NTLM Relay Is Dead?

No!



About us

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- Co-Founder of Qihoo360 PegasusTeam.
- Specializes in penetration testing and wireless security.
- A lecturer at the China Internet Security Conference (ISC) security training camp.
- Blackhat, Codeblue, Poc, Kcon, etc. Conference speaker.

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- Back2Zero/XDSEC Team.
- Independent Security Researcher.
- Currently focusing on web application security, cloud security, windows security.

TL,DR

- NTLM basic
- NTLM reflection attack history
- New technology to perform NTLM reflection attack
- A whole new perspective in SSRF
- Critical security issue in JAVA
- The new era in NTLM Reflection



Let's Talk About NTLM



NTLM Authentication

- NT LAN Manager: Suite of security protocols NTLM
- Network authentication for Remote Services
- Challenge-Response authentication mechanism



NTLM Authentication

- Supported by the NTLM Security Support Provider on Windows
- NTLMv1/NTLMv2/NTLM2 Session
- HTTP, SMB, LDAP, MSSQL, etc.



NTLM Type 1 Message

Client Request - NTLMSSP_NEGOTUATE





NTLM Type 2 Message


Server Response - NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE





NTLM Type 3 Message

Client Request - NTLMSSP_AUTH





NTLMv2 Type 3 Message

Difference in NTLMv2 and NTLMv1

Net-NTLM = f(Challenge, NTLM Hash, Client Challenge)

Add client challenge to NTLMSSP_AUTH

Client

Server



SMB -> SMB Reflection Attack



SMB Reflection - SMB->SMB


Steps to reproduce:

Visiting an attacker's Web site with file:// in HTLM.

The browser will authenticate to attacker automatically.

(There are many ways to get an SMB request)

Relaying the Net-NTLM HASH to the same machine (SMB Reflection)






SMB Reflection - MS08-068

Microsoft issued a partial fix (MS08-068)

Stop relaying back to itself finally.

Can not stop Attacker from

Relaying the Net-NTLM Hash to another machine or Perform Cross-Protocol Reflection attack.



Active Challenge Table



HTTP -> SMB Reflection Attack

Cross-Protocol Reflection



Hot Potato - HTTP->SMB Reflection

Combined 3 vulnerabilities to perform Privilege Escalation

- 1. NetBIOS Name Service Spoofing
- 2. Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (WAPD) MITM Attack
- 3. HTTP->SMB Reflection Attack



Hot Potato - HTTP->SMB Reflection

6 Steps To Reproduce (Windows 7)

- 1. Start NBNS Spoofing to hijack WAPD
- 2. Start a Web Server on localhost:80
- 3. Redirect Windows Defender Update request to http//localhost/GETHASHxxx
- 4. Send 401 Response to Windows Defender Update
- 5. Windows Defender Update will authenticate to us with SYSTEM account automatically.
- 6. Send the Net-NTLM Hash to Samba Service




Hot Potato - HTTP->SMB Reflection





Hot Potato - HTTP->SMB Reflection



Send 401 HTTP Response


NTLM Authentication Automatically

System account





Hot Potato - HTTP->SMB Reflection



Relay Net-NTLM hash to SMB Service







Hot Potato - HTTP->SMB Reflection

MS16-075

Fix local HTTP->SMB Reflection

MS16-077

WPAD Name Resolution will not use NetBIOS (CVE-2016-3213)

Does not send credential when requesting the PAC file(CVE-2016-3236)



New technology to perform NTLM reflection attack



A Journey to bypass MS16-075

Unpatched

```
38 192.168.98.1
                   3.359475 192.168.98.146 TCP
                                                                 54 80 → 49292 [ACK] Seq=358 Ack=537 Win=261824 Len=0
                                                                236 Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: \
   39 192.168.98.1 3.361675 192.168.98.146 SMB
   40 192.168.98.146 3.362064 192.168.98.1
                                                                 192 Session Setup AndX Response
                                                                 66 63611 → 445 [ACK] Seg=377 Ack=544 Win=131200 Len=0
   41 192,168,98,1
                      3.362090 192.168.98.146 TCP
▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
  ▼ SMB Header
       Server Component: SMB
       [Response to: 39]
       [Time from request: 0.000389000 seconds]
       SMB Command: Session Setup AndX (0x73)
       NT Status: STATUS_SUCCESS (0x00000000)
     ▶ Flags: 0x98, Request/Response, Canonicalized Pathnames, Case Sensitivity
     ▶ Flags2: 0x4801, Error Code Type, Extended Security Negotiation, Long Names Allowed
```



