

Exuberant and Uninformed: How Financial Markets (Mis-)Allocate Capital during Booms

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Job Market Paper

October 23, 2020

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Abstract

I develop a macroeconomic growth model with a central emphasis on the informational role of financial markets. Economic agents save by purchasing financial claims on firms. Crucially, agents acquire information about firm-productivity to guide their trading decision. In the aggregate, this information determines the financial market's ability to allocate more capital to productive firms and, thus, pins down total factor productivity (TFP). Using this framework, I study how information varies in response to fundamental (productivity) and non-fundamental (sentiment) macroeconomic shocks. Both lead to similar co-movements in output, asset prices, and investment but affect information differently. Productivity booms crowd-in information and, thus, amplify the initial shock by increasing TFP further. In contrast, sentiment shocks, defined as waves of optimism or pessimism, crowd-out information acquisition, which dampens sentiment booms through a decrease in TFP. I show that information acquisition in the laissez-faire equilibrium is generally constrained inefficient for two reasons. First, each agent acquires information to extract rents from others (*rent-extracting behavior*). Second, atomistic agents do not internalize that their information acquisition helps improve capital allocation and TFP (*information spillover*). Finally, I consider an application to asset purchase/sales programs and show that such government interventions can be an effective way to address financial market inefficiencies.

Keywords: Financial Markets; Information Production; Misallocation; Macroeconomics; Booms

JEL Codes: D80, E32, E44, G14

*Email Address: ilja.kantorovitch@upf.edu. I want to thank Vladimir Asriyan, Alberto Martin and Victoria Vanasco for their guidance and advice on this project. I acknowledge support from the German National Academic Foundation throughout my studies. I also thank Edouard Schaal, Isaac Baley, Filippo Ippolito and the participants of the CREi Macro Lunch and the 1st NuCamp Virtual PhD Workshop for their insightful comments and feedback.

1 Introduction

Financial markets play a central role in allocating capital to its most productive uses, yet they do not fulfill this role equally well at all times. The last twenty-five years, for instance, have been characterized by successive booms and busts in financial markets, which have been difficult to justify on fundamental grounds (Martin and Ventura, 2018).¹ Against this backdrop, there are growing concerns that such booms led to a deterioration in capital allocation, ultimately hurting aggregate productivity.² The general narrative is as follows: during booms, the perception is that all investments perform well. Thus, agents are less prone to acquire information about specific investments, so that markets eventually become less informative and the allocation of resources worsens.

Albeit appealing, this narrative is loose and cannot be fully evaluated without a theory of information acquisition and its macroeconomic effects. The goal of this paper is to provide such a theory. Specifically, it develops a tractable macroeconomic framework in which financial markets play the key role of aggregating information. The central feature of the framework is that information is endogenous, in the sense that agents can decide to engage in costly information acquisition. The framework can thus shed light on the two-way interaction between the state of the macroeconomy, agents' incentives to acquire information, and financial markets' ability to allocate more capital to productive firms.

I model a dynamic economy populated by traders and firms. Firms are subject to idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Traders must decide in which firms to invest, but they have imperfect information about firm productivity. To make their investment decision, traders combine their private information with a public signal that is provided by financial markets, which effectively aggregate the information of all traders.

The model is based on three core assumptions. First, each trader receives an imperfect signal about firm productivity, which features both idiosyncratic and correlated noise. The idiosyncratic noise captures agent-specific information, while the correlated noise captures a common “sentiment” across agents. From an economic standpoint, this sentiment is meant to capture a range of phenomena that drives asset prices away from their fundamental value, such as herding, network effects, social learning, extrapolative expectations, or bubbles (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2015; Shiller, 2015, 2017). Second, traders can exert a costly effort to acquire additional information about the productivity of firms, which effectively raises

¹For example, the dot-com bubbles in the US and the housing bubbles in the US and Southern Europe.

²Gopinath et al. (2017) document a rise in capital misallocation during the housing boom has been documented for Southern Europe and García-Santana et al. (2020) study it for Spain. Doerr (2018) provides similar evidence for the US. Gorton and Ordoñez (2020) relate credit booms in general to changes to total factor productivity. They find that “bad” booms can lead to a decrease in TFP. Similarly, Borio et al. (2015) shows that credit booms lead to a worsening of allocative efficiency of labor.

the precision of their signal. Third, to avoid the well-known Grossman-Stiglitz paradox (see Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) and justify the acquisition of information in equilibrium, traders are assumed to be overconfident. This is formalized by assuming that each trader believes the noise in her signal to be fully idiosyncratic. In a nutshell, each trader believes that she is not prone to sentiments even though she understands that everyone else is.

I derive three key results. The first is that information matters for aggregate TFP, which depends both on the exogenous productivity of firms and on the allocative efficiency of capital across firms. The latter in turn depends on the precision of information: more precise information strengthens the correlation between the size of a firm and its productivity, thereby raising allocative efficiency. An economy with higher information acquisition thus allocates more capital to productive firms and has a higher TFP.

A second key result is that the precision of information depends on the state of the economy. In particular, I study how information acquisition reacts to two types of macroeconomic shocks, to sentiment and productivity. Sentiment shocks, defined as waves of optimism or pessimism, formally drive the correlated component of individual signals: as I mentioned earlier, they are meant to capture forces that drive asset prices away from their fundamental value. Sentiment and productivity shocks lead to similar co-movements in output, investment, wages, and asset prices. However, they have different effects on information acquisition and, therefore, on the allocation of capital across firms.

In particular, information production is increasing in productivity. This is due to a scale effect: since high productivity raises the optimal size of a firm, it also boosts the benefits of acquiring more precise information about it. However, information acquisition is non-monotonic in sentiment. The reason is that, from the viewpoint of an individual trader, the benefit of acquiring information depends on the marginal impact of this information on her investment decisions. But if sentiment regarding a specific firm is too high or too low, a trader knows what her optimal strategy is even without precise information: namely, not to invest in firms where sentiment is high (i.e., firms that are “overvalued”) and to invest in firms where sentiment is low (i.e., firms that are “undervalued”). Thus, extreme sentiments discourage the acquisition of information.

This leads to a third key result of the paper: while productivity-driven booms are endogenously amplified by information acquisition, sentiment-driven booms may be dampened. Productivity booms *crowd-in* information acquisition, which improves allocative efficiency and thus raises productivity further. Sentiment-driven booms, however, may *crowd-out* information acquisition, thereby reducing allocative efficiency and thus overall productivity. This last result resonates well with the narrative outlined above, by which booms are increasingly perceived to fuel resource misallocation (e.g. Doerr, 2018; García-Santana et al.,

2020; Gopinath et al., 2017). My model provides a formal justification for this narrative, insofar as booms are predominantly driven by sentiment, they weaken the incentives to acquire information. It also captures a dichotomy of “good” (productivity-driven) and “bad” (sentiment-driven) booms as in Gorton and Ordoñez (2020).

These results are broadly consistent with empirical evidence. Dávila and Parlato (2020) propose an identification procedure to estimate price informativeness from price and earnings data,³ which is closely related to information acquisition in my model. Comparing fluctuations around the corresponding trends reveals a highly positive correlation between price informativeness and TFP growth as can be seen in Figure 15 in the Appendix. From 1995 to 2001, price informativeness and TFP growth were increasing, pointing to a productivity-driven expansion. In contrast, the housing boom from 2002 to 2007 eventually even led to a decline in TFP and a steep fall in price informativeness, which indicates a sentiment-driven boom during these years. This interpretation is in line with Borio et al. (2015), who suggest that TFP growth low during the housing boom *because of the financial boom*, not despite it.

The third main result is that information acquisition is always at an inefficient level in the laissez-faire equilibrium due to two inefficiencies. First, traders acquire information to *extract trading rents* from other traders, potentially driving information acquisition above its optimal level. Secondly, traders take prices as given and do not take into account the productivity-improving effect of *collective* information acquisition. This *information spillover* can lead to information acquisition being too low. Whether information acquisition is too low or too high in the laissez-faire equilibrium, how important the cross-sectional allocation of capital is. In particular, information acquisition is too low exactly when firms are highly substitutable and the allocation of capital matters and vice versa.

Moreover, my model sheds light on two pressing policy debates. First, it suggests that a social planner should stabilize the economy in the face of sentiment shocks, which lead to fluctuations in asset prices and investment that are not justified by fundamentals. This policy prescription of “leaning-against-the-wind”, which is not exclusive to my model, is often criticized on informational grounds: namely, it requires the planner to be able to distinguish sentiment- from productivity-driven fluctuations in real time. My model suggests that, although they look similar in many respects, both types of fluctuations can indeed be distinguished through their effects on information acquisition and thus on the dispersion in asset prices. In particular, whereas productivity booms boost information production and thus increase dispersion in firm valuations, sentiment booms discourage information production and thus reduce the dispersion in firm valuations.

³Intuitively, relative price informativeness is the weight an otherwise uninformed observer puts on the information embodied in the price relative to her prior. In my model, the weight only varies due to changes in the information acquisition by traders.

A second policy debate refers to the effects of large-scale asset purchases by policymakers. There is the widespread (although informal) perception that asset purchases can distort prices and thus the allocation of resources. My model yields a simple yet robust insight: whether this concern is justified or not depends on whether asset purchases reduce or aggravate the aggregate mispricing of assets. By reducing the supply of assets in the hands of traders, asset purchases in the model change the marginal trader’s identity and thus raise equilibrium prices. If asset prices were initially depressed due to low productivity, the common perception laid out above is correct: by distorting prices upward, asset purchases discourage information acquisition and thus worsen the allocation of capital. However, if asset prices were initially depressed due to negative sentiment, this conclusion does not hold. On the contrary, by undoing the effect of negative sentiment and asset purchases actually fuel information production and thus improve the allocation of resources.

Finally, the paper makes a methodological contribution by providing a tractable macroeconomic model of information production and aggregation. With a few exceptions,⁴ financial markets’ role as aggregators of dispersed information has received little attention in macroeconomics.⁵ The primary reason is that most standard models of informative financial markets rely on non-optimizing agents, such as noise traders, which are not straightforward to reconcile with general-equilibrium analysis. Instead, my model relies on a small behavioral deviation - overconfidence - which means that traders do not adequately perceive the idiosyncratic and correlated components in their signals. This misperception motivates them to acquire costly information as they believe in having an informational edge over the market. This simple assumption is grounded on empirical evidence,⁶ and it avoids the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox.⁷

1.1 Literature Review

This paper is part of the literature on the link between information production and the business cycle (Ambrocio, 2019; Asriyan, Laeven, and Martin, 2019; Chousakos, Gorton, and Ordonez, 2020; Farboodi and Kondor, 2019; Veldkamp, 2005).⁸ The overarching theme

⁴Some exceptions are David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran (2016), Peress (2014), and Straub and Ulbricht (2018).

⁵The idea of markets as aggregators of dispersed information dates back to Hayek (1945): “The economic problem of society is (...) rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.”

⁶See for example Enke and Zimmermann (2019), Eyster et al. (2018), and Grimm and Mengel (2018).

⁷The Grossman-Stiglitz paradox states that no equilibrium exists in models of financial markets with costly information acquisition when there is no noise to keep prices from being perfectly revealing.

⁸See also Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010), Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017), Gorton and Ordoñez (2014), Ordonez (2013), Straub and Ulbricht (2018), and Van Nieuwerburgh and Veld-

is that incentives to produce information vary over the cycle, which in turn shapes the business cycle. This paper shows that the source of fluctuations is important to determine the relationship between the cycle and information production. Similar to Asriyan, Laeven, and Martin (2019) and Chousakos, Gorton, and Ordóñez (2020), non-fundamental booms (and busts) crowd-out information from financial markets.

This paper builds on the literature on informative financial markets (Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2011a; Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980; Kyle, 1985; Vives, 2010). In this literature, limits-to-arbitrage keep arbitrageurs from eliminating mispricing and, therefore, incentives to produce information persist in equilibrium. The microstructure of the financial market in my model is identical to Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011a). Whereas Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011a) split their agents in rational and noise traders, all traders are overconfident in my model. A number of papers study informative financial markets in a macroeconomic context (Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski, 2017; Asriyan, 2020; David, Hopenhayn, and Venkateswaran, 2016; Peress, 2014; Straub and Ulbricht, 2018). I add to this literature by studying the effects of aggregate shocks to information acquisition and the allocation of capital. From a normative perspective, I show under which conditions information acquisition is likely to be too high or low in the competitive equilibrium.

This paper contributes to the literature on the feedback between financial markets and the real economy, as surveyed in Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012). This literature mostly studies the role of secondary markets as sources of information, for example to inform managers (Dow and Gorton, 1997; Holmström and Tirole, 1993). Similar to Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2017), I study the two-way feedback between the financial and real economy when traders acquire information endogenously. In my model information is also important as a measure of allocative efficiency when managers do not learn from asset prices.

There is ample empirical evidence that asset prices are indeed informative. See Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2013) for a survey on the literature that uses “non-synchronicity” as a measure of price-informativeness.⁹ Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) find that more developed countries have stock markets that are more informative. Focusing instead on the cross-section of firms, Durnev, Morck, and Yeung (2004) find that non-synchronicity is positively related to corporate investment’s efficiency. More recently, Bai, Philippon, and Savov (2016) and Farboodi, Matray, et al. (2020) show that prices have become better predictors of corporate earnings in the US since the 1960s. The latter emphasize that this has been mainly the case for large growth firms. Dávila and Parlato (2020) provide a micro-founded measure of

kamp (2006) for related work.

⁹Non-synchronicity has been suggested by Roll (1988) as a measure of firm-specific information in asset prices. The main idea is that the more volatility in asset prices stem from firm-specific factors, the more informative are prices about firms.

price informativeness. They find that prices have become more informative since the 1990s, but price informativeness has also become increasingly volatile since the late 1990s. Finally, Bennett, Stulz, and Wang (2020) provide evidence that price informativeness increases firm productivity. Price-informativeness is closely related to the allocative efficiency of financial markets in my model.

In this model, traders suffer from correlation neglect. This bias has been studied in the literature and documented repeatedly in experimental settings (Brandts, Gritligil, and Weber, 2015; Chandrasekhar, Larreguy, and Xandri, 2012; Enke and Zimmermann, 2019; Eyster et al., 2018; Grimm and Mengel, 2018). When receiving information from multiple sources, neglecting correlated noise in the signals can lead to an overly precise posterior. Therefore, correlation neglect leads to overconfidence, which plays a central role in the literature on behavioral biases, especially in relation to financial markets (Daniel and Hirshleifer, 2015; Glaser and Weber, 2010).

Finally, there is a broad literature on sentiments in macroeconomics (see Nowzohour and Stracca, 2020, for a survey). There are different definitions of sentiments, ranging from self-fulfilling beliefs (Asriyan, Fuchs, and Green, 2019; Martin and Ventura, 2018) to news and noise shocks (Angeletos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan, 2010; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2012). In this model, sentiments are waves of non-fundamental optimism or pessimism. When a positive sentiment shock hits, agents become optimistic about productivity and vice versa.

2 Model

2.1 Households and Traders

The model is populated by overlapping generations of households indexed by $i \in [0, 1]$. As is common in the New-Keynesian literature, I assume that each household i consists of a unit mass of traders indexed by $ij \in [0, 1] \times [0, 1]$ (see for example Blanchard and Galí, 2010). Households pool resources, borrow on behalf of traders and distribute consumption equally, whereas traders individually maximize the utility for the household given by

$$U_{it} = C_{it,t} + \delta \mathbb{E} \{C_{it,t+1}\} - \int_0^1 IA(\beta_{ijt}) dj, \quad (1)$$

where $C_{it,t}$ is youth consumption, $C_{it,t+1}$ is old age consumption, $\delta \in (0, 1)$ is the discount factor and $\int_0^1 IA(\beta_{ijt}) dj$ are information acquisition costs which are introduced in more detail in a later section.

When young, traders each inelastically supply one unit of labor and receive a wage W_t

and buy shares of intermediate good firms in a competitive financial market. To avoid unbounded demands by risk-neutral traders, demand for each stock is limited to the interval $[\kappa_L, \kappa_H]$ where $\kappa_L \leq 0$ and $\kappa_H > 1$.¹⁰ Traders also choose the precision β_{ijt} of a noisy signal of firm productivity to inform their trading decision subject to a utility cost $IA(\beta_{ijt})$. Finally, the household lends and borrows through risk-less bonds with return R_{t+1} .

2.2 Technologies

2.2.1 Final Good Sector

There are many identical final good firms owned by households. The production function for the final good, which also serves as the numéraire, is Cobb-Douglas over labor and a CES-aggregate of intermediate goods. Aggregate output is

$$Y_t = L^{1-\alpha} \left(\int_0^1 Y_{jt}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}}, \quad (2)$$

where $\theta \in (0, \infty)$ is the elasticity of substitution between varieties and α is the share of intermediate goods. Y_{jt} is an intermediate good produced by firm j . The final good can be consumed or invested in firm-capital.

2.2.2 Intermediate Good Sector

For each generation there is a unit mass of intermediate good firms $j \in [0, 1]$ with production function

$$Y_{jt} = A_{jt-1}^{\frac{\theta}{\theta-1}} K_{jt}, \quad (3)$$

where K_{jt} is firm-capital and $\ln(A_{jt-1}) \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(a_{t-1}, \sigma_a^2)$ is firm productivity. Capital takes time to build, such that investment takes place in t but production in $t+1$, and depreciates fully after production. Each firm sells a unit mass of claims to total firm-revenue to households and finances capital investment with the proceeds,¹¹

$$P_{jt} = K_{jt+1}. \quad (4)$$

¹⁰See Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (e.g., 2011a) and Dow, Goldstein, and Guembel (2017) for similar approaches and Appendix C for a further elaboration.

¹¹See Appendix D for a micro-foundation and further discussion.

2.2.3 Information

Trader ij is only active in the market for shares of firm j , for which she is an expert as she receives a signal

$$s_{ijt} = a_{jt} + \frac{\eta_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}, \quad (5)$$

where $a_{jt} \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(a_t, \sigma_a^2)$ is firm productivity, $\eta_{ijt} \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(0, 1)$ is idiosyncratic noise, $\varepsilon_{jt} \stackrel{iid}{\sim} \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_t, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ is correlated noise which is interpreted as *sentiment*, and β_{ijt} is a information precision parameter chosen by trader ij .¹² Both idiosyncratic and correlated noise are *iid* over time and across markets; idiosyncratic noise is also *iid* between traders. A high realization of η_{ijt} means that trader ij is optimistic about firm j relative to other traders in the same market. Similarly, a high realization of ε_{jt} means that traders in market j are collectively too optimistic.

Assumption 1 (*Overconfidence*). *Trader ij believes the information structure to be*

$$\begin{aligned} s_{ijt} &= a_{jt} + \frac{\eta_{ijt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}} \\ s_{-ijt} &= a_{jt} + \frac{\eta_{-ijt} + \varepsilon_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{-ijt}}}. \end{aligned}$$

Following Assumption 1, traders believe that sentiment ε_{jt} drives the beliefs of all traders except their own. As a result, traders are overconfident and willing to acquire costly information to exploit mispricing induced through sentiment shocks ε_{jt} .¹³ Finally, trader ij chooses the precision of her private signal β_{ijt} subject to a convex cost function $IA(\beta_{ijt})$ with standard properties $IA(0) = 0$, $IA'(0) = 0$, $IA''(\cdot) > 0$.

2.2.4 Aggregate Shocks

Two classes of shocks drive the economy. *Aggregate productivity shocks* move the mean of the distribution of firm-specific productivity shocks, $a_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(a_t, \sigma_a^2)$, and *aggregate sentiment shocks* drive the mean of firm-specific sentiment shocks, $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_t, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$, similar to Angelatos, Lorenzoni, and Pavan (2010). The sentiment shock ε_t is meant to capture a range of phenomena that lead to non-fundamental price movements in financial markets, e.g., herding, informational cascades, social learning, bubbles, liquidity trading, etc. (see Kindleberger and Aliber, 2015; Shiller, 2015, 2017).

¹²See section 7.2 for the effect of uncertainty about aggregate shocks.

