The Dynamics of Self-Evaluation

Julia Ignaszewski

2020

A THESIS PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE B.A. WITH HONOURS DEGREE

Abstract

The process of self-evaluation is one that individuals engage in daily, often multiple times per day. Prior research has found that a dynamics systems approach to studying self-evaluation can lend particular insights into how psychological constructs such as self-esteem develop (Vallacher, Nowak, Froelich, & Rockloff, 2002). This research focuses on examining time series data on self- and other-evaluation using a fractal analysis, comparing the evaluations of the self versus the other, as well as investigating relationships between measured psychological constructs relating to the self. This was done in an effort to gain insight into the underlying factors behind patterns of evaluation. The results revealed relationships between self-evaluation dynamics and self-esteem, self-concept clarity, stability of self, childhood trauma, narcissism, and self-consciousness. Other-evaluation was found to be similar to self-evaluation when comparing variability and dynamism, and dissimilar when comparing the affective tone of judgements. Finally, self-evaluation was found to be scale-free when a spectral analysis was used to look at the evaluation trajectory variables.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank my supervisors Dr. Georg Northoff and Dr. Mark MacLeod for their continuous support throughout this process. Their compassion and understanding through the difficult events of 2020 have been crucial to the completion of this thesis.

A special thank you goes to Dr. Annemarie Wolff, even though she was not a formal supervisor, she was always available for consultation and she did a great deal to aid experimental procedure.

Lastly, I would like to thank David Smith and Angie Antolinez, my colleagues in collecting and analyzing the data. Through all the difficulties of learning novel methods, I could always rely on their thoughtful inputs and ideas, as well as their optimism and camaraderie.

Table of Contents

Abstract ii
The Dynamics of Self-Evaluation
Self-Structure
Emerging Coherence and Stability of Self-Structure
Overview of Research Strategy
Otherness
Scale Free Properties of the Brain and the Self
Methods
Participants11
Materials
Procedure
Results
Mean Differences in Trajectory Variables
Analysis Split by Time Period
Correlations Between Trajectory Variables
Fractal Analyses on Trajectory Data
Overview of Psychological Scale Data
Principal Components Analysis
Trajectory Variables and Psychological Scales
Discussion
References 39

List of Tables

Table 1	15
Table 2	22
Table 3	24
Table 4	25
Table 5	26
Table 6	28
Table 7	29
Table 8	30

List of Figures

Figure 1	6
Figure 2	16
Figure 3	18
Figure 4	19
Figure 5	19

List of Appendices

Appendix A: Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale	44
Appendix B: Beck's Depression Inventory	45
Appendix C: Childhood Trauma Questionnaire	48
Appendix D: Pathological Narcissism Inventory	51
Appendix E: Self-Concept Clarity Scale	55
Appendix F: Rosenberg Instability of Self Items	57
Appendix G: Self-Consciousness Scale-Revised	58
Appendix H: Electrode Placements	59
Appendix I: Consent Form	60
Appendix J: Demographic Health Questionnaire	61

The Dynamics of Self-Evaluation

Selfhood is a complex human phenomenon which can, according to Gallagher and Zahavi (2012) be disassembled into two substrates. The first form, the minimal self, is the aspect of selfhood which is integral to the sense of "mineness" intrinsic to phenomenological consciousness (Gallagher & Zahavi, 2012). The second form, the narrative self, can be conceived of as the aspect of selfhood which generates an individual identity (Gallagher 2000). Together, the two forms of the self are layered on top of each other to create a multi-laminar self which guides the individual through life via integration of the "now" with the overall perception of who they are. For the purposes of this paper, it can be assumed that I am referring to the narrative self whenever I reference the notion of the "self". The self therefore represents the subjectivities and nuances of an individual being from the first-person perspective. Whether it is how one looks or how one acts, the self is uniquely expressed in the mind's eye, making it inaccessible to the outside world, arguably the biggest challenge faced by mental health professionals when trying to deal with pathologies of the psyche. Though there are many researchers that debate the definition of the self and its origins, there has been increasing interest in the mechanics of the self. In this paper I will be examining time series data on narrative evaluation using various analyses to examine the dynamics of self-referential cognition. I will also be investigating relationships between measured psychological constructs relating to the self to gain insight into the underlying factors behind patterns of narrative evaluation. Analysed contiguously, these two principal aims should lend insight to the "how" and "why" of the dynamics of self-evaluation, respectively.

Self-Structure

The basic functions of the narrative self, such as regulating action, seem to hinge on elements of self-understanding (Vallacher, Nowak, Froelich, & Rockloff, 2002). In a given context an individual chooses the actions that make the most sense to who they are, what ambitions they might have etc. Elements in this case loosely represent values extracted from memories of success, failure, and social interactions, as well as goals and aspirations. They play a crucial role in shaping how people think of themselves, how they lead their lives, and are often cited as reasons for their behaviour. To gain insight into oneself, self-evaluation, otherwise described as a session of self-referential cognition, must be employed. When performing a selfevaluation, an individual may consider themselves in many different aspects to gain a better understanding of who they are and how they are perceived by others, and their subsequent trajectory through life is based on a foundation made up of these unique elements. Despite the multitude of things that could be classified as an element, there is a common currency when it comes how people evaluate themselves. For example, the self-perceived element of "shyness" may take on a positive valence in the context of other qualities which collectively curate the image of someone who is introverted or reserved. Additionally, people tend to see disparity between their own reality and these cognitive elements as something negative, which, if not ameliorated, can cause an individual to perceive themselves undesirably. For example, drinking and driving is a social more, and an individual who engages in it repeatedly will most likely feel some level of guilt or lowered sense of self-worth upon reflection.

Self-evaluation is therefore a valuable enterprise for the human mind and is a system that plays a prominent role in an individual's quality of life. It is exactly these aforementioned cognitive elements which form a putative "platform" upon which the individual may perform

self-evaluation. The platform is ever-shifting –able to accommodate new information into its structure, dictating the flow of self-relevant cognitions at any given moment. Vallacher, Nowak, Froelich, and Rockloff (2002) define this platform as a *self-structure*, a complex and self-organizing system that affects global properties like self-esteem and self-certainty. Global properties are ones that require consideration of the whole object (or in this case, person) rather than local phenomenology.

Emerging Coherence and Stability of Self-Structure

The model of self-structure (Vallacher, Nowak, Froelich, & Rockloff, 2002) is meant to elucidate the causal chain of events which determine how positively and clearly an individual perceives themselves to be over time (Sharp-Davidson, 2015). In this section I will discuss how the self-structure organizes itself. As discussed earlier, each element in the self-structure represents a trait, taking on a valence. Elements range from positive to negative valence, indicating whether an individual feels they exemplify a given trait or not. For example, should a person be a professional athlete, they probably have a firm understanding that they are more athletic than the average person, so their "athletic" element would take on a positive valence. Elements also vary in stability, with traits that are well-reinforced taking on a greater stability than those that are not.

The most stable element in a group of related elements is termed an *attractor state*, named for its tendency to be a frequent point of reference for the individual. An attractor state can be likened to a ball in the bottom of a bowl, a fixed and stable point in a dynamic system (Miller, 2016). A strong attractor is resistant to varied feedback due to a vast database of memories that reinforce its valence as either negative or positive. Because the self-structure tends to differentiate elements into evaluatively relevant clusters, there is likely to be more than one

attractor state. It is theorized that while performing a self-evaluation, an individual may initially query some part of themself, but their thought process will likely move through to the more stable elements in their self-structure (Vallacher et al., 2000), just as the ball rolling in the bowl will eventually come to a stop at the deepest point. In an individual with a *coherent* selfstructure, the self-structure is organized in a way in which there are clusters of negative- and positive-valenced elements that form concentric grouping around the attractor state(s). However, in a region of the self-structure with low evaluative coherence (weak attractor state), the selfevaluation is characterized by inconsistent and often contrasting beliefs. Figure 1 shows the putative model of the self-structure (Vallacher, Nowak, Forelich, & Rockloff, 2002). The coherency and stability of the self-structure is largely established by how well a person knows themself, and how stable this knowledge is over time. In light of this, people who have a lower self-concept clarity and a lower self-concept stability are more susceptible to self-structure reorganization based on varied outsider feedback. With this in mind, the coherence of a selfstructure dictates the dynamics of self-evaluation in a way wherein highly coherent organization results in less variability of self-related cognitions.


