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Remote Debugging Detection in Android

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
Master's Degree programme
in Computer Science

Academic Year 2022-2023

What is the problem?




Store sensitive information




Steal sensitive information

How can this happen?


Man-At-The-End (MATE) Attacks



Incremental executions attacks



Target program



Incremental executions

What is a possible solution?

Know the attacker in advance



How does an attacker think?


What could the attacker do?



Prevent the attack

How is it possible?

Components of the process




Data
mining



Anomaly
detection




Debugger
detection



Security
level

What types of data are useful?



High level information:

connected real debuggers

Medium level information:

sensors data, sensors alerts, settings,
recharge type, debuggable applications,
application state in lifecycle

Low level information:

duration of syscall, sequences of syscall,
incremental executions path

Why exactly these information?


Some suspicious cases



Stationary device




USB connection



Wrong syscall sequences


Software architecture



Architecture description



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Components description



Server (Python): sensors alerts, statistics of system calls, instruction sequences, incremental execution paths, calculation of device alert level



Low level library (C++): system calls, sequences of syscall, incremental executions path, thesis project of another classmate



High level library (JAVA): debuggers, sensors data, settings, recharge type, debuggable applications

Types of execution logs

C++ library logs

Syscall started

```
----- SYSCALL ENTRY START -----  
Notification origin: it.mircovenerba.audiorecorder  
PID: 14711 SPID: 14711  
Timestamp: 1673561963897680  
Syscall = ioctl (29)  
Stack unwinding = {  
    PC 0x000079d54b34d8 ... - startRecording(..)  
    PC 0x000079d546f2f4 ... - talkWithDriver(..)  
    PC 0x000079ca76e7ac ... - main(..) .....}  
Parameters = {  
    0x000000000000003c  
    0x00000000c0306201  
    0x0000007fcfedfb68...}  
Registers = {  
    PC: 0x00000079d54b34d8  
    SP: 0x0000007fcfedfa50  
    RET: 0x000000000000003c...}  
----- SYSCALL ENTRY STOP -----
```

Syscall finished

```
----- SYSCALL EXIT START -----  
PID: 18480  
SPID: 18480  
Timestamp: 1684069975351329  
Return value: 0000000000000000  
----- SYSCALL EXIT STOP -----
```

Types of extracted data for each syscall

- timing
- system call number
- stack trace
- parameters
- cpu registers

Java library logs – first part

Debuggable applications	Recharge type	Developer options
Debuggable flag enabled in the manifest file	Check when the recharge type is USB	Check if they are enabled
<p>LIST OF DEBUGGABLE APPLICATIONS</p> <p>Application Name: AudioRecorder</p> <p>Application Name: Progetto Android</p>	<p>LIST OF CHARGING RECORDS</p> <p>Charging record Is charging: True Usb charging: True Ac charging: False Start timestamp: 1684070992389 Finish timestamp: 17893546284049</p> <p>Charging record Is charging: False Usb charging: False Ac charging: False Start timestamp: 17893546284050</p>	<p>LIST OF DEVELOPER OPTIONS RECORDS</p> <p>Developer options record Developer options: True Android debug bridge: True Start timestamp: 1684070992362</p>

Java library logs – second part

Debuggers	App lifecycle	Sensors data
Check when a debugger is attached	Check when the application is running	Check if each position is valid or not
<p>LIST OF ALL DEBUGGERS</p> <p>Debugger Name: GDB debugger Found: False</p> <p>Debugger Name: JDWP debugger Found: True Timestamp: 1684070992389</p>	<p>LIST OF ALL LIFECYCLE RECORDS</p> <p>Lifecycle record On resume: True On pause: False Start timestamp: 1684071051553 Finish timestamp: 1891736453297</p> <p>Lifecycle record On resume: False On pause: True Start timestamp: 1891736453298</p>	<p>LIST OF ALL SENSOR NUMBER RECORDS</p> <p>Sensor record Azimuth value: 0 Pitch value: 2 Roll value: 0 Start timestamp: 1684070994605 Finish timestamp: 1684070994606</p> <p>Sensor record Azimuth value: 0 Pitch value: 2 Roll value: 359 Start timestamp: 1684070994607</p>

Web server logs – first part

Instructions analysis	Instructions sequence	Simple syscalls sequences
Count instructions with longer duration		(pid, spid)
<p>ANALYSIS OF INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>Instruction</p> <p>Name: clock_gettime Minimum duration: 182 Maximum duration: 5436 Average duration: 829.66 Number measurements: 78 List measurements: [1854, 857, 801...]</p> <p>Instruction</p> <p>Name: close Minimum duration: 353 Maximum duration: 353 Average duration: 353 Number measurements: 1 List measurements: [353]</p>	<p>LIST OF INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>Instruction</p> <p>Name: clock_gettime Pid: 20403 Spid: 20403 Status: Finished Start: 1684070932532139 Finish: 1684070932533993 Duration: 1854 Return Value: 0</p> <p>Instruction</p> <p>Name: clock_gettime Pid: 20403 Spid: 20403 Status: Not finished Start: 1684070932533994</p>	<p>LIST OF SYSCALLS SEQUENCES</p> <p>Sequence</p> <p>(20403, 20403) -> ['clock_gettime', 'clock_gettime', 'gettimeofday', 'write', 'sendto', 'recvfrom', 'clock_gettime', 'clock_gettime', 'gettimeofday', 'read', ...]</p> <p>Sequence</p> <p>(20403, 20404) -> ['getuid', 'epoll_pwait', 'clock_gettime', 'clock_gettime', 'gettimeofday', 'read', 'clock_gettime', 'read', 'getuid', 'epoll_pwait', ...]</p>