¹³This assumption is necessary to avoid the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). It states that informationally efficient markets are impossible in the absence of noise when information is costly. In that case, markets would already reveal all information and, therefore, destroy the incentive to acquire costly information in the first place.




Figure 1: Intraperson timing.

For simplicity, traders perfectly observe aggregate shocks $\{a_t, \varepsilon_t\}$ before their information acquisition decision, but firm-specific shocks $\{a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}\}$ need to be learned. The law of motions for the aggregate shocks are irrelevant for this setup, as the dynamic model is a repetition of static problems. It follows that the information set of trader ij consists of the private signal s_{ijt} , share prices $\{P_{jt}\}$ for all markets $j \in [0, 1]$ and the mean and variances of firm-specific shocks $\{a_t, \varepsilon_t\}$, i.e., $\mathcal{I}_{ij} = \{s_{ijt}, \{P_{jt}\}, a_t, \varepsilon_t\}$. In other words, traders have rational beliefs about aggregates, but disagree about the productivity of intermediate good firms based on public information in form of prices and private signals.

2.3 Timing

The timing is laid out in Figure 1. At the beginning of each period, young traders work in the final good sector and receive wage W_t . Then, traders choose the precision of their signal and the financial market opens. At the end of the period, investment takes place and consumption takes place.

2.4 Notation

Traders think that their private signal does not contain correlated noise ε_{jt} as in Assumption 1. Therefore, expectations that condition on the private signal are distorted and, for example, trader ij 's expectations about revenue are $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{jt+1}|s_{ijt}, P_{jt}\}$.

The determinants of functions are usually omitted to save on notation. For example, the firm j 's revenue is denoted by Π_{jt+1} instead of $\Pi(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}, Y_{t+1})$. A_{jt} is indexed by t instead of $t+1$ as traders can learn about firm productivity in period t .

2.5 Household's and Trader's Problem

Household i takes the interest rate R_{t+1} as given and decides how much to borrow or lend. Furthermore, households are also prone to the behavioral bias of Assumption 1, but do not

observe the private signals of traders in the household. The household's problem is then

$$\max_{B_{it+1}} C_{it,t} + \delta \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \{C_{it,t+1}\} - \int_0^1 IA(\beta_{ijt}) dj \quad (\text{P1})$$

$$s.t. \quad C_{it,t} = W_t - \int_0^1 x_{ijt} P_{jt} dj - B_{it+1} \quad (6)$$

$$C_{it,t+1} = \int_0^1 x_{ijt} \Pi_{jt+1} dj + R_{t+1} B_{it+1} \quad (7)$$

$$C_{it,t}, C_{it,t+1} \geq 0. \quad (8)$$

Households optimally choose how to much lend or borrow subject to the budget constraints during youth and old age. The first constraint (6) states that today's consumption is equal to wages W_t minus the costs of buying stocks $\int_0^1 x_{ijt} P_{jt} dj$ and saving through the bond market B_{it+1} . Constraint (7) states that old age consumption is equal to revenue $\int_0^1 x_{ijt} \Pi_{jt+1} dj$ plus income from lending on the bond market $R_{t+1} B_{it+1}$. Although household i is overly optimistic of the return of its portfolio due to overconfidence, each household correctly values the portfolio of all other households. Therefore, limiting borrowing by the natural borrowing constraint as in (8) rules out default.

Household i 's optimal saving decision is given by

$$B_{it+1} \begin{cases} = -\frac{\int_0^1 x_{ijt} \Pi_{jt+1} dj}{R_{t+1}} & \text{if } R_{t+1} < \frac{1}{\delta} \\ \in \left[-\frac{\int_0^1 x_{ijt} \Pi_{jt+1} dj}{R_{t+1}}, W_t - \int_0^1 x_{ijt} P_{jt} dj \right] & \text{if } R_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\delta} \\ = W_t - \int_0^1 x_{ijt} P_{jt} dj & \text{if } R_{t+1} > \frac{1}{\delta} \end{cases} \quad (9)$$

If the interest rate R_{t+1} is below $\frac{1}{\delta}$, it is optimal to borrow as much as possible. If the interest is equal to $\frac{1}{\delta}$, household i is indifferent between borrowing and saving. Finally, if the interest rate is above $\frac{1}{\delta}$, it is optimal to save as much as possible. Plugging (6) and (7) into (P1) and using the solution for the saving decision (9) yields the problem of trader ij

$$\max_{x_{ijt}, \beta_{ijt}} \max \{1, \delta R_{t+1}\} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \left\{ x_{ijt} \left(\frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \Pi_{jt+1} - P_{jt} \right) \right\} - IA(\beta_{ijt}) \quad (\text{P2})$$

$$s.t. \quad x_{ijt} \in [\kappa_L, \kappa_H] \quad (10)$$

$$\beta_{ijt} \geq 0, \quad (11)$$

where terms that do not depend on the decision by trader ij were dropped. Trader ij chooses demand for share j x_{ijt} subject to the position limits (10) and decides on the information precision β_{ijt} subject to a non-negativity constraint. Traders can use the household's pooled

resources and borrow through the household for trading. The first term $\max\{1, \delta R_{t+1}\}$ reflects that then $R_{t+1} > \frac{1}{\delta}$ the value of an additional unit of wealth is above one.

3 Equilibrium Characterization

3.1 Input Markets

Wages and intermediate good prices are determined competitively,

$$W_t = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial L} = (1 - \alpha) Y_t \quad (12)$$

$$\rho_{jt} = \frac{\partial Y_t}{\partial Y_{jt}} = \alpha Y_t^{\alpha_Y} Y_{jt}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}, \quad (13)$$

where $\alpha_Y = \frac{\alpha\theta - \theta + 1}{\alpha\theta}$. Wages are equal to a share $(1 - \alpha)$ of output. The price for intermediate good j is downward sloping in the quantity produced of the same good. Finally, the revenue of intermediate good firm j is given by

$$\Pi_{jt+1} = \rho_{jt+1} Y_{jt+1}. \quad (14)$$

3.2 Trader's Decisions

Trading Trader ij sells $-\kappa_L$ shares if the price P_{jt} is above her expectations of revenue Π_{jt+1} using the interest rate on bonds R_{t+1} as the benchmark rate, is indifferent between buying or selling when they coincide and buys κ_H shares when her expectations exceed the price,

$$x(s_{ijt}, P_{jt}) = \begin{cases} \kappa_L & \text{if } \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{\Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt}, P_{jt}\} < P_{jt} \\ \in [\kappa_L, \kappa_H] & \text{if } \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{\Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt}, P_{jt}\} = P_{jt} \\ \kappa_H & \text{if } \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{\Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt}, P_{jt}\} > P_{jt} \end{cases} \quad (15)$$

Information Acquisition As laid out in (15), the trading decision is driven by the realization of the private signal s_{ijt} relative to the price P_{jt} . Consequently, trader ij chooses information precision β_{ijt} to improve her ability to identify profitable trading opportunities. A central object in this context is the subjective probability of buying conditional on realizations of productivity a_{jt} , sentiment ε_{jt} , trader ij 's information choice β_{ijt} and the symmetric choice of all other traders in the market β_{jt} . Taking expectations with respect to the realizations of

the idiosyncratic noise η_{ijt} yields the probability of buying

$$\mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt} = \kappa_H | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\} = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(\eta_{ijt}) 1_{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt}, P_{jt}\} > P_{jt}} d\eta_{ijt} \quad (16)$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the standard-normal pdf.¹⁴

The first order condition for the information acquisition decision is obtained after plugging (15) into (P2). Evaluating the expectations with respect to the realizations of the idiosyncratic noise η_{ijt} and taking the symmetric information acquisition decisions of all other traders as given ($\beta_{-ijt} = \beta_{jt}$) leads to the first-order condition,

$$\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) = \max\{1, \delta R_{t+1}\} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}_t \left\{ \underbrace{(\kappa_H - \kappa_L) \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt} = \kappa_H | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}}}_{\text{Change in the probability of buying}} \underbrace{\left(\frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \Pi_{jt+1} - P_{jt} \right)}_{\text{Rents}} \right\} = IA'(\beta_{ijt}). \quad (17)$$

The marginal benefit of acquiring information consists of two parts. The first is the probability of buying in state $(a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt})$ given information choices $(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})$. The second component are trading rents given by the difference between the net-present value of firm-revenue minus the price of the stock.

3.3 Financial Market

Market-Clearing At the symmetric equilibrium ($\forall j : \beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$), traders buy κ_H shares whenever their private signal is above some threshold, $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$, are indifferent between buying and selling when their private signal coincides with the threshold and sell otherwise. After normalizing the supply of shares in each market j to one, the market-clearing condition becomes

$$\kappa_H \left(1 - \Phi \left(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}} (\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt} \right) \right) - \kappa_L \Phi \left(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}} (\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt} \right) = 1, \quad (18)$$

which can be used to solve for the threshold signal

$$\hat{s}(P_{jt}) = a_{jt} + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} + \Phi^{-1} \left(\frac{\kappa_H - 1}{\kappa_H + \kappa_L} \right)}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}. \quad (19)$$

¹⁴A more detailed derivation can be found in Appendix A.

Price Signal Traders learn from prices, which is equivalent to observing a noisy signal of the form

$$z_{jt} = \hat{s}(P_{jt}) - \frac{\Phi^{-1}\left(\frac{\kappa_H - 1}{\kappa_H + \kappa_L}\right)}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} = a_{jt} + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}. \quad (20)$$

When the price P_{jt} is high, traders realize that this can be due to two reasons: either firm j is productive (high a_{jt}) or other traders are very optimistic (high ε_{jt}). Therefore, prices are a noisy signal of firm productivity. The combination of dispersed information and position limits for asset demand ensure that the signal is normally distributed as $z_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(a_{jt}, \sigma_\varepsilon^2 / \beta_{ijt})$ for all values of κ_L and κ_H . I call z_{jt} the *price signal* and expectations condition rather on z_{jt} instead of P_{jt} .

A crucial object in my analysis is the precision of the price signal $\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$, also referred to as price informativeness in the literature. If $\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$ is high, financial markets efficiently aggregate information and asset prices are informative about firm productivity. This naturally leads to productive firms receiving on average more capital which improves the allocative efficiency of financial markets. I focus on the endogenous component β_{jt} .

As is evident now, the values of κ_H and κ_L do not matter for the price signal z_{jt} . They only pin down the identity of the marginal trader, which has a predictable effect on the price. For instance, the marginal trader is relatively optimistic for $\kappa_H - \kappa_L > 2$, which means that price is set by a trader who received a private signal with positive idiosyncratic noise ($\eta_{ijt} > 0$). As a result, the price would be upward biased.¹⁵ Choosing $\kappa_H = 2$ and $\kappa_L = 0$ ensures that the choice of position limits does not introduce a bias in share prices as the marginal trader has on average unbiased beliefs ($\eta_{ijt} = 0$).

The following proposition shows that the described equilibrium is unique. Moreover, the price P_{jt} is equal to the valuation of the *marginal* trader who is just indifferent between buying or not and observed the private signal $s_{ijt} = z_{jt}$. Any trader who is more optimistic than the marginal trader ($s_{ijt} > z_{jt}$) buys two shares, whereas more pessimistic traders buy nothing.

Proposition 1. *Observing P_{jt} is equivalent to observing the signal (20) whenever K_{jt+1} is non-decreasing in z_{jt} . In the unique equilibrium, in which demand $x(s_{ijt}, P_{jt})$ is non-increasing in P_{jt} , the price is equal to the valuation of the trader with the private signal $s_{ijt} = z_{jt}$,*

$$P(z_{jt}) = \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ \Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \}. \quad (21)$$

¹⁵This mechanism plays an important role in Fostel and Geanakoplos (2012) and Simsek (2013) and is treated more in-depth in Appendix C.

3.4 Bond and Capital Market

The net supply of bonds is equal to zero, $\int_0^1 B_{it+1} di = 0$. Moreover, as all households are ex-ante identical, positions in bond markets are zero for all households, $\forall i : B_{it+1} = 0$. There is no excess demand or supply for bonds whenever the return on bonds R_{t+1} is equal to the return that traders expect to earn on the stock market. This is the case whenever

$$R_{t+1} = \frac{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ \Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \} dj}{\int_0^1 P_{jt} dj}, \quad (22)$$

which is derived by integrating (18) on both sides.

The aggregate value of the stock market is equal to the aggregate capital stock as all revenue from financial markets is invested by firms as follows from aggregating (4),

$$\int_0^1 P_{jt} dj = K_{t+1}. \quad (23)$$

3.5 Equilibrium Definition

In equilibrium, all traders choose the same information precision for all markets ($\forall ij : \beta_{ijt} = \beta_t$) and expect all other traders to choose the same.

Definition 1. *A symmetric, competitive equilibrium consists of prices $\{W_t, \rho_{jt+1}, P_{jt}, P_t, R_{t+1}\}$ and allocations $\{B_{it+1}, x_{ijt}, \beta_{ijt}, K_{jt+1}\}$ such that:*

1. *Given prices $\{W_t, \rho_{jt+1}, P_{jt}, R_{t+1}\}$ and allocations $\{x_{ijt}, \beta_{ijt}\}$, B_{it+1} solves the household's problem P1.*
2. *Given prices $\{P_{jt}, R_{t+1}\}$ and allocations $\{B_{it+1}, \beta_{jt}, K_{jt+1}\}$, $\{x_{ijt}, \beta_{ijt}\}$ solve the trader's problem P2.*
3. *Prices are such that markets for labor, intermediate goods, shares, bonds and capital clear, i.e., (12), (13), (18), (22) and (23) hold.*

4 Properties of the Equilibrium

In the following, I work out the properties of the equilibrium abstracting from the information acquisition decision until the next section. I focus on how the allocation of capital can be expressed in terms of beliefs of the marginal trader and how these beliefs respond to shocks both idiosyncratic and aggregate. Next, I demonstrate how the allocation of capital through

the stock market leads to total factor productivity, which depends on the information choice. Finally, I show that the market allocation is distorted and derive the constrained-efficient allocation.

As shown in (21), the beliefs of the marginal trader determine share prices. Therefore, they play a central role for the allocation of capital both in the cross-section and aggregate. The marginal trader's expectations are a weighted sum of the realization of both idiosyncratic and aggregate productivity and sentiment shocks,

$$\ln \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} = \omega_p(\beta_{jt}) a_t + \omega_a(\beta_{jt}) a_{jt} + \omega_\varepsilon(\beta_{jt}) (\varepsilon_{jt} - \varepsilon_t) + \omega_{s\varepsilon}(\beta_{jt}) \varepsilon_t + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{V}_{jt}. \quad (24)$$

The weights $\{\omega_p(\beta_{jt}), \omega_a(\beta_{jt}), \omega_\varepsilon(\beta_{jt}), \omega_{s\varepsilon}(\beta_{jt})\}$ depend on information acquisition β_{jt} . \mathbb{V}_{jt} is related to the uncertainty of the marginal trader and does not depend on shocks.¹⁶

The first two terms capture the effect of aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. If traders do not acquire information ($\beta_{jt} = 0$), traders only rely on their prior a_t ($\omega_p(0) = 1$ and $\omega_a(0) = 0$). As traders acquire more information, they shift weight from their prior to the realization of firm productivity ($\lim_{\beta_{jt} \rightarrow \infty} \omega_a(\beta_{jt}) = 1$). This leads to a higher sensitivity of the allocation of capital to firm-specific productivity shocks and improves the allocative efficiency of financial markets.

In contrast to the weights on productivity shocks, the weights on sentiment shocks are hump-shaped in β_{jt} . If traders do not acquire information, they do not have a signal to learn from and, therefore, their expectations cannot be moved by noise ($\omega_\varepsilon(0) = \omega_{s\varepsilon}(0) = 0$). For perfect information, traders receive signals that do not contain noise in the first place ($\lim_{\beta_{jt} \rightarrow \infty} \omega_\varepsilon(\beta_{jt}) = \omega_{s\varepsilon}(\beta_{jt}) = 0$). If β_{jt} goes to either extreme, both idiosyncratic and aggregate sentiment shocks do not affect the beliefs of traders.

The aggregate sentiment shock ε_t moves the beliefs of traders although ε_t is common knowledge. This effect stems from the behavioral bias in Assumption 1. Traders correct the price signal z_{jt} for the aggregate sentiment shock, but mistakenly believe that their private signal s_{ijt} is unaffected by sentiment and, therefore, do not correct their private signal in a similar way.

4.1 Capital Allocation and TFP

The results so far can be combined to derive the allocation of capital and total factor productivity in equilibrium as captured in the following Proposition.

Proposition 2 (Market Allocation). *Under the market allocation:*

¹⁶See Appendix A for derivations.

(i) Firm-capital is given by

$$K_{jt+1} = \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta}{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta dj} K_{t+1}. \quad (25)$$

(ii) The aggregate production function is

$$Y_t = A(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) K_t^\alpha \quad (26)$$

with total factor productivity

$$\ln A(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) = \underbrace{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right)}_{\text{exogenous}} + \underbrace{\kappa^a(\beta_{t-1}) \sigma_a^2 - \kappa^\varepsilon(\beta_{t-1}) \sigma_\varepsilon^2}_{\text{allocative efficiency}}. \quad (27)$$

(iii) $A(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1})$ can be locally decreasing in β_{t-1} if σ_ε^2 is large enough and is monotonically increasing otherwise.

The first part of the Proposition highlights that capital is allocated to firms with higher realizations of the price signal z_{jt} whether it is driven by sentiment or productivity. Moreover, changes to aggregate investment K_{t+1} lead a proportional change in firm-capital for all firms. Consequently, total factor productivity (TFP) has both an exogenous and endogenous component. The exogenous component is related to the realization of the aggregate productivity shock a_t , which mechanically increases productivity of all firms. The endogenous component captures instead the allocational efficiency of financial markets, which is determined by aggregate information acquisition β_t .

However, the market does not allocate capital efficiently given the available information. As traders are overconfident, expectations in (25) condition also on the private signal s_{ijt} , although it is uninformative after observing z_{jt} . In other words, P_{jt} behaves as if the precision of the market signal z_{jt} was $\beta_{jt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$, although its true precision is $\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$. Therefore, the price *overreacts* to the price signal z_{jt} .¹⁷

¹⁷This distortion has been studied intensively in Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011a, 2015) and is called the “information aggregation wedge”. Its general equilibrium implications are studied in Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2017). In contrast to this paper, their model features a combination of rational and noise traders. Therefore, the information aggregation wedge does not require a behavioral price-setting traders. Furthermore, it arises in any informative financial market model in which traders learn from both a heterogeneous private signal and the price. It does not arise in models in which the information set of informed agents is homogeneous (Grossman and Stiglitz, 1980) or in models in which traders do not observe the price before submitting market orders (Kyle, 1985). In the former case informed agents cannot learn anything from the price and in the latter it is not possible to learn from the price before trading. Both of these models restrict the analysis to linear models, whereas non-linearity arises naturally in macroeconomic models and therefore a different model is used here.




Figure 2: Total factor productivity as defined in (27). If the variance of sentiment shocks σ_ε^2 is sufficiently large, financial markets may worsen allocative efficiency relative to the case in which capital is equally distributed between firms ($\beta_t = 0$).

This distortion can be so severe that an increase in information acquisition β_t leads to a decrease in TFP as seen in Figure 2. As traders acquire more precise information, they also wrongly put more weight on their private signal. The overall effect on TFP depends on the balance between the beneficial effect of an increase in price informativeness $\beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$ and an increased weight on the private signal.

This price distortion leads to ex-ante misallocation of capital, i.e., output can be increased by reallocating capital between firms given the same publicly available information $\{z_{jt}\}$. A social planner would use the available information efficiently, leading to the *constrained-efficient* allocation summarized in the following Proposition.

Proposition 3 (Constrained-Efficient Allocation). *Under the constrained-efficient allocation:*

(i) *Firm-capital is*

$$K_{jt+1}^{eff} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|z_{jt}\}^\theta}{\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|z_{jt}\}^\theta dj} K_{t+1}. \quad (28)$$

(ii) *TFP $A^{eff}(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1})$ is monotonically increasing in aggregate information acquisition β_{t-1} .*

(iii) *$A^{eff}(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) \geq A(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1})$, with strict inequality for interior values of β_{t-1} .*

The *constrained-efficient* allocation assigns the correct precision $\beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}$ to the price signal z_{jt} . Relative to the market allocation, the constrained-efficient allocation redistributes capital from firms that were previously too large to firms that were too small as seen in Figure




Figure 3: Market allocation of capital K_{jt} as in (25) and the constrained-efficient allocation K_{jt}^{eff} as in (28).

