The ADIC-DAG Yellow Paper

Formalization, Conjectures, and Partial Results

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Abstract

This Yellow Paper formalizes the ADIC-DAG protocol as introduced in the White Paper and extends it with precise state-machine semantics, admissibility invariants, and mathematically stated conjectures together with partial results and proof sketches. The core ideas—a p-adic ultrametric on message features, higher-dimensional Tangle attachments (each message approves d+1 parents), and dual finality tests via k-core coverage and persistent homology—are specified in a way intended to be machine-checkable and implementable. We also present a reference generative model, security assumptions, parameter phase diagrams near (p,d)=(3,3), and an open-problem bank with acceptance criteria for decentralized research and bounties.

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1 Introduction and Design Goals

ADIC-DAG is a feeless, reputation-weighted distributed ledger where each message attaches to d+1 parents across distinct p-adic neighborhoods (axes), enforcing multi-axis diversity at the moment of attachment. Finality is certified by two independent tests: (F1) a k-core coverage criterion with axis-diversity and reputation thresholds; and (F2) stabilization of weighted persistent homology in the future cone. The ADIC token funds utility (storage, PoUW bounties, governance) but not consensus security; consensus weight derives from refundable deposits and a non-transferable reputation (ADIC-Rep).

Notation. Fix a prime p and a dimension $d \in \{2,3,\ldots\}$. Each message x carries features $\Phi(x) = (\varphi_1(x), \ldots, \varphi_d(x)) \in \mathbb{Q}_p^d$, a public key P_x , a reputation $R(P_x) \geq 0$, and an approval set $A(x) = \{a_0, \ldots, a_d\}$ respecting acyclicity. Let $\rho = (\rho_1, \ldots, \rho_d) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\geq 0}^d$ be axis radii and $q \in \{2, \ldots, d+1\}$ a diversity threshold.

2 System Model and State Machine

2.1 The simplicial DAG and future cones

Definition 2.1 (Simplicial hypergraph). The ledger state at any time is a directed acyclic simplicial hypergraph $T_d = (V, \Sigma_d)$ where every $x \in V$ adds a simplex $\{x, a_0, \ldots, a_d\} \in \Sigma_d$ with directed approvals $x \to a_i$, and with no directed cycles. The *future cone* of x is the set of y that (transitively) approve x.

Definition 2.2 (Admissibility and diversity). Given ρ, q , a candidate approval set $A(x) = \{a_0, \ldots, a_d\}$ is admissible if, for each axis $j \in \{1, \ldots, d\}$,

- (C1) $v_p(\varphi_j(x) \varphi_j(a_i)) \ge \rho_j$ for all i;
- (C2) the multiset of p-adic balls $\{B^{(p)}(\varphi_j(a_i), \rho_j)\}_{i=0}^d$ contains at least q distinct balls;
- (C3) $\sum_{i=0}^{d} R(a_i) \ge R_{\min}$ and $\min_i R(a_i) \ge r_{\min}$.

2.2 Node state machine

Each node maintains:

- a local view of tips $T \subset V$ (vertices with no incoming approvals),
- per-axis vector clocks to ensure acyclicity on arrival,
- an escrow ledger of deposits D and refunds,
- an estimator for finality (F1)/(F2) with parameters $(k, q, R^*, D^*, \Delta, \varepsilon)$.

The transition function ValidateAndAttach checks signature, format, acyclicity, admissibility, escrows D, and appends the simplex. Periodic Finalize runs (F1) and/or (F2); on success it refunds D and updates ADIC-Rep.

3 Tip Selection by Multi-Axis Random Walk (MRW)

Definition 3.1 (MRW kernel). Let $\operatorname{proxp}(x,y) := \prod_{j=1}^d (1 + p^{\rho_j - \operatorname{v}_p(\varphi_j(x) - \varphi_j(y))})^{-1}$ and $\operatorname{trust}(y) := R(y)^{\alpha}/(1 + \operatorname{age}(y))^{\beta}$. With $\mu, \lambda > 0$ and conflict $\operatorname{penalty} \operatorname{conflict}(y) \in \{0, 1, \dots\}$, define

$$\Pr(t \to y) \propto \exp(\lambda \operatorname{proxp}(x, y) \operatorname{trust}(y) - \mu \operatorname{conflict}(y)).$$

Run MRW independently per axis, intersect or diversity-merge candidates, then sample a distinct d+1-tuple satisfying (C1)–(C3).

Remark 3.2 (No-starvation desideratum). We seek parameter regimes $(\lambda, \mu, \alpha, \beta)$ under which honest tips below a given reputation percentile receive a non-vanishing visitation frequency. See Conjecture 9.4.