In the study by Vallacher, Nowak, Froelich, and Rockloff, (2002) their experiments validated this model of the dynamics of self-evaluation. They found that the self-esteem, or global positivity in the self-structure, dictated the self-evaluation in that higher levels of self-esteem promoted more positive self-relevant thoughts and vice versa for low levels of self-esteem. Certainty and stability in the self-structure was manifested in the dynamic properties of the self-evaluation wherein lower certainty and stability was associated with a rapid and varied stream of self-referential cognition over time. Among all participants, the researchers found that the evaluative tone seemed to grow more stable towards the end of the evaluation, which is


posited to represent the stream of thoughts converging on a state of maximal coherence, irrespective of whether the participant had a higher or lower self-esteem. Even when priming effects (being asked to recount a negative or a positive story about oneself) were introduced, they wore off by the end of the evaluation. The implication for these results is that when evaluatively inconsistent information is integrated into a region with high coherence, it is likely that it will be discounted due to the collective influence of the surrounding elements. If a person has a generally negative view of themselves, positive feedback will have little to no effect on improving that perception as the interacting influences amongst elements in the negative feedback loop work to reinforce one another.

To test the coherence and stability of the self-structure amongst our own participants, we administered several questionnaires. The Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965) was first used to measure how positively participants perceive themselves (see Appendix A). We also administered Beck's Depression Inventory (BDI) (see Appendix B) (Steer, Beck, & Garrison, 1986) and the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (CTQ) (see Appendix C) (Bernstein, Fink, Handelsman, & Foote, 1994) to screen for symptoms of major depressive disorder (MDD), as childhood trauma has been an observed risk factor for psychiatric illness (Heim, Newport, Mletzko, Miller, & Nemeroff, 2008). It has long been purported that self-esteem and quality of life are heavily intertwined and that MDD reduces individual sense of self-worth (Nnadozie, 2017). The Pathological Narcissism Inventory (PNI) (see Appendix D) was used to screen for narcissistic traits Pincus, 2013). Since the present study aims to examine the dynamics of self-evaluation in healthy participants, any individual scoring high on the above questionnaires was excluded from the analyses (none were excluded). To test self-concept clarity, we administered the Self-Concept Clarity Scale (SCC) (see Appendix E) (Campbell et al., 1996) and Rosenberg's

Figure 1

Model of Self-Structure Organization





Note. Visualization of an incoherent (top image) and a coherent (bottom image) self-structure. Dark grey squares represent negative-valence elements and light grey squares represent positive-valence elements. Height of squares represents stability of the elements. Figure reprinted from Vallacher, R. R., Nowak, A., Froehlich, M., & Rockloff, M. (2002).

(1965) four-point Self-Esteem Instability Scale (SEIS) (see Appendix F), which both relate to how stable and coherent the elements in the self-structure are. Self-consciousness is another construct which was included as a measured variable via the use of the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS) (see Appendix G) developed by Fenigstein, Shceier and Buss (1975), as self-consciousness and self-esteem are closely related (Cheek & Melchior, 1990). These scales were later analyzed using a principle component analysis.

Overview of Research Strategy

Due to the hypothesized link between the structure and dynamics of self-evaluation (Vallacher et al., 2002), our experimental paradigm required sampling with a high degree of temporal resolution (200 Hz). We adapted our methods from Vallacher et al. (2002) who used the mouse paradigm previously used in research about the dynamics of social judgement. The participants were asked to describe themselves into a microphone as fully and as honestly as they could. The participants then used a mouse cursor to rate statements in their recorded personal narrative by moving it closer or farther away from a target at the centre of the computer screen. By tracking the cursor position frame-by-frame we collected data on cursor position which was divided into independent variables cursor position, distance from centre and velocity which charted a trajectory for the participants' sentiments towards their stream of consciousness narratives. Position and velocity were used to assess the stability and coherence of the participants' self-structures by tracking how much and how rapidly the cursor was moved. According to the hypothesis about the tendency for thought to move towards an attractor state, the rate of change in position (velocity) as well as the frequency of change in position of the cursor should decrease towards the end of the evaluation task, and should have less variability overall for participants with a higher self-structure coherence and stability. Distance from the

centre was used as a measure of overall positivity/negativity. If previous hypotheses are correct, then individuals scoring higher on the self-esteem scale should have a lower overall distance from the centre. All individuals should also hypothetically see less variability in distance from the target towards the end of the evaluation task, as in the original experiment.

Otherness

Despite the fact that the self can only be fully accessed by the person who ascribes it to themself, it is the presence of other people that can activate self-relevant thought at any moment (Vallacher, Nowak, Froehlich, & Rockloff, 2002). Jung (1988) wrote that the self "plants us in otherness" which is to say that in order to individuate one must (seemingly paradoxically) exist amongst other people. Along a similar vein Charles Horton Cooley (1983) wrote "each to each a looking glass, reflects the other that doth pass," in reference to his theory of the Looking-glass self. Cooley's work highlighted the way in which an individual's sense of self is derived from perceptions of others, their overt or covert social judgements acting as a mirror of sorts. Seeing as the perceptions of others seem to have a large effect on self-value (as hypothesized by both Jung and Cooley) the current study expanded the original experimental paradigm (Vallacher, Nowak, Froehlich, & Rockloff, 2002) to include otherness within the realm of selfhood.

We ran a very similar task as described in the overview section on the same participants to explore whether the dynamics of social judgement function similarly when applied to the self compared to the other. Participants used the mouse cursor to rate the statements in a pre-recorded personal narrative and this data was compared to the mouse cursor movements in the self condition. In order to eliminate between subjects differences, each participant partook in this condition.

Scale Free Properties of the Brain and the Self

Thus far I have discussed the self from a psychological and cognitive perspective. In this section I will discuss the dynamics of cortical brain activity and how they are similar to the theorized dynamics of the self. The human brain is organized into local nuclei which form a large-scale interconnected network. This complex system is able to continuously reorganize and synchronise with disparate biological structures on an extremely fine-grained temporal scale, much like our model of the self. Though our body and environment are in a constant state of change, the temporal continuity of the self allows it to endure and remain largely stable over time. The self has the task of integrating fleeting external stimuli and psychological processes with a much longer timescale, thus operating unbound by just one timescale. Because of this, the self can be described as "scale-free." Scale-freeness is a concept used to describe a network in which its elements are independent of its size, meaning that when the network grows or changes, the underlying structure remains the same (Kolvoort, Wainio-Theberge, Wolff, & Northoff, 2020). For this reason, a spectral analysis was used to later analyse the data.

Electroencephalography (EEG) is a technique used in neuroimaging that provides real-time information on the change in electrical potential across the scalp (and hence the activity of the neurons underneath). The brain's spontaneous activity is expressed in oscillatory patterns. These patterns are defined by stages of varying frequencies, from ultrafast (40-180 Hz) to infraslow ones (0.01-0.1 Hz). Power (the amount of activity at a given frequency band) has an inverse relationship with frequency wherein high power is observed at lower frequencies and vice versa. This pattern follows a power law distribution wherein power is proportional to the inverse of the frequency raised to the power (expressed as a formula below) which can also be described as scale-free (Kolvoort, Wainio-Theberge, Wolff, & Northoff, 2020).

$$P \propto 1/f^{\beta}$$

The invariance observed in statistical properties of biological signals in the brain denotes the constancy of the relationship between frequency and power irrespective of the magnitude of the timescale, suggesting continuity much like it did when applied to the self. Because of this parallel, A significant portion of the current experimental paradigm was performed under EEG. For the purposes of this honours thesis, this topic will not be explored in-depth. However, it is important to lay the foundation for comparison between the dynamics of the brain and the self.

Methods

The purpose of the experiment was to gather behavioural and neurological data about the nature of individuals' self-evaluative thought patterns. Questionnaires were administered to aid in making conclusions about differences between participants. The methods of this study are partially based on those used by Vallacher, Nowwak, and Rockloff (2002).

Participants

Ten healthy female and sixteen male participants (n = 26) between the ages of 19 and 71 (M = 30.6, SD = 14.2) were recruited by word of mouth. Participants were compensated \$60 CAD in cash after completing the experiment.

Materials

A personal laptop was used to record the personal narratives. A set of headphones was used by the participant to listen to the narratives. A computer mouse and monitor were used for the evaluation procedure.