Web server logs – second part

Possible next instruction	Incremental execution path	Alert level device
Check if the sequence is valid or not	Check how actual path is % equal of last one	Alert level from 0 to 10, 9 / 10 device blocked
<p>LIST OF POSSIBLE INSTRUCTIONS</p> <p>Instruction Name: clock_gettime Next: [clock_gettime, epoll_pwait, ..]</p> <p>Instruction Name: epoll_pwait Next: [fcntl, gettimeofday, getuid, ioctl, ...]</p>	<p>LIST OF FOUND SUBSEQUENCES</p> <p>SUBSEQUENCE Portion of code: 8.928571428571429% Subsequence: ['recvfrom', 'recvfrom', 'clock_gettime', 'epoll_pwait',]</p> <p>SUBSEQUENCE Portion of code: 12.5% Subsequence: ['futex', 'clock_gettime', 'clock_gettime', 'futex', 'clock_gettime', ...]</p>	<p>Device</p> <p>Ip address: 192.168.1.3 Security level: 7 Good things: C++ library started Debugger not found Subsequences not found Bad things: Debuggable applications Developer options Charging type USB Instruction more duration many times Sequence not secure many times Sensor alerts many times Stationary device many times</p>

Validation and testing

Process stages



Web server – Training mode

Model = all the possible combinations that identify normal, or rather ideal, behavior of an Android application

Instruction level

clock_gettime has longer duration: 612, now is mapped

epoll_pwait has longer duration: 1345, now is mapped

recvfrom has longer duration: 438, now is mapped

recvfrom has new minimum duration: 177 vs 438->438

clock_gettime has new minimum duration: 237 vs 612->612

clock_gettime has new maximum duration: 879 vs 237->612

gettimeofday has longer duration: 176, now is mapped

Sequence level

Insert recvfrom -> clock_gettime sequence? [yes/no] yes

Insert clock_gettime -> clock_gettime sequence? [yes/no] yes

Insert clock_gettime -> gettimeofday sequence? [yes/no] yes

Insert gettimeofday -> write sequence? [yes/no] yes

Insert write -> clock_gettime sequence? [yes/no] no

Insert gettimeofday -> read sequence? [yes/no] no

Insert read -> clock_gettime sequence? [yes/no] yes

Web server – Check mode


<p>Found debuggable application Security level of device = 1</p> <p>Found developer options enabled Security level of device = 2</p> <p>Device stationary</p> <p>Bad position</p> <p>Found invalid sequence: recvfrom -> epoll_pwait</p> <p>socket has longer duration: 6230 vs 213->4937</p> <p>Bad position</p> <p>Found USB charging type Security level of device = 3</p> <p>clock_gettime has longer duration: 16228 vs 176->14562</p> <p>gettimeofday has longer duration: 21512 vs 145->7662</p>	<p>Longer duration many times Security level of device = 4</p> <p>Device stationary</p> <p>Found subsequence</p> <p>Found invalid sequence: getuid -> gettimeofday</p> <p>Found invalid sequence: ioctl -> epoll_ctl</p> <p>Insecure sequence many times Security level of device = 5</p> <p>Bad position</p> <p>Device stationary</p> <p>Bad position</p> <p>Bad position many times Security level of device = 6</p>	<p>openat has longer duration: 6707 vs 354->5938</p> <p>socket has longer duration: 5544 vs 213->4937</p> <p>Device stationary</p> <p>Device stationary many times Security level of device = 7</p> <p>Found invalid sequence: futex -> write</p> <p>ioctl has longer duration: 9449 vs 225->3346</p> <p>A jdwp debugger is found Security level of device = 10, device blocked</p>
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Examples of next actions


In relation of the **alert level of the device**

- keep the connection enabled for safe device
- keep warning devices always monitored
- put in a blacklist all blocked devices
- possibly block the connection for less secure devices

Test applications



Calculator



Audio recorder

Future developments

Some future developments

- Unique identifier of the device
- Reprojection all functionality in the same and native package
- In-depth study of settings file to understand which is the most suitable combination for all configuration variables
- Improvement of the training phase using machine learning algorithms
- Implementation of 1 to n model in the web server

**Thanks for
the attention**

Related work

- MATE attacks
 - Obfuscation, e.g. the modification of the code / flow of execution
 - Device attestation, e.g. device properties verified and not counterfeit
 - Dynamic code renewability, e.g. a tool chain capable to modify code
 - Self debugging, e.g. connected debugger to occupy the unique free position
- Anomaly detection
 - Static analysis (ProfileDroid), e.g. code that acquire and communicate sensitive data
 - Dynamic analysis (TaintDroid), e.g. various levels of abstraction
 - Download external resources (DroidTrace), e.g. check resources from a remote server
 - Sandboxing (Aurasium), e.g. application inside a bubble