

Identity Blockchain - Proof of Identity

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Abstract

Identity Blockchain uses state-certified electronic identities (eIDs) to create blockchain identities and a consensus protocol called Proof of Identity (PoI). PoI is "green" and enables many applications that are impossible to implement without verified identity on the blockchain, e.g., direct democracy and universal basic income, encrypted messaging, etc. *Identity Blockchain* preserves identity anonymity by using zk-SNARKs and an anonymization protocol for identity onboarding.

1 Introduction

TODO

2 Notation

(K, K^{-1})	Pair of public key K and the corresponding private key K^{-1}
$K(value)$	String $value$ encrypted with a public key K
$K^{-1}(value)$	String $value$ encrypted with a private key K^{-1}
H	zk-SNARK-friendly hash function
Nin	Unique state-issued personal <i>National Identification Number</i>
CA	Certificate Authority
eID	Electronic identification document
K_{ID}	CA-certified public key of eID
K_P	Person key, unique public key used to access <i>Identity Blockchain</i>

Sometimes we write K for (K, K^{-1}) .

3 Registering K_{ID}

Register K_{ID} on *Identity Blockchain* by calling

$$registerK_{ID}(H(Nin), K_{ID}^{-1}("registerK_{ID}"), proofNinOwnsKid).$$

Pseudo-solidity code

```
1  mapping(uint256 => uint256) public ninKidUsed;
2  mapping(uint256 => bool) public kidInvalid;
3
4  function registerKid(
5      uint256 hNin, // hNin = H(Nin)
6      uint256 vKid, // vKid = KidPrivate("registerKid")
7      bytes proofNinOwnsKid
8  ) public {
9      uint256 previousKey = ninKidUsed[hNin];
10     if (previousKey == vKid) return; // already registered
11     bool isOwner = zksnarkverify(VK, [hNin, vKid],
12         proofNinOwnsKid); // VK = verification key
13     if (isOwner && !kidInvalid[vKid]) {
14         if (previousKey != 0) kidInvalid[previousKey] = true;
15         ninKidUsed[hNin] = vKid;
16     }
```

Pseudo-circom code

Using <https://github.com/zkp-application/circom-rsa-verify> for now, MIT license. Which probably doesn't work, we should check (sha256?). The next line is used on a file of shape: —BEGIN PUBLIC KEY— ... —END PUBLIC KEY— —BEGIN CERTIFICATE— ... —END CERTIFICATE— We assume: modulus = Subject Modulus exp = Subject Exponent
 openssl x509 -in Identification.pem -text -noout

```

1  pragma circom 2.0.0;
2
3  include "./utils/rsa_verify.circom"
4  include "./circomlib/circuits/sha256/sha256.circom"
5  include "./circomlib/bitify.circom"
6
7  //hashNumberOfWords = 4 for sha256
8  //rsaNumberOfWords = 32 for 2048 rsa
9  //we use words of 64 bits
10 template NinOwnsKid(
11     rsaNumberOfWords,
12     hashNumberOfWords,
13     lengthInBitsOfSignedMessage,
14     lengthOfNinInBits
15 ){
16     //TODO: What happens to uint256 when converted to signal
17
18     //public:
19     signal input hNin;
20     signal input vKid;
21
22     //private:
23     signal input Nin;
24     //Kid, CA signature
25     signal input exp[rsaNumberOfWords];
26     signal input sign[rsaNumberOfWords];
27     signal input modulus[rsaNumberOfWords];
28
29     //we need some inputs to verify what is signed
30     //and that Nin in the right place in the signed message
31     signal input messageToBeSigned[lengthInBitsOfSignedMessage];
32     signal input Nin[lengthOfNinInBits];
33
34     //TODO: Insert Nin into messageToBeSigned in the right place
35     //or create constraint on the corresponding bits
36
37
38     component sha = Sha256(lengthInBitsOfSignedMessage);
39     for (int i = 0; i<lengthInBitsOfSignedMessage; i++) {
40         sha.in[i] <== messageToBeSigned[i]
41     }
42
43     var hashed[hashNumberOfWords]; //4x64 bit
44     var hashedBits[hashNumberOfWords*64];
45     for (int i=0; i<hashNumberOfWords*64;i++){
46         hashedBits[i] <== sha.out[i];
47     }
48     component b2n = Bits2Num(64);
49     //TODO:Can we use a component multiple times?
50     //Will all the constraints be generated
51     for (int i=0;i<hashNumberOfWords;i++){
52         for (int j=0;j<64;j++){
53             b2n.in[j] <== hashedBits[i*64+j];
54         }
55         hashed[i] <== b2n.out;
56     }
57
58
59     //lets assume sha256WithRSAEncryption
60
61     component rsa = RsaVerifyPkcs1v15(64, rsaNumberOfWords, 17,

