# **UNIVERSITY OF PISA**



# School of Engineering Master of Science in Computer Engineering Hardware And Embedded Security

# PROJECT DOCUMENTATION **AES-SBOX BASED STREAM CIPHER**

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# **Summary**

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# Specification analysis

The aim of this project is to build a stream cipher based on the AES S-box mechanism. In particular, the plaintext, an 8-bit ASCII coded character, is XORed with the value obtained by the substitution of an 8-bit counter value inside the AES S-Box component. The counter value is initialized with the value of the symmetric key, provided as input, and then incremented whenever a new character is being fed to the circuit. The encryption consists in:

$$C[i] = P[i] \oplus S(CB[i])$$

#### Where:

- C[i] is the 8-bit ASCII code of the i<sup>th</sup> character of ciphertext.
- P[i] is the 8-bit ASCII code of the i<sup>th</sup> character of plaintext.
- CB[i] is the 8-bit value of the i<sup>th</sup> counter (counter block), for i = 0,1,2,..., and it can be represented by the formula CB[i] = K + i mod 256, being K the 8-bit symmetric key.
- S() is the S-box transformation of AES algorithm, that works over a byte.
- is the XOR operator.

From these requirements we first studied which were the input and output needed for our logic network for the encryption.

#### Required inputs:

- 1. symmetric key
- 2. plaintext
- 3. din\_valid

The symmetric key is an 8-bit numerical value while the plaintext must be interpreted as an 8-bit ASCII coded character. There is also a din\_valid pin which must be used to notify cipher when the input values are ready.

#### Required outputs:

- dout\_ready
- 2. ciphertext

The ciphertext is the result of the encryption process while the dout\_valid pin acts like a notification that the output data is ready, therefore a consumer network needs to check it before consuming the ciphertext data.

From these inputs, that were provided as a requirement, we started thinking how we should treat the arrival of new plaintext in the same encryption session: we decided that our network must be able to manage sequential plaintext arrival. In particular, if the user driving the network keeps the din\_valid pin to 1 and changes the plaintext at each clock, the network must be able to sample each new input and provide as output the corresponding encrypted value at the subsequent clock. We also evaluated other possibilities to differentiate the arrival of sequential plaintext, like for example make it explicit by exploiting the din\_valid pin: the user piloting the network needs to reset the din\_valid pin and raise it up again in the next clock cycle to differentiate different plaintext arrival. None of the solutions looked brilliant because they affect the throughput by wasting clock cycles. The decision of not relying on any explicit input for new plaintext arrival implies that encryption must be performed in just one clock cycle after the corresponding sampling, reducing as much as possible the overhead due to input data variation.

As another design choice we decided to not insert an error pin in case of wrong inputs. So, in case the user provides as plaintext not an ASCII coded character the network will perform the encryption as well and it will not generate an internal error.

Finally, we started reasoning about the decryption module. From our design schemes it basically turned out that the decryption module is exactly the same as the encryption one, where the ciphertext (instead of the plaintext), the symmetric key and din\_valid are provided as inputs, while the plaintext and dout\_ready are provided as output.

From a mathematical perspective this reasoning is true thanks to those properties of the XOR operator:

(1) 
$$A \oplus A = 0$$

(2) 
$$A \oplus 0 = A$$

Suppose we have as input a symmetric key k and a ciphertext c, what will happen is that the substitution inside of the S-Box is the same that the one performed during the encryption (since it still uses just the symmetric key).

Let's call with S the substituted S-Box value from the key.

**Encryption** is

$$C = P \oplus S$$
.

Decryption instead is

$$C \oplus S = (P \oplus S) \oplus S = P \oplus S \oplus S = P \oplus (S \oplus S) = P$$

So, in the end we decided to not create a new module for decryption but instead we will use the same encryption module for that.