EEG activity was recorded using a 64-channel actiCAP (Brain Products GmbH, Germany) with electrodes at Fp1, Fp2, AF7, AF3, AF4, AF8, F7, F5, F3, F1, Fz, F2, F4, F6, F8, FT9, FT7, FC5, FC3, FC4, FC6, FT8, FT10, T7, C5, C3, C1, Cz, C2, C4, C6, T8, TP9, TP7, CP5, CP3, CP1, CPz, CP2, CP4, CP6, TP8, TP10, P7, P5, P3, P1, Pz, P2, P4, P6, P8, PO9, PO7, PO3, POz, PO4, PO8, PO10, O1, Oz, and O2, reference electrode at FCz and ground electrode at AFz (see Appendix H) according to the extended International 10–20 Systems. The impedance of all channels was measured at less than 5 kΩ before recording was initiated and remained below this level for the duration of the recording. The signal was amplified (actiCHamp) and the

unfiltered data was recorded at a sampling frequency of 1000 Hz using the EEG BrainVision Recorder (Brain Products GmbH, Germany).

Procedure

The experimental procedure can be broken down into four stages. In the first stage participants filled out the informed-consent form (see Appendix I) while the EEG cap was being assembled based on head measurements which were provided by the participants prior to their arrival at the lab. Afterwards, participants were instructed to record an eight-minute personal narrative on the laptop of one of the researchers, using a free online recording application (123apps, 2012). Participants were told to describe themselves in terms of traits, accomplishments, and goals but were told to leave out their name for the sake of anonymity.

In the second stage, the participants' self-narrative recordings were transferred to the lab computer and set up for the third stage of the experiment. BIP2AUX (bipolar-to-auxiliary adapter) electrodes measuring heart rate, eye blinks, and saccades as well as grounding electrodes were taped to the participant's face and body. Each participant was then seated in a chair in front of the lab computer thirty cm away from the monitor at eye level. The researchers fitted the EEG cap with sixty-four electrodes onto the participants heads, making sure that participants' hair and scalp had been freshly washed and dried. Once the cap was secured and conductive gel had been inserted between the electrodes and the scalp, all lights and electronics were turned off.

In the third stage, the participants sat straight and motionless with their feet planted on the ground and their eyes open and fixated on a target displayed on the computer monitor. Their brain activity was measured for eight minutes in order to gather resting state data (baseline) via the EEG electrodes. The participants then completed three more tasks in front of the computer

with the EEG cap on, in a randomized order. All tasks were eight minutes in length and performed in silent and dark conditions. Participants were encouraged to take breaks in between tasks to relax and reposition.

In two of the subsequent tasks, the participants were instructed to put on headphones and listen to an audio recording. These two tasks were identical except that in one of the tasks the participants were evaluating their own personal narrative while in the other they were evaluating a stranger's personal narrative (same stranger narrative was used for all participants). As the recording was playing, participants evaluated the statements in real time by moving the mouse cursor in relation to a target displayed in the centre of the computer monitor. The closer the cursor is positioned to the target, the more positive the statement is, and the farther away, the more negative. Participant cursor trajectories were recorded using a script coded in python.

In the final task the participants were instructed to evaluate their spontaneous thought patterns in the same way as previously described. After this, the EEG cap was removed, and the participants were instructed to wash their hair before stage four.

The final portion of the experiment involved completing questionnaires relating to how the participant felt during the tasks, about their childhood, mental health, and sense of self, as well as a demographic information sheet (see Appendix J).

Data was analyzed using Matlab (MATLAB, 2010), IBM SPSS Statistics (IBM Corp, 2017) and Jamovi (The Jamovi project, 2020).

Results

Mean Differences in Trajectory Variables

An independent samples t-test was conducted to compare participant trajectories (velocity, position, and distance) in self and other conditions. The test showed that there were no significant differences between the velocity variable in the self (M = 0.190, SD = 0.279) versus the other condition (M = 0.191, SD = 0.417); t(51) = -.006, p = .996. This indicated that participant cursor movement speed did not vary depending on whether they were evaluating their own or an other's narrative. There was no significant difference observed for the position variable in the self (M = 928.553, SD = 270.806) versus the other condition (M = 960.588, SD = 196.559); t(51) = -.491, p = .625 suggesting that narrative ownership also did not affect the changes in cursor position. There was a significant difference t(51) = 2.019, p < 0.05 observed in the distance variable in the self (M = 289.417, SD = 270.806) versus the other condition (M = 209.404, SD = 196.559) suggesting that overall ratings of positivity versus negativity differed based on narrative ownership (figure 2). However, the effect size was moderately small (d = 0.34). See Table 1 for a complete list of all means and standard deviations.

Analysis Split by Time Period

A one-way ANOVA was used to test whether mean scores on trajectory variables were significantly different between time periods. The data was split into three time periods. There were no significant differences found in the distance variable (F(158) = .047, p = .954), position variable (F(158) = .001, p = .999), nor Velocity variable (F(158) = .680, p = .508), not supporting the hypothesis that self-evaluation dynamics are affected by an attractor state.

Table 1


Means and Standard Deviations of Variables in the Self and Other Condition

		Descriptives		
Condition	Variables	n	M	SD
Self	Velocity	27	0.190	0.279
	Position	27	928.553	270.806
	Distance	27	289.417	157.680
Other	Velocity	26	0.191	0.417
	Position	26	960.588	196.559
	Distance	26	209.404	128.780
Total	Velocity	53	0.190	0.350
	Position	53	944.268	235.593
	Distance	53	250.165	148.444

Note. Missing data in the *other* condition.

Figure 2

Error Bar Chart Comparing Mean Distance in Both Conditions



Note. Significant difference observed between the other and self condition on the distance variable.

Correlations Between Trajectory Variables

A two-tailed bivariate correlation analysis was used to determine the existence of relationships between the variables, which showed no significance between velocity and distance r(51) = -.120, p = .392, nor velocity and position r(51) = -.025, p = .860, indicating that velocity was independent of both changes in cursor position and distance from the target (negative/positive sentiment). There was a significant but weak positive correlation between the distance and position variables r(51) = 2.77, p < .05, showing that as distance from the centre increased, so too did the amount of change in cursor position. This relationship is visualized on a scatterplot in figure 3.

Fractal Analyses on Trajectory Data


Fractal analyses, generally applied to data in biological or economic studies, are a novel way to measure behavioural data based on temporal patterns (Rutherford, Haskell, Glasbey, Jones, & Lawrence, 2003). A part of this experiment aimed to see if behavioural data (i.e., the mouse cursor trajectories collected during the narrative evaluations) would produce a scale free signal. We used a Power Spectral Density analysis to look at the signal of each variable in the self versus the other condition. As can be observed by the plots in Figure 4, the power of the signal was highest at lower frequencies, following a power law distribution in all three trajectory variables. This supports the hypothesis that behavioural data patterns relating to the self are in accordance with neuronal signals relating to the self.

Overview of Psychological Scale Data

To look at the distribution of scores for each psychological scale, the data was visualized using density plots (Figure 5). The average score for the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire was 42.5 (SD = 18.5) (Figure 5A) showing that most participants scored lower in childhood trauma.

Figure 3


Correlation Between Mean Distance and Mean Position




Note. Significance is at an alpha level of .05. Based on the distance, position changes accordingly.

Figure 4

Power Spectral Density Plots for Velocity, Distance, and Position in Both Conditions



Density Plots Displaying the Distribution of Scores for Each Questionnaire



The average score for Beck's Depression Inventory was $11.8 \ (SD=18.5)$, indicating that depression scores for this dataset were mostly grouped in the lower percentiles (Figure 5B). The average score for the Pathological Narcissism Scale was $18.7 \ (SD=7.05)$, indicating that total narcissism scores were mostly grouped around the mean (Figure 5C). The average score on the Self-Consciousness Scale was $40.7 \ (SD=9.53)$ indicating low to mid self-consciousness across participants (Figure 5D). The average score on the Instability of Self Scale was $13.8 \ (SD=4.74)$ Indicating a (Figure 5E). The average score on the Self-esteem scale was $39.1 \ (SD=6.99)$ indicating that self-esteem scores were mostly centred around the mean (Figure 5F). The average score on the Self-Concept Clarity Scale was $40.7 \ (SD=9.53)$ which indicated that self-concept clarity scores ranged from mid to high (Figure 5G).

Principal Components Analysis

To find underlying constructs in the psychological data, a Principle Components Analysis (PCA) was used. Six principal components were extracted based on the Kaiser method (eigenvalue > 1). Varimax rotation was used to better differentiate the components. Table 2 shows the explained variance of rotated sums of squared loadings. Together the components accounted for 83.8% of the variance, with the first three explaining 56% (component 1 = 22.4%, component 2 = 19.2%, component 3 = 14.6%). The last three components only explained 27.6% of the data (component 4 = 10.95%, component 5 = 9.14%, component 6 = 7.5%) but were included in the analysis for a more dimensional understanding of correlations of responses.