```

Features

Sybil resistance

A Person is prevented from registering more than one K_P , e.g. by using different identification documents issued for the same Nin .

Fix for the loss of eID

A Person who has lost a previously registered K_{ID} , e.g. due to loss of eID, can overwrite it by registering a new K_{ID} .

Identity theft damage control

If a Person overwrites the previous K_{ID} with a new one, the identity Thief loses access to services that verify the entire identity chain.

Remarks

- i) An entity that knows K_{ID} , e.g. the CA who certified the corresponding eID, can know that the Person has registered K_{ID} on *Identity Blockchain*.
- ii) Reasoning for the choice of arguments: if $H(Nin, K_{ID}^{-1}(\text{"register } K_{ID}"))$ was used as an argument, then TODO. On the other hand, the choice of arguments Nin and $K_{ID}^{-1}(\text{"register } K_{ID}"))$ would TODO.

4 Registering K_P

Register K_P on *Identity Blockchain* by calling

$$\text{register}K_P(\text{Nin}K_{ID}, \text{Nin}K_{ID}K_P, \text{proof}),$$

where:

$$\text{Nin}K_{ID} = H(\text{Nin}, K_{ID}^{-1}(\text{"register}K_P\text{"}))$$

$$\text{Nin}K_{ID}K_P = H(\text{Nin}, K_{ID}^{-1}(\text{"register}K_P\text{"}), K_P^{-1}(\text{"register}K_P\text{"})).$$

Pseudo-solidity code

```
1  mapping(uint256 => uint256) public ninKidKpUsed;  
2  mapping(uint256 => bool) public kpInvalid;  
3  mapping(uint256 => uint256) public ninKidKpLastConfirmed;  
4  
5  function registerKp(  
6      uint256 ninKid,  
7      uint256 ninKidKp,  
8      bytes proof  
9  ) public {  
10     uint256 previousKey = ninKidKpUsed[ninKid];  
11     if (previousKey == ninKid) return; // already registered  
12     bool ok = zksnarkverify(VK, [ninKid, ninKidKp], proof); //  
        VK = verification key  
13     if (ok && !kpInvalid[ninKidKp]) {  
14         if (previousKey != 0) kpInvalid[previousKey] = true;  
15         ninKidKpUsed[ninKid] = ninKidKp;  
16         ninKidKpLastConfirmed[ninKid] = block.number;  
17     }  
18 }
```

Features

Sybil resistance

K_P is a unique public key bound to the Person on the *Identity Blockchain*. By design, the Person cannot have two valid K_P keys at the same time.

TODO: Explanation/proof.

Anonymity

No one who has a database with all public keys K_{ID} or/and public keys K_P can tell, from the function call, which Nin , K_{ID} or K_P was used. This is true under the assumption that CA, which certified the eID, does not have access to K_{ID}^{-1} , i.e. that K_{ID} was securely generated on the eID.

TODO: Explanation/proof.