3. Moreover, TFP is monotonically increasing in aggregate information acquisition β_{t-1} under the constrained-efficient allocation, because the interaction with the behavioral bias is removed.

The following Corollary provides conditions under which the market and constrained-efficient allocation coincide.

Corollary 1. *The market allocation and constrained efficient allocation ($K_{jt} = K_{jt}^{eff}$) coincide if*

- (i) *symmetric information acquisition in market j β_{jt} goes to zero or infinity.*
- (ii) *the variance of firm-specific productivity shocks σ_a^2 goes to zero or infinity.*
- (iii) *the variance of firm-specific sentiment shocks σ_ε^2 goes to zero.*

As Corollary 1 shows, the behavioral bias disappears both when households have perfect information or no information at all ($\beta_{jt} \in \{0, \infty\}$), as in both cases traders put zero weight on their private signal. There is also no distortion if the prior is arbitrarily noisy ($\sigma_a^2 \rightarrow \infty$), as in that case both the market and the efficient allocation put full weight on the price signal z_{jt} . If the prior is arbitrarily precise ($\sigma_a^2 \rightarrow 0$), the weight is zero for both. Finally, if the variance of sentiment shocks goes to zero, financial markets perfectly aggregate information as the price signal z_{jt} converges to firm productivity a_{jt} .

4.2 Aggregate Investment

Aggregate investment in this economy is in one of two regions. In the first region, traders consume during youth and investment is pinned down by $R_{t+1} = \frac{1}{\delta}$. In the second region, the interest rate is so high ($R_{t+1} > \frac{1}{\delta}$) that traders exhaust their wages for investment. Finally, $R_{t+1} < \frac{1}{\delta}$ cannot arise in equilibrium as investment would collapse to zero and the interest rate R_{t+1} would go to infinity. Taken together, aggregate investment is equal to

$$K_{t+1} = \min \left\{ \left(\alpha \delta A_t^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}, W_t \right\}. \quad (29)$$

Aggregate shocks and information acquisition determine investment in the elastic region. Aggregate productivity and sentiment shocks increase investment as traders expect all firms to be more productive. An increase in aggregate information acquisition β_t has ambivalent effects, as it may increase or decrease TFP A_t and the average expectations of firm productivity $\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta dj$ may be hump-shaped in β_t .

5 Main Results

As laid out in the prior section, the model has several sources of non-monotonicity. TFP may be locally decreasing in aggregate information acquisition β_t , but also aggregate investment K_{t+1} may be non-monotonic in β_t . These effects are not due to a friction that can easily be removed, but rather arise through imperfect aggregation of information in a market with dispersed information.

Economic intuition tells us that better information usually leads to better economic outcomes. Indeed, the model allows for this intuition to hold by restricting the parameter space. As Corollary 1 shows, the distortion vanishes as the variance of firm-specific sentiment shocks σ_ε^2 goes to zero. Therefore, there must be some threshold $M > 0$, such that whenever σ_ε^2 is below that threshold, TFP and aggregate investment K_{t+1} are increasing in β_t for a neutral stance of sentiment ($\varepsilon_t = 0$). For the following analysis, I assume that this is the case as captured in the following Assumption.

Assumption 2. *The variance of firm-specific sentiment shocks σ_ε^2 is low enough such that*

- (i) $\frac{\partial A(a_t, \beta_t)}{\partial \beta_t} > 0$.
- (ii) for $\varepsilon_t = 0$: $\frac{\partial K_{t+1}(\beta_t)}{\partial \beta_t} \geq 0$.

5.1 Aggregate Shocks and Information Acquisition

Recent experiences during stock and credit booms have raised concerns about increasing capital misallocation during these episodes (Doerr, 2018; Gopinath et al., 2017; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2020). This model can be used as a laboratory to think about the effects of productivity and sentiment shocks that may drive such episodes and their effect on the incentive to acquire information and thereby allocative efficiency. The following Proposition starts with the effect of aggregate sentiment shocks.

Proposition 4. *There exists a threshold $\bar{\varepsilon}$ such that:*

- (i) *Information acquisition is increasing in the sentiment shock if $\varepsilon_t < \bar{\varepsilon}$*
 - (ii) *Information acquisition is decreasing in the sentiment shock if $\varepsilon_t > \bar{\varepsilon}$*
- where the threshold $\bar{\varepsilon}$ is negative for $\theta > \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$ and positive for $\theta < \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$.*

Proposition 4 shows that the effect of relatively small sentiment shocks ($\varepsilon_t \approx 0$) on information acquisition is ambiguous and depends on the parameters of the model. However, sentiment shocks always crowd-out information acquisition once they are sufficiently large. Moreover, note that aggregate sentiment shocks do not affect price informativeness directly but only through information acquisition.

At first, it may seem surprising that *aggregate* sentiment shocks crowd-out information acquisition, especially as in this model, *firm-specific* sentiment shocks incentivize information acquisition in the first place. This is because knowledge about an *aggregate* sentiment shock changes the incentive to acquire *firm-specific* information. In particular, there are two direct channels through which sentiment shocks affect the incentive to acquire information:

1. Sentiment shocks make valuations more extreme and, therefore, trading less *information-sensitive*. A relatively imprecise yet unbiased signal is sufficient to identify grossly mispriced firms and trade accordingly. Moreover, sentiment shocks make subtle mispricing rarer, for which precise information is helpful as shown in Figure 4. This effects *crowds-out* information acquisition for positive and negative sentiment shocks equally. Moreover, firms with such subtle mispricing must appear relatively unproductive in an otherwise exuberant market and consequently attract less capital as in Figure 5. This *relative size* effect *crowds-out* information acquisition for positive sentiment shocks as learning about smaller firms is unattractive.
2. Aggregate sentiment shocks increase aggregate investment K_{t+1} , which leads to an increase in the *absolute size* of all firms and a rise in the incentive to acquire information.




Figure 4: Left panel: probability of buying depending on the realization of the firm-specific sentiment shock ε_{jt} . Right panel: The derivative of the probability of buying. The trading decision is most information-sensitive, i.e., varies most with the realization of the sentiment shock ε_{jt} around zero.

To further build intuition for this result, I use (25) in (17) to rewrite the marginal benefit of information acquisition evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium,

$$\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) \Big|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} \propto \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left\{ \underbrace{\underbrace{\frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt}=2\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \Big|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}}}_{\text{Information-Sensitivity}} \left(\frac{K_{jt+1}}{K_{t+1}} \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}}_{\text{Relative Size}} \underbrace{K_{t+1}^{\alpha}}_{\text{Absolute Size}} \left(A_{jt} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} \right) \right\}. \quad (30)$$

The *information-sensitivity* channel materializes through the interaction of the change in the buying probability with the distribution of firm-specific sentiment shocks ε_{jt} . In the symmetric equilibrium ($\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$), traders expect to buy whenever they are more optimistic than the marginal trader, i.e., $s_{ijt} \geq z_{jt} \iff \eta_{ijt} \geq \varepsilon_{jt}$. The resulting probability of buying is $\Phi(-\varepsilon_{jt})$ where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard-normal cdf. Consequently, the derivative of the buying probability with respect to the realization of the firm-specific sentiment shock ε_{jt} is $-\phi(\varepsilon_{jt})$ where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the standard-normal pdf. As shown in Figure 4, the trading decision is most elastic for relatively small realizations of the firm-specific sentiment shock ε_{jt} . However, aggregate sentiment shocks push the distribution of ε_{jt} to the more inelastic regions toward the extremes.

Formally, this effect can be captured by multiplying the change in the buying probability with the distribution of sentiment shocks

$$\phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) f(\varepsilon_{jt}) \propto \exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)} \right\} \tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt}), \quad (31)$$

where $f(\varepsilon_{jt})$ is the pdf of $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_t, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ and $\tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt})$ is the pdf of ε_{jt} as if its distribution was $\mathcal{N}\left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)$. The *information-sensitivity* channel is captured by the term $\exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)} \right\}$, which is symmetrically decreasing around zero. Somewhat surprisingly, the decline in *information-sensitivity* does not depend on the actual pass-through of sentiment shocks to expectations. The reason can be found in the trading decision, which neither depends on the actual mispricing caused by sentiment shocks but only on the realization of the firm-specific sentiment shock ε_{jt} . Therefore, aggregate sentiment shocks can discourage information acquisition, even if they do not significantly affect actual prizes.

The additional effect of a decline in information-sensitivity on the *relative size* of firms, for which information remains valuable, is captured by taking expectations of the relative firm-size $\left(\frac{K_{jt+1}}{K_{t+1}}\right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}$ with the density $\tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt})$,

$$\int_0^1 \tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt}) \left(\frac{K_{jt+1}}{K_{t+1}}\right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} dj \propto \exp \{ -(\theta-1) \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \}, \quad (32)$$

where $\omega_{s\varepsilon} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta_t}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}$. For a positive sentiment shock, information acquisition becomes effectively directed towards smaller firms, which weakens the incentive to acquire information, which is illustrated in Figure 5 and formally captured by $\exp \{ -(\theta-1) \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \}$.

The *relative size* effect is increasing in the elasticity of substitution and in the pass-through of aggregate sentiment shocks $\omega_{s\varepsilon}$, which is non-monotonic in information acquisition β_t . If intermediate goods are close substitutes, firms that are perceived as unproductive attract very little capital. Moreover, if aggregate sentiment shocks have a large effect on expectations, these priced firms will be even smaller and information acquisition less attractive.

The *absolute size* effect is captured by changes in aggregate investment. Restricting our attention to shocks for which $K_{t+1} < W_t$ leads to

$$K_{t+1}^\alpha \propto \exp \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \right\}. \quad (33)$$

As long as traders do not fully invest their wages, the *absolute size* effect can be captured by $\exp \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \right\}$. Intuitively, the effect on investment is stronger when α and therefore the returns to scale increase. A further increase in the sentiment shock is ineffectual for the *absolute size* channel once traders fully invest their wages, but incentivizes nonetheless more information acquisition through an increase in the value of resources as captured by $\max \{1, R_{t+1}\delta\}$ in (P2).




Figure 5: Firms that are fairly priced and for which information is valuable are in the center of the firm-size distribution under neutral sentiment ($\varepsilon_t = 0$). In contrast, for positive sentiment shocks, the same firms are in the left part of the firm-size distribution as they appear to be unproductive relative to other firms.

Putting all three effects together allows to write the marginal benefit of information acquisition for a given symmetric information acquisition choice ($\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$) as

$$\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) \Big|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} \propto \exp \left\{ \underbrace{-\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)}}_{\text{Information-Sensitivity}} \underbrace{-(\theta-1)\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_t}_{\text{Relative Size}} + \underbrace{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_t}_{\text{Absolute Size}} \right\}. \quad (34)$$

For the empirically plausible calibration $\theta - 1 > \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}$, positive sentiment shocks always *crowd-out* information, as the increase in aggregate investment is dominated by a larger decrease in size of fairly priced firms. Conversely, negative sentiment shocks initially *crowd-in* information, as fairly priced firms turn out to be relatively large although aggregate investment goes down. Finally, the *information-sensitivity* channel always dominates for large shocks.

Productivity shocks have quite different effects on the incentive to acquire information. Whereas sentiment shocks affect trading in multiple ways, productivity shocks leave the buying decision unaffected. The reason is that traders believe that sentiment shocks affect only other traders, whereas productivity shocks affect all traders. The only channel through which productivity shocks change the incentive to acquire information is through an increase in aggregate investment (*absolute size* channel) and dividends for all firms. This result is captured in the following Proposition.

Proposition 5. *Positive (negative) productivity shocks crowd-in (out) information.*

The model provides a rationale for the different impact of “good” and “bad” booms as in




Figure 6: Information acquisition is non-monotonic in the sentiment shock, with the peak $\bar{\varepsilon}$ being negative for $\theta > \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$. Information acquisition is monotonically increasing in the productivity shock.

Gorton and Ordoñez (2020). Whereas productivity-driven “good” booms increase information acquisition and improve allocative efficiency, sentiment-driven “bad” booms *crowd-out* information and increase capital misallocation. The results of both Propositions 4 and 5 are pictured in Figure 6.

5.2 Real Feedback

Financial markets do not only react to aggregate shocks, but also shape the economy’s response to aggregate shocks. In the following, aggregate shocks hit an economy that is in steady state. Whether shocks amplify or dampen the effect of shocks on output is determined relative to an economy for which the information choice is fixed at the endogenous steady state level β^* .

In the economy with fixed information precision β^* the only effect of aggregate shocks is the direct effect on TFP and investment. Positive shocks of both types increase investment, whereas only productivity shocks also have a direct effect on TFP. The opposite is true for negative shocks, which depress investment and TFP in the case of productivity shocks. Whereas the direct effect of aggregate shocks are straightforward, the indirect effects are more subtle.

There are two indirect effects of sentiment shocks, which lead to a non-monotonic response of the economy. First, sentiment shocks affect the allocative efficiency of financial markets through their effect on information acquisition, which also decreases investment. The cost of misallocation through a decrease in information acquisition depends on the elasticity of sub-

stitution between intermediate goods. If the elasticity of substitution is large, misallocation between firms is costly. Moreover, a high elasticity of substitution also lead to a stronger decrease in information acquisition for a positive sentiment shock. In contrast, the costs of misallocating capital are low if the elasticity of substitution is small.

The second effect concerns the pass-through of sentiment shocks. Since traders are unaffected by sentiment if they acquire either no or perfect information ($\beta_t \in \{0, \infty\}$), the effect of a given sentiment shock on beliefs must be maximized for an interior value of information precision. Therefore, a change in information acquisition by traders may increase or decrease the effect of a given sentiment shock on their beliefs, which depends on whether steady state information precision β^* is above or below the threshold $\frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$. If β^* is above (below) the threshold, then the effect of aggregate sentiment shocks is locally decreasing (increasing) in information acquisition. For example, a positive sentiment shock crowds-out information acquisition, which leads to an amplification of the shock if the resulting precision choice β^* is still above the threshold $\frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$.

The results for the case with $\beta^* < \frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$ are captured in the following Proposition and are visualized in Figure 7.

Proposition 6. (i) For $\theta > \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$ and $\beta^* < \frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$, information acquisition dampens positive sentiment shocks.

(ii) Large positive sentiment shocks eventually lead to a decrease in aggregate investment if $\lim_{\varepsilon_t \rightarrow \infty} \sqrt{\beta_t(\varepsilon_t)}\varepsilon_t = 0$.

The second result of Proposition 6 captures that the costs of misallocation must be eventually so large that they outweigh the investment-stimulating effect of sentiment shocks. Moreover, the direct effect of sentiment shocks vanishes as sentiment shocks grows large, as long as information acquisition declines fast enough. This result is captured in the following Corollary.

Corollary 2. If information acquisition declines fast enough as sentiment shocks grow large, then aggregate investment approaches its level without information acquisition $\beta_t = 0$ and sentiment shock $\varepsilon_t = 0$. Formally,

$$\lim_{\varepsilon_t \rightarrow \pm\infty} \sqrt{\beta_t(\varepsilon_t)}\varepsilon_t = 0 \Rightarrow \lim_{\varepsilon_t \rightarrow \pm\infty} K(\beta_t(\varepsilon_t), \varepsilon_t) = K(0, 0).$$

These results may strike at first as counter-intuitive as sufficiently large positive sentiment shocks possibly decrease prices and output, because the decrease information acquisition can outweigh the expansionary effect of sentiment shocks and eventually drive the pass-through of sentiment shocks to zero. Moreover, this section studies only *anticipated* sentiment




Figure 7: Whether information acquisition dampens or amplifies sentiment shocks depends on the size of the shock and parameters. As information acquisition affects both allocative efficiency and the pass-through of sentiment shocks, large sentiment shocks eventually drive information so low that investment and output decrease.

shocks. If the same shock was unknown prior to the information acquisition decision, positive sentiment shocks would unambiguously increase investment as in the economy with exogenous information precision.

Similar forces are active for negative shocks with the exception that negative sentiment shocks initially crowd-in information acquisition if the elasticity of substitution is large enough ($\theta > \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$). If strong enough, this indirect effect can even lead to negative sentiment shocks being initially expansionary. In contrast, if the elasticity of substitution is relatively small ($\theta < \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$), then negative sentiment shocks always crowd-out information acquisition and are, therefore, initially amplified.

Similar to the previous section, the indirect effect of productivity shocks leads generally to amplification. As follows from Proposition 5, positive productivity shocks crowd-in information acquisition, which leads to an improvement in the allocation of capital and incentivizes additional investment. Therefore, compared to the economy with fixed information precision, the reaction of both output and investment to a productivity shock are larger if information precision is allowed to adjust, as can be seen in Figure 8. This result is captured in the following Proposition.

Proposition 7. *Information acquisition amplifies productivity shocks.*




Figure 8: Productivity shocks crowd-in information acquisition, which leads to an additional increase in TFP and Aggregate Investment K_{t+1} . As a result, the effect of productivity shocks is amplified.

5.2.1 Numerical Illustration

This section provides a numerical illustration of booms driven by productivity and sentiment shocks, focusing on the region of parameters and shocks for which sentiment shocks are expansionary and dampened by information acquisition. To capture the notion of booms, aggregate shocks build up over time according to an auto-regressive process

$$y_t = \begin{cases} \rho y_{t-1} + \zeta & t \in [0, B] \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases},$$

where y_t is the aggregate shock, ζ is a constant innovation and $\rho \in (0, 1)$ is the persistence. After the boom is over, the aggregate shock returns to a neutral stance and remains there.

The expansionary effect of sentiment shocks is dampened as can be seen in Figure 9. Optimistic expectations lead to an increase in investment, but traders decide to cut back on information acquisition, which decreases the allocative efficiency of financial markets. In total, output still increases because the sentiment shock leads to an offsetting increase in investment. In this case, the endogenous response of traders dampens the effect of a positive sentiment shock.

In contrast, productivity-driven booms are generally amplified by an increase in information acquisition as seen in Figure 10. This mirrors the result from Proposition 8. Expectations of higher productivity tomorrow cause an increase in investment today, which triggers more information acquisition. As a result, the endogenous response of traders amplifies the effect




Figure 9: Sentiment-driven booms are dampened by information acquisition.

of productivity shocks. Times of high productivity are also times in which financial markets allocate capital efficiently.

6 Is there a Role for Policy?

After studying the positive properties of the model, I turn now to the normative implications. There are two sources of inefficiency in this model. First, there are two externalities with respect to the information acquisition decision that work in opposite directions. On the one hand, traders acquire information to steal rents from other traders and ignore the negative effect they impose on others. On the other hand, the individual information acquisition decision does not affect the allocation of capital, whereas collective information acquisition is crucial for aggregate productivity. Traders ignore this positive externality of information acquisition. Whether information acquisition is inefficiently high or low depends on the strength of the rent-stealing motive relative to the usefulness for information in allocating capital.

Second, traders' overconfidence distorts the allocation of capital between firms as described in section 4.1, and lets aggregate sentiment shocks drive investment. A state- and price-dependent tax/subsidy on dividends is sufficient to fix this distortion. The formal analysis is delegated to Appendix E as the focus of the paper is on information acquisition.




Figure 10: Productivity-driven booms are amplified by the information acquisition.

For the following welfare analysis, I abstract from well-known inter-generational trade-offs by using a two-period model. Traders are born with an endowment, acquire information and buy shares. Production takes place in the second period and the final good sector combines intermediate goods into the final good without labor,

$$Y_1 = \left(\int_0^1 Y_{j1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}}. \quad (35)$$

The setup is otherwise identical to the main model.

The section proceeds in the following steps. First, I explain in detail why information acquisition is inefficient in the competitive equilibrium and for which parameters it is likely to be either too high or too low. Next, I consider the optimal intervention if the social planner can only steer the information choice, but not aggregate investment. Finally, I propose an implementation for a policy that incentivizes or discourages information acquisition.