To interpret each principal component, loadings of > .4 were persevered and the questionnaire variables with the highest loadings were used for naming. Component one, named Narcissistic Self showed high positive correlations for all items of the PNI. Subscales of the PNI

Table 2

Explained Variance in Six-Component PCA

	Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings		ndings
	Total	% of Variance	Cumulative %
Component 1	5.15	22.391	22.391
Component 2	4.415	19.195	41.586
Component 3	3.367	14.639	56.225
Component 4	2.518	10.949	67.174
Component 5	2.102	9.141	76.315
Component 6	1.722	7.487	83.802

Note. Total column represents eigenvalues.

were taken from Pincus (2013) and included Entitlement Rage (ER), Grandiose Fantasy (GF), Devaluing (DEV), Hidden Self (HS), Self-Sacrificing Self-Enhancement (SSSE), Exploititiveness (EXP), and Contingent Self-Esteem (CSE). This principal component lends validity for the PNI as a measure of personality aspects of narcissism. The component loadings for each of these items are displayed in Table 3.

The second component was termed Trauma-Affected Self as it had high loadings for all items of the CTQ and the BDI which were negatively correlated with RSES. Subscales for the CTQ were taken from Bernstein, Fink, Handelsman, and Foote (1994) and included Physical Abuse (PA), Emotional Abuse (EA), Sexual Abuse (SA), Physical Neglect (PN), Emotional Neglect (EN), and Minimization and Denial (MD). Component loadings for these items can be seen in Table 4. As the name suggests, the self-esteem is negatively correlated with childhood trauma and depression, which are positively correlated.

High scores on the ISES were positively correlated with high scores on the contingent self-esteem and devaluing items of the PNI as well as high scores on the BDI within the third component. However, RSES and SCC scores were negatively correlated, supporting the hypothesis that low self-esteem is associated with an instable and unclear self-concept. This component was termed the Low-Esteem Instable Self for that reason. Component loadings can be seen in Table 5.

Component four was mostly centred around self-consciousness in the public domain, as the public and social items of the SCS were correlated positively within it. Subscales of the SCS were taken from Scheier and Carver (2013) and included the Private subscale (SCS_Private) which measures introspection of the inner self, Public subscale (SCS_Public) which measures introspection about one's public self, and the Social subscale (SCS_Social) which measures

Table 3

Component 1: Narcissistic Self

	Component Loadings	
PNI_Total	.912	
PNI_ER	.805	
PNI_GF	.707	
PNI_DEV	.664	
PNI_HS	.429	
PNI_SSE	.844	
PNI_EXP	.873	
PNI_CSE	.629	

Note. Only loadings > .4 included.

Table 4

Component 2: Trauma-Affected Self

	Component Loadings	
RSES_Total	466	
CTQ_EA	.852	
CTQ_PA	.876	
CTA_SA	.754	
CTQ_EN	.505	
CTQ_PN	.635	
CTQ_Total	.943	
BDI	.445	

Note. Only loadings > .4 included.

Table 5

Component 3: Low-Esteem Instable Self

	Component Loadings	
ISES_Total	.818	
RSES_Total	710	
SCC_Total	735	
PNI_CSE	.603	
PNI_DEV	.509	
BDI	.610	

Note. Loadings > .4 were included.

social anxiety. CTQ_MD correlated negatively in this component, indicating that self-consciousness in social situations is inversely related to minimization and denial of childhood trauma. Component loadings are shown in Table 6.

Component five was termed Neglected Hidden Self because it showed high positive correlations with items on the Hiding Self subscale of the PNI, the Emotional and Physical Neglect items on the CTQ, and a negative correlation with Minimization and Denial items on the CTQ. Component loadings are shown in Table 7. This was interpreted to mean that neglect during childhood is associated with inability/unwillingness to expose one's true self, and a lower chance that individuals might underreport trauma.

Component six, termed Grandiose Self, found a high positive correlation with higher scores on the SCS_Private and moderate positive correlations with high overall self-consciousness scores (SCS_Total) as well as higher scores on the Grandiose Fantasy subscale of the PNI. This indicates that high introspection of the inner self is associated with overall self-consciousness as well as a tendency to engage in compensatory aggrandizing fantasies (i.e. fantasizing about being acknowledged for some accomplishments etc.). The component loadings are displayed in Table 8.

Overall, the PCA confirmed trends found in the literature, which shall be discussed in the discussion section.

Trajectory Variables and Psychological Scales

To see if underlying constructs are associated with trends in evaluation trajectory, a correlational analysis was run. Distance was negatively correlated with RSES scores (r(26) = -0.438, p < 0.05) and SCC scores (r(26) = -0.402, p < 0.05), showing a moderately strong relationship

Table 6

Component 4: Conscious Self

	Component Loadings
SCS_Public	.788
SCS_Social	.649
SCS_Total	.748
CTQ_MD	557

Note. Loadings > .4 were included.

Table 7

Component 5: Neglected Hidden Self

	Component Loadings
PNI_HS	.770
CTQ_EN	.603
CTQ_PN	.595
CTQ_MD	643

Note. Loadings > .4 were included.

Table 8

Component 6: Grandiose Self

	Component Loadings	
SCS_Private	.854	
SCS_Total	.448	
PNI_GF	.495	

Note. Loadings > .4 were included.

between distance from the centre (a measure of negative sentiment) and lower self-esteem and self-concept clarity. Distance was positively correlated with CTQ_EA scores (r(25) = .497, p < .05), indicating and strong relationship between childhood emotional abuse and greater negative sentiment. Velocity was positively correlated with CTQ_PA scores (r(25) = .487, p < .05), CTQ_PN scores (r(25) = .625, p < .001), total CTQ scores (r(25) = .455, p < .05), and BDI scores (r(26) = .389, p < .05). This result shows a strong relationship between higher rate of change in cursor position, higher childhood trauma scores and a moderately strong relationship between higher rate of change in cursor position and higher depression scores. The position variable had no significant correlations, indicating that the changes in cursor position were unaffected by psychological constructs.

Discussion

This study partially supported the hypotheses adapted from Vallacher, Nowak, Froehlich and Rockloff (2002). There were no differences observed in the trajectory variables when data was analyzed by time period, suggesting that putative attractor states did not have a strong effect on the dynamics of participant evaluations. Ackerman and Kanfer (2009) found that participant fatigue and motivation was related to task length, which could impact performance. A reason for the lack of significance could be participant fatigue, as the present study had a more cognitively taxing paradigm than the original. In the original study the narratives recorded ranged from 1 ½ minutes to 5 minutes while the length of the narratives in the present study were all around 8 minutes. Furthermore, the present study included four 8-minute tasks under EEG conditions instead of just one.

Recall that correlational analysis found that self-esteem was found to impact affective judgements (as measured by the distance variable), which supports the hypothesis that low self-esteem is related to feelings of negativity about the self. This result supports the findings in the study by Vallacher, Nowak, Froelich and Rockloff (2002). The analysis also found a correlation between the distance variable and low scores on the SCC scale and high scores on the items on the CTQ_EA, which indicates that a low understanding of the self (unclear self) and low self-esteem are not only related but that they are negatively affected by childhood emotional abuse. Research on childhood abuse and its emergent psychopathology (Finzi-Dottan & Karu, 2006) found that emotional abuse had a detrimental effect on self-representation. The hypothesized parallel between self-concept clarity and self-structure stability and coherence seems to be supported in these results as well as the results from the PCA. Importantly, the third principal component (Low Self-Esteem Instable Self) unveiled the relationship between the RSES, ISES,

SCC scale, BDI, PNI_CSE, and PNI_DEV, accounting for the missing links in the correlational analysis between the trajectory variables and psychological constructs. An instable (high ISES scores) and unclear self (low SCC scores) were related to self-esteem being contingent on perceptions of social judgement (high PNI_CSE scores), and disinterest in others who do not provide admiration (high PNI_DEV scores). This makes intuitive sense when considering that individuals with instable self-structures are hypothesized to have their self-perception more heavily affected by outsider input. Placing higher value on outsider feedback could be a compensatory mechanism for a pre-existing low self-esteem. Pincus and Ansell (2009) found that scoring high on the PNI was associated with lower self-esteem, which is in line with the results of the current study, at least for the items mentioned above. The BDI loading onto this component suggests that negative attitudes towards oneself are associated with lower self-esteem. Practical implications for this data can be gathered by looking at research on the interdependency between quality of life, self-esteem and depression (Kuehner & Buerger, 2005), which finds that quality of life and self-esteem suffers as depressive symptoms increase.