Remarks

- i) Reasoning behind the choice of arguments: TODO

5 zkp code

```
1 //pseudo zokrates zk-SNARK
2 import "hashes/sha256/512bitPacked" as sha256packed
3 import "ecc/babyjubjubParams.code" as context
4 import "ecc/proofOfOwnership.code" as proofOfOwnership
5
6 def proofPINOwnsK(
7     field[2] PINHash,
8     field[2] K_1Hash,
9     field[2]
10
11     private field[?] CACert){
12 }
13
14 def proof_of_being_a_person(
15     //publically known arguments
16     field[2] PINKeyUsedHash,
17     field[2] PINKeyPersonKeyIssuedHash,
18     field[2] PersonKeyInvalidHash,
19     field[2] KeyInvalidHash,
20
21     //BC state
22     field BC_PINUsed, //BC State
23     field BC_PINKeyUsed, //BC State
24     field BC_PINKeyPersonKeyIssued, //BC State
25     field BC_PersonKeyInvalid, //BC State
26     field BC_KeyInvalid, //BC State
27     ?field BC_private_key_challenge?
28
29     //CA keys!
30     field[?][?] CAKeys, //? BC State
31     ...
32
33     //private data
34     //15360 bit RSA key is equivalent to 256-bit symmetric keys
35     //2048 bit RSA key is equivalent to 112 bit symmetric keys
36     //eID has 2048 bit RSA
37     private field PIN, //max 254 bits, using only 128 = 16 bytes
38     private field K_private_bc_new, //ECC private key
39     private field[?] K_new, //public RSA key from eID
40     private field[?] K_1_new, //private RSA key from eID, actually
41         signed message
42     //K_1_new("PeopleBC person proof")
43     private field K_private_bc_old, //ECC private key, old
44     private field[?] K_1_old, //K_1_old("PeopleBC person proof")?
45     //?private field[2] K_bc_new, //ECC public key ?no need for key
46         pair verification?
47     //?private field[2] K_bc_old, //ECC public key ?no need for key
48         pair verification
49     private field[?] CACert,
50     private field CAindex
51 {
52     //actual checking code here
53     field[2] hash_PIN = sha256packed([0,0,0,PIN])
54     assert(hash_PIN == PINHash); //proving that we know the real PIN,
55         unimportant
```

```

52
53 //proving ownership of newly registered key,
54 //no real need to prove ownership of bc key
55 //we actually need to prove ownership of K_1_new,
56 //and its connection to PIN via CA
57 context=context()//babyjubjubParams context
58 proofOfOwnership(K_bc_new, K_private_bc_new, context)==1
59
60 //prove that you own the K_new
61 //pseudo
62 RSADecrypt(K_new, K_1_new) == "PeopleBC Person Proof";//?+
    BC_private_key_challenge;
63
64 //prove that Key is connected to CA
65 //pseudo
66 checkCASSignature(CAKey[CAindex], CACert, K_new) == 1;
67
68 //prove that K_new is PIN certificate
69 //pseudo
70 extractPIN(CACert)==PIN;
71
72 //end
73
74 //end..
75 }

```

6 Problems

- P1** The rate of addition of identities, the problems of frequent changes of Merkle Tree Roots, and how long it takes to generate zkp proof, and block generation time.
- P2** The Thief stole K_{ID}^{-1} before we registered on *Identity Blockchain* and then registered K_{ID} and K_P .
- P3** The Thief stole K_{ID}^{-1} after we registered on *Identity Blockchain*.
- P4** Trying to use unregistered Key.
- P5** Trying to register the same *Nin* with multiple Keys (e.g. two physical ids).
- P6** Using K_P without checking the whole $CA \rightarrow K_{ID} \rightarrow K_P$ chain.
- i) Using K_P to register as a mining key.
 - ii) Invalidating K_P .
 - iii) Using new K_P as a mining key.

Solution

Look at the solution to ??.

The Mining Registry can accept new K_P after an expiration period (which can be e.g. one day).

- P7** A combination of ?? and ??. The Thief steals K_{ID} , registers K_P and registers K_P for mining. The problem is bigger, because we can't invalidate K_P if we don't know which K_P it is.

Solution

We make K_P renewable. We write the last block number it was renewed on to the *Identity Blockchain*. Mining Registry can choose to accept K_P that is not older than some time period (for the Registry a good period would seem to be one day). When paying the miners, the Registry also requires proof of K_P .

- P8** Only K_P is compromised.