4 Conflict Energy and Drift

For a conflict set C (e.g. mutually exclusive UTXO spends), define

$$\operatorname{supp}(z;C) = \sum_{\substack{y \text{ descends to } z}} \frac{R(y)}{1 + \operatorname{depth}(y)}, \qquad E = \sum_{\substack{C \ z \in C}} \operatorname{sgn}(z) \operatorname{supp}(z;C).$$

Conjecture 4.1 (Negative drift of conflict energy). Under MRW and admissibility (C1)-(C3), there exist $c, \delta > 0$ (depending on $\lambda, \mu, \rho, q, \alpha, \beta$) such that

$$\mathbb{E}[E(t+1) - E(t) \mid \mathcal{F}_t] \leq -c \, \mathbf{1}_{\{E(t) > \delta\}},$$

hence conflicts resolve to a unique winner with finite expected time and subexponential tails.

Attempted proof. Couple MRW to a time-changed birth—death process on support differences; use admissibility to bound the probability that newly arriving mass can concentrate on a losing branch across q distinct balls per axis. A supermartingale argument with optional stopping yields the claimed drift. Completing the proof requires (i) explicit mixing bounds for MRW (Sec. 9.2) and (ii) a uniform anti-concentration bound across axes.

5 Finality: k-Core and Persistent Homology

Definition 5.1 (Finality tests). A node x is final if either:

- (F1) (k-core) The future cone of x contains a k-core with at least q distinct p-adic balls per axis, total reputation $\geq R^*$, and minimum depth $\geq D^*$.
- (F2) (**Homology**) In the induced weighted simplicial complex, H_d stabilizes over a window of Δ rounds and the bottleneck distance on H_{d-1} falls below ε .

Conjecture 5.2 (Implication gap). There exist thresholds $(k, q, R^*, D^*, \Delta, \varepsilon)$ such that, for the ADIC generative model, (F1) implies (F2) with probability $1 - \delta$. Quantify minimal such tuples and δ .

Proof sketch. Model the future cone as a d-simplicial percolation process constrained by (C1)–(C3). A dense k-core distributed across q balls per axis forces stabilization of higher-dimensional cycles: high-weight d-simplices fill d-holes while keeping (d-1)-noise below the ε threshold, yielding (F2). A quantitative proof needs explicit isoperimetric inequalities on the product ultrametric and stability of persistent diagrams under weighted additions.

6 Economics and Reputation

6.1 Feeless base and refundable deposits

Every message escrows a deposit D refunded on finality; objective faults (invalid signature, malformed approvals, provable sybil overlap) trigger slashing of D. Fees are not required for liveness or safety.

6.2 ADIC-Rep (reputation)

Definition 6.1 (Reputation update). For public key P,

$$R_{t+1}(P) = \gamma R_t(P) + (1 - \gamma)(\operatorname{good}(P) - \operatorname{bad}(P)),$$

where good credits finalized approvals with diversity/depth weighting and bad penalizes overlap across axes. Only R (not ADIC balances) affects consensus weight.

Conjecture 6.2 (Stability and boundedness). For appropriate $(\gamma, \eta, caps)$, the reputation dynamics are globally stable and uniformly bounded against any finite-budget adversary.

Attempted proof. Construct a Lyapunov function $L = \sum_{P} w_{P} R(P)$ with weights inversely proportional to axis-overlap rates. Show $\mathbb{E}[L_{t+1} - L_{t}] \leq -\xi \sum_{P} R(P)$ outside a compact set. The main gap is a tight bound on overlap estimators under adaptive adversaries.

7 Parameters and Safe Operating Regions

7.1 v1 defaults

We adopt (p, d) = (3, 3), $\rho = (2, 2, 1)$, q = 3, k = 20, $D^* = 12$, window $\Delta = 5$, reputation exponents $(\alpha, \beta) = (1, 1)$, and deposit D = 0.1 ADIC as a reference point for analysis and benchmarks.

7.2 Phase diagram (conceptual)

We consider the region in $(p, d, \rho, q, k, D^*, \Delta, \lambda, \mu, \alpha, \beta)$ space separating liveness (non-empty admissible tip set, bounded confirmation latency) from finality failure (persistent topological noise or absence of diversified k-cores). A formal map is left as Conjecture ??.

8 Security Model

Adversarial goals include sybil concentration (violating (C2)), censorship (starving honest tips), and double-spend (sustaining conflicting support). Defenses: refundable deposits, soul-bound reputation, MRW across axes, diversity thresholds, and dual finality with topological stabilization.

