprocessing	Instructions hidden inside data (HTML, code, zero-width chars)	Quote/fence untrusted text, enforce schemas, neutralize imperative verbs
Context Assembly	Injection merged with system + history (critical point)	Context firewall, trust-aware formatting, summarization of untrusted chunks
Forward Pass (Attention)	Model gives weight to injected instructions	Policy-tuned system prompt, adversarial training, safety routing
Decoding Loop	Malicious tokens realized in output	Constrained decoding, self-check prompts, two-pass generation
Post-processing	Harmful/injected content slips through	Policy classifiers, PII redaction, attribution logs, watermarking
Tool Use	Injection exploits functions or APIs	Strict schemas, least privilege, sandboxing, mediated outputs
Monitoring & Ops	Gaps over time, model drift	Red-team CI pipelines, injection metrics, automated kill-switch policies

tion methods. This points to the necessity of continuous monitoring and red-teaming, where systems are regularly stress-tested with adversarial prompts under realistic conditions. Organizations deploying LLMs in production should treat prompt injection defense as a dynamic process, incorporating not only preventive measures but also detection, response, and recovery workflows.

Table 2 outlines the stages of vulnerability identified in our experiments and the corresponding defenses proposed in the literature. This structured breakdown emphasizes that prompt injection is not a single-point failure but rather a pipeline-wide risk: weaknesses can emerge at ingestion, preprocessing, context assembly, or even during post-processing and tool invocation. Mapping defenses to each of these stages provides a practical framework for practitioners seeking to harden their LLM deployments against adversarial manipulation.

6 Conclusion

Experiments demonstrated that no model can reliably defend against prompt injection through alignment alone. Safeguards and complementary countermeasures must therefore be implemented to protect both users and the LLM.

Among the attack types, image-based injection remains the most concerning. As a relatively new vector, it introduces additional processing steps that complicate sanitization. Whether models rely on tokenization or pixel arrays, their use in sensitive domains—such as medical imaging—requires enhanced safeguards to mitigate the risks of adversarial manipulation.

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