

IT Security



Chapter 6: Secure Software Engineering

Part 1

- ▶ Process model
- ▶ Analysis of safety requirements
- ▶ Security architecture and design
- ▶ Security analysis tools





What do we want to learn?

- ▶ How do we get security into the software engineering process?
- ▶ What should we consider regarding security before implementation?
- ▶ What are the design principles for security?
- ▶ How can I verify security in my IT-System?






Why Secure Software Engineering?

- ▶ Insecure software can cause nasty surprises




The phases of Secure Software Engineering






The requirements and concept phase





A process model for security analysis





Step 2 in the process model: specify the protection requirements

- ▶ Identify critical information objects
 - ▶ Evaluation regarding security objectives (CIA)
 - ▶ What is the damage if security objectives are violated?
- ▶ Evaluate the protection requirements of the use cases
 - ▶ Which use cases cause high damage if security objectives are violated?
 - ▶ Also consider technical use cases (e.g., certificate management, system administration, authorization assignment).
- ▶ Assign roles and rights in the system
 - ▶ Which users/roles are there?
 - ▶ Who is allowed to do what?
 - ▶ Establish access control principles ("need to know", "segregation of duties", ...)
- ▶ Identify and analyze threats
 - ▶ Threat Modeling
 - ▶ Risk analysis





A modell for Threat Analysis




▶ Microsoft Threat Model: STRIDE

- ▶ **S**poofing
 - ▶ Users should not be able to become any other user or assume the attributes of another user
- ▶ **T**ampering
 - ▶ Data tampering involves the malicious modification of persistent data and data over networks.
- ▶ **R**epudiation
 - ▶ Users may dispute transactions if there is insufficient auditing or recordkeeping of their activity

[https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/commerce-server/ee823878\(v=cs.20\)](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/commerce-server/ee823878(v=cs.20))



STRIDE



▶ Microsoft Threat Model: STRIDE

▶ Information Disclosure

- ▶ The exposure of information to individuals who are not supposed to have access to it

▶ Denial of Service

- ▶ Deny service to valid users—for example, by making a Web server temporarily unavailable or unusable

▶ Elevation of Privilege

- ▶ An unprivileged user gains privileged access and thereby has sufficient access to compromise or destroy the entire system



Microsoft Threat Modeling



- ▶ There are five major threat modelling steps
 - ▶ defining security requirements
 - ▶ creating an application diagram
 - ▶ identifying threats
 - ▶ mitigating threats
 - ▶ validating that threats have been mitigated

Quelle: <https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/securityengineering/sdl/threatmodeling>

Microsoft Threat Modeling Tool <https://aka.ms/threatmodelingtool>

▶ Alternative approaches to threat analysis

- ▶ Misuse cases
- ▶ Attack trees
- ▶ Threat catalogs

Weitere Informationen in:
Matthias Rohr: Sicherheit von Webanwendungen in der Praxis,
Springer Vieweg, 2018 (**E-Book**)



Threat Modeling Process

https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Threat_Modeling_Cheat_Sheet.html

- ▶ Decompose and model the system
 - ▶ Create an application diagram (processes, data store, actors)
 - ▶ Describe data flow (data in transit and at rest)
 - ▶ Define trust boundaries
- ▶ Identify Threats
 - ▶ Define all possible threats
 - ▶ Identify attack vectors, attack trees and misuse cases
 - ▶ Map threat agents to application entry points
 - ▶ Define the impact and probability for each threat
→ **Risk Analysis**
- ▶ Determine Countermeasures and mitigation
 - ▶ Identify risk owner (responsible for mitigation)
 - ▶ Build risk treatment strategy (Reduce, Transfer, Avoid, Accept)



Sample Model from modeling tool OWASP Threat Dragon



Threat Dragon

Edit diagram >


Edit threats v

Credentials should be encrypted
Information disclosure



+ Add a new threat...