A Journey to bypass MS16-075

Patched

```
26 192.168.98.1
                                 0.225838
                                               192.168.98.151
                                                                    SMB
                                                                              221 Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
                                                                              352 Session Setup AndX Response, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE, Error: STATUS_
        27 192.168.98.151
                                  0.226159
                                                192.168.98.1
                                                                     SMB
                                  0.443404
        34 192.168.98.1
                                                                              236 Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: \
                                                192.168.98.151
                                                                     SMB
                                                                              105 Session Setup AndX Response, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
        35 192.168.98.151
                                  0.443875
                                                192.168.98.1
                                                                     SMB
                                                                              142 Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\192.168.98.151\IPC$
        38 192.168.98.1
                                  0.543386
                                                192.168.98.151
                                                                     SMB
                                  0.543593
                                                192.168.98.1
                                                                     SMB
                                                                              105 Tree Connect AndX Response, Error: Bad userid
        39 192.168.98.151
Frame 35: 105 bytes on wire (840 bits), 105 bytes captured (840 bits) on interface 0
Ethernet II, Src: Vmware_11:47:69 (00:0c:29:11:47:69), Dst: Vmware_c0:00:08 (00:50:56:c0:00:08)
Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.98.151, Dst: 192.168.98.1
Transmission Control Protocol, Src Port: 445, Dst Port: 64441, Seq: 418, Ack: 377, Len: 39
NetBIOS Session Service
SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)

▼ SMB Header
     Server Component: SMB
     [Response to: 34]
     [Time from request: 0.000471000 seconds]
     SMB Command: Session Setup AndX (0x73)
     NT Status: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xc00000022)
  ▶ Flags: 0x98, Request/Response, Canonicalized Pathnames, Case Sensitivity
   ▶ Flags2: 0x4801, Error Code Type, Extended Security Negotiation, Long Names Allowed
     Process ID High: 0
```



A Journey to bypass MS16-075

Flags in Type 2 Message

Contained in a bitfield within the header Most of these will make more sense late

Description	Content
Signature	Null-terminated ASCII "NTLMSSP"
Message Type	long (0x0200000)
Target Name	the name of the authentication target
Flags	long
Challenge	8 bytes information about the authentication target
Context	8 bytes
Target Information	security buffer
Version	8 bytes

Fuzzing NTLM Message Flags



A Journey to bypass MS16-075

Get a different Type 3 Message!

```
34 192.168.98.1
                   6.865052
                             192.168.98.151
                                                  503 HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized , NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE (text/html)
 35 192.168.98.151
                   6.869463
                             192.168.98.1
                                                  734 GET /mkmMLvT3ILii5V HTTP/1.1 , NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: WIN77\Administrator
 36 192.168.98.1
                   6.869538
                             192.168.98.151
                                           TCP
                                                   54 8080 → 49261 [ACK] Seq=450 Ack=937 Win=261440 Len=0
▼ Negotiate Flags: 0x028a0205, Negotiate Version, Negotiate Target Info, Negotiate Extended Security, Target Type Server, Negotiate NTLM key, Request Target, Negotiate UNICODE
   0... --- = Negotiate 56: Not set
   .0.. .... Key Exchange: Not set
   ..0. .... = Negotiate 128: Not set
       .... - Negotiate 0x10000000: Not set
   .... 0... ... ... ... = Negotiate 0x08000000: Not set
       .0.. .... 0x04000000: Not set
   .... ..1. .... .... .... = Negotiate Version: Set
       ...0 .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x01000000: Not set
   .... 1... 1... ... ... = Negotiate Target Info: Set
       .... .0.. .... .... .... = Request Non-NT Session: Not set
   .... -... ..0. .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x00200000: Not set
          ...0 .... .... = Negotiate Identify: Not set
   .... = Negotiate Extended Security: Set
          .... .0.. .... .... = Target Type Share: Not set
   .... = Target Type Server: Set
          .... ---- Target Type Domain: Not set
          .... -... .0.. .... = Negotiate 0x00004000: Not set
          .... -... Supplied: Not set
   .... ---- Negotiate Anonymous: Not set
   .... ---- Negotiate NT Only: Not set
   .... - Negotiate NTLM key: Set
   .... ---- 0x00000100: Not set
   .... = Negotiate Lan Manager Key: Not set
   .... = Negotiate Datagram: Not set
   .... = Negotiate Seal: Not set
   .... ---- Negotiate Sign: Not set
```



A Journey to bypass MS16-075

Negotiate Local Call:

The server sets this flag to inform the client that the server and client are on the same machine

```
▼ Negotiate Flags: 0xa28ac205, Negotiate 56, Negotiate 128, Negotiate Version, Negotiate Target Info,
   1... ---- = Negotiate 56: Set
   .0.. .... Key Exchange: Not set
   ..1. .... = Negotiate 128: Set
   ...0 .... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x10000000: Not set
   .... 0... .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x08000000: Not set
   .... .0.. .... .... .... .... = Negotiate 0x04000000: Not set
   .... ..1. .... .... .... .... = Negotiate Version: Set
   .... = Negotiate 0x01000000: Not set
   .... 1... 1... .... .... = Negotiate Target Info: Set
   .... .... .0.. .... .... .... = Request Non-NT Session: Not set
   .... ---- 0x00200000: Not set
   .... ---- Identify: Not set
   .... ---- 1... 1... .... --- Negotiate Extended Security: Set
   .... ----- O.. .... .... = Target Type Share: Not set
   .... ----- Target Type Server: Set
   .... ---- Target Type Domain: Not set
   .... = Negotiate 0x00004000: Set
                                                 ed: Not set
   .... ---- Supplied: Not set
   .... = Negotiate Anonymous: Not set
   .... ----- Negotiate NT Only: Not set
   .... ----- Negotiate NTLM key: Set
   .... ---- 0x00000100: Not set
   .... ----- Hegotiate Lan Manager Key: Not set
   .... ----- Degotiate Datagram: Not set
   .... ----- Negotiate Seal: Not set
   .... = Negotiate Sign: Not set
   .... = Request 0x00000008: Not set
   .... .... .... .... .... .1.. = Request Target: Set
   .... .... .... .... .... .... 1 = Negotiate UNICODE: Set
 NTLM Server Challenge: d2bc662dc82faafc
 Reserved: 303c460100000000
```