9 Open Problems and Partial Results

Below we formalize key problems as conjectures/theorems. Each has a "counts-as-solved" target for decentralized bounties.

9.1 Ultrametric embeddings and diversity

Conjecture 9.1 (Low-distortion encoders). Construct $\Phi: \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{Q}_p^d$ for discrete features with distortion bounded by a function of (p,d) while preserving radii constraints in (C1)–(C2).

Attempted proof. Use base-p digit interleaving and Hensel lifting for hierarchical buckets; prove that the p-adic distance between encodings lower-bounds axis separation after coarse-graining. Gaps: optimal constants and adversarial worst cases.

Conjecture 9.2 (Minimal diversity threshold). For fixed (p, d, ρ) , there exists q_{\min} such that $q \ge q_{\min}$ makes long-term axis capture by any bounded-budget coalition exponentially unlikely.

Proof sketch. Model approvals as occupancy in product p-adic trees; apply multi-type branching bounds and Chernoff-style tail inequalities across axes.

9.2 MRW mixing and fairness

Conjecture 9.3 (MRW mixing time). The MRW mixes to a stationary measure in $\tilde{O}(\text{poly}(d)/\text{gap})$ steps uniformly over time (with mild degree/age regularity).

Conjecture 9.4 (Fairness under heterogeneous reputations). Under suitable $(\lambda, \mu, \alpha, \beta)$, honest tips below any fixed reputation percentile receive a minimum visitation frequency $> \theta > 0$.

Attempted proof. Bound conductance of the MRW kernel by decoupling axis-wise transitions; apply path-congestion techniques to obtain a spectral-gap lower bound depending on (ρ, q) and degree regularity.

9.3 Percolation, cores, and homology

Conjecture 9.5 (Core threshold with diversity). In a random ADIC-like directed d-simplicial hypergraph with constraints (C1)–(C3), the emergence of a k-core that is q-diverse per axis exhibits a sharp threshold in average attachment rate.

Conjecture 9.6 (F1 vs. F2 separation). There exist parameter families where (F1) holds but (F2) fails (or vice versa), with explicit topological obstructions.

Attempted proof. Construct gadgets of d-simplices that sustain a k-core yet maintain transient (d-1) cycles above the ε bottleneck until additional cross-axis attachments occur.

9.4 Reputation dynamics

Conjecture 9.7 (Collusion resistance). There exist $(\gamma, \eta, caps)$ such that no coalition can raise average reputation above honest baselines without violating (C2).

9.5 Mechanism design

Conjecture 9.8 (Minimal refundable deposit). There is a threshold D^{\dagger} (in units tied to workload) above which spam/overlap attacks are suboptimal for any attacker with bounded variance in issuance rate.

Conjecture 9.9 (Potential-game formulation). The attach/approve game admits a potential whose local maxima coincide with equilibria maximizing diversity and liveness.

9.6 Complexity bounds

Conjecture 9.10 (Dynamic finality complexity). The online decision "is x final under (F1)/(F2)?" is fixed-parameter tractable in D^* and local degree, or else admits conditional lower bounds (e.g. SETH) for general streams.

Conjecture 9.11 (Near-log update for homology). There exists a dynamic algorithm that maintains H_d and H_{d-1} with amortized $O(\log^c m)$ updates for ADIC-style streams, or else an $\Omega(m^{\epsilon})$ lower bound holds.

10 Reference Specification (Condensed)

10.1 Admissibility score

For $A = \{a_0, \ldots, a_d\}$ define

$$S(x; A) = \sum_{j=1}^{d} \min_{a \in A} p^{-\max\{0, \rho_j - \mathbf{v}_p(\varphi_j(x) - \varphi_j(a))\}}.$$

Require $S(x; A) \ge d$ and (C2)–(C3).

10.2 Validation and finality

```
Validate(x):
   check signature, format, per-axis acyclicity
   assert Admissible(x, A(x))
   escrow deposit D
Finalize():
   test F1 and/or F2 on candidates
   refund D on finality; update ADIC-Rep; slash faults
```

11 Generative Model for Analysis

We consider a time-indexed process where honest arrivals follow a renewal process with bounded inter-arrival variance, features $\Phi(x)$ are drawn from axis-specific distributions with Lipschitz densities in the *p*-adic topology, and adversaries can adaptively choose features and timing subject to deposit costs. This model underlies Conjectures 4.1, 5.2, 9.3.

12 Toward Machine-Checkable Proofs

We recommend formalizing (i) admissibility invariants, (ii) MRW kernel properties, and (iii) finality criteria as executable properties in a proof assistant (e.g. Coq/Lean). The p-adic arithmetic, ultrametric balls, and simplicial complexes are standard libraries or straightforward to encode.