6.1 Static Information Choice

Endow a social planner with the ability to dictate a level of information acquisition β_{ij0} to each trader, but households decide on consumption and investment autonomously.¹⁸ More-

¹⁸The full planner's problem is covered in the Appendix E.

over, the social planner observes aggregate shocks $\{a_0, \varepsilon_0\}$ before taking her decision. The corresponding maximization problem is

$$\max_{\{\beta_{ij0}\}} C_0 + \delta C_1 - \int_0^1 I A(\beta_{ij0}) dj \quad (\text{SP1})$$

$$s.t. \quad C_1 = A_0(\{\beta_{ij0}\}) K_1^\alpha \quad (36)$$

$$C_0 = W_0 - K_1 \quad (37)$$

$$K_1 = \min \left\{ \left(\alpha \delta A_t^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}, W_t \right\} \quad (38)$$

$$\beta_{ij0} \geq 0. \quad (39)$$

The social planner maximizes welfare subject to a number of constraints. Old age consumption is equal to aggregate production as in (36), for which total factor productivity $A(\{\beta_{ij0}\})$ depends on information acquisition. Youth consumption as in (37) depends on aggregate investment, which also depends on implicitly on information acquisition as seen in (38). Finally, (39) is a non-negativity constraint on information acquisition.

Since all traders and firms are ex-ante homogeneous, the social planner chooses the same level of information precision $\beta_0 = \beta_{ij0}$ for all traders and markets. The marginal benefit of increasing β_0 for the social planner is

$$MB^{SP}(\beta_0) = \underbrace{\delta \frac{\partial A_0(\beta_0)}{\partial \beta_0}}_{\text{Change in TFP}} K_1(\beta_0)^\alpha + \left(\alpha A_0(\beta_0) K_1(\beta_0)^{\alpha-1} - \frac{1}{\delta} \right) \delta \underbrace{\frac{\partial K_1(\beta_0)}{\partial \beta_0}}_{\text{Change in Investment}}. \quad (40)$$

The social planner targets both total factor productivity $A_0(\beta_0)$ and aggregate investment $K_1(\beta_0)$. Note that the latter effect is only relevant if aggregate investment is efficiently high or low, which is generally the case due to the price distortion described in section 4.1 and aggregate sentiment shocks.

The first observation is that (40) does not coincide with the marginal benefit in (17). Moreover, the difference cannot be expressed in the form of a simple wedge. This finding leads directly to the following Proposition.

Proposition 8. *Information acquisition is inefficiently high or low in the competitive equilibrium.*

The reason for this result is that the information acquisition decision is subject to two externalities with opposing effects. First, traders do not incorporate the rent-stealing effect of an individual increase in information precision, i.e., they ignore a negative externality.

Second, as traders take prices in given, they do not take into account the benefit of a collective increase in information precision while choosing their individual precision. Both externalities are explained in more detail in the following.

Traders think that their information allows them to systematically buy shares which are hit by a negative sentiment shock, thus earning a rent. Acquiring more precise information allows them to identify profitable trading opportunities even better. However, if trader ij decides to buy two shares, these two shares cannot be bought by another trader. Consequently, any rent that accrues to trader ij must be subtracted from rents that are earned by other traders. This rent-stealing motive drives information acquisition in this model in the first place, but can also lead to inefficiently high information acquisition.

Instead, the social benefit of information acquisition stems from an improvement in the allocation of capital. However, this effect only arises if traders acquire more precise information collectively. In contrast, individual information acquisition and trading have only infinitesimal effects on prices, which are therefore ignored by traders when deciding which shares to buy and how much information to acquire. Therefore, information acquisition has a positive externality, which can lead to information acquisition being too low in the competitive equilibrium.

Two simple examples can be constructed to showcase situations in which information acquisition is clearly too high or low in equilibrium. First, assume that the social planner confiscates rents and redistributes them equally. Traders have no incentive to acquire information, but the social planner still values information for its effect on the allocation of capital. In this case, information acquisition is inefficiently low. Second, let firm output be given exogenously, such that $Y_{jt} = A_{jt}$. Moreover, traders make bets on firm revenue by buying or selling options. Traders acquire information because they think they can earn rents by trading, although information has no social value. In this case, information acquisition is inefficiently high.

Comparing the social planner's choice and the outcome of the competitive equilibrium sheds light on when information acquisition is likely to be inefficiently high or low. As it can be seen in Figure 11, the social planner's choice of β_0 is initially increasing in the variance of sentiment shocks σ_ε^2 as the social planner counters a decrease in TFP.¹⁹ The social planner's choice is monotonically increasing in the variance of productivity shocks σ_a^2 as more heterogeneous firms increases the benefits of allocating capital efficiently. Moreover, when σ_a^2 is low, the social planner's choice for information precision may be below information

¹⁹Once σ_ε^2 exceeds a certain level, the social planner chooses not to acquire information ($\beta_0 = 0$). This discontinuity is due to the price distortion explained in section 4.1 and the resulting non-monotonicity of TFP as in Figure 2. The distortion becomes so severe that distributing capital equally between firms and saving on information acquisition costs is preferable to misallocating capital through the financial market.




Figure 11: The social planner's choice of information precision β_0 can be above or below the outcome in the competitive equilibrium. In particular, the planner's choice is below the competitive outcome for low values for the variance of productivity shocks and elasticity of substitution.

precision in the competitive equilibrium.

Consider the case of perfect complements as $\theta \rightarrow 0$. In that case, it becomes optimal to distribute capital equally between firms as every intermediate good is necessary to expand aggregate production. As a result, information about firm-productivity has no social value as it does not aid the optimal allocation anymore. In other words, total factor productivity becomes flat in information acquisition. Nonetheless, traders find it profitable to acquire information as firm-revenue still depends on the realization of firm productivity. As the elasticity of substitution increases, intermediate goods become more substitutable and allocating more capital to the most productive increasingly important. As a result, the planner's information precision choice is eventually above the outcome in the competitive equilibrium.

To sum up, the social planner's choice deviates from the competitive equilibrium. As there are two externalities with opposite effects at the same time, information acquisition in the competitive equilibrium can be both too high or low. The difference between the social planner and the competitive equilibrium also depends on the realization of aggregate shocks, as shown in the following section.

6.2 Responding to Aggregate Shocks

The social planner increases information acquisition in response to both negative and positive sentiment shocks for two reasons. First, traders expect that extracting rents becomes less information-sensitive when a sentiment shock hits the economy. However, the value of information for the allocation of capital is only affected insofar as aggregate investment changes. Second, the social planner seeks to also steer investment through the information




Figure 12: Information acquisition under the social planner and in the competitive economy depending on the realization of aggregate shocks.

acquisition decision. For example, when a positive sentiment shock hits the economy, then acquiring more precise information eventually dampens the impact of the sentiment shock. The resulting response is asymmetric for positive and negative shocks, as positive shocks increase investment which makes information more valuable, whereas negative shocks lower investment.

In contrast, the social planner's choice in response to productivity shocks is pro-cyclical. An increase in exogenous productivity a_0 incentivizes information acquisition in two ways. First, note that TFP can be decomposed into two parts, $A_0 = A_0(a_0)A_0(\beta_0)$, where the first is exogenously driven by a_0 and the second is related to allocative efficiency through β_0 . Therefore, an increase in a_0 amplifies the improvement in the allocative efficiency through an increase in β_0 . Second, positive productivity shocks lead to an increase in investment which additionally incentivizes information acquisition.

The social planner's choice is shown in comparison to the competitive equilibrium in Figure 12. For the chosen parameters, the social planner chooses generally more precise information than traders choose in the competitive equilibrium. Sentiment shocks widen the difference between the social planner's choice and the competitive outcome, whereas productivity shocks leave the gap largely unchanged. How the social planner can implement this policy is discussed in the following section.

6.3 Implementation

Traders are taking a gamble when they decide to buy shares in a given asset. The social planner can incentivize information acquisition by increasing the stakes for each trade. This idea

can be implemented through a redistribution of dividends between over- and underperforming firms as shown in the following Corollary.

Corollary 3. *A state-dependent tax/subsidy $\tau(a_{jt}, z_{jt})$ on dividends with the properties,*

$$(i) \text{ No price distortions: } \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} = \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}$$

$$(ii) \text{ Monotonicity of beliefs: } \frac{\partial \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0}, z_{j0}\}}{\partial s_{ij0}} > 0$$

$$(iii) \text{ Monotonicity of prices: } \frac{\partial \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}}{\partial z_{j0}} > 0$$

increases (decreases) $\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0})$ when

$$\begin{aligned} \tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \geq (\leq) 1 &\iff \Pi_{j1} \geq \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \text{ and } \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ij0} = 2 | a_{j0}, \varepsilon_{j0}, \beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0}\}}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \geq 0 \\ \tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \leq (\geq) 1 &\iff \Pi_{j1} \leq \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \text{ and } \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ij0} = 2 | a_{j0}, \varepsilon_{j0}, \beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0}\}}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \leq 0 \end{aligned}$$

and there exists for all z_{j0} some a_{j0} for which the inequalities are strict.

Intuitively, the social planner can make assets more or less risky by taxing/subsidizing dividends depending on realized productivity and market expectations. For example, subsidizing dividend payments of over-performing firms and taxing under-performing firms makes any investment riskier and information acquisition more attractive. To avoid distorting prices, subsidies and taxes must offset each other in expectations.

As an illustration, the following combination of a tax $\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0})$ and a lump-sum transfer $T(a_{j0}, z_{j0})$ encourage information acquisition,

$$\begin{aligned} \tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) &= \begin{cases} 0 & a_{j0} < z_{j0} \\ 1 & a_{j0} \geq z_{j0} \end{cases} \\ T(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) &= \begin{cases} 0 & a_{j0} < z_{j0} \\ \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{j1} | a_{j0} < z_{j0}, s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} & a_{j0} \geq z_{j0} \end{cases}. \end{aligned}$$

I assumed $a_0 = -\frac{\sigma_a^2}{2}$ as a normalization. In words, the tax is confiscatory if the realization of the productivity shock a_{j0} is below the price signal z_{j0} , i.e., the firm disappoints market expectations. The expected tax revenue from the perspective of the marginal trader are transferred to buyers if the realization of a_{j0} is above z_{j0} , i.e., the firm exceeds market expectations. A tax schedule that incentivizes information acquisition, therefore, increases




Figure 13: The tax schedule incentivizes information acquisition.

both the potential down- and upside of any trade. The before- and after-tax dividend schedule is shown in Figure 13 for the case with $z_{j0} = 0$.

Information acquisition can be discouraged by flattening the dividend function instead. A straightforward and common implementation is through a progressive dividend tax in combination with the deduction of losses from realized gains, effectively offsetting part of the incurred losses by reducing the tax owed. In the model, the social planner can completely crowd-out information acquisition by buying up all shares and selling shares that are a stake in aggregate output. As there is no aggregate uncertainty, such shares pay a deterministic dividend and traders do not acquire information.

To recapitulate, the social planner generally chooses a level of information acquisition that deviates from the competitive equilibrium. If firms are heterogeneous with respect to productivity or the elasticity of substitution is sufficiently high, the social planner chooses a higher level of information precision than the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, the social planner should seek to increase information acquisition in response to both negative and positive sentiment shocks. In contrast, the information acquisition should increase with the productivity shock. Finally, taxes and subsidies that increase the exposure to risk stemming from firm productivity increase the incentive to acquire information.

7 Discussion

7.1 Asset Purchases

In the last decade, central banks have repeatedly used asset purchases to stabilize financial markets, spur growth, and inflation (see Gagnon, Sack, et al., 2018, for a brief overview). These interventions were accompanied by concerns that asset purchases might harm market efficiency and lead to an increase in capital misallocation (e.g., Fernandez, Bortz, and Zeolla, 2018). Although this model is too stylized to give a full assessment of asset purchases, it can be used to shed light on the effect of asset purchases on information acquisition in financial markets.

In this model, asset purchases have real effects by exploiting that information is dispersed between traders. The mechanism works as follows. Asset purchases lead to an upward shift in the identity of the marginal trader, who becomes more optimistic, and consequently, asset prices increase. Additionally, announced asset purchases have an effect on information acquisition. Then, the resulting reduction in the asset supply discourages information acquisition similar to a positive sentiment shock. Therefore, this model can provide a rationale for the concerns about asset purchases and a possible decline in market efficiency.

However, the equivalence of asset purchases and sentiment shocks shows that asset purchases can also be used to offset negative sentiment shocks. When a sufficiently large negative sentiment shock hits the economy, traders anticipate that prices will be depressed, which discourages information acquisition as trading becomes less information-sensitive. The central bank can offset the downward bias on asset prices through the negative sentiment shock by purchasing assets. This counter-measure can lead to unbiased prices, which restores the incentive to acquire information for traders. This logic is captured in the following Proposition and is visualized in Figure 14.

Proposition 9. *Let the social planner acquire $d^{SP} \in (-1, 1)$ units of assets, such that $1 - d^{SP}$ shares are left for traders. Then,*

- (i) asset purchases ($d^{SP} > 0$) undo negative sentiment shocks both in terms of investment and information acquisition.*
- (ii) asset sales ($d^{SP} < 0$) undo positive sentiment shocks both in terms of investment and information acquisition.*

In other words, asset purchases and sales can *increase* market efficiency by countering sentiment shocks. This finding is relevant for central banks in deciding when to start shrinking the size of their balance sheets. Central banks can avoid the adverse effects of asset sales by waiting until sentiment has reached a more neutral level. A reduction in asset holdings can




Figure 14: Asset purchases counter negative sentiment shocks.

then even increase information acquisition and market efficiency.

7.2 Uncertainty

The analysis so far assumed that traders observed aggregate states perfectly before they decided on information precision. This assumption is not crucial for the results, which also hold when traders have only imperfect information about aggregate states when they take their information acquisition decision.

The simplest setting to think about the effects of uncertainty is to reveal aggregate shocks after the information acquisition decision but before trading. Furthermore, assume that aggregate productivity and sentiment shocks are auto-correlated.²⁰ Then, the law of motions for aggregate shocks are given by

$$a_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \xi_t^a \quad (41)$$

$$\varepsilon_t = \rho_\varepsilon \varepsilon_{t-1} + \xi_t^\varepsilon, \quad (42)$$

where $\rho_a \in (0, 1)$ and $\rho_\varepsilon \in (0, 1)$ capture the persistence of aggregate shocks and $\xi_t^a \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\xi_a}^2)$ and $\xi_t^\varepsilon \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_{\xi_\varepsilon}^2)$ are the corresponding innovations. Traders are able to

²⁰An alternative would be not to reveal aggregate shocks before trading takes place. In this setting traders learn from private and public signals also about aggregate states. Similarly, the social planner can use publicly available information to guide her interventions. The insights are broadly the same as in the case when aggregate shocks are revealed after the information acquisition decision.

learn about past aggregate states by observing past aggregate investment K_t and output Y_t . Whereas K_t is moved by both productivity and sentiment, output Y_t reacts only to productivity after controlling for K_t^α . For example, if investment was high but output disappointing, investment must have been driven by a positive sentiment shock. The prior for traders about aggregate states is then given by

$$a_t|a_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(\rho_a a_{t-1}, \sigma_{\xi_a}^2) \quad (43)$$

$$\varepsilon_t|\varepsilon_{t-1} \sim \mathcal{N}(\rho_\varepsilon \varepsilon_{t-1}, \sigma_{\xi_\varepsilon}^2). \quad (44)$$

In this setting, past sentiment shocks generate expectations about future sentiment shocks. The analysis of Proposition 4 still applies, as traders evaluate the value of information for different realizations of the sentiment shock ε_t .

The policy analysis is not substantially changed under aggregate uncertainty if the planner has to decide on policy before the aggregate shocks are revealed. Indeed, uncertainty is irrelevant for interventions that offset the effect of sentiment shocks on information acquisition, as only *anticipated* sentiment shocks can affect information acquisition. Therefore, the optimal tax or subsidy to information acquisition does not depend on the realization of the sentiment shock, but only on the traders' prior. The social planner can optimally steer how much information traders acquire, if she is able to collect information about traders' expectations about sentiment, for example through surveys.

The effect of uncertainty is more subtle when the social planner also tries to steer investment. In this case, also the realization of sentiment shocks matters. Therefore, any intervention does not explicitly condition on the realization of the sentiment shock has to weigh the costs and benefits of taxes or subsidies on investment in different states. In this setting, information acquisition can diminish the impact of sentiment shocks. This effect is especially attractive as the social planner is uncertain about the concrete realization of sentiment shocks.

Finally, multiple indicators can be used by the social planner to identify whether a boom is driven by sentiment or productivity. A sentiment-driven boom crowds-out information acquisition, decreases the variance of prices and all firms look more alike. In contrast, a productivity-driven boom crowds-in information, leads to more dispersion in asset prices and firm capital. Therefore, if the aggregate level of investment increases but all firms are doing equally well, the social planner wants to lower investment and increase information acquisition. If policy needs to be decided before investment realizes and aggregate shocks are persistent, then also past realizations of price-earnings ratios can be informative about future aggregate shocks. For example, if investment was high but output relatively low, then

investment must have been driven by sentiment and future investment is also likely to be driven by sentiment.

8 Conclusion

I develop a tractable framework that allows studying information acquisition in financial markets embedded in a neoclassical growth model. In such a model, total factor productivity has an endogenous component that depends on the traders’ decentralized information acquisition. When asset prices are more informative, more capital is allocated to the most productive firms and total factor productivity increases. I add to the literature by studying the effect of aggregate shocks on information acquisition.

I prove that sentiment shocks, defined as waves of non-fundamental optimism or pessimism, crowd-out information acquisition as trading becomes less information sensitive. This result is crucial to understanding the effect of these shocks on aggregate productivity. Although positive sentiment shocks lead to an increase in investment, they also worsen aggregate productivity. This finding relates to the empirical finding that credit booms often lead to a worsening in productivity (Borio et al., 2015; Doerr, 2018; Gopinath et al., 2017; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2020). In contrast, productivity shocks crowd-in information and thereby increase aggregate productivity above and beyond the initial shock. This dichotomy rationalizes the finding in Gorton and Ordoñez (2020) that there are both “good” and “bad” credit booms. My model suggests that “good” booms are driven by productivity, whereas “bad” booms are driven by sentiment.

From a normative perspective, I show that information acquisition is inefficiently high or low in the competitive equilibrium. Both outcomes are possible because there are two externalities with opposing effects. Traders acquire information to increase trading rents, which are a wash from the social planner’s perspective. This rent-stealing motive incentivizes information acquisition but can also lead to traders acquiring too much information. Moreover, traders do not take into account the positive externality of *collective* information acquisition, which improves the allocation of capital. This externality can lead to information acquisition being too low. Generally, information acquisition is too low in the competitive equilibrium when firms are heterogeneous and their products are close substitutes.

The model can also be used to evaluate stabilization policies. In this context, asset purchases and sales stand out as they affect both investment and information acquisition. In particular, asset purchases can stimulate investment and information acquisition when a negative sentiment shock hits the economy. This intervention, however, requires that the social planner can differentiate between productivity and sentiment shocks. Asset purchases

can also be a distortion source when used in the absence of a negative sentiment shock, which discourages information acquisition and worsens allocative efficiency. The social planner can differentiate productivity- from sentiment-driven booms by focusing on the cross-section of firms. During a sentiment-driven boom, firms appear more similar, whereas a productivity-driven boom increases firms' heterogeneity.

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A Trading

I assume that every family i consists of many traders indexed by $ij \in [0, 1]$. The information set of each trader consists of $\{s_{ijt}, \{z_{jt}\}, a_t, \varepsilon_t\}$, i.e., traders observe their private signal, all public signals and the aggregate states. This setting allows that traders have rational expectations about aggregates, but still disagree about firm-specific variables, which motivates trade. I impose that $\kappa_L = 0$ and $\kappa_H = 2$.

