


TLDR: a simplified summary  
to explain what is  
otherwise a difficult  
concept



\* some important notes  
about something



how to read this  
mindmap: CLOCK-  
WISE. Start at  
1 o'clock and end  
at 11 o'clock

This is an example sheet.

## Structure

① Grounds for Challenging an Admin Decision


② Challenging an Admin Decision



- role of the Court in Admin. Law to ensure decision makers act w/in their legally-empowered boundary
- administrative decisions can be easily challenged "ultra vires"
- in 1960s & 1970s codification of procedures for administrative tribunals stated in Ontario
- nearly all provinces followed suit
- Legislature tried to distribute decision-making process
  - expediency
  - expert/technical
  - volume of decision
- "privative clauses" was introduced, trying to be ~~more~~ introduced, to judicial review
- largely ignored by the judiciary; the Constitution S. 96 (Crevier)
- Superior Courts have a constitutional role and inherent jurisdiction to review admin. decisions


MAP

1.



## MECHANISMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY / SCRUTINY

- ① Many jurisdictions enacted laws that provides legislative Scrutiny of subordinate legislation ("stand permanently referred")
  - all new legislation laid before the legislature, with power to direct the executive to repeal or amend eg. Manitoba's Regulations Act
- ② At the Federal Level, the ministry of justice is statutorily required to verify that statutes and regulations comply with rights and freedoms set out in Bill of Rights and Charter of Rights and Freedom.
- ③ Public Consultation = requirement to provide the public with notice of draft regulations for comment especially those particularly affected. see Ontario's Human Rights Code
- ④ Judicial Review =
  - a) Validity of regulations/rules may be challenged where statutorily prescribed mandatory steps for their effective enactment were not followed. Immeubles Port Louis Inc.
  - b) Substantive challenge, eg. comply w/ Charter and other constitutional requirements.
  - c) JR due to ultra vires = must be within scope and limit conferred by the delegating act.
  - d) Strong presumption that the authorizing powers require the subordinate legislator to comply with the common law principle of PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS.



- An administrative decision maker first reference
- See if an affected individual is required by law to be afforded procedures, and if so, what they are.
- MAY set out a detailed list of procedural requirements

*Singh v Canada (MEI)*

- may also have to refer to a different statute that establish particular procedural requirements
- eg. Financial Services Tribunal  
Administrative pension proceedings  
Pension Benefits Act
- Financial Services Commission of Ontario Act  
enabling act of the Tribunal

### Advocacy Tip:

- being familiar w/ the enabling act is useful as decision makers must act w/in their statutory mandate
- understanding the objective/purpose of the statute will provide an advocate a 'theme' by which he/she can use to ensure their approach resonates w/ the decision-maker
- identify what is the normative policy choice of a particular statute, eg. providing income to injured workers, stability of capital markets, protecting the public, encouraging competition etc

① a (lieutenant) governor in council

② individual minister

③ the board / tribunal itself

Manitoba's Regulation Act

Manitoba's Labour Relations Act


## Examples of Provincial Statutory Procedural Codes

### ONTARIO SPPA - Statutory Powers and Procedures Act

- conflict w/ enabling statute, SPPA prevails unless it is expressly provided in the other statute that it prevails SPPA
- recognized different tribunals require different approach
  - SPPA will apply to the exercise of a "statutory power of decision" where a hearing is required by or under a statute or "otherwise by law".

### ALBERTA APJA - Administrative Procedure and Jurisdiction Act

- no provision for general applicability
- tribunals will be subject to APJA designated by regulation
- provisions are not comprehensive



### BRITISH COLUMBIA ATA - Administrative Tribunal Act

- empowers Tribunals to make their own rules
- few procedural requirements
- must refer to enabling statutes to ascertain which ATA provisions apply, if at all

- Some provinces have statutory procedural codes
- Prescribe procedural standards for decision-makers falling within the ambit.
- Scope / applicability may be limited or modified by an authority's ENABLING st. and DELEGATED legislation, have to be read together

### QUEBEC AJA - Administrative Justice Act

- more detailed
- different procedural requirements for "adjudicative" and "administrative" tribunals

- Public authorities frequently issue guidelines and policies, including procedural aspects of decision making
- NOT LEGALLY BINDING aka "soft laws"
- Sometimes the power to enact these soft laws is provided for in the enabling statute, though not necessary.
- Will become legally binding if subject to governor in council approval and tabling in Parliament.

- Often plays a dominant role in a decision maker's decision making - it is observed that front-line decision makers rely almost exclusively on these guidelines, rarely referring to their enabling statutes

- **Baker** = Supreme Court relied on ministerial guidelines as a "useful indicator" in determining a reasonable interpretation of the minister's power

- **Bezaire** = judicial reliance on soft law to determine procedural issues; ON court relied on ministerial procedural guideline on school closings and on the school board procedural policy as evidence of what procedures were required by common law procedural fairness.

- Many tribunals now have jurisdiction over Charter and Constitutional questions

R v Conway

Nova Scotia (WCB) v Martin

- Tribunal's statute may address if it can hear Charter issues.