The velocity variable (rate of change in cursor position) was found to be independent of distance and position, indicating that increased dynamism of the trajectory was not associated with any trends in judgement affect nor variability in self-evaluation. Positive correlations between the velocity variable and the CTQ_PA, CTQ_PN, CTQ_Total, and BDI suggest that rate of change in cursor position was higher for those who experienced some level of childhood mistreatment (especially physical abuse and neglect) and who had a negative attitude towards themselves. As the velocity variable was not associated with the ISES scale, the hypothesis that self-concept instability is related to erratic changes in self-evaluation was rejected. The PCA generated a principal component, termed the Trauma-Affected Self, which revealed a

relationship between the presence of childhood trauma (CTQ EA, CTQ PA, CTQ SA, CTQ EN, CTQ PN, and CTQ Total), low self-esteem, and depressive symptoms. The link between childhood trauma and mood disorders such as depression has already been briefly discussed but can be further supplemented by neurological research on the role of early life trauma in modulating neuroplastic mechanisms leading to increased vulnerability to mental illness (Catteneo et al., 2015). Thome et al., (2018) found that psychological trauma had an impact on cognitive processes via fear conditioning, resulting in anticipation of aversive stimuli even in a non-threatening environment. Thome et al. also found that traumatized individuals reacted faster when ambiguous stimuli were presented, suggesting that fear overgeneralization decreased their cognitive load during decision making. It could be the case that the correlation between velocity and childhood trauma observed in the current study is based on the same principal, wherein fear-conditioned individuals have more rapid cursor movements, though the only "aversive" stimuli would have been nested within the participant narratives themselves. However, there is contradicting evidence on reaction speed in research with depressed patients, which finds that cognitive processing speed is dampened by the presence of depressive symptoms (Albert, Potter, McQuoid, & Taylor (2018), so the association between velocity and higher scores on the BDI could negate the former explanation.

The position variable had no significant correlations with any of the psychological measures, which contradicts the hypothesis that self-concept uncertainty was related to increased variability in self-evaluation. It was, however, correlated with the overall distance scores, which indicates that these two measures were dependent on each other to some degree. These results suggest that the position variable may not have been a valid measure of variability. Repeating

this method by calculating the magnitude and number of position changes could give more informative data on the variability in evaluation.

The component called Narcissistic Self provided validity for the PNI, while the component called the Conscious Self supported the validity for the SCS, as all items of both scales were correlated within their respective components. Interestingly, component six (Grandiose Self) found a relationship between SCS_private, SCS_total, and PNI_GF scores. This result suggests that high introspection of the inner self was associated with overall self-consciousness as well as engagement in compensatory fantasies about accomplishments and social appraisal. The relationship between grandiose fantasy and introspection of the inner self and self-consciousness could be explained by an urge to present oneself as "perfect" (Casale, Fioravanti, Rugai, Flett, & Hewitt, 2016) or by a multitude of overlapping psychological domains. For example, it could be the case that self-reflectiveness is an unhealthy aspect of private self-consciousness that is related to a lack of understanding of oneself (Conway, Giannopoulos, Ciank, & Mendelson, 1993).

Component five, called Hidden Self, found a relationship between high scores on the PNI_HS, CTQ_EN, CTQ_PN, and low scores on the CTQ_MD. Grandiose narcissism had been associated with perfectionist self-presentation with the intention of deflecting attention away from personal inadequacies (Conway, Giannopoulos, Ciank, & Mendelson, 1993), which could suggest that the hiding of the self is a part of this overcompensation mechanism. The CTQ items correlating with the rest of the psychological measures within this component could suggest that individuals who were faced with some level of childhood neglect are compelled to hide the self in adulthood. This interpretation is supported by research on the role of childhood mistreatment in the origins of perfectionism (Ko, Hewitt, Cox, Flett, & Chen, 2019), which showed that

adverse parenting was related to perceived defectiveness and aspects of perfectionism. The CTQ_MD is a measure for estimating the tendency to underreport trauma, and the negative correlation of this subscale with the aforementioned measures indicates that minimization and denial of trauma is inversely related to this grouping of responses. It could be argued that childhood neglect is used to mask any personal failings as those caused by a poor upbringing, although this assumption does not have any literature behind it.

Analyzing trajectory variables in the self versus other narrative ownership condition showed that affective tone (measured by the distance variable) differed significantly. Upon closer examination, participants tended to rate themselves more negatively (higher mean distance) than they did the other narrative. Epley, Gilovich and Savitsky (2001) found that social judgement for blunders and failings was less condemning than participants assumed they would be, and that overly pessimistic expectations were rooted in a cynical intuition of human judgement. Additionally, the researchers theorized that if it is the case that individuals have this assumption, it is likely that they would apply an equivalent level of judgement upon their own successes and failures, which this study supports. It could also be the case that because a number of the participants were familiar with the principal investigators who conducted the study (myself and my colleagues), that their judgements were less harsh. Taylor and Koivumaki (1976) conducted a study which found a positivity effect for perceptions of those with whom participants had a closer relationship, indicating that the results from the present study could have been biased by acquaintanceship and friendship.

There were no differences found in the variables position and velocity between the self and other narrative ownership conditions, which could suggest that these behavioural measures are not subject to change based on selfhood. In other words, it could be the case that dynamism

and variability in evaluation are core mediators of evaluation style and do not shift based on subject matter (selfhood versus otherness).

Studies analyzing self-related processes conventionally use static methods such as comparing means and finding correlations. Classically, self-esteem is conceived as a static global trait operating on a macro time scale (life-long) whereas self-evaluation is treated as an unstable and shifting process confined to shorter and more fluctuating micro time scale (day-to-day) (Rosenberg, 1986). While this view affords a more convenient perspective on self-esteem, the stability of self-esteem as a trait should not be treated in such a fixed way (Wong, Vallacher, & Nowak, 2014). Previous research by Delignières, Fortes, and Ninot (2004) found that fractal dynamics were present in self-esteem fluctuations sampled twice daily across five hundred days. The presence of 1/f noise in their results led them to conclude that self-esteem variability was part of a complex self-similar structure intertwined across many time scales. The fractal temporal structure of their results showed that fluctuations in self-esteem on macro scales were statistically identical to fluctuations on micro scales, which means simply that self-esteem as a trait and self-evaluation as a process are qualitatively equivalent patterns with shared dynamical underpinnings. In light of this research, the present analyses sought to include a dynamic approach, which found a pattern of self-similarity wherein the power was inversely proportional to the frequency in timeseries data (1/f), in accordance with the fractal temporal structure of selfevaluation as observed by Delignières, Fortes, and Ninot (2004) as well as Wong, Vallacher, and Nowak (2014).

In conclusion, self-evaluation is a dynamic process that can be equivalated to the emergent global self-esteem trait in the long term. It is influenced by a multitude of overlapping psychological underpinnings which in some cases are associated with one another. This finding

provides a foundation for future directions when it comes to analyzing and conceptualizing self-esteem. Self-evaluation time series data could be compared to neurobiological data seeing as they have a similar scale-free dynamic, as I intend to do. It could also be compared to a greater range of psychological measures (questionnaires) to unearth the influences of life events on self-structure. Trends in self-evaluation can also be informative to mental health professionals in assessing their patients' self-esteem, as these micro and macro constructs are self-similar.

Comparisons between selfhood and otherness marked the presence of a common fallacy in beliefs about social judgement. The influence of otherhood on the self is nascent in the inequality between harshness of judgements between the narrative ownership conditions. In this way, it could be said that the self is judged by the perceived criteria of the other, which raises many potential future directions for study on social judgement. For example, incorporating an opportunity for explanation of the judgements could give researchers insight on judgement criteria pervasive among the participants. From there, fairness of judgements levelled at the self versus the other could be disambiguated. The analysis of trajectory produces the same conclusions that were posited by Jung and Cooley, that otherness is an inextricable factor in defining the self.