13 Implementation Roadmap (Aligned to Proof Obligations)

Phase 0 (prototype): message format, encoders, MRW, admissibility, k-core, deposits/refunds, explorer.

Phase 1 (beta): streaming homology library, ADIC-Rep SBT, axis-aware gossip, anti-entropy checkpoints.

Phase 2 (mainnet-candidate): PoUW hooks, storage markets, governance (quadratic), parameter sweeps, adversarial testing.

14 Genesis (Informative)

The Genesis hyperedge uses (p, d) = (3, 3) with anchors in distinct balls; the manifest (parameters, anchors, multisig) is anchored on multiple L1s for timestamping. Contribution addresses for legacy L1 coordination:

BTC

bc1qnykv3t8fqpar7aguaas3sxtlsqyndxrpa0g7h8

ETH

0x7EB0c7ea79D85d2A3Ac45aF6A8CB0F7AC9A125bE

SOL

GrUy83AAsibyrcUtpAVA8VgpnQSgyCAb1d8Je8MXNGLJ.

Contributions fund R&D and infrastructure; no returns are promised or implied.

15 Conclusion

ADIC-DAG formalizes a feeless consensus with multi-axis diversity and dual finality grounded in combinatorics and topology. The conjectures herein chart the path for decentralized mathematical research that will harden guarantees and tune parameters ahead of mainnet.

A Problem Bank (Canonical Statements & Acceptance Criteria)

Each item below includes a crisp target for acceptance.

A. p-Adic Geometry & Axis Encodings

Conjecture A.1 (A1: Low-distortion ultrametric encoders). Given discrete feature sets, produce $\Phi: \mathcal{X} \to \mathbb{Q}_p^d$ with distortion $\leq f(p,d)$ s.t. (C1)-(C2) hold. **Accept if:** worst-case or distributional bounds \mathscr{E} explicit encoder.

Conjecture A.2 (A2: Minimal diversity thresholds). There exists q_{\min} achieving exponentially small capture probability for bounded-budget coalitions. Accept if: non-asymptotic tail bounds vs. q, ρ and budget.

B. MRW on Ultrametrics

Conjecture A.3 (B1: MRW mixing). TV mixing in $\tilde{O}(\text{poly}(d)/\text{gap})$. Accept if: rigorous upper bounds; or matching lower bounds.

Conjecture A.4 (B2: Hitting diverse parents). Within T^* steps MRW selects d+1 admissible parents per (C1)–(C3). Accept if: non-trivial upper/lower bounds or sharp asymptotics.

C. Conflict Energy

Conjecture A.5 (C1: Explicit drift). Quantify $c(\cdot)$, prove $\mathbb{E}[\tau_{\text{resolve}}] \leq C \log(1 + |support|)$. Accept if: drift & tail bounds.

D. Finality via k-Core and Homology

Conjecture A.6 (D1: (F1) \Rightarrow (F2)). Specify minimal $(k, q, R^*, D^*, \Delta, \varepsilon)$ yielding (F2) w.h.p. **Accept** if: thresholds & failure δ proved.

Conjecture A.7 (D2: Separation). Families where (F1) holds and (F2) fails (or vice versa). Accept if: explicit constructions & proofs.

E. Hypergraph Percolation

Conjecture A.8 (E1: Core threshold with diversity). Sharp threshold for q-diverse k-core. **Accept** if: threshold or finite-size scaling with bounds.

F. Reputation Dynamics

Conjecture A.9 (F1: Stability). Global stability & boundedness for $(\gamma, \eta, caps)$. Accept if: Lyapunov proof with explicit bounds.

G. Deposits and Mechanism Design

Conjecture A.10 (G1: Minimal refundable deposit). Threshold D^{\dagger} making spam/overlap attacks suboptimal. Accept if: attacker-model proof & sensitivity.

K. Complexity

Conjecture A.11 (K1: Dynamic finality complexity). FPT in D^* and local degree or conditional hardness. Accept if: formal classification.

B Reference Pseudocode

```
# Axis-aware gossip (informal):
on_receive(msg x):
    if not verify_signature(x): reject
    if not acyclic_per_axis(x): queue/later
    if not admissible(x): reject
    escrow_deposit(x.P, D)
    attach_simplex(x, A(x))
    for neighbor in peers:
        send_if_useful(neighbor, x)

# Finality loop:
every t_f seconds:
    candidates = select_recent()
    for x in candidates:
        if KCoreFinal(x, k, q, R*, D*): finalize(x); refund(x.P, D)
        else if HomologyFinal(x, Delta, Epsilon): finalize(x); refund(x.P, D)
```