Main Request Data Flow



<https://owasp.org/www-project-threat-dragon/>



Example for Threat Modeling with STRIDE:

Identify threats and assign type and mitigations

Threat	Type	Mitigation
Unauthorized request to DB	I	All queries to be authenticated
DB Credential Theft	I	Use FW to restrict access to DB to only background Worker IP
Message Tampering in Message queue	T	Sign all messages
Fake messages in queue	S	Implement authentication on queue
Generate malicious messages that Background Worker cannot process	D	Validate content of messages before processing, reject messages with invalid content, log the rejection, do not log the malicious content
Brute forcing of Web Application Login	E	Slowdown login attempt after unsuccessful login, 2FA for admin accounts
Sniffing of Web requests	I	Https Encryption of all requests
SQL injection	T	Input validation
Undocumented change of Web App Config	R	Auditing all changes in Web App Config, access control to Web App Config



Risik Analysis



- ▶ A comprehensive risk/threat analysis is costly and time-consuming
 - ▶ often the customer/client is not ready for it
 - ▶ → Perform a pragmatic risk analysis
- ▶ Focus on the most important risks
- ▶ Focus on data criticality and interfaces
- ▶ Risks must be assessed by the responsible parties (ISO, DPO, product owner, management)
- ▶ Establish transparency about the assessment of risks
 - ▶ Review by ISO/DPO

▶ Risk analysis for Logging



- ▶ We consider logging in a cloud application as an example



- ▶ Security Goals
 - ▶ The root cause of incidents or faulty platform or application behavior can be adequately analyzed and identified.
 - ▶ Required log data and analysis tools are available and correspond to the actual state of the system at the relevant time.
 - ▶ The technical logs are secured from unauthorized access and manipulation.



Risks at Logging

⚡ Availability

- **R-1: Missing log data.** An incident cannot be sufficiently analyzed because relevant log information for the required period of time has not been collected, e.g. due to a misconfiguration/failure of the log stack or according infrastructure components.
- **R-2: Loss of log data.** Log information gets lost, e.g. due to a failure of the log storage.

⚡ Integrity

- **R-3: Manipulation of logs.** The root cause of an incident can be hidden or obscured by modification or deletion of log data.

⚡ Availability

- **R-4: No access to log data.** Relevant log data cannot be viewed when required due to blocked access, e.g. missing credentials

⚡ Confidentiality

- **R-5: Disclosure of sensitive log information.** Information written to log files can give valuable guidance to an attacker or expose sensitive user data

⚡ Compliance

- **R-6: Violation of deletion obligation.** To store log files longer than the allowed retention period violates compliance (e.g. GDPR)



Risk-Control-Matrix for Logging

System Component	Risk	Risk name	Mitigating measures
Logging	R-1	Missing log data	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- all logs are collected and stored in a central managed log stack- log configuration is maintained by DevOps experts- regular review of all critical assets for their correctness and currency- mechanism to ensure that all required logs are captured (e.g. via documented search in logging system, configuration rule/policy)
Logging	R-2	Loss of log data	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- backup of log data by AWS- storage of log data provided by AWS in a managed ELK stack- retention of 30 days- independent monitoring of logging software with alerting in case of failure
Logging	R-3	Manipulation of logs	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- log data secured by AWS- access control via IAM- measures for integrity- audit the access to log data
Logging	R-4	No access to log data	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- availability is provided by AWS
Logging	R-5	Disclosure of sensitive log information	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- isolation of application log data (separate storage and access control for different applications/tenants)- role-based access control to logs- encryption of data at rest, decryption key only available to application owner- transport of log data is secured with minimum TLS 1.2
Logging	R-6	Violation of deletion obligation	<ul style="list-style-type: none">- complete deletion of log data immediately after end of retention period- there are no local copies / snapshots of log data (enforced by policy)- deletion process according to GDPR and security needs



The result of the security analysis is a **Security Concept**