References

- Ackerman, P. L., & Kanfer, R. (2009). Test length and cognitive fatigue: An empirical examination of effects on performance and test-taker reactions. *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied*, 15(2), 163-181. doi: 10.1037/a0015719
- Bernstein, D. P., Fink, L., Handelsman, L., & Foote, J. (1994). Childhood Trauma Questionnaire. *PsycTESTS Dataset*. doi:10.1037/t02080-000
- Campbell, J. D., Trapnell, P. D., Heine, S. J., Katz, I. M., Lavallee, L. F., & Lehman, D. R. (1996). Self-concept clarity: Measurement, personality correlates, and cultural boundaries. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 70(1), 141-156.
- Casale, S., Fioravanti, G., Rugai, L., Flett, G. L., & Hewitt, P. L. (2016). The interpersonal expression of perfectionism among grandiose and vulnerable narcissists: Perfectionistic self-presentation, effortless perfection, and the ability to seem perfect. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 99, 320-324. doi: 10.1016/j.paid.2016.05.026
- Cattaneo, A., Macchi, F., Plazzotta, G., Veronica, B., Bocchio-Chiavetto, L., Riva, M. A., & Pariante, C. M. (2015). Inflammation and neuronal plasticity: A link between childhood trauma and depression pathogenesis. *Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience*, *9*, 40. doi: 10.3389/fncel.2015.00040
- Cheek, J. M., & Melchior, L. A. (1990). *Shyness, self-esteem, and self-consciousness*. In H. Leitenberg (Ed.), *Handbook of social and evaluation anxiety* (p. 47–82). Plenum Press. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-2504-6_3

- Conway, M., Giannopoulos, C., Ciank, P., Mendelson, M. (1993). Dysphoria and specificity in self-focused attention. *Society for Personality and Social Psychology*, 19(3), 265-268. doi: 10.1177/0146167293193002
- Delignières, D., Fortes, M., Ninot, G. (2004). The fractal dynamics of self-esteem and physical self. *Nonlinear Dynamics of Psychology and Life Sciences*, 8(4), 479-510.
- Epley, N., Gilovich, T., & Savitsky, K. (2001). Do others judge us as harshly as we think? Overestimating the impact of our failures, shortcomings, and mishaps. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(1), 44-56. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.81.1.44
- Fenigstein, A., Scheier, M. F., and Buss, A. H. (1975). Public and private self-consciousness: assessment and theory. *J. Consult. Clin. Psychol.* 36, 1241–1250. doi: 10.1037/h0076760
- Finzi-Dottan, R., & Karu, T. (2006). From emotional abuse in childhood to psychopathology in adulthood: a path mediated by immature defense mechanisms and self-esteem. *Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease*, 194(8), 616-621. doi: 10.1097/01.nmd.0000230654.49933.
- Gallagher, S. 2000. Philosophical Conceptions of the Self: Implications for Cognitive Science. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences* 4(1): 14–21.
- Gallagher, S., & D. Zahavi. 2012. The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd ed. New York: Routledge.
- Heim, C., Newport, D. J., Mletzko, T., Miller, A. H., & Nemeroff, C. B. (2008). The link between childhood trauma and depression: Insights from HPA axis studies in humans. *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, *33*(6), 693-710. doi:10.1016/j.psyneuen.2008.03.008

- IBM Corp. Released 2017. IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 25.0. Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.
- Jones, J. H. (2018, February 19). Time Series and Spectral Analysis. Retrieved August 22, 2020, from http://web.stanford.edu/class/earthsys214/notes/series.html
- Ko, A., Hewitt, P. L., Cox, D., Flett, G. L., Chen, C. (2019). Adverse parenting and perfectionism: A test of the mediating effects of attachment anxiety, attachment avoidance, and perceived defectiveness. *Personality and Individual Differences*, 150. doi: 10.016/j.paid.2019.06.017
- Kolvoort, I. R., Wainio-Theberge, S., Wolff, A., Northoff, G. (2020). Temporal integration as "common currency" of brain and self-scale-free activity in resting-state EEG correlates with temporal delay effects on self-relatedness. *Human Brain Mapping*. doi: 10.1002/hbm.25129
- MATLAB. (2010). version 7.10.0 (R2010a). Natick, Massachusetts: The MathWorks Inc.
- Miller, P. (2016). Dynamical systems, attractors, and neural circuits. *F1000Research*, *5*, 992. doi:10.12688/f1000research.7698.1
- Nnadozie, J. C. (2017). Self Esteem, Social Support And Postpartum Depression. *Journal of International Social Research*, 10(51), 551-556. doi:10.17719/jisr.2017.1789
- Pincus, A. L. (2013). The Pathological Narcissism Inventory. *Understanding and Treating Pathological Narcissism.*, 93-110. doi:10.1037/14041-006
- Rosenberg, M. (1965). *Society and the adolescent self-image*. Revised edition. Middletown, CT: Wesleyan University Press.

- Rosenberg, M. (1986). Conceiving the self. Malabr, FL: Krieger.
- Sharp-Davidson, D. (2015). *Self-structure and discrimination: Implications for coping and wellbeing* (Unpublished PHD thesis). Australian National University.
- Scheier, M.F., & Carver, C. S., (2013). Self-Consciousness Scale—(SCS_R). Measurement Instrument Database for the Social Science. Retrieved from www.midss.ie
- Steer, R. A., Beck, A. T., & Garrison, B. (1986). Applications of the Beck Depression

 Inventory. *Assessment of Depression*, 123-142. doi:10.1007/978-3-642-70486-4 13
- Taylor, S. E., & Koivumaki, J. H. (1976). The perception of self and others: Acquaintanceship, affect, and actor-observer differences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 33(4), 403-408. doi: 10.1037/0022-3414.33.4.403
- The Jamovi project (2020). *Jamovi* (Version 1.2) [Computer Software]. Retrieved from https://www.jamovi.org
- Thome, J., Hauschild, S., Koppe, G., Liebke, L., Rausch, S., Herzog, J. I., Müller-Engelmann, M., Steil, R., Priebe, K., Hermans, D., Schmahl, C., Bohus, M., & Lis, S. (2018).
 Generalisation of fear in PTSD related to prolonged childhood maltreatment: An experimental study. *Psychological Medicine*, 48(13), 2223-2234. doi: 10.1017/S0033291717003713
- Vallacher, R. R., Nowak, A., Froehlich, M., & Rockloff, M. (2002). The Dynamics of Self-Evaluation. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6(4), 370-379. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0604_11

- Wong, A. E., Vallacher, R. R., Nowak, A. (2014). Fractal Dynamics in Self-Evaluation Reveal Self-Concept Clarity. *Society for Chaos Theory in Psychology & Life Sciences*, *18*(4), 349-369. doi: 10.1207/S15327957PSPR0604_11
- 123apps LLC (2012-2020). Voice Recorder [web application software]. Retrieved from https://online-voice-recorder.com/

Appendix A

Rosenberg Self Esteem Scale (Rosenberg, 1965)

1. I feel that I am a pers	on of worth,	at least on an eq	ual plane	with others
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
2. I feel that I have a nu	mber of good	l qualities		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
3. All in all, I am incline	ed to feel that	t I am a failure		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
4. I am able to do things	s as well as m	ost other people	;	
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
5. I feel I do not have m	uch to be pro	oud of		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
6. I take a positive attitu	ide toward m	yself		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
7. On the whole, I am sa	atisfied with 1	myself		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
8. I wish I could have m	ore respect f	or myself		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
9. I certainly feel useles	s at times			
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)
10. At times I think I am 1	no good at all	1		
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)

Appendix B

Beck's Depression Inventory (Steer, Beck, & Garrison, 1986)

1. Sadness

- 0 I do not feel sad.
- 1 I feel sad much of the time.
- 2 I am sad all the time.
- I am so sad or unhappy that I can't stand it.

2. Pessimism

- 0 I am not discouraged about my future.
- I feel more discouraged about my future than I used to be.
- I do not expect things to work out for me.
- 3 I feel my future is hopeless and will only get worse.

3. Past Failure

- 0 I do not feel like a failure.
- 1 I have failed more than I should have.
- 2 As I look back, I see a lot of failures.
- I feel I am a total failure as a person.

4. Loss of Pleasure

- I get as much pleasure as I ever did from the things I enjoy.
- I don't enjoy things as much as I used to.
- I get very little pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.
- 3 I can't get any pleasure from the things I used to enjoy.

5. Guilty Feelings

- 0 I don't feel particularly guilty.
- I feel guilty over many things I have done or should have done.
- 2 I feel quite guilty most of the time.
- 3 I feel guilty all of the time.

6. Punishment Feelings

- 0 I don't feel I am being punished.
- 1 I feel I may be punished.
- 2 I expect to be punished.
- 3 I feel I am being punished.

7. Self-Dislike

- 0 I feel the same about myself as ever.
- 1 I have lost confidence in myself.
- 2 I am disappointed in myself.
- 3 I dislike myself.