A Journey to bypass MS16-075

VIDEO DEMO



A Journey to bypass MS16-075

Now we bypass Microsoft patch successfully!



Rebirth Hot Potato

HTTP->SMB NTLM Reflection&WAPD Attack



Potato Rebirth - Bypass MS16-075

- MS16-075
 - Fix local HTTP->SMB Relay
 - Windows Defender Update Client will send a Net-NTLM hash that can't be exploited




Potato Rebirth - Bypass MS16-075

http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=121721



Potato Rebirth

MS16-075 Patched





Potato Rebirth - MS16-077

MS16-077:

WPAD Name Resolution will not use NetBIOS (CVE-2016-3213)

Does not send credential when requesting the PAC file(CVE-2016-3236)

WAPD MITM Attack is Dead!



Potato Rebirth - MS16-077

Compromising IPv4 networks via IPv6

using mitm6 to abuses the default IPv6 configuration in Windows network to spoof DNS replies by acting as a malicious DNS server and redirect traffic to an attacker-specified endpoint.

WAPD MITM Attack Rebirth!



Potato Rebirth - MS16-077

Combined 3 vulnerabilities to perform Privilege Escalation

- 1. Compromising IPv4 networks via IPv6 to hijack WAPD
- 2. Use go.microsoft.com to get an authentication
- 3. Change flag in NTLM Type 2 Message to bypass MS 16-75

Hot Potato Rebirth!



Incidentally

Man-in-the-middle Attack are required before most NTLM attacks

- Poison DNS
- Spoof NetBIOS/LLMNR
- ARP attack
- Exploit the WPAD
- etc

We always relay to SMB.

We need to wait and wait.




A Whole New perspective In SSRF


Ignore Many SSRF defense&Directly lead to RCE Via once exploit



New perspective In SSRF



New perspective In SSRF







New perspective In SSRF

FROM SSRF TO RCE

Attack Network Connector

- Completely ignore most of the SSRF defense solutions.
- Once exploiting can directly lead to the impact of RCE.
- Increasing the risk of many SSRF vulnerabilities which have been considered in low impact.



Critical Security Issue in JAVA



FROM SSRF TO RCE


URLConnection

The superclass of all classes that represent a communications link between the application and a URL.

The most of JAVA function use URLConnection to send HTTP request.



FROM SSRF TO RCE





FROM SSRF TO RCE

The default behavior of Java will not judge the validity of the URL, but always return true.

```
static class DefaultNTLMAuthenticationCallback extends NTLMAuthenticationCallback{

DefaultNTLMAuthenticationCallback() {

public boolean isTrustedSite(URL var1) {

return true;
}
}
```



FROM SSRF TO RCE







FROM SSRF TO RCE

VIDEO DEMO



FROM SSRF TO RCE

Affects all JDK versions!



FROM SSRF TO RCE

An SSRF vulnerability is required, is that all?



The new era in NTLM Reflection



New era in NTLM Reflection

NTLM Authenticate Automatically

Security issue in Java basic Class, that means most of JAVA application is affected.

Influence Expansion

Not just SSRF, anything which will send an HTTP request to us is affected. Over other vulnerabilities, such as XXE, Deserialization, etc.



Java Deserialization



New era in NTLM Reflection

Deserialization Attack (Affects most of Java application)

Chris Frohoff and Gabriel Lawrence presented their research into Java object deserialization vulnerabilities ultimately resulting in what can be readily described as the biggest wave of RCE bugs in Java history.

After two years later, Moritz Bechler releases a tool to achieve code execution during the unmarshalling process in 2017.

How to fixed?

Add a blacklist to mitigate Java Deserialization Attack.



New era in NTLM Reflection

Bypass all Java Deserialization Blacklist

Just need to find a gadget that will send an HTTP request to us.

Affected Software

All Java applications use a class blacklist to mitigate deserialization attack are affected.




Bypass all Java Deserialization Blacklist Directly lead to RCE



New era in NTLM Reflection

- SSRF
- Deserialization
- XXE
- Database
- Sandbox
- Java Security Scanner
- Java Crawler
- Cloud Service
- Man-In-The-Middle
- Anything sends an HTTP request to us





Acknowledgement

- OPCDE
- Impacket (@SecureAuthCorp)
- Responder (@SpiderLabs)
- mitm6 (@Foxglove Security)
- ZackAttack(@Urbane Security)



Thanks!

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