The beliefs of traders about firm productivity A_{jt} are relevant for their trading decision, where

$$\begin{aligned}\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}, z_{jt}\} &= \exp\left\{\omega_{p,ijt}a_t + \omega_{s,ijt}s_{ijt} + \omega_{z,ijt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{ijt}\right\} \\ \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} &= \exp\left\{\omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{s,jt}z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{jt}\right\}\end{aligned}$$

where $a_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(a_t, \sigma_a^2)$, $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_t, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ and ω -terms are the corresponding Bayesian weights,

$$\begin{aligned}\omega_{z,ijt} &= \frac{\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}} & \omega_{z,jt} &= \frac{\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{jt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}} \\ \omega_{s,ijt} &= \frac{\beta_{ijt}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}} & \omega_{s,jt} &= \frac{\beta_{jt}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{jt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}} \\ \omega_{p,ijt} &= \frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}} & \omega_{p,jt} &= \frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{jt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}},\end{aligned}$$

and $\{\mathbb{V}_{jt}, \mathbb{V}_{ijt}\}$ stand for posterior uncertainty

$$\mathbb{V}_{ijt} = \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}, \quad \mathbb{V}_{jt} = \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{jt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}.$$

Alternatively, the beliefs of the marginal trader who observed $s_{ijt} = z_{jt}$ can be expressed as a function of shocks,

$$\ln \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} = \omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{\varepsilon,jt}\varepsilon_t + \omega_{a,jt}a_{jt} + \frac{\omega_{a,jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}(\varepsilon_{jt} - \varepsilon_t) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{jt},$$

where $\omega_{a,jt} = \omega_{z,jt} + \omega_{s,jt}$ and $\omega_{\varepsilon,jt} = \omega_{s,jt}/\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}$.

Trader ij buys shares of firm j whenever

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{jt+1}|s_{ijt}, z_{jt}\} \geq \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{jt+1}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}$$

which is equivalent to

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt}, z_{jt}\} \geq \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}.$$

The above inequality leads to

$$\begin{aligned} \omega_{p,ijt}a_t + \omega_{s,ijt}s_{ijt} + \omega_{z,ijt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{\mathbb{V}_{ijt}}{2} &\geq \omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{s,jt}z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{\mathbb{V}_{jt}}{2} \\ \iff \eta_{ijt} &\geq \frac{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}{\omega_{s,ijt}}\left(\omega_{p,ijt}a_t + \omega_{z,ijt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{\mathbb{V}_{ijt}}{2}\right) + \sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}a_{jt} \\ &\quad - \frac{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}{\omega_{s,ijt}}\left(\omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{s,jt}z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{\mathbb{V}_{jt}}{2}\right) \end{aligned}$$

Since η_{ijt} is standard-normally distributed, the perceived probability of buying can be written in closed form

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt} = 2 | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\} &= \Phi\left(-\frac{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}{\omega_{s,ijt}}\left(\omega_{p,ijt}a_t + \omega_{z,ijt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{ijt}\right) + \sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}a_{jt}\right. \\ &\quad \left.- \frac{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}{\omega_{s,ijt}}\left(\omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{s,jt}z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{jt}\right)\right), \end{aligned}$$

where $\Phi(\cdot)$ is the standard-normal cdf and the weights on the realizations of shocks depend on the information precision choice of trader ij and of all other traders $-ij$. For a symmetric information choice ($\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$), the buying probability can be simplified to

$$\mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt} = 2 | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\}_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} = \Phi(-\varepsilon_{jt}).$$

Traders think that they are more likely to buy shares when the realization of the sentiment shock is relatively low and shares are therefore cheap relative to their fundamental value.

Finally, traders choose their information precision taking the symmetric choice of all other traders as given. The derivative of the probability of buying with respect to β_{ijt} is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt} = 2 | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} &= \phi\left(-\frac{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}{\omega_{s,ijt}}\left(\omega_{p,ijt}a_t + \omega_{z,ijt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{ijt}\right) + \sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}a_{jt}\right. \\ &\quad \left.- \frac{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}{\omega_{s,ijt}}\left(\omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{s,jt}z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_t}}\varepsilon_t\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{jt}\right)\right) \\ &\quad * \left(-\frac{1}{2\beta_{ijt}^{3/2}}\left(\sigma_a^{-2}a_t + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\right) + \frac{a_{jt}}{2\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}\right. \\ &\quad \left.- \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}} - \frac{1}{2\beta_{ijt}^{3/2}}(\mathbb{V}_{ijt})^{-1}\right)\left(\omega_{p,jt}a_t + \omega_{s,jt}z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt}\left(z_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}\right) + \frac{1}{2}\mathbb{V}_{jt}\right)\right) \end{aligned} \quad (45)$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the standard normal pdf. For a symmetric information choice ($\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$) this

expression can be simplified to

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{P} \{x_{ijt} = 2 | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \right|_{\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}} = \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) \left[\frac{1}{2\sqrt{\beta_{it}}} (a_{jt} + z_{jt}) - \frac{1}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \left(\omega_{p,jt} a_t + \omega_{s,jt} z_{jt} + \omega_{z,jt} \left(z_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \right) + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{V}_{jt} \right) \right].$$

B Figures

Figure 15 provides suggestive empirical evidence for the key mechanism in the data. In the time series, price informativeness and TFP growth are positively related. Viewed through the lens of my model, this allows to back out the type of shocks that drove the cycle between 1995 and 2010. First, the period between 1995 and 2001 was marked by an acceleration in TFP growth which was accompanied by an increase in price informativeness. The dot-com boom and subsequent bust was at least partially driven by productivity.

The housing boom between 2002 until 2007 was marked by a sharp decline in productivity growth and a fall in price-informativeness. The model suggests that this expansion was driven by sentiment, which also worsened aggregate productivity. This view is also shared by Borio et al. (2015) and Doerr (2018).




Figure 15: Dávila and Parlato (2020) propose an identification strategy to measure price informativeness using a general, linear asset pricing equation and stochastic process for shocks. Relative prices informativeness corresponds in this model to $\frac{\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$. Total factor productivity growth is utilization adjusted for both labor and capital following Basu, Fernald, and Kimball (2006) and the source is the Federal Reserve of San Francisco. In the left panel, both time series are presented after removing a cubic trend from both data series from 1995 to 2017 and apply a two year moving average to smooth both time series. In the right panel, the raw time series are shown.

C Position Limits

C.1 Exogenous Position Limits

In the main text I have assumed that traders can buy up to two units of each stock. Assume now that traders' position limits are given by $x_{ijt} \in [0, \kappa_H]$. Consider first some special cases.

Let $\kappa_H \in [0, 1)$. In that case the traders are collectively not able to clear the market. The result is that the stock price collapses to zero, all traders acquire κ_H units of firm j 's stock,

and the price is uninformative because it does not vary with firm productivity. Similarly, if $\kappa_H = 1$, traders are able to clear the market, but the same outcome arises.

In contrast, if there are no upper limits to how much traders can buy ($\kappa_H = \infty$), the most optimistic trader alone can clear the whole market. Expectations about dividends and the interest rate R_{t+1} go to infinity, but prices are finite. Information becomes useless for traders because the probability of buying in any given market is zero.

To avoid these edge cases, I focus position limits for which the market clearing condition gives an interior solution for the threshold, i.e., $\kappa_H \in (1, \infty)$. The market clearing condition leads to the threshold $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$,

$$\begin{aligned} \kappa_H \left(1 - \Phi \left(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}} (\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt} \right) \right) &= 1. \\ \iff \hat{s}(P_{jt}) &= a_{jt} + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} + \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\kappa_H} \right)}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \end{aligned}$$

The resulting expectations of dividends can be written by multiplying the price under $\kappa_H = 2$ with a factor related to κ_H ,

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left\{ \Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt} + \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{\kappa_H}{2} \right) / \sqrt{\beta_{jt}}, z_{jt} \right\} = \underbrace{\exp \left\{ \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\kappa_H} \right) / \sqrt{\beta_{jt}} \right\}^\theta}_{\text{bias through choice of position limits}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ \Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \}.$$

Consequently, the interest rate is also distorted,

$$R_{t+1} = \exp \left\{ \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{\kappa_H}{2} \right) / \sqrt{\beta_{jt}} \right\}^\theta \frac{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ \Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \} dj}{K_{t+1}}.$$

For $\kappa_H = 2$ the marginal trader is neither optimistic nor pessimistic and, therefore, the bias due to the choice of position limits is equal to zero.

Holding K_{t+1} constant leads to an unchanged allocation of capital,

$$\begin{aligned} K_{jt+1} &= \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left\{ \Pi_{jt+1} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt} + \Phi^{-1} \left(1 - \frac{1}{\kappa_H} \right) / \sqrt{\beta_{jt}}, z_{jt} \right\}}{R_{t+1}} \\ &= \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \}^\theta}{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \}^\theta dj} K_{t+1}. \end{aligned}$$

A different interest rate will affect aggregate investment through 29. If buyers are relatively optimistic ($\kappa_H > 2$), then the interest and aggregate investment increase. Setting $\kappa_H = 2$ is for the model without the information choice inconsequential and only avoids introducing a multiplicative factor for expectations of dividends.

For the information acquisition decision, the choice of position limits has similar effects as aggregate sentiment shocks or reductions in asset supply. The main idea is the same: when the aggregate sentiment shock is positive, traders expect to buy in fewer states of the world, making information less valuable. The same effect is present when setting the position limit $\kappa_H > 2$; however, it is counteracted by traders acquiring more units if they trade, which is absent in the case of sentiment shocks. Depending on which effect dominates, the maximum information choice is achieved for $\kappa_H < 2$ or $\kappa_H > 2$.

Position limits affect the analysis for sentiment shocks and revert the logic outlined in the main text. For example, assume that $\kappa_H = 1 + \eta$, where $\eta > 0$ is a small number. Then almost all traders need to buy shares to clear the market. It follows that trading is information-insensitive because all traders expect to buy κ_H units of nearly all firms irrespective of the private signal. Different from the intuition before, a positive sentiment shock makes traders think that the trading decision becomes more information-sensitive. Recall that the trading decision is most information-sensitive if the ex-ante probability of buying is $\frac{1}{2}$. As the increase in the sentiment shock pushes the ex-ante probability of trading towards $\frac{1}{2}$ from below, a sentiment shock can make the trading decision more information-sensitive.

The choice of $\kappa_H = 2$ in the main text guarantees that the marginal trader is, on average, neither optimistic nor pessimistic absent sentiment shocks. Moreover, considering aspects outside of the model, excess or lack of demand can lead to entry or exit of traders because prices are predictably under-/overpriced. It can also lead to additional entry or exit of firms for the same reason. Both forces tend to undo the effects of too much/little demand. Finally, denoting position limits in units of shares is mainly an analytical simplification when including risk-neutral traders in the financial markets.

C.2 Short-Selling

Short-selling was ruled out in the main text for analytical convenience, but does not change the results of the model. Assume that traders can take also negative positions, such that $x_{ijt} \in [-2, 2]$. The market clearing condition becomes

$$\underbrace{2 \left(1 - \Phi \left(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}} (\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt} \right) \right)}_{\text{buying}} - \underbrace{2 \Phi \left(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}} (\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt} \right)}_{\text{selling}} = 1,$$

and the threshold is

$$\hat{s}(P_{jt}) = a_{jt} + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} + \Phi^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{4} \right)}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}.$$

In contrast to before, more traders need to be buying to clear the market, because previously inactive traders now short stocks and thereby increase their supply. Therefore, short-selling leads to a lower price because the marginal trader will be more pessimistic than before. The bias can be avoided by letting traders take asymmetric position, e.g., $x_{ijt} \in [-2, 4]$, in which case the marginal trader still is identified by the signal $\hat{s}(P_{jt}) = a_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt}/\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}$.

C.3 Endogenous Position Limits

Finally, let traders choose position limits $x_{ijt} \in [\kappa_L, \kappa_H]$ subject to a cost $c^L(\kappa_L)$ and $c^H(\kappa_H)$ before trading takes place. One interpretation funds and credit lines have to be allocated between markets, which can be costly. It may be, however, valuable if traders expect that some markets are under- or overpriced. For example, if market j is hit by a positive sentiment shock, traders may want to extend their ability to short-sell in this market while reducing their ability to buy. Generally, this possibility will tend to imperfectly counteract the effects of sentiment shocks.

The effect on the information acquisition decision is more subtle. Consider as a partial equilibrium example that trader ij received private information that shares of firm j will be underpriced. In anticipation of a depressed market, trader ij extends her ability to buy, but completely forgoes short-selling. Intuitively, the opportunity cost of buying when prices are too high is captured by $(\kappa_H - \kappa_L) * Loss$. Therefore, the value of information is increasing in $\kappa_H - \kappa_L$. Whether the adjustment of position limits increases information acquisition depends, therefore, on whether $\kappa_H - \kappa_L$ is increased as a result.

More formally, the expected trading rents can be written as

$$\widetilde{EU}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) = \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ (\kappa_H \mathcal{P}\{\text{Buy}\} + \kappa_L \mathcal{P}\{\text{Sell}\}) * \text{Profits} \}.$$

Because there are no trading costs, it must be that $\mathcal{P}\{\text{Sell}\} = 1 - \mathcal{P}\{\text{Buy}\}$:

$$\widetilde{EU}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) = \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ [(\kappa_H - \kappa_L) \mathcal{P}\{\text{Buy}\}] * \text{Profits} \} - \kappa_L \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ \text{Profits} \}.$$

Taking the derivative with respect to β_{ijt} yields,

$$\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) = \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left\{ \left[(\kappa_H - \kappa_L) \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{\text{Buy}\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \right] * \text{Profits} \right\}.$$

The marginal benefit to acquire information is proportional to $\kappa_H - \kappa_L$. Therefore, if traders decide to expand $\kappa_H - \kappa_L$ in response to a shock, it will tend to increase information acquisition.

D Intermediate Good Firms

D.1 Micro-Foundation

Intermediate good firms sell their whole revenue stream to traders to focus the analysis on information frictions. This assumption can be micro-founded by assuming that there are at least two entrepreneurs without private wealth for each variety j . Entrepreneurs need to turn to financial markets for funding their project, but the market is competitive in the sense that at most one entrepreneur for each variety j can sell her shares to traders. A mechanism chooses the entrepreneur who promises the highest rate of return on her shares. If there is a tie, the successful entrepreneur is chosen at random among the entrepreneurs that offer the highest return.

Formally, the entrepreneurs problem is

$$\max_{K_{jkt+1}, D_{jkt+1}} C_{jkt} + \delta \mathbb{E} \{C_{jkt+1}\} \quad (46)$$

$$s.t. \quad K_{jkt+1} + C_{jkt} \leq P_{jkt}. \quad (47)$$

$$C_{jkt+1} \leq \Pi_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) - D_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) \quad (48)$$

$$C_{jkt}, C_{jkt+1}, K_{jkt+1}, D_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) \geq 0 \quad (49)$$

where

$$P_{jkt} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \exists k' \neq k : R_{jkt+1} < R_{jk't+1} \\ \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{D_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} & \text{w.p. } 1 - \frac{1}{|k''|} \text{ if } \exists k'' \neq k : R_{jkt+1} = R_{jk''t+1} \text{ and } \forall k' \neq k : R_{jkt+1} \geq R_{jk't+1} \\ \frac{1}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{D_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} & \text{w.p. } \frac{1}{|k''|} \text{ if } \forall k' \neq k : R_{jkt+1} > R_{jk't+1} \end{cases} \quad (50)$$

The entrepreneur maximizes her utility over consumption today and tomorrow with the same utility function as households.²¹ When young, entrepreneurs can either consume or invest in their firm. When old, entrepreneurs pay out a dividend D_{jkt+1} and consume what remains of revenue Π_{jkt+1} .

The entrepreneur is only able to sell her shares at a positive price if she offers the highest return in market j . If the entrepreneur promises a lower rate of return R_{jkt+1} than some other entrepreneur k' , she will not be able to sell her shares and raise nothing. If she promises the highest rate of return in the economy, but other entrepreneur promise the same rate of

²¹Entrepreneurs can only raise funds by selling claims to revenue and cannot borrow or lend otherwise. This setting guarantees that asset prices are an invertible function of z_{jt} , a noisy signal of firm productivity, without which the equilibrium in the financial market does not exist. See Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011b, 2017) for a discussion of this issue.

return, she will be able to sell her shares with probability $1/|k''|$ where $|k''|$ is the number of entrepreneurs which promise the highest return. If only she promises the highest return, she will be able to sell her shares with probability one. Finally, the rate of return is given by

$$R_{jkt+1} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{D_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1})\}}{K_{jkt+1}}. \quad (51)$$

There is perfect competition between entrepreneurs because productivity A_{jt} is attached to the variety j instead of the entrepreneur jk and all entrepreneurs sell at the same price ρ_{jt+1} . Therefore, the only equilibrium is one in which at least two entrepreneurs choose

$$D_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) = \Pi_{jkt+1}(A_{jt}, K_{jkt+1}) \quad (52)$$

$$K_{jkt+1} = P_{jkt} \quad (53)$$

It is easy to verify that this is the only equilibrium. Any entrepreneur k who chooses (52) and (53) can only deviate by either investing less or paying a lower dividend. It follows there exists another entrepreneur who promises a higher return on investment and following (50) entrepreneur k is unable to sell her shares. Similarly, any entrepreneur who does not choose (52) and (53) does not have a profitable deviation. Choosing to invest less or promising a lower dividend leads to no change, as the rate of return is only further depressed. Investing more or promising a higher dividend is similarly inconsequential as long as the entrepreneur does not choose (52) and (53). If she chooses to deviate to (52) and (53), she still earns zero profits but gets to produce with positive probability. Therefore, (52) and (53) are an equilibrium.

To show that at least two entrepreneurs choosing (52) and (53) is the only equilibrium, it is necessary to show that profitable deviations exist for all other choices of investment and dividends. First, consider that only one entrepreneur k chooses (52) and (53) and all others either invest strictly less or pay a lower dividend in some states. Then entrepreneur k can raise her profits by either investing less or promising a lower dividend while still promising the highest rate of return. Second, assume that all entrepreneurs choose an investment and dividend policy that leads to positive profits for the entrepreneur in at least some states. In this case, there is a profitable deviation for any entrepreneur k , as she invest more or pay a larger dividend to promise the highest rate of return while keeping positive profits. Therefore, the only equilibrium is given by at least two entrepreneurs choosing (52) and (53).

D.2 Entrepreneurs with Market Power: Equity

Alternatively, assume there is only one entrepreneur per variety. Furthermore, entrepreneurs are patient and restricted to selling equity contracts as captured in the following Assumption.

Assumption 3 (*Equity Contracts*). *Entrepreneurs can only sell claims to a fraction $\lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t) \in [0, 1]$ of firm-revenue.*

The share of revenue that is sold to the market is allowed to depend on price P_{jt} and on the aggregate value of stock market, P_t . The entrepreneur's maximization problem is

$$\max_{\lambda_{jt}, K_{jt+1}} \mathbb{E} \{C_{jt+1} | P_{jt}\} \quad (54)$$

$$C_{jt+1} \leq \Pi(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) - D(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) \quad (55)$$

$$D(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) = \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t) \Pi(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) \quad (56)$$

$$0 \leq K_{jt+1} \leq P_{jt}, \quad (57)$$

The entrepreneur maximizes her consumption, which consists of firm-revenue $\Pi(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1})$ after paying dividends $D(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1})$ subject to constraints (55), (56) and (57). The first constraint states that consumption can be at most revenue minus dividends. The second constraint follows from Assumption 3. The last constraint imposes non-negativity on investment and states that entrepreneurs cannot borrow additional funds from other sources. Plugging in the constraints into the objective yields the simplified problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t), K_{jt+1}} \quad & \mathbb{E} \{ \Pi_{jt+1} - \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t) \Pi_{jt+1} | z_{jt} \} \\ & 0 \leq K_{jt+1} \leq P_{jt} \end{aligned}$$

The asset price P_{jt} can be expressed as

$$P_{jt} = \alpha \frac{\lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)}{R_{t+1}} Y_t^{\alpha_Y} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \} K_{jt+1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}.$$

It is optimal for the entrepreneur to invest everything she raises, which allows to write firm-capital as

$$P_{jt} = K_{jt+1} = \left(\alpha \frac{\lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)}{R_{t+1}} Y_t^{\alpha_Y} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{ A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt} \} \right)^{\theta}.$$

Plugging this back into the entrepreneur's problem leads to a simplified problem

$$\max_{\lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)} (1 - \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)) \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)^{\theta-1} (1 - \alpha^{\theta-1}) \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt}\} \left(\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} \frac{Y_t^{\alpha_Y}}{R_{t+1}} \right)^{\theta-1}.$$

The first order condition to the simplified problem is

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial \lambda_{jt}} (1 - \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)) \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)^{\theta-1} &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow (\theta - 1) \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)^{\theta-2} - \theta \lambda_{jt}(P_{jt}, P_t)^{\theta-1} &= 0 \\ \Rightarrow \forall j, t : \quad \lambda_{jt} &= \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, all entrepreneurs irrespective of firm-specific and aggregate asset prices sell a constant fraction $\lambda_{jt} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$ of revenue to the financial market. The resulting dividend per share is

$$D_{jt+1} = \alpha \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} Y_{t+1}^{\alpha_Y} A_{jt} K_{jt+1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}.$$

Assigning market power to entrepreneurs, therefore, effectively leads to a mark-up on the price of the intermediate good as traders only receive a fraction $\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$ of firm-revenue for completely funding firm investment. The effect is to depress investment, which can be undone through an ad-valorem subsidy of $\tau = \frac{\theta}{\theta-1}$ in the market for intermediate goods.

D.3 Entrepreneurs with Market Power: Credit Markets

The main focus of this paper is to study booms that are caused by productivity or sentiment. There is an extensive literature that studies such booms in credit markets. The model can be extended to cover debt securities that are centrally traded instead of stock markets. Assume that the entrepreneur's technology is given by

$$Y_{jt} = \begin{cases} A_t^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} K_{jt} & \text{w.p. } \pi_{jt} \\ 0 & \text{w.p. } 1 - \pi_{jt} \end{cases}.$$

Different to before, entrepreneurs run projects that are either successful and give a certain return on capital or fail and produce nothing. Success or failure is determined by the realization of a normally distributed variable,

$$P(Y_{jt} > 0) = P(a_{jt} > \bar{a}) = \Phi \left(\frac{a_t - \bar{a}}{\sqrt{\sigma_a^2}} \right) = \pi_t.$$

The entrepreneur's project succeeds whenever $a_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(a_t, \sigma_a^2)$ has a realization above the threshold \bar{a} . Households have dispersed information about the firm-specific shock $s_{ijt} = a_{jt} + \frac{\eta_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}}$ where η_{ijt} is idiosyncratic noise and ε_{jt} is correlated noise. Same as before, traders suffer from correlation neglect and perceive only their own signal to be $s_{ijt} = a_{jt} + \eta_{ijt}/\sqrt{\beta_{ijt}}$. The households problem is the same as in the main model.

To finance their projects, entrepreneurs issue a unit mass of debt securities with the payoff

$$X_{jt} = \begin{cases} \lambda_{jt} & \text{if } Y_{jt} > 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

The security pays an amount λ_{jt} when the project succeeds and zero otherwise.²² The entrepreneur maximizes the revenue that she can keep in case of success after repaying debt obligations

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\lambda_{jt}, K_{jt+1}} \quad & \rho_{jt+1} Y_{jt+1}(a_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) - X_{jt}(a_{jt}, \lambda_{jt}) \\ 0 \leq K_{jt+1} \leq P_{jt}. \end{aligned}$$

The entrepreneur invests all raised funds, $K_{jt+1} = P_{jt}$. Using $P(a_{jt} > \bar{a} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}) = P(\tilde{a}_{jt+1} > \bar{a})$ where $\tilde{a}_{jt+1} \sim \mathcal{N}(\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}, \mathbb{V})$ are the posterior beliefs of the marginal trader, the price of debt and firm-capital can then be written as

$$K_{jt+1} = P_{jt} = \frac{\lambda_{jt}}{R_{t+1}} \Phi\left(\frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}}{\sqrt{\mathbb{V}}}\right), \quad (58)$$

where $\mathbb{V} = (\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{jt}(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^{-1}$ is the posterior uncertainty. The solution to the entrepreneur's problem is

$$\lambda_{jt} = \left(\frac{\theta - 1}{\theta} \alpha Y_{t+1}^{\alpha_Y} A_{t+1}\right)^\theta \frac{\Phi\left(\frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}}{\sqrt{\mathbb{V}}}\right)^{\theta-1}}{(R_{t+1})^{\theta-1}}, \quad (59)$$

which depends on the market valuation of debt or equivalently the interest rate that entrepreneur j faces. Using (58) and (59) in the expression for firm-revenue allows to express the entrepreneur's decision as a fraction of output,

$$\frac{\lambda_{jt}}{\rho_{jt+1} Y_{jt+1}(a_{jt}, K_{jt+1})} = \frac{\theta - 1}{\theta}. \quad (60)$$

²²Quantity and payoffs can be interchanged by denoting the mass of securities by λ_{jt} and the payoff in the good state is normalized to one. Instead, the quantity is normalized to one and the payoff is allowed to vary.

This result recovers the optimal equity contract from section D.2.

In contrast to the model with equity, there is an additional channel through which shocks affect information acquisition. The binary payoff function introduces changes in the variance of outcomes for firms driven by productivity and sentiment shocks. The variance of outcomes is captured by $\pi_{jt}(1 - \pi_{jt})$, whereas riskiness normally would only be captured by the probability of failure, $1 - \pi_{jt}$. Intuitively, a project is entirely safe whenever the probability of success, π_{jt} , is equal to one. In this case, learning about the firm-specific shock, a_{jt} , is inconsequential. The same reasoning applies if the project is sure to fail ($\pi_{jt} = 0$). Therefore, the effect of changes to a_t is ambiguous. Positive shocks to a_t trigger additional information acquisition only when π_{jt} was low before, but they crowd-out information when debt becomes safe as a consequence. Therefore, the aggregate shocks affect the (perceived) riskiness of debt.²³

Although this model abstracts from banks and credit intermediation, it replicates the main stylized facts of credit booms before financial crises. First, credit booms are episodes of sharp increases in lending and economic activity (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor, 2010). This is the case in the model presented here, as the volume of credit increases in response to a positive aggregate shock. As a result, investment and economic activity increase. Second, credit becomes riskier as lending standards are relaxed, and riskier firms get access to credit (Keys et al., 2010). In response to a sentiment shock, all firms are considered to be safer than they actually are. Because there is more scope for a change in beliefs for relatively risky firms, the sentiment shock leads to a disproportionate increase in funding for risky firms (low π_{jt}). Third, credit spreads decrease in the boom phase before a financial crisis (Krishnamurthy and Muir, 2017). In the case for sentiment driven booms, all firms are perceived to be safer than they actually are and, therefore, spreads are low.

E Full Social Planner Problem

In the main text, the social planner could only intervene by choosing information precision. Now, the social planner can choose consumption, information acquisition and investment in the aggregate and cross-section to maximize social welfare, defined as the sum of utilities of all traders. Therefore, the social planner is able to achieve the second best by fixing all inefficiencies. The maximization problem is

²³An alternative interpretation is that productivity shocks affect productivity conditional on success, A_{t+1} . In this case, productivity shocks would have no effect on the riskiness of debt and behave similar to a productivity shock in the model with equity markets.

$$\max_{K_{j1}, C_0, C_1, \beta_{j0}} C_0 + \delta \mathbb{E}_0 \{C_1\} - \int_0^1 I A(\beta_{j0}) dj \quad (\text{SP1})$$

$$s.t. \quad K_1 = W_0 - C_0 \quad (61)$$

$$C_1 \leq Y_1(\{K_{j1}\}, \{\beta_{j0}\}) \quad (62)$$

$$C_0 \leq W_0 \quad (63)$$

$$K_{j1}, C_0, C_1, \beta_{j0} \geq 0. \quad (64)$$

Constraint (61) states that aggregate capital in period 1 is equal to endowments W_0 minus youth consumption C_0 . (62) and (63) are resource constraints. (64) are non-negativity constraints on consumption, information acquisition and capital. The solution to the social planner's problem is given in the following Proposition.

Proposition 10. *The social planner's allocation under perfect information about aggregate shocks $\{a_0, \varepsilon_0\}$ is given by $\{C_0^{SP}, K_{j1}^{SP}, K_1^{SP}, \beta_0^{SP}\}$, where*

$$K_{j1}^{SP} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta}{\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj} K_1^{SP} \quad (65)$$

leading to aggregate output

$$Y_1^{SP} = A_0^{SP} (K_1^{SP})^\alpha \quad \text{with } A_0^{SP} = \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\theta-1}}. \quad (66)$$

The interest rate is

$$R_1^{SP} = \alpha A_0^{SP} (K_1^{SP})^{\alpha-1}, \quad (67)$$

which leads to aggregate investment

$$K_1^{SP} = \min \left\{ (\alpha \delta A_0^{SP})^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}}, W_0 \right\}. \quad (68)$$

The symmetric information acquisition choice is

$$\text{for all } \beta_{j0} = \beta_0^{SP} : \delta \frac{\partial A_0^{SP}}{\partial \beta_0} \Big|_{\beta_0 = \beta_0^{SP}} (K_1^{SP})^\alpha = \frac{\partial I A_0}{\partial \beta_0} \Big|_{\beta_0 = \beta_0^{SP}}. \quad (69)$$

The social planner fixes the two aforementioned inefficiencies. First, the social planner distributes capital optimally by attributing the correct precision to the price signal z_{jt} as in (28) and (65). As a result, ex-ante marginal products of capital are equalized between firms.

This reallocation of capital leads to an increase in TFP as in Proposition 3 compared to the competitive allocation. Second, the social planner chooses information acquisition β_0^{SP} to increase TFP instead of trading rents. Given that the social planner optimally distributes capital between firms as in (65), an increase in β_0^{SP} has always beneficial effects on A_0^{SP} .

E.1 Implementation

In this section I investigate how the social planner can implement the centralized allocation through the use of taxes and subsidies. Net proceeds and costs of taxes and subsidies are distributed lump-sum between old traders.

The social planner can apply a tax/subsidy on dividend income to achieve the constrained-efficient allocation of capital. Under this state-dependent tax/subsidy, traders receive

$$\Pi_{j1}^{DE} = \tau^{Bias}(z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1}, \quad \text{where } \tau^{Bias}(z_{j0}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}}{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|x_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}}. \quad (70)$$

As seen in Figure 3, $\tau^{Bias}(z_{j0})$ is a subsidy on dividends whenever $K_{j1}^{eff} < K_{j1}$. If the social planner has information about aggregate shocks, the tax/subsidy corrects also for aggregate sentiment shocks through the marginal trader's expectations $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|x_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}$. A tax (subsidy) can lower (increase) investment in response to a positive (negative) sentiment shock.

Moreover, a tax/subsidy $\tau^{Info}(\beta_{ij0})$ on information acquisition is sufficient to induce the socially optimal level,

$$\frac{\partial IA^{DE}(\beta_{ij0})}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} = \tau^{Info}(\beta_{ij0}) \frac{\partial IA(\beta_{ij0})}{\partial \beta_{ij0}}, \quad \tau^{Info}(\beta_{ij0}) = \frac{\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0}) \Big|_{\beta_{ij0}=\beta_{j0}}}{\delta \frac{\partial A_0}{\partial \beta_0} K_1^\alpha}. \quad (71)$$

Applying the after-tax marginal cost leads directly to the first order condition as in (69). The results are summarized in the following Proposition.

Proposition 11. *The social planner allocation $\{K_1^{SP}, K_{j1}^{SP}, \beta_0^{SP}\}$ can be implemented through taxes/subsidies (70) and (71).*

Alternatively, the social planner can use transaction taxes to implement the optimal capital allocation. Since Tobin (1972), financial transaction taxes have been discussed with the objective of reducing volatility by making short-term speculation less profitable. This analysis is inapplicable here as assets are short-lived and only traded once. Nonetheless, a transaction tax can be used to drive a wedge between how much traders pay for shares and how much is invested in capital. The following Proposition shows how such a transaction tax

can be used to stabilize investment against sentiment shocks and reallocate capital across firms.

Corollary 4. *(i) Aggregate investment can be stabilized with respect to sentiment shocks through a transaction tax,*

$$K_{j1}^{DE} = \tau^{Trans}(\varepsilon_0) P_{j0}, \quad \tau^{Trans}(\varepsilon_0) = \exp\{-\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_0\}, \quad \omega_{s\varepsilon} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta_0}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_0(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}. \quad (72)$$

(ii) The dividend tax/subsidy (70) can be substituted by a state-dependent transaction tax,

$$K_{j1}^{DE} = \tau^{Trans}(P_{j0}) P_{j0}, \quad \tau^{Trans}(P_{j0}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}}{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}}. \quad (73)$$

F Information Structure

In this model, I assumed that traders are overconfident in that they wrongly believe that sentiment drives the beliefs of all other trader except their own. Whereas it is empirically reasonable to assume that behavioral biases play a role in financial markets, I chose this approach for tractability. Avoiding the introduction of non-optimizing agents greatly simplifies embedding a model of informative financial markets in a macro setting and facilitates the welfare analysis. Moreover, overconfidence is sufficient to motivate costly information acquisition and avoid the Grossman-Stiglitz paradox. This assumption is not necessary for deriving the main result that sentiment shocks crowd-out information and can identically be derived with noise trades in partial equilibrium.

In the following I walk through different assumptions for the information structure and their relationship to information aggregation and acquisition.

Exogenous Public Signals

The simplest case is one in which traders do not have private signals but instead observe public signals of the form $z_{jt} = a_{jt} + \varepsilon_{jt}/\sqrt{\beta}$. This setting mirrors the allocation in Proposition 3. However, it has nothing to say about the origin of the signal. How does it come about, and what determines its precision?

Heterogeneous Private Signals

To say something about the aggregation of information, endow traders with heterogeneous private signals

$$s_{ijt} = a_{jt} + \frac{\eta_{ijt} + \varepsilon_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}.$$

Following the same steps as in section 3.3 leads to the market equilibrium under the assumption of rationality and overconfidence.

Under rationality the efficient allocation of capital is achieved, but information acquisition is ruled out. As in the model with overconfidence, observing the asset price is isomorphic to observing $z_{jt} = \int s_{ijt}dj$. However, rational traders realize that they have nothing to learn from their private signal after observing the public signal z_{jt} . However, setting up this equilibrium required that traders use their private signal for their buying decision. In this setting traders are indifferent between buying or not, as they all share the same information set. Therefore, the indifference can be broken in favor of buying whenever $s_{ijt} \geq z_{jt}$.²⁴

The main drawback of this approach is that it rules out costly information acquisition. The private signal s_{ijt} becomes fully uninformative after observing the public signal z_{jt} in equilibrium ($\forall i : \beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$). In this case the trader finds it optimal to deviate to $\beta_{ijt} < \beta_{jt}$, which guarantees an informative private signal. However, since traders are ex-ante homogeneous, no asymmetric equilibrium can exist. There is no equilibrium with costly information acquisition and rationality, similar to the result in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).

To overcome this problem, I assume that traders think that their private signal does not contain sentiment. Therefore, they do not discard their private signal s_{ijt} after observing the price signal z_{jt} . The posterior of trader ij becomes

$$a_{jt} | \textcolor{blue}{s}_{ijt}, z_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N} \left(\frac{\textcolor{blue}{\beta}_{ijt}s_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-2}z_{jt}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \textcolor{blue}{\beta}_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-2}}, \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \textcolor{blue}{\beta}_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_{\varepsilon}^{-2}} \right),$$

where I marked in blue terms that follow from the overconfidence assumption. It follows that traders have posteriors that are too precise, as they think that their private signal remains informative after observing z_{jt} . This misperception motivates traders to invest in their private signal with the anticipation of trading rents. Finally, this bias leads to an overreaction of prices to the price signal z_{jt} as described in section 4.1. This price distortion appears also in models with rational and noise traders, if rational traders learn from prices and have heterogeneous private signals.²⁵ The main focus of this paper, however, is not on the price distortion, but rather time-varying price-informativeness and allocational efficiency of financial markets.

²⁴This class of equilibria is referred to as “fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium” and they are studied in Grossman (1976).

²⁵For a more detailed discussion, see Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2011a, 2015).

G Proofs

Proof of Proposition 1. The proof follows the same steps as the proof for Proposition 1 in Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2017) as the financial market in this model is isomorphic to their version. It is repeated here for completeness. The only difference is that K_{jt+1} depends on the price signal z_{jt} , whereas k in Albagli, Hellwig, and Tsyvinski (2017) is determined before trading takes place. Therefore, it is necessary to assume that $K_{jt+1}(z_{jt})$ is non-decreasing in z_{jt} as the price might otherwise be not invertible, which is confirmed ex-post.

There must be a threshold $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$ such that all households with $s_{ijt} \geq \hat{s}(P_{jt})$ find it profitable to buy two units of share j and otherwise abstain from trading. It follows that the price must be equal to the valuation of the trader who is just indifferent between buying or not,

$$P_{jt} = \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{D(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) | s_{ijt} = \hat{s}(P_{jt}), P_{jt}\}.$$

This monotone demand schedule leads to total demand $2(1 - \Phi(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}(\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt}))$. Equalizing total demand with a normalized supply of one leads to the market clearing condition

$$2\left(1 - \Phi\left(\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}(\hat{s}(P_{jt}) - a_{jt}) - \varepsilon_{jt}\right)\right) = 1$$

with the unique solution $\hat{s}(P_{jt}) = z_{jt} = a_{jt} + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}$. If P_{jt} is pinned down by z_{jt} , then P_{jt} is invertible, given that K_{jt+1} is non-decreasing in z_{jt} . It follows then that observing P_{jt} is equivalent to observing $z_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(a_{jt}, \beta_{jt}^{-1}\sigma_\varepsilon)$. Traders treat the signal z_{jt} and their private signal $s_{ijt} \sim \mathcal{N}(a_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}^{-1})$ as mutually independent. Using this result, the price can be restated as

$$P(z_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) = \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{D(A_{jt}, K_{jt+1}) | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}$$

where posterior expectations of trader ij are given by

$$a_{jt} | s_{ijt}, z_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\frac{\sigma_a^{-2}a_t + \beta_{ijt}s_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}z_{jt}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}, \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{ijt} + \beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}\right).$$

It remains to show uniqueness of the above solution. Start with the assumption that demand $d(s_{ijt}, P_{jt})$ is non-increasing in P_{jt} . It follows that $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$ is non-decreasing in P_{jt} . There are two cases to differentiate. First, if $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$ is strictly increasing in P_{jt} , then the price is indeed uniquely pinned-down by z_{jt} and invertible; it can be expressed like above. Secondly, assume that the threshold is flat over some interval, such that $\hat{s}(P_{jt}) = \hat{s}$ over some interval $P_{jt} \in (P', P'')$ for $P' \neq P''$. Furthermore, choose $\epsilon > 0$ small enough such that $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$ is increasing to the left and right of the interval, i.e., over $P_{jt} \in (P' - \epsilon, P')$ and $P_{jt} \in (P'', P'' + \epsilon)$. In these regions, $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$ is monotonically increasing in P_{jt} , which is uniquely pinned down by z_{jt}

and invertible; observing the price is equivalent to observing the signal z_{jt} . In this case the price can be expressed as before for $z_{jt} \in (\hat{s}(P' - \varepsilon), \hat{s})$ and $z_{jt} \in (\hat{s}, \hat{s}(P'' + \varepsilon))$. This leads to a contradiction to the assumption that $P' \neq P''$, because $P(z_{jt}, K_{jt+1})$ is continuous and monotonically increasing in z_{jt} . Therefore, $\hat{s}(P_{jt})$ cannot be flat and the above solution is indeed unique. \square

Proof of Proposition 2. (i) Using (4) in (21) leads to the expression for firm-capital

$$K_{jt+1} = \left(\frac{\alpha Y_{t+1}^{\alpha_Y}}{R_{t+1}} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} \right)^{\theta}. \quad (74)$$

Plugging R_{t+1} from (22) into (21) using (74) leads to

$$K_{jt+1} = \frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta}}{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta} dj} K_{t+1}.$$

Finally, plugging this expression for firm capital into the aggregate production function leads to

$$\begin{aligned} Y_t &= \left(\int_0^1 Y_{jt}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} di \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}} \\ &= \left(\int_0^1 A_{jt-1} K_{jt}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} di \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}} \\ &= \frac{\left(\int_0^1 A_{jt-1} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt-1} | s_{ijt-1} = z_{jt-1}, z_{jt-1}\}^{\theta-1} dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt-1} | s_{ijt-1} = z_{jt-1}, z_{jt-1}\}^{\theta} dj \right)^{\alpha}} K_t^{\alpha} \\ &= A_{t-1} L^{1-\alpha} K_t^{\alpha} \end{aligned}$$

where total factor productivity is

$$\begin{aligned}
A_{t-1} &= \frac{\left(\int_0^1 A_{jt-1} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt-1} | s_{ijt-1} = z_{jt-1}, z_{jt-1}\}^{\theta-1} dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt-1} | s_{ijt-1} = z_{jt-1}, z_{jt-1}\}^\theta dj \right)^\alpha} \\
&= \exp \left\{ \theta a_{t-1} + ((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)^2 \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + (\theta-1)^2 \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} + (\theta-1)\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_{t-1} + \frac{(\theta-1)}{2}\mathbb{V} \right\}^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}} \\
&: \exp \left\{ \theta a_{t-1} + \theta^2 \omega_a^2 \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + \theta^2 \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} + \theta \omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_{t-1} + \frac{\theta}{2}\mathbb{V} \right\}^\alpha \\
&= \exp \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} a_{t-1} + \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} ((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)^2 - \alpha\theta^2 \omega_a^2 \right) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + (\alpha\theta(\theta-1) - \alpha\theta^2) \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} \right) \\
&= \exp \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} a_{t-1} + \alpha\theta \left((\theta-1)\omega_a^2 + 2\omega_a + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - \theta\omega_a^2 \right) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \alpha\theta\omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} \right) \\
&= \exp \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) + \omega_a(2-\omega_a) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} \right)^{\alpha\theta}.
\end{aligned}$$

The weights $\{\omega_a, \omega_\varepsilon, \omega_{s\varepsilon}\}$ and \mathbb{V} are derived in Appendix A. Finally, total factor productivity can be expressed as

$$\ln A_{t-1}(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1}) = \underbrace{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right)}_{\text{exogenous}} + \underbrace{\kappa^a(\beta_{t-1}) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \kappa^\varepsilon(\beta_{t-1}) \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2}}_{\text{allocative efficiency}}$$

where $\kappa^a(\beta_{t-1}) = \frac{\omega_a(2-\omega_a)}{2}$ and $\kappa^\varepsilon(\beta_{t-1}) = \frac{\omega_\varepsilon^2}{2}$.

(iii) $\omega_a(\beta_t)$ is monotonically increasing in β_t . In the case with $\beta_t = 0$ or $\beta_t \rightarrow \infty$, no noise enters the posterior of traders. Therefore, the Bayesian weight on realizations of correlated noise, $\omega_\varepsilon(\beta_t)$, must be hump-shaped. It follows then from (27) that if σ_ε^2 is large enough relative to σ_a^2 , TFP is an inversely hump-shaped function of β_t . Reversely, if σ_ε^2 is small enough relative to σ_a^2 , $A(a_{t-1}, \beta_{t-1})$ is monotonically increasing in β_{t-1} . \square

Lemma 1. Denote the Bayesian weights $\omega_a^{eff} = \frac{\beta\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$, $\omega_\varepsilon^{eff} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$ and posterior uncertainty $\mathbb{V}^{eff} = \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$, then

$$\underbrace{(\omega_a^{eff})^2 \sigma_a^2 + (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \sigma_\varepsilon^2}_{= \text{Var}(\mathbb{E}\{a_{jt}|z_{jt}\})} + \underbrace{\mathbb{V}^{eff}}_{\text{Var}(a_{jt}|z_{jt})} = \underbrace{\sigma_a^2}_{\text{Var}(a_{jt})}.$$

Proof.

$$\begin{aligned}
(\omega_a^{eff})^2 \sigma_a^2 + (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \sigma_\varepsilon^2 + \mathbb{V}^{eff} &= \frac{\beta_t^2 \sigma_\varepsilon^{-4}}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})^2} \sigma_a^2 + \frac{\beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-4}}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})^2} \sigma_\varepsilon^2 + \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}} \\
&= (\mathbb{V}^{eff})^2 (\sigma_a^{-2} + 2\beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2} + \beta_t^2 \sigma_\varepsilon^{-4} \sigma_a^2) \\
&= (\mathbb{V}^{eff})^2 (\sigma_a^{-4} + 2\beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2} \sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t^2 \sigma_\varepsilon^{-4}) \sigma_a^2 \\
&= (\mathbb{V}^{eff})^2 (\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})^2 \sigma_a^2 \\
&= \sigma_a^2.
\end{aligned}$$

□

Proof of Proposition 3. (i) An efficient allocation of capital equalizes marginal products between firms. Demand for firm-capital follows from the following maximization problem

$$\max_{K_{jt+1}} \alpha Y_{t+1}^{\alpha_Y} \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt}\} K_{jt+1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} - R_{t+1} K_{jt+1}$$

with the first-order condition

$$K_{jt+1} = \left(\frac{\mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt}\}}{R_{t+1}} \alpha Y_{t+1}^{\alpha_Y} \right)^\theta.$$

Integrating over all firms on both sides yields

$$R_{t+1} = \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \alpha Y_{t+1}^{\alpha_Y} K_{t+1}^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}.$$

Plugging this expression back into the first order condition leads to the constrained-efficient allocation

$$K_{jt+1} = \frac{\mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt}\}^\theta}{\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt}\}^\theta dj} K_{t+1}.$$

(ii) Plugging (28) into (26) leads to

$$Y_t = A_{t-1}^{eff} K_t^\alpha,$$

where the constrained-efficient level of total factor productivity is

$$A_{t-1}^{eff} = \frac{\left(\int_0^1 A_{jt} \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt-1}\}^{\theta-1} di \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}}}{\left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | z_{jt-1}\}^\theta di \right)^\alpha}.$$

The analytical expression can be obtained by evaluating the conditional expectations and using the constrained-efficient Bayesian weights and posterior uncertainty,

$$\omega_p^{eff} = \frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}, \quad \omega_a^{eff} = \frac{\beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}, \quad \omega_\varepsilon^{eff} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}, \quad \mathbb{V}^{eff} = \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$$

which leads to

$$\begin{aligned} A_{t-1}^{eff} &= \frac{\left(\int_0^1 A_{it-1} \mathbb{E} \{A_{it-1} | z_{it-1}\}^{\theta-1} di \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}}}{\left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{A_{it-1} | z_{it-1}\}^\theta di \right)^\alpha} \\ &= \exp \left\{ \theta a_{t-1} + ((\theta-1)\omega_a^{eff} + 1)^2 \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + (\theta-1)^2 (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} + \frac{(\theta-1)}{2} \mathbb{V}^{eff} \right\}^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}} \\ &: \exp \left\{ \theta a_{t-1} + \theta^2 (\omega_a^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + \theta^2 (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} + \frac{\theta}{2} \mathbb{V}^{eff} \right\}^\alpha \\ &= \exp \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} a_{t-1} + \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} ((\theta-1)\omega_a^{eff} + 1)^2 - \alpha\theta^2 (\omega_a^{eff})^2 \right) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + (\alpha\theta(\theta-1) - \alpha\theta^2) (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} \right) \\ &= \exp \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} a_{t-1} + \alpha\theta \left((\theta-1) (\omega_a^{eff})^2 + 2\omega_a^{eff} + \frac{1}{\theta-1} - \theta (\omega_a^{eff})^2 \right) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \alpha\theta (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} \right) \\ &= \exp \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) + 2\omega_a^{eff} \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \left((\omega_a^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} + (\omega_\varepsilon^{eff})^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2} \right) \right)^{\alpha\theta} \\ &\stackrel{\text{Lemma 1}}{=} \exp \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) + 2(\omega_a^{eff}) \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \left(\frac{\sigma_a^2 - \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_{t-1}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}}{2} \right) \right)^{\alpha\theta} \\ &= \exp \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) + 2\omega_a^{eff} \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} - \omega_a^{eff} \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right)^{\alpha\theta} \\ &= \exp \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) + \omega_a^{eff} \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right)^{\alpha\theta}. \end{aligned}$$

TFP under the efficient allocation of capital can be similarly decomposed in two expressions,

$$\ln A_{t-1}^{eff} = \underbrace{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right)}_{\text{exogenous}} + \underbrace{\alpha\theta\omega_a^{eff} \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2}}_{\text{allocative efficiency}}.$$

It follows that

$$\frac{\partial \omega_a^{eff}}{\partial \beta_{t-1}} > 0 \Rightarrow \frac{\partial A_{t-1}^{eff}}{\partial \beta_{t-1}} > 0.$$

(iii) As under both allocations capital is distributed equally between firms for $\beta_{t-1} = 0$,

total factor productivity also coincides,

$$A_{t-1}^{eff} = A_{t-1} = \exp \left(\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) \right).$$

In the perfect information ($\beta_{t-1} = \infty$) case the efficient and market allocation also coincide,

$$A_{t-1}^{eff} = A_{t-1} = \exp \left(\frac{1}{\theta-1} \left(a_{t-1} + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right) + \frac{\sigma_a^2}{2} \right)^{\alpha\theta}.$$

For $\beta_t \in (0, \infty)$, TFP under the constrained-efficient capital allocation must be higher than under the market allocation, as is the allocation is explicitly derived to maximize firm-production given the available information information, which guarantees that ex-ante marginal products of capital are equalized given an aggregate level of investment.²⁶ \square

Proof of Corollary 1. The distortion vanishes of the expectations of the marginal trader $\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}$ and $\mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|z_{jt}\}$ coincide, i.e., $K_{jt+1} = K_{jt+1}^{eff}$.

(i) When the private signal is infinitely noisy, both the expectations converge to the unconditional expectation,

$$\lim_{\beta \rightarrow 0} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} = \lim_{\beta \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|z_{jt}\} = \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}\}.$$

When the private signal is infinitely precise, both expectations converge to the actual realization of A_{jt} ,

$$\lim_{\beta \rightarrow \infty} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} = \lim_{\beta \rightarrow \infty} \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|z_{jt}\} = A_{jt}$$

(ii) When the variance of firm-specific productivity shocks goes to zero, i.e., the prior becomes arbitrarily precise, both expectations converge to $\exp\{a_t\}$

$$\lim_{\sigma_a^2 \rightarrow 0} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} = \lim_{\sigma_a^2 \rightarrow 0} \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|z_{jt}\} = \exp\{a_t\}.$$

When the variance of firm-specific productivity shocks goes to infinity, i.e., the prior becomes arbitrarily noisy, both allocations coincide because they put full weight on the price signal z_{jt} ,

$$\lim_{\sigma_a^{-2} \rightarrow 0} \omega_z = \lim_{\sigma_a^{-2} \rightarrow 0} \omega_z^{eff} = 1$$

²⁶Direct proof is in the making.

where

$$\omega_z = \frac{\beta_t (1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t (1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}, \quad \omega_z^{eff} = \frac{\beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}.$$

(iii) When the variance of firm-specific sentiment shocks goes to zero, financial markets perfectly aggregate dispersed information as the precision of the price signal goes to infinity. \square

Lemma 2 (Joining two Normal PDFs). *Let $f(\varepsilon_{jt})$ be the pdf of $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_t, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$ and $\phi(\cdot)$ the standard-normal pdf. Then*

$$f(\varepsilon_{jt}) \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) = \exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_{jt}^2}{2(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2)} \right\} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2\pi(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2)}} \tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt})$$

where $\tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt})$ is the transformed pdf of $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)$.

Proof. Write out the pdfs explicitly,

$$\begin{aligned} \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_{jt}^2}{2} \right\} \\ f(\varepsilon_{jt}) &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{(\varepsilon_{jt} - \varepsilon_t)^2}{2\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right\} \\ f(\varepsilon_{jt}) \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_{jt}^2}{2} - \frac{(\varepsilon_{jt} - \varepsilon_t)^2}{2\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right\}. \end{aligned}$$

Rearranging the term inside the exponential function,

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{(\varepsilon_{jt} - \varepsilon_t)^2}{\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \varepsilon_{jt} = \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} - 2\varepsilon_{jt}\varepsilon_t + \varepsilon_t^2}{\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \varepsilon_{jt} \\
& \text{join fractions} = \frac{(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2)\varepsilon_{jt} - 2\varepsilon_t\varepsilon_{jt} + \varepsilon_t^2}{\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \\
& \text{divide by } (1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2) = \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} - 2\varepsilon_{jt}\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \\
& \text{add and subtract} = \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} - 2\varepsilon_{jt}\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} + \frac{\left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2 - \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \\
& \text{exchange terms} = \frac{\varepsilon_{jt} - 2\varepsilon_{jt}\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} + \frac{\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} - \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \\
& \text{join paranthesis again} = \frac{\left(\varepsilon_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} + \frac{\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} - \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \\
& = \frac{\left(\varepsilon_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} + \frac{1 - \frac{1}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}}{\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \varepsilon_t^2 \\
& = \frac{\left(\varepsilon_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} + \frac{\frac{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2-1}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}}{\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \varepsilon_t^2 \\
& = \frac{\left(\varepsilon_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} + \frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2}
\end{aligned}$$

This allows to write

$$\begin{aligned}
f(\varepsilon_{jt}) \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) &= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{2} - \frac{(\varepsilon_{jt} - \varepsilon_t)^2}{2\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right\} \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\left(\varepsilon_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \right\} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right) \right\} \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{2\pi(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}}} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \frac{\left(\varepsilon_{jt} - \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right)^2}{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} \right\} \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right) \right\} \\
&= \exp \left\{ -\frac{1}{2} \left(\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right) \right\} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2\pi(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)}} \tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt}).
\end{aligned}$$

□

Lemma 3 (Auxiliary Results Market Allocation). *Denote the Bayesian weights $\omega_a = \frac{\beta_{jt}(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}{\sigma_a^{-2}+\beta_{jt}(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}$,*

$\omega_\varepsilon = \frac{\omega_a}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}$, $\omega_{z\varepsilon,it} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}}{\sigma_a^{-2}+\sqrt{\beta_{jt}(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}}$, and posterior uncertainty $\mathbb{V} = \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2}+\beta_{jt}(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}$, then

- (i) $\omega_a^2 \sigma_a^2 + \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \mathbb{V} = \sigma_a^2$,
- (ii) $\omega_a^2 \sigma_a^2 + \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} = \sigma_a^2 - \mathbb{V} = \omega_a \sigma_a^2$,
- (iii) $\frac{\omega_\varepsilon}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} = \omega_{z\varepsilon}$.

Proof. (i)

$$\begin{aligned}
\omega_a^2 \sigma_a^2 + \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} + \mathbb{V} &= \frac{\sigma_a^2 \beta^2 (1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})^2}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2} + \frac{\beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2} + \frac{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2} \\
&= \frac{\sigma_a^{-2} + 2\beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}) + \sigma_a^2 \beta^2 (1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})^2}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2} \\
&= \frac{\sigma_a^{-4} + 2\sigma_a^{-2}\beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}) + \beta^2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})^2}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2} \sigma_a^2 \\
&= \frac{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2}{(\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}))^2} \sigma_a^2 \\
&= \sigma_a^2
\end{aligned}$$

(ii) The first equality follows from (i). Then

$$\begin{aligned}
\sigma_a^2 - \mathbb{V} &= \sigma_a^2 - \frac{1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})} \\
&= \frac{\sigma_a^2 \sigma_a^{-2} + \sigma_a^2 \beta(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}) - 1}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})} \\
&= \frac{\beta(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})} \sigma_a^2 \\
&= \omega_a \sigma_a^2.
\end{aligned}$$

$$(iii) \quad \frac{\omega_\varepsilon}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} = \frac{\omega_\varepsilon}{\sigma_\varepsilon^2(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})} = \frac{\omega_\varepsilon \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}{(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})} = \omega_{z\varepsilon}. \quad \square$$

Lemma 4. *In the symmetric equilibrium with $\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$ for $K_{t+1} < W_t$,*

(i) *Sentiment shocks ε_t affect the marginal benefit of information acquisition through three channels,*

$$MB(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} \propto \exp \left\{ \underbrace{-\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2)}}_{\text{Information-Sensitivity}} \underbrace{-(\theta - 1)\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_t}_{\text{RelativeSize}} + \underbrace{\frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha}\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_t}_{\text{Absolute Size}} \right\}.$$

(ii) *Productivity shocks a_t increase the marginal benefit of information acquisition,*

$$MB(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} \propto \exp \left\{ \left(\frac{\alpha\theta - \theta + 1}{\theta - 1} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + 1 \right) a_t \right\}.$$

Proof of Lemma 4. (i) Assume $a_t = 0$ without loss of generality. The marginal benefit to increasing β_{ijt} is

$$\begin{aligned}
MB(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} &= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f(\varepsilon_{jt}) \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ijt} = 2\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \Big|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} \alpha A_t^{\alpha_Y} \\
&\quad * \frac{(A_{jt} - \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}z_{jt}\}) \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta-1}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}} K_{t+1}^\alpha d\varepsilon_{jt} da_{jt},
\end{aligned} \tag{75}$$

where $g(a_{jt})$ is the pdf of $a_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \sigma_a^2)$ and $f(\varepsilon_{jt})$ is the pdf of $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}(\varepsilon_t, \sigma_\varepsilon^2)$. The most immediate effect comes from changes to aggregate investment K_{t+1}^α . For $\delta R_{t+1} = 1$,

$$K_{t+1}^\alpha = \left(\alpha \delta A_t^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}} \propto \exp \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \right\}. \tag{76}$$

The *Scale* channel is summarized by $\exp \left\{ \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \right\}$. Next, the derivative of the probability of buying at $\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}$ is

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{P} \{x_{ijt} = 2\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \right|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} = \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) \left(\frac{\omega_{p,it}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} a_{jt} + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{2\beta_{jt}} - \frac{\omega_{\varepsilon,it} \varepsilon_{jt} - \omega_{z\varepsilon,it} \varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\mathbb{V}_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \right),$$

where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the standard-normal pdf. Combine $f(\varepsilon_{jt})$ with $\phi(\varepsilon_{jt})$ using Lemma (2),

$$\phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) f(\varepsilon_{jt}) = \exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)} \right\} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2\pi(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)}} \tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt}), \quad (77)$$

where $\tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt})$ is the pdf of a fictional variable $\varepsilon_{jt} \sim \mathcal{N}\left(\frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}, \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}\right)$. The *Information-Sensitivity* channel is summarized by $\exp \left\{ -\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)} \right\}$. For the rest of the proof, substitute

$$\begin{aligned} \varepsilon_{jt} &= \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \\ d\varepsilon_{jt} &= \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} dx \end{aligned}$$

Substitute ε_{jt} out of $\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{P} \{x_{ijt}=2\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \right|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}}$,

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{P} \{x_{ijt} = 2\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \right|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} = \frac{\omega_{p,it}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} a_{jt} + \left(\frac{1}{2\beta_{jt}} - \frac{\omega_{\varepsilon,it}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \right) \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + \frac{\varepsilon_t}{2\beta_{jt}(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\mathbb{V}_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}}$$

Substitute ε_{jt} out of $\tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}$,

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\} &= \exp \left\{ \omega_a a_{jt} + \omega_\varepsilon \varepsilon_{jt} - \omega_{z\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{V} \right\} \\ &= \exp \left\{ \omega_a a_{jt} + \omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + \cancel{\omega_\varepsilon \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} - \omega_{z\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{V} \right\} \\ &= \exp \left\{ \omega_a a_{jt} + \omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + \frac{1}{2} \mathbb{V} \right\} \end{aligned}$$

Substitute ε_{jt} out of the firm-specific multiplier for firm-capital,

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta-1}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di\right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}} &= \exp \left\{ (\theta-1)\omega_a a_{jt} + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \frac{\varepsilon_t}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} - (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \varepsilon_t - \frac{(\theta-1)\theta}{2} (\omega_a^2 \sigma_a^2 + \omega_\varepsilon^2 \sigma_\varepsilon^2) \right\} \\
&\propto \exp \left\{ (\theta-1)\omega_a a_{jt} + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x - (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \varepsilon_t \right\} \\
&= \exp \left\{ (\theta-1)\omega_a a_i + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x - (\theta-1)\omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \right\} \\
&= \exp \left\{ (\theta-1)\omega_a a_i + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x \right\} \exp \{ -(\theta-1)\omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \}
\end{aligned} \tag{78}$$

where I used Lemma 3 (iii) repeatedly. The *Size* channel is summarized through $\exp \{ -(\theta-1)\omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \}$. It remains to show that there are no other terms in $MB(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})$ that depend on ε_t . It is sufficient to show that

$$\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \tilde{f}(\varepsilon_{jt}) \frac{(A_{jt} - \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}z_{jt}\}) \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta-1}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di\right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}} d\varepsilon_{jt} da_{jt} \stackrel{!}{=} 0.$$

Substituting ε_{jt} out leads to

$$\begin{aligned}
&\int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}}} \phi(x) \frac{(A_{jt} - \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}z_{jt}\}) \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta-1}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di\right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}} \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} dx da_{jt} \\
&\propto \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(x) \left(A_{jt} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta-1} - \mathbb{E}\{A_{jt}|s_{ijt}=z_{jt}z_{jt}\}^\theta \right) dx da_{jt} \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(x) \left(\exp \left\{ ((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)a_{jt} + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + \frac{(\theta-1)\mathbb{V}}{2} \right\} - \exp \left\{ \theta\omega_a a_{jt} + \theta\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x + \frac{\theta}{2}\mathbb{V} \right\} \right) dx da_{jt} \\
&\propto \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \phi(x) \left(\exp \left\{ ((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)a_{jt} + (\theta-1)\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x - \frac{\mathbb{V}}{2} \right\} - \exp \left\{ \theta\omega_a a_{jt} + \theta\omega_\varepsilon \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}} x \right\} \right) dx da_{jt} \\
&= \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} g(a_{jt}) \left(\exp \left\{ ((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)a_{jt} + \frac{(\theta-1)^2\omega_\varepsilon^2}{2} \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} - \frac{\mathbb{V}}{2} \right\} - \exp \left\{ \theta\omega_a a_{jt} + \frac{\theta^2\omega_\varepsilon^2}{2} \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right\} \right) da_{jt} \\
&= \exp \left\{ \frac{((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)^2}{2} \sigma_a^2 + \frac{(\theta-1)^2\omega_\varepsilon^2}{2} \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} - \frac{\mathbb{V}}{2} \right\} - \exp \left\{ \frac{\theta^2\omega_a^2}{2} \sigma_a^2 + \frac{\theta^2\omega_\varepsilon^2}{2} \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right\}.
\end{aligned}$$

It remains to show that

$$((\theta-1)\omega_a + 1)^2 \sigma_a^2 + (\theta-1)^2 \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2} - \mathbb{V} \stackrel{!}{=} \theta^2 \omega_a^2 \sigma_a^2 + \theta^2 \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2}.$$

Using Lemma 3 (i), the LHS is equal to

$$\begin{aligned}
& ((\theta^2 - 2\theta + 1) \omega_a^2 + 2(\theta - 1) \omega_a \cancel{\sigma_a^2}) \sigma_a^2 + (\theta^2 - 2\theta + 1) \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} \cancel{\sigma_a^2} + \omega_a^2 \sigma_a^2 + \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} \\
&= ((\theta^2 - 2\theta + 2) \omega_a^2 + 2(\theta - 1) \omega_a) \sigma_a^2 + (\theta^2 - 2\theta + 2) \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} \\
&= 2(\theta - 1) \omega_a \sigma_a^2 + (\theta^2 + 2(1 - \theta)) \left(\omega_a^2 + \omega_\varepsilon^2 \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} \right) \\
&= 2(\theta - 1) \omega_a \sigma_a^2 + (\theta^2 + 2(1 - \theta)) (\omega_a \sigma_a^2) \\
&= \theta^2 \omega_a \sigma_a^2.
\end{aligned}$$

Using Lemma 3 (ii), the RHS is equal to

$$\frac{\theta^2 \omega_a^2}{2} \sigma_a^2 + \frac{\theta^2 \omega_\varepsilon^2}{2} \frac{\sigma_\varepsilon^2}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} = \theta^2 \omega_a \sigma_a^2.$$

Combining both confirms the conjecture. The marginal benefit of information acquisition depends on ε_t only through the multiplicative effects in (76), (77) and (78), such that

$$MB(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}} \propto \exp \left\{ \underbrace{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t}_{Scale} \underbrace{- \frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^2)}}_{Information-Sensitivity} \underbrace{- (\theta-1) \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t}_{Size} \right\}.$$

(ii) Follow the same strategy as in (i). Start with the expressions for aggregate investment, K_{t+1}^α , and productivity $A_t^{\alpha_Y}$ in (75). For $\delta R_{t+1} = 1$, they are equal to

$$A_t^{\alpha_Y} K_{t+1}^\alpha = A_t^{\alpha_Y} \left(\alpha \delta A_t^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}},$$

where

$$A_t^{\alpha_Y} \propto \exp \left\{ \frac{\alpha\theta - \theta + 1}{\theta - 1} a_t \right\}, \quad \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \propto \exp \{a_t\}.$$

Putting both together yields

$$A_t^{\alpha_Y} K_{t+1}^\alpha \propto \exp \left\{ \left(\frac{\alpha\theta - \theta + 1}{\theta - 1} + \frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right) a_t \right\}.$$

Again, using substitution with

$$a_{jt} = \sqrt{\sigma_a^2} y + a_t,$$

It follows that

$$\begin{aligned} A_{jt} &= \exp \{a_t\} \exp \left\{ \sqrt{\sigma_a^2} y \right\} \\ \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt} z_{jt}\} &\propto \exp \{a_t\} \end{aligned}$$

which yields

$$\frac{(A_{jt} - \mathbb{E} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt} z_{jt}\}) \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^{\theta-1}}{\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{jt} | s_{ijt} = z_{jt}, z_{jt}\}^\theta di \right)^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}} \propto \exp \{a_t\}$$

The change in the trading probability does *not* depend on a_t

$$\left. \frac{\partial \mathcal{P} \{d_{ij} = 2 | a_{jt}, \varepsilon_{jt}, \beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}\}}{\partial \beta_{ijt}} \right|_{\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}} = \phi(\varepsilon_{jt}) \left(\frac{\omega_p}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \sqrt{\sigma_a^2} y + \frac{\varepsilon_{jt}}{2\beta_{jt}} - \frac{\omega_\varepsilon \varepsilon_{jt} - \omega_{z\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} + \frac{1}{2} \frac{\mathbb{V}_{jt}}{\sqrt{\beta_{jt}}} \right).$$

Finally,

$$MB(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt})|_{\beta_{ijt} = \beta_{jt}} \propto \exp \left\{ \left(\frac{\alpha\theta - \theta + 1}{\theta - 1} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} + 1 \right) a_t \right\}$$

□

Proof of Proposition 4. (i) and (ii) follow from Lemma 4 (i). The cutoff can be derived by taking the derivative with respect to ε_t ,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial \varepsilon_t} \left(-\frac{\varepsilon_t^2}{2(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2)} - (\theta - 1) \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} \varepsilon_t \right) &\stackrel{!}{=} 0 \\ \iff -\frac{\bar{\varepsilon}}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} - (\theta - 1) \omega_{s\varepsilon} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \omega_{s\varepsilon} &= 0 \\ \iff \frac{\bar{\varepsilon}}{1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2} &= \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} - \theta \right) \omega_{s\varepsilon} \\ \iff \bar{\varepsilon} &= (1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^2) \left(\frac{1}{1 - \alpha} - \theta \right) \omega_{s\varepsilon} \end{aligned}$$

where $\omega_{s\varepsilon} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta_t}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta_t(1 + \sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}$. For $\varepsilon_t < \bar{\varepsilon}$, information acquisition β_t is increasing in ε_t . For

$\varepsilon_t > \bar{\varepsilon}$, information acquisition β_t is decreasing in ε_t . \square

Proof of Proposition 5. Follows from Lemma 4 (ii). \square

Proof of Proposition 6. (i) Using the result from Proposition 4 (ii) and the assumption that $\theta > \frac{1}{1-\alpha}$, it must be that positive sentiment shocks crowd-out information acquisition. Moreover, as $\beta^* < \frac{\sigma_a^{-2}}{1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2}}$, it must be that the pass-through of aggregate sentiment shock $\omega_{s\varepsilon}$ is smaller for when the information choice is allowed to adjust compared to the fixed information level β^* . As a result, sentiment shocks are dampened by information acquisition in financial markets, as less precise information by itself leads to less investment and the sentiment shock is less powerful through a decrease in the pass-through.

(ii) $\lim_{\varepsilon_t \rightarrow \infty} \sqrt{\beta_t(\varepsilon_t)}\varepsilon_t = 0$ guarantees that the pass-through of sentiment shocks goes faster to zero than the sentiment shock goes to infinity, i.e., the direct effect of sentiment shocks on investment disappears as shocks become arbitrarily large. Moreover, Lemma 4 (i) shows that through the information-sensitivity effect $\lim_{\varepsilon_t \rightarrow \infty} \beta_t(\varepsilon_t) = 0$. \square

Proof of Corollary 2. Follows directly from Proposition 6 (ii). \square

Proof of Proposition 7. Follows from Proposition 5 and Assumption 2. \square

Proof of Proposition 10. The social planner's allocation is given by equalizing the marginal products of capital for each firm given the market signals $\{z_{jt}\}$. The maximization problem of the social planner for firm-capital allocation is therefore

$$\max_{K_{j1}} \mathbb{E} \left\{ \left(\int_0^1 Y_{j1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}} dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha\theta}{\theta-1}} | z_{jt} \right\} - R_1^{SP} K_{j1},$$

for some interest rate R_1^{SP} . The resulting first order condition for firm-capital is

$$K_{j1}^{SP} = \left((R_1^{SP})^{-1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \mathbb{E} \{ A_{j0} | z_{j0} \} \right)^{\theta}.$$

Integrating on both sides yields

$$R_1^{SP} = \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{ A_{j0} | z_{j0} \}^{\theta} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} (K_1^{SP})^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}.$$

Substituting R_1^{SP} out of K_{j1}^{SP} yields (65). Following the same steps as in the proof for Proposition 3, leads to

$$Y_1^{SP} = A_0^{SP} K_1^{\alpha}, \quad \text{where } A_0^{SP} = \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{ A_{j0} | z_{j0} \}^{\theta} dj \right)^{\frac{\alpha}{\theta-1}}.$$

Substituting Y_1^{SP} out of the expression for R_1^{SP} then leads to (67). trader consumption follows as in 68 using R_1^{SP} instead of R_{t+1} . Finally, taking K_1^{SP} as given and plugging in Y_1^{SP} in (SP1), (69) follows after taking the derivative with respect to β_t . \square

Proof of Proposition 8. Follows directly from (??) as $\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ijt}, \beta_{jt}) \Big|_{\beta_{ijt}=\beta_{jt}=\beta_t} \neq MB^{SP}(\beta_t)$. \square

Proof of Proposition 11. Show that the decentralized allocations coincide with the social planner's allocations. The proof follows the same steps as the derivation of the equilibrium in the main section. Households receive from firm j the dividend

$$\hat{\Pi}_{j1} = \tau^{Bias}(z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}}{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} A_{j0} K_{j1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}$$

and expected dividends become

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left\{\hat{\Pi}_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\right\} = \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\} K_{j1}^{\frac{\theta-1}{\theta}}.$$

The price is using $P_{j0} = K_{j1}$

$$P_{j0} = \frac{1}{R_1} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left\{\hat{\Pi}_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\right\} = \left(\frac{1}{R_1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}\right)^\theta.$$

This allows to adjust the expression for expected dividends,

$$\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left\{\hat{\Pi}_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\right\} = \left(\frac{1}{R_1}\right)^{\theta-1} (\alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\})^\theta,$$

which is then used in the expression for the interest rate R_1

$$\begin{aligned} R_1 &= \frac{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\left\{\hat{\Pi}_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\right\} dj}{\int_0^1 P_{j0} dj} \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{R_1}\right)^{\theta-1} (\alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y})^\theta \int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj K_1^{-1} \\ R_1 &= \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj\right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} K_1^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}. \end{aligned}$$

Using this result again in the expression for the price yields

$$K_{j1}^{DE} = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta}{\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj} K_1 = K_{j1}^{SP}.$$

As in the main text, the entrepreneur chooses $\lambda_{jt} = \frac{\theta-1}{\theta}$. Plugging this into the expression for the interest rate R_1 and substituting $Y_1^{\alpha_Y}$ leads to

$$R_1 = \alpha \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E} \{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} K_1^{\alpha-1} = R_1^{SP}.$$

This result also leads directly to $K_1^{DE} = K_1^{SP}$. Finally, the first order condition for information acquisition of trader ij is

$$\begin{aligned} MB(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0}) &= \frac{\partial IA^{DE}}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} = \tau^{Info}(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0}) \frac{\partial IA(\beta_{ij0})}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} = \frac{MB(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0})}{\frac{\partial Y_1}{\partial \beta_0} \Big|_{\beta_0=\beta_{ij0}}} \frac{\partial IA(\beta_{ij0})}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \\ \iff \frac{\partial Y_1}{\partial \beta_0} \Big|_{\beta_0=\beta_{ij0}} &= \frac{\partial IA(\beta_{ij0})}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \end{aligned}$$

which is the same first-order condition as in (69) and therefore $\beta_0^{DE} = \beta_0^{SP}$. \square

Proof of Corollary 4. (i) First, denote $\omega_{s\varepsilon} = \frac{\sqrt{\beta}}{\sigma_a^{-2} + \beta(1+\sigma_\varepsilon^{-2})}$ as the weight on the correlated noise in the private signal. The transaction tax/subsidy $\tau^{Trans}(\varepsilon_0) = \exp\{-\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_0\}$ leads to traders paying P_{j0} but only $\tau^{Trans}P_{j0}$ is collected by the entrepreneur. The transaction tax/subsidy is aimed to stabilize aggregate asset prices with respect to aggregate sentiment shocks. It is a tax when traders are exuberant and a subsidy when they are depressed. The proof follows the same steps as for Proposition 11 with the difference that $K_{j1} = \tau^{Trans}P_{j0}$ and therefore firm-capital is

$$K_{j1} = \left(\frac{1}{R_1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \tau^{Trans}(\varepsilon_0) \right)^\theta$$

Following the same steps as before, the interest rate is

$$R_1 = \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \tau^{Trans}(\varepsilon_0) K_1^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}.$$

Since $\left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} \propto \exp\{\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_0\}$, it follows that the transaction tax/subsidy $\tau^{Trans}(\varepsilon_0) = \exp\{-\omega_{s\varepsilon}\varepsilon_0\}$ keeps the interest rate R_1 from moving with the aggregate sentiment shock ε_t and stabilizes, therefore, aggregate investment with respect to sentiment shocks.

(ii) Similarly, allow now the transaction tax to vary with the share price,

$$\tau^{Trans}(P_{j0}) = \frac{\mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}}{\tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}}.$$

Same as before, the traders pays P_{j0} but only $\tau^{Trans}(P_{j0}) P_{j0}$ is collected by the entrepreneur. Firm-capital is then equal to

$$\begin{aligned} K_{j1} &= \left(\frac{1}{R_1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \tau^{Trans}(P_{j0}) \right)^\theta \\ &= \left(\frac{1}{R_1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\} \right)^\theta \end{aligned}$$

It remains to show that also the interest rate R_{t+1} coincides with R_t^{SP} . The aggregate market values of the stock market and capital stock are given by

$$\begin{aligned} K_1 &= \int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj \left(\frac{1}{R_1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \right)^\theta \\ P_0 &= \int_0^1 P_{j0} dj = \int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^{\theta-1} dj \left(\frac{1}{R_1} \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \right)^\theta \\ \Rightarrow P_t &= \frac{\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^{\theta-1} dj}{\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj} K_1 \end{aligned}$$

This allows to write the interest rate and substitute P_t

$$\begin{aligned} R_1 &= \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{A_{j0}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^{\theta-1} dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} P_0^{-\frac{1}{\theta}} \\ &= \alpha Y_1^{\alpha_Y} \left(\int_0^1 \mathbb{E}\{A_{j0}|z_{j0}\}^\theta dj \right)^{\frac{1}{\theta}} K_1^{-\frac{1}{\theta}}. \end{aligned}$$

It follows the transaction tax $\tau^{Trans}(P_{j0})$ corrects for the mispricing between firms and stabilizes aggregate investment with respect to the sentiment shock. \square

Proof of Corollary 3. The marginal benefit of information acquisition after applying the tax/subsidy $\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0})$ is

$$\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0}) \propto \tilde{\mathbb{E}} \left\{ 2 \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ij0} = 2\}}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \left(\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1} | s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \right) \right\}.$$

Assume that a tax fulfills the following conditions

$$\begin{aligned}\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \geq (\leq) 1 &\iff \Pi_{j1} \geq \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \text{ and } \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ij0} = 2\}}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \geq 0 \\ \tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \leq (\geq) 1 &\iff \Pi_{j1} \leq \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\Pi_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\} \text{ and } \frac{\partial \mathcal{P}\{x_{ij0} = 2\}}{\partial \beta_{ij0}} \leq 0\end{aligned}$$

and for all z_{j0} there is at least some a_{j0} for which the inequalities are strict. In the first case, $\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \geq 1$ whenever the trading rents $\Pi_{j1} - \tilde{\mathbb{E}}\{\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \Pi_{j1}|s_{ij0} = z_{j0}, z_{j0}\}$ are positive and acquiring additional information leads to an increase of the probability of trading in that state. The same reasoning applies for $\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \leq 1$ and losses. This set of taxes increases $\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0})$. The reverse reasoning applies when $\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \geq 1$ for losses and $\tau(a_{j0}, z_{j0}) \leq 1$ for gains, which leads to a decrease in $\widetilde{MB}(\beta_{ij0}, \beta_{j0})$. \square

Proof of Proposition 9. Let the social planner buy $d^{SP} \in (-1, 1)$ units of shares in all markets. The market clearing condition for market j becomes

$$2 \left(1 - \Phi \left(\sqrt{\beta_{j0}} (\hat{s}(P_{j0}) - a_{j0}) - \varepsilon_{j0} \right) \right) = 1 - d^{SP},$$

Keeping position limits fixed, the exogenous demand d^{SP} changes the identity of the marginal trader. If the social planner purchases more assets, the marginal trader becomes more optimistic on average. The threshold signal becomes,

$$\hat{s}(P_{j0}, d^{SP}) = a_{j0} + \frac{\varepsilon_{j0} + \Phi^{-1} \left(\frac{1+d^{SP}}{2} \right)}{\sqrt{\beta_{j0}}}.$$

It follows immediately that asset purchases or sales with $d^{SP} = 2\Phi(-\varepsilon_0) - 1$ ensure that the marginal trader holds unbiased beliefs,

$$\hat{s}(P_{j0}, d^{SP}) = a_{j0} + \frac{\varepsilon_{j0} - \varepsilon_0}{\sqrt{\beta_{j0}}}.$$

As a result, the asset purchases/sells force the trader to correct also the private signal for the sentiment shock. It follows that prices are unbiased and aggregate investment is at the level in absence of the sentiment shock.

Traders expect to buy in equilibrium whenever $s_{ijt} > \hat{s}(P_{j0}, d^{SP})$. Asset purchases/sells reverting the threshold for the private signal towards its level in absence of the aggregate sentiment shock $\varepsilon_0 = 0$, effectively undoing any change to the incentive to acquire information, because the trader thinks that she is unaffected by the sentiment shock and markets became unaffected by the sentiment shock. \square