8. Self-Criticalness

- 0 I don't criticize or blame myself more than usual.
- I am more critical of myself than I used to be.
- 2 I criticize myself for all of my faults.
- 3 I blame myself for everything bad that happens.

9. Suicidal Thoughts or Wishes

- 0 I don't have any thoughts of killing myself.
- 1 I Have thoughts of killing myself, but I would not carry them out.
- 2 I would like to kill myself.
- 3 I would kill myself if I had the chance

10. Crying

- 0 I don't cry any more than I used to.
- 1 I cry more than I used to.
- 2 I cry over every little thing.
- 3 I feel like crying, but I can't.

11. Agitation

- I am no more restless or wound up than usual.
- 1 I feel more restless or wound up than usual.
- I am so restless or agitated that it's hard to stay still.
- I am so restless or agitated that I Have to keep moving or doing something.

12. Loss of Interest

- 1 have not lost interest in other people or activities.
- 1 I am less interested in other people or things than before.
- 2 I have lost most of my interest in other people or things.
- 3 It's hard to get interested in anything.

13. Indecisiveness

- 0 I make decisions about as well as ever.
- 1 I fint it more difficult to make decisions than usual.
- I have much greater difficult in making decisions than I used to.
- 3 I have trouble making any decisions.

14. Worthlessness

- 0 I do not feel I am worthless.
- I don't consider myself as worthwhile and useful as I used to.
- 2 I feel more worthless as compared to other people.
- 3 I feel utterly worthless.

15. Loss of Energy

- 0 I have as much energy as ever.
- 1 I have less energy than I used to have.

- I don't have enough energy to do very much.
- I don't have enough energy to do anything.

16. Changes in Sleeping Pattern

- I have not experienced any change in my sleeping pattern.
- 1a I sleep somewhat more than usual.
- 1b I sleep somewhat less than usual.
- 2a I sleep a lot more than usual.
- 2b I sleep a lot less than usual.
- 3a I sleep most of the day.
- 3b I wake up 1-2 hours early and can't get back to sleep.

17. Irritability

- 0 I am no more irritable than usual.
- 1 I am more irritable than usual.
- 2 I am much more irritable than usual.
- 3 I am irritable all the time.

18. Changes in Appetite

- 1 I have not experienced any change in my appetite.
- 1a My appetite is somewhat less than unusual.
- 1b My appetite is somewhat greater than usual.
- 2a My appetite is much less than before.
- 2b My appetite is much greater than usual.
- 3a I have no appetite at all.
- 3b I crave food all the time.

19. Concentration Difficulty

- 0 I can concentrate as well as ever.
- 1 I can't concentrate as well as usual.
- 2 It's hard to keep my mind on anything for very long.
- I find I can't concentrate on anything.

20. Tiredness or Fatigue

- 0 I am no more tired or fatigued than usual.
- 1 I get more tired or fatigued more easily than usual.
- I am too tired or fatigued to do a lot of the things I used to do.
- I am too tired or fatigues to do most of the things I used to do.

21. Loss of Interest in Sex

- 1 I have not noticed any recent change in my interest in sex.
- I am less interested in sex than I used to be.
- 2 I am much less interested in sex now.
- 3 I have lost interest in sex completely.

Appendix C

Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (Bernstein, Fink, Handelsman, & Foote, 1994)

1. I didn't have enough to eat

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true) true)

2. I knew there was someone to take care of me and protect me

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true) true)

3. People in my family called me things like "stupid", "lazy", or "ugly"

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true) true)

4. My parents were too drunk or high to take care of the family.

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true) true)

5. There was someone in my family who helped me feel important or special.

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely true) 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true)

6. I had to wear dirty clothes

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true) true)

7. I felt loved

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely true) 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true)

8. I thought that my parents wished I had never been born

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely true) 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true)

9. I got hit so hard by someone in my family that I had to see a doctor or go to the hospital

1 (Never true) 2 (rarely 3 (sometimes 4 (often true) 5 (Very often true) true)

10. There was nothing I wanted to change about my family

1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
11. People in my family hit me so hard that it left me with bruises or marks								
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
12. I was punished w	vith a belt, a boa	rd, a cord, or some of	other hard object					
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
13. People in my fan	nily said hurtful	or insulting things t	o me					
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
14. People in my fan	nily said hurtful	or insulting things t	o me					
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
15. I believe that I w	as physically ab	used						
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
16. I had the perfect	childhood							
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
17. I got hit or beater	n so badly that it	was noticed by son	neone like a teache	er, neighbor, or doctor				
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
18. I felt that someon	ne in my family	hated me						
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
19. People in my fan	nily felt close to	each other						
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
20. Someone tried to	touch me in a s	exual way, or tried t	to make me touch t	hem				
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)				
21. Someone threate	ned to hurt me o	r tell lies about me	unless I did someth	ning sexual with them				

1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
22. I had the best family in the world									
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
23. Someone tried to	make me do s	exual things or watch	n sexual things						
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
24. Someone molest	ed me								
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
25. I believe that I w	as emotionally	abused							
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
26. There was some	one to take me	to the doctor is I need	ded it						
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
27. I believe that I w	as sexually abu	ised							
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					
28. My family was a	source of stren	igth and support							
1 (Never true)	2 (rarely true)	3 (sometimes true)	4 (often true)	5 (Very often true)					

Appendix D

Pathological Narcissism Inventory (Pincus, 2013)

1. I often fantasize ab	out being	g admired	and respec	ted.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
2. My self-esteem fluct	tuates a 1	ot.				
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
3. I sometimes feel ash	amed ab	out my exp	pectations	of others w	when they	disappoint me.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
4. I can usually talk my	y way ou	t of anythi	ng.			
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
5. It's hard to feel good	d about n	nyself whe	n I'm alon	e.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
6. I can make myself for	eel good	by caring	for others.			
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
7. I hate asking for help	p.					
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
8. When people don't i	notice me	e, I start to	feel bad al	bout mysel	lf.	
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
9. I often hide my need	ls for fea	r that other	rs will see	me as need	dy and de	pendent.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
10. I can make anyone	believe a	anything I	want them	to.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
11. I get mad when peo	ople don'	t notice al	l that I do i	for them.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
12. I get annoyed by pe	eople wh	o are not in	nterested in	n what I sa	y or do.	
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
13. I wouldn't disclose	all my i	ntimate the	oughts and	feelings to	someon	e I didn't admire.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
14. I often fantasize ab	out havii	ng a huge i	mpact on t	the world a	round m	e.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)

15. I find it easy to ma	nipulate	people.				
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
16. When others don't	notice m	ne, I start to	o feel wort	hless.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
17. Sometimes I avoid	l people b	ecause I'n	n concerne	d that they	'll disapp	point me.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
18. I typically get very	angry w	hen I'm ui	nable to ge	t what I w	ant from	others.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
19. I sometimes need i	importan	t others in	my life to	reassure m	e of my	self-worth.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
20. When I do things f	for other	people, I e	xpect them	to do thin	gs for me	e.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
21. When others don't	meet my	expectation	ons, I ofter	n feel asha	med abou	it what I wanted.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
22. I feel important wh	nen other	s rely on m	ne.			
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
23. I can read people l	ike a boo	k.				
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
24. When others disap	point me	, I often ge	et angry at	myself.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
25. Sacrificing for other	ers make	s me the be	etter person	n.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
26. I often fantasize ab	out acco	mplishing	things that	t are proba	bly beyon	nd my means.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
27. Sometimes I avoid	l people b	ecause I'n	n afraid the	ey won't d	o what I	want them to.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
28. It's hard to show o	thers the	weakness	es I fell ins	side.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
29. I get angry when c	riticized.					
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
30. It's hard to feel go	od about	myself un	less I knov	v other pec	nle admi	re me.

0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
31. I often fantasize ab	out being	g rewarded	l for my ef	forts.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
32. I am preoccupied v	vith thou	ghts and co	oncerns the	at most pe	ople are 1	not interested in me.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
33. I like to have friend	ds who re	ely on me l	because it	makes me	feel impo	ortant.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
34. Sometimes I avoid	people b	ecause I'n	n concerne	d they wo	n't ackno	wledge what I do for
them.						
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
35. Everybody likes to	hear my	stories.				
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
36. It's hard for me to	feel good	l about my	self unless	s I know of	ther peop	le like me.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
37. It irritates me when	n people	don't notic	e how goo	d a persor	ı I am.	
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
38. I will never be satis	sfied unti	il I get all 1	that I deser	ve.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
39. I try to show what	a good p	erson I am	through m	ny sacrific	es.	
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
40. I am disappointed v	when peo	ple don't	notice me.			
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
41. I often find myself	envying	others' ac	complishm	nents.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
42. I often fantasize ab	out perfo	orming her	oic deeds.			
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
43. I help others in ord	er to pro	ve I'm a g	ood person	1.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
44. It's important to sh	ow peop	le I can do	it on my o	own, even	if I have	some doubts inside.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
45. I often fantasize ab	out being	g recogniz	ed for my	accomplisi	nments.	

