Wieners Attack ENG

February 7, 2020

1 Wiener's attack

RSA decryption (or signature) creation tends to be relatively energy and time expensive, since we can't just pick a nice private exponent d with low Hamming weight (it would be easily guessable). So one may experience an urge to peek such public exponent e, that d bitlength is much less than the modulus N, say if N is 2048, than d is around 500 bits. Intuition says, that since d is hard to guess (500 bits), you should feel safe with this decision. Unfortunately, this is and extremely dangerous mistake to make. ## Theorem (M. Wiener) Let N = pq with $q . Let <math>d < \frac{1}{3}N^{\frac{1}{4}}$. Given (N, e) with $ed = 1 mod \varphi(N)$, Marvin can efficiently recover d.

1.0.1 Proof (taken from Twenty Years of Attacks on the RSA Cryptosystem by Dan Boneh)

The proof is based on approximations using continued fractions. Since $ed = 1 mod \varphi(N)$ there exists a k such that $ed - k\varphi(N) = 1$. Therefore,

$$\left|\frac{e}{\varphi(N)} - \frac{k}{d}\right| = \frac{1}{d\varphi(N)}$$

Hence, $\frac{k}{d}$ is an approximation of $\frac{e}{\varphi(N)}$. Although Marvin does not know $\varphi(N)$, he may use N to approximate it. Indeed, since $\varphi(N) = N - p - q + 1$ and $p + q - 1 < 3\sqrt{N}$, we have $|N - \varphi(N)| < 3\sqrt{N}$. Using N in place of $\varphi(N)$ we obtain:

$$\left|\frac{e}{N} - \frac{k}{d}\right| = \left|\frac{ed - k\varphi(N) - kN + k\varphi(N)}{Nd}\right| = \left|\frac{1 - k(N - \varphi(N))}{Nd}\right| \le \left|\frac{3k\sqrt(N)}{Nd}\right| = \frac{3k}{d\sqrt{N}}$$

Now, $k\varphi(N) = ed - 1 < ed$. Since e < N, we see that $k < d < \frac{1}{3}N^{\frac{1}{4}}$. Hence we obtain:

$$\left| \frac{e}{N} - \frac{k}{d} \right| \le \frac{1}{dN^{\frac{1}{4}}} < \frac{1}{2d^2}$$

This is a classic approximation relation. The numbber of fractions $\frac{k}{d}$ with d < N approximating $\frac{e}{N}$ so closely is bounded by log_2N In fact, all such fractions are obtained as convergents of the continued fraction expansion of $\frac{e}{N}$ All one has to do is compute the logN convergents of the continued fraction for $\frac{e}{N}$. One of these will equal $\frac{k}{d}$. Since $ed - k\varphi(N) = 1$, we have gcd(k, d) = 1 and hence $\frac{k}{d}$ is a reduced fraction. This is a linear-time algorithm for recovering the secret key d. **Q.E.D**

1.1 Continued fractions and convergents

Continued fraction is an expression obtained through an iterative process of representing a number as a sum of its integer part and the reciprocal of another number, then writing this other number as the sum of its integer part and another reciprocal and so on. Example: For real x > 0 and integers $a_i > 0$, for i = 1, ..., n

$$x = a_0 + \frac{1}{a_1 + \frac{1}{a_2 + \frac{1}{a_2}}} \cdot \cdot \cdot + \frac{1}{a_2}$$

is a continued fraction. The ingegers a_0 , a_1 , etc., are called the *coefficients* or *terms* of the continued fraction. There are many ways to abbreviate continued fractions. We'll be using this one:

$$x = [a_0; a_1, a_2, \dots]$$

A continued fraction can be approximated by its initial segments. Such approximations are called convergents. Obviously, for a rational x the number of such convergents is finite. The first four convergents of a continued fraction are:

$$\frac{a_0}{1}, \frac{a_1a_0+1}{a_1}, \frac{a_2(a_1a_0+1)+a_0}{a_2a_1+1}, \frac{a_3(a_2(a_1a_0+1)+a_0)+(a_1a_0+1)}{a_3(a_2a_1+1)+a_1}$$

If there are successive convergents, they can be calculated recusively. h_i are numerators and k_i are denominators. Then the series can be calculated this way:

$$\frac{h_i}{k_i} = \frac{a_i h_{i-1} + h_{i-2}}{a_i k_{i-1} + k_{i-2}}$$

Now implement the algorithm for finding coefficients and convergents for any given rational number.