# Block diagram and design choices

The device is implemented as a Mealy machine operating in four possible states, stored into STAR register:

- **SO**, reset state triggered by a negative edge of the *\_reset* signal meant for keeping the state untouched regardless of how inputs are driven. State kept until the very next positive edge of the *\_reset* signal.
- **S1\_INIT,** reached right after S0. In this state both *plain\_text* and *symmetric\_key* input signals are stored in the correspondent registers when *din\_valid* pin is high.
- **S1**, like the above one, except for the fact that the key stored in S1\_INIT state is kept updated as new input are supplied to the circuit.
- **S2,** finally, in this state the output is ready and stored in TXT\_OUT\_CHAR register and *dout\_ready* signal is set to "1". As long the input signal *din\_valid* is kept high this state will not be exited providing the outer world a new valid output every cycle, otherwise the circuit enters S1 state waiting for a new valid input.




Figure 1 logic representation of the encryption/decryption circuit.

Such architecture allows the user to continuously supply input (both plain text and cipher text) and consequently retrieving valid output every clock cycle. The presence of state S1 can be useful in the circumstance in which a train of input data cannot be furnished. In this state, in fact, the circuits maintain the key for the next byte and waits for a valid input.

Next image shows a theoretical complete round of execution.




Figure 2 Theoretical round of execution

### Waveforms

The simulation shown in figure 3 is a practical demonstration of the architecture explained above. It is possible to denote the positive edge of the *rst\_n* signal that is followed by the assignment of the symmetric key and the first byte to be encrypted respectively on the *simmetric\_key* and *txt\_in\_char* pins. The effective process of encryption, once sampled the plaintext (and the key as well), takes only the time of traversing the LUT and a barrier of XORs. Both are implemented as asynchronous logic, whose propagation time is well contained in a clock cycle.




Figure 3 simulation of file encryption containing "hello world!" with key 8'h12

#### The same can be told for the decryption process:





Figure 4 simulation of file decryption

# **Testbench**

The test phase is composed by a testbench written in Verilog and a script written in Python simulating the circuit, capable of producing valid output for a given plaintext.

The testbench consists simply in feeding the cipher the conte of a cipher-text one byte at a time and then storing the output into a brand-new file. The latter is then matched with the correspondent target output obtained leveraging the Python script.

Instead, to check the validity of the file containing deciphered text it is enough to confront them with the original text-file previously encrypted and the decrypted.







Figure 5 High-Level representation of the testing flow

# Implementation of RTL design on FPGA and results

We implemented the RTL design on the device 5CGXFC9D6F27C7 of the Cyclone V family.



#### Static Timing Analysis (STA)

We added a Synopsis Design Constraints named timing\_constraints.sdc where added a timing constraint for the clock but also the input and output delays.

create\_clock -name clk -period 10 [get\_ports clk]

set\_false\_path -from [get\_ports rst\_n] -to [get\_clocks clk]


set\_input\_delay -min 1 -clock [get\_clocks clk] [get\_ports {rst\_n din\_valid simmetric\_key[\*] txt\_in\_char[\*]}]

set\_input\_delay -max 2 -clock [get\_clocks clk] [get\_ports {rst\_n din\_valid simmetric\_key[\*] txt\_in\_char[\*]}]


set\_output\_delay -min 1 -clock [get\_clocks clk] [get\_ports {dout\_ready[\*] txt\_out\_char[\*]}]

set\_output\_delay -max 2 -clock [get\_clocks clk] [get\_ports {dout\_ready[\*] txt\_out\_char[\*]}]


After we ran the STA without the virtual pin assignment, we obtained these results in terms of maximum frequency:



Although when checking the Timing Closure Recommendations tab, we found that there were some failing setup paths with the output pins of the ciphertext data. This was due to the fact that we had not performed yet the virtual pin assignment.





We then performed the virtual pin assignment with the following settings:




By re-running analysis & synthesis task, the fitter task and the STA analysis we then ended up with those final results:

#### Slow model





#### Fast model



Fast 1100mV 0C Model Hold Summary

Slack

0.172

**End Point TNS** 

0.000

<<Filter>>
Clock

clk

Finally, no failing setup paths were found, and the worst-case slack is 2.377ns. The slack basically indicates the margin by which a timing requirement is met or not met. In the specific the slack is the difference between the required time and the arrival time in each path. In this case since it is positive it means that there is not a path which is too slow, instead the worst one is fast enough to meet all timing requirements.



Last thing we did was to generate the code to program the FPGA device. This operation was done just to make sure that there were no errors during this task, since we did not physically have a Cyclone V FPGA device at our disposal.