Charter of Rights and Freedom  
and Constitutional law

- If both Tribunal and Court have JD, Tribunal is obliged to exercise that JD.

However:-


- remedy sought must be within Tribunal's jurisdiction

(Courts retain JD over certain remedies)

- If Constitutional validity of applicability of an Act is raised in an administrative hearing, notice must be given to the appropriate Attorney General.

3. Only Charter or Constitutional rights can override legislative restrictions.

OCEAN PORT HOTEL



- Admin law - procedural protection varies greatly depending on the context
- Context = type of interest at stake, regulatory context, and impact of the decision
- WHAT LEVEL of procedural fairness can be sought pursuant to "C.L.P.P.F"

BAKER

- established the modern CL approach to the duty of fairness
- administrative decision-making is now considered to be ON A SPECTRUM
- once an individual's "rights, interests, or privileges" are at stake, duty of fairness applies, the question then becomes one of degree.
- attempts to balance between
  - give effect to legislature's intention in crafting administrative processes (accessibility, efficiency, cost etc.)
  - protect affected individual's interest
- the 5 Baker principles gives basis of procedural protections

## ELABORATIONS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE

[1990] KNIGHT v INDIAN HEAD SCHOOL DIVISION No. 19

- further rejection of the rigid categories or need to distinguish between judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative decisions

- expanded duty of fairness beyond office-holders dismissible only for cause


- set out THREE-PRONG factors as the THRESHOLD

- Nature of decision to be made
- Relationship between the individual and the body
- Effect of the decision on that individual's rights

- Embraced the concept that procedural fairness is a free-standing CL right, eschewing the need to find it express or implied on a decision-maker enabling statute (NOTE: 3/7 judges dissented and insisted it must be statutory and if not, then no duty)



- Modern approach to CL duty of fairness evolves to be a question of DEGREE. See Baker.



1964 English House of Lords case of Ridge v Baldwin

1979

Canadian Supreme Court Nicholson v HNR

- Per Laskin CJ: "in the sphere of judicial or quasi-judicial = natural justice, in the sphere of executive or administrative, there is a GENERAL DUTY OF FAIRNESS"
- Subsequent cases "duty of fairness" came to replace natural justice as organizing principle in Admin Law, thus removing the need to differentiate whether judicial or quasi-judicial.

Most importantly, Knight also made a distinction between

① legislative and general decisions  
vs

② administrative and specific decisions

i.e. not all administrative bodies are saddled with the duty to act fairly

*Canada (AG) v Inuit Tapiriit of Canada (1980)*


### Historically

- Started as a means of expressing the notion that an applicant's state in the outcome required procedural fairness
- also sometimes used to describe the nature of substantive interest for which PF protection is being sought

see WEBB and HUTFIELD

1972 Lord Denning in *R v LIVERPOOL* granted an entitlement to PF protection based on particular factual circumstances and laid the foundation (though not specifically mentioning the exact term)

### CANADIAN MODERN DOCTRINE



■ GP : an expectation of a hearing arising out

- ① express representation;
- ② a practice of holding such hearings; or
- ③ combination of both

■ S.C. of Canada have acknowledged this doctrine in

5 cases, although decided negatively in all of them; precise application of doctrine in Canada still unclear

- Reference re Canada Assistance Plan [1991]
- Old St. Boniface Residents Assn. Inc. v. Winnipeg (City) [1990]
- Canadian Union of Public Employees v. Service Employees Int'l. Union v. ON (Ministry of Labour) [2003]
- Sunshine Coast Parents for French v. Sunshine Coast (School) [1990]
- Mount Sinai Hospital v. Quebec (Ministry of Health & Social Services) [2001]

1966 R v Randolph

1985 Cardinal v Kent Institution

GP: see Canada v Inuit Tapirisat


Homy Realty and Development Co v.  
Wyoming (Village) 1980

Canadian Association of Regulated  
Importers v Canada (AG) 1993

Issue of Individualized Decision Making  
Based on Exercise of Broad Discretionary Power

Idziak v Canada (Ministry of Justice) 1992

Suresh v Canada (M. & Citizenship & Immigration) 2002



English  
In re Pergamon Press (197)

Re Abel and Advisory Review  
Board (1979) Ontario CA

Dairy Producers Co-op Ltd v.  
Sask CHRights Commission (1994)  
(QB)

Hawish v Cundall (Sask QB)  
(1989)

Decisions Affecting Rights, Privileges or Interest

Webb v Ontario Housing Corp.  
Hutfield v. Board of SK GH District  
Court

## Authorson v Canada (AB) 2003

- Parliament enacted S.8-1(4) of the Department of Veterans Act to limit Crown's liability for interest

- Class action suit by veterans receiving benefits, claiming law imperable = deprived of enjoyment of property except by due process S.1(a) and right to fair hearing for determination of one's rights and obligations S.2(e)

SC held: federal legislation that conflicts with protectors of Bill is imperable UNLESS said legislation expressly declares it operates notwithstanding Bill of Rights

= Pl. has right to expropriate property, even w/out compensation, if its intention clear and in this case that intention was clear and unambiguous

BILL OF RIGHTS See: Reasoning


- The terms "individual" and "person"

**Central Cottage**