0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
46. I can't stand relyin	ıg on	other peopl	le because	it makes m	ne feel we	eak.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
47. When others don't	resp	ond to me t	he way tha	at I would l	ike them	to, it is hard for me to still
feel ok with myself.						
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
48. I need others to ac	know	ledge me.				
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
49. I want to amount to	o son	nething in tl	he eyes of	the world.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
50. When others get a	glim	pse of my n	eeds, I fee	el anxious a	nd ashan	ned.
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
51. Sometimes it's eas	sier to	be alone th	nan to face	e not getting	g everyth	ing I want from other
people.						
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)
52. I can get pretty ang	gry w	hen others	disagree v	vith me.		
0 (not like me at all)	1	2	3	4	5	6 (very much like me)

Appendix E

Self-Concept Clarity Scale (Campbell et al, 1996)

1. My beliefs about myself often conflict with one another.*					
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
	e one opinion of	myself and on a	nother day	I might have a	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
ot of time wor	ndering about w	hat kind of perso	n I really	am.*	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
I feel that I a	m not really the	person that I app	pear to be.	*	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
	kind of person I	have been in the	past, I'm 1	not sure what I was	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
perience con	flict between th	e different aspect	ts of my po	ersonality.	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
I think I kno	w other people 1	better than I know	w myself.	*	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
about myself	seem to change	very frequently.	*		
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
9. If I were asked to describe my personality, my description might end up being different from one day to another day.*					
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
anted to, I do	n't think I could	tell someone wh	at I'm real	lly like.*	
sagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)	
	sagree) I might have binion.* sagree) I feel that I a sagree) I feel that I a sagree) I think I know sagree) I think I know sagree) about myself sagree) ked to descript om one day to sagree)	sagree) 2 I might have one opinion of binion.* sagree) 2 of of time wondering about we sagree) 2 I feel that I am not really the sagree) 2 of about the kind of person I seagree) 2 I think I know other people I sagree) 2 about myself seem to change sagree) 2 ked to describe my personality om one day to another day.* sagree) 2 anted to, I don't think I could	sagree) 2 3 It might have one opinion of myself and on an opinion.* sagree) 2 3 It feel that I am not really the person that I apparent about the kind of person I have been in the sagree) 2 3 As about the kind of person I have been in the sagree) 2 3 Experience conflict between the different aspect asagree) 2 3 It think I know other people better than I know sagree) 2 3 about myself seem to change very frequently. sagree) 2 3 ked to describe my personality, my description one day to another day.* sagree) 2 3 anted to, I don't think I could tell someone when	I might have one opinion of myself and on another day sinion.* sagree) 2 3 4 It of time wondering about what kind of person I really a sagree) 2 3 4 I feel that I am not really the person that I appear to be. sagree) 2 3 4 Ink about the kind of person I have been in the past, I'm researce) 2 3 4 Experience conflict between the different aspects of my person I think I know other people better than I know myself. Sagree) 2 3 4 I think I know other people better than I know myself. Sagree) 2 3 4 about myself seem to change very frequently.* sagree) 2 3 4 ked to describe my personality, my description might enom one day to another day.* sagree) 2 3 4 anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to, I don't think I could tell someone what I'm real anted to.	

11. In general, I have a cle	ar sense of who	o I am and wha	t I am.	
1 (Strongly Disagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)
12. It is often hard for me what I want.*	to make up my	mind about thi	ngs because	e I don't really know
1 (Strongly Disagree)	2	3	4	5 (Strongly Agree)

Appendix F

Rosenberg Instability of Self Items (Rosenberg, 1965)

1. Sometimes I feel worth	less; at other	times I feel that	I am wor	thwhile				
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)				
2. Sometimes I feel happy with myself; at other times I feel very unhappy with myself								
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)				
13. Sometimes I feel usel	ess; at other to	imes I feel very ι	ıseful					
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)				
14. Sometimes I feel very	bad about m	yself; at other tin	nes I feel	very good about myself				
1 (Not at all like me)	2	3	4	5 (Very much like me)				

Appendix G

Self-Consciousness Scale-Revised (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975)

Items	0	1	2	3
I'm always trying to figure myself out.				
I'm concerned about my style of doing things.				
It takes me times to get over my shyness in new				
situations.				
I think about myself a lot.				
I care a lot about how I present myself to others.				
I often daydream about myself.				
It's hard for me to work when someone is watching me.				
I never take a hard look at myself.				
I get embarrassed very easily.				
I'm self-conscious about the way I look.				
It's easy for me to talk to strangers.				
I generally pay attention to my inner feelings.				
I usually worry about making a good impression.				
I'm constantly thinking about my reasons for doing				
things.				
I feel nervous when I speak in front of a group.				
Before I leave my house, I check how I look.				
I sometimes step back (in my mind) in order to examine				
myself from a distance				
I'm concerned about what other people think of me.				
I'm quick to notice changes in my mood.				
I'm usually aware of my appearance.				
I know the way my mind works when I work through a				
problem.				
Large groups make me nervous				

Appendix H

Electrode Placements

actiCAP 64Ch Standard-2

Green holders: electrode positions Ch1 – Ch32 Yellow holders: Label 1-32, hard-wired Ch33 –


Ch64 Blue holder: Ref Black holder: Gnd

Components:

• Softcap, white

• Holders with flat side inwards

- 3 additional holders (white, empty label) for use with double-sided adhesive rings to place electrodes on bare skin
- 1 chin belt
- this layout / pinout



Appendix I

Consent Form



Informed Consent Form for Study Participants

Title of Protocol: "The Fractal dynamics of the Self"			
Principal Investigators: Ju	ulia Ignaszewski		
Participant Name:			
I,	, have read the	preceding information and	
	ons to help me understand what m		
•	at the study and related procedure	<u>*</u>	
	nt to participate in the study unless	I decide otherwise. I will	
receive a signed copy of this con	nsent form.		
Participant (Print Name)	Signature	Date	
Tarrespant (Time Tame)	Signature	Butt	
Person Obtaining Consent	Signature	Date	
_	S		
(Print Name)			
Investigator Statement			
I certify that I have explained th	ne research study to the above indi-	vidual including the nurnose	
	ts and potential benefits associated		
	aised have been answered to the in		
	understands my explanations and		
consent.			
Investigator (Print Name)	Signature	Date	
mvestigator (Fillit Name)	Signature	Date	

Appendix J

Demographic Health Questionnaire

1.	Have you ever been diagnosed with a mental illness or condition (ex. Depression,	
	anxiety, posttraumatic stress disorder, etc.)?	
	If yes, which illness and when?	
2.	Have you ever been diagnosed with a neurological condition (ex. Epilepsy, stroke,	
	dementia, etc.)?	
	If yes, which condition and when?	
3.	Have you ever had a head injury that was treated by a doctor?	
4.	Have you ever been knocked unconscious for more than 5 minutes?	
5.	In the past 3 months have you used alcohol or drugs in a way that caused you to take	
	risks, neglected your responsibilities, or caused problems in your relationships with	
	friends or family?	
6.	Have you ever used alcohol or drugs in a way that you knew was hurting you, where you	
	needed more of it to get the same feeling, or used it to make yourself feel better	
	physically or mentally?	
7.	Have you ever been treated with chemotherapy, radiation therapy to your brain or	
	electroconvulsive therapy (ECT)?	
8.	Are you currently taking any medication prescribed by a doctor?	
	If yes, which medication?	
9.	Are you below the age of 18?	
10.	Do you need glasses to read?	
	If so, do you have them with you today?	
11.	In the last 7 days, have you smoked cigarettes on a regular basis?	
12.	In the last 7 days, have you smoked cigarettes or ingested marijuana?	
13.	In the last 7 days, have you taken any other medication not listed above (ex. Advil,	
	Tylenol, Tylenol-3, multivitamin, etc)?	
	If yes, which medication?	
14.	What is your approximate height?	
15.	What is your approximate weight?	

16.	Sex
17.	Highest education
18.	When did you last eat (in hours)?