Hint: you can use Euclidian algorithm for finding coefficients

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Now that you've implemented the algorithm to find convergents, let's see how to use them to find p and q. Since $\frac{k}{d}$ is a reduced fraction, the denominator of one of the convergents is the d itself. This is enough to decrypt, but we can even factor the N. We also know k, and $\varphi(N) = \frac{ed-1}{k}$, so we can calculate $\varphi(N)$.

$$N - \varphi(N) = pq - (p-1)(q-1) = pq - pq + p + q - 1 = p + q - 1$$

$$q = N - \varphi(N) - p + 1$$

$$N = pq = p(N - \varphi(N) - p + 1) = pN - p\varphi(N) - p^2 + p$$

$$p^2 - p(N - \varphi(N) + 1) + N = 0$$

We have a nice quadratic equation, the roots of which are p and q

Now let's try to apply this knowledge to a vulnerable server. The concept is the same as in the blinding task. You need to provide a valid signature for 'flag' to get the flag. Steps: 1. Find d through the cunning use of continued fractions 2. Find p and q 3. Sign message and send to server 4. Profit

```
[1]: import socket
     import re
     from Crypto. Util.number import inverse, long to bytes, bytes to long
     class VulnServerClient:
         def init (self,show=True):
             """Initialization, connecting to server"""
             self.s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM)
             self.s.connect(('cryptotraining.zone',1338))
             if show:
                 print (self.recv_until().decode())
         def recv until(self,symb=b'\n>'):
             """Receive messages from server, by default till new prompt"""
             data=b''
             while True:
                 data+=self.s.recv(1)
                 if data[-len(symb):] == symb:
                     break
             return data
         def get_public_key(self,show=True):
             """Receive public key from the server"""
             self.s.sendall('public\n'.encode())
             response=self.recv_until().decode()
             if show:
                 print (response)
             e=int(re.search('(?<=e: )\d+',response).group(0))</pre>
             N=int(re.search('(?<=N: )\d+',response).group(0))</pre>
             self.num_len=len(long_to_bytes(N))
             self.e,self.N=e,N
             return (e,N)
         def checkSignatureNumber(self,c,show=True):
             """Check if this number is a valid signature for 'flag'"""
             try:
                 num_len=self.num_len
             except KeyError:
                 print ('You need to get the public key from the server first')
             signature_bytes=long_to_bytes(c,num_len)
             self.checkSignatureBytes(signature_bytes,show)
         def checkSignatureBytes(self,c,show=True):
             """Check if these bytes are a valid signature for 'flag'"""
                 num_len=self.num_len
             except KeyError:
                 print ('You need to get the public key from the server first')
```

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return
    if len(c)>num_len:
        print ("The message is too long")
    hex_c=c.hex().encode()
    self.s.sendall(b'flag '+hex_c+b'\n',)
    response=self.recv_until(b'\n').decode()
    if show:
        print (response)
    if response.find('Wrong')!=-1:
        print('Wrong signature')
        x=self.recv_until()
        if show:
            print (x)
    flag=re.search('CRYPTOTRAINING\{.*\}',response).group(0)
    print ('FLAG: ',flag)
def setPrivateKey(self,p,q):
    """Set private key"""
    self.p=p
    self.q=q
    self.d=inverse(self.e,(p-1)*(q-1))
def signMessageBytes(self,m):
    """Sign message after finding private key"""
    try:
        num_len=self.num_len
    except KeyError:
        print ('You need to get the public key from the server first')
    if len(m)>num_len:
        print('m too long')
    if len(m)<num_len:</pre>
        m=bytes([0x0]*(num_len-len(m))) + m
    signature_bytes=long_to_bytes(pow(bytes_to_long(m),self.d,self.N))
    return signature_bytes
def __del__(self):
    self.s.close()
```

```
[2]: vs=VulnServerClient()
  (e,N)=vs.get_public_key()
```

Welcome to the Wiener attack task

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Private exponent d is just 500 bits, so you should be able to find it Available commands:
help - print this help
public - show public key
flag <hex(signature(b'flag'))> - print flag
quit - quit
>
e: 8839551043978443608398025896780793202003010536758606314296322410796306377928704733115527530568335157503545935668140280687677644384828827776
```

 $\begin{array}{l} e\colon 88395510439784436083980258967807932020030105367586063142963224107962932270090\\ 06377928704733115527530568335157503545935668140280687677644384828827774341791741\\ 67531101705349192056441564161813881940662103858990879528064249455962302439810906\\ 86122984068829991815467478093723627539243672428333723190058091506420994459082959\\ 31797686993337044287442366446944633023395286044870591661230521198944254856540088\\ 73775391149102634853875531641579809554358787031415968474616444976201252313903301\\ 79843055661987371450397018342663325443054774257588676997705586499693980142841132\\ 83810963997678267189504521186597841548911958269916619229615 \end{array}$

 $\begin{array}{lll} \text{N:} & 21256322430089598854338700689200271903675413740952314650877563305595200298214\\ 79584027940861064949753515591988619949409409411394632703885502835311311237589587\\ 99623003985099830415299465089729855511075800086427546384784838006984961812360327\\ 54477863099560877646304578656434264999846507664057649629041155688091673087737339\\ 57983796150015314035043818283353542906505870410128364876171682940342880810603400\\ 11418775963432932239367388470383293641635502826193087609782306888074314016493443\\ 55691016571996821077683391062587473841296561195823674862584848815178470969038968\\ 457357643287439205370389631026298698109507847364723418309709 \end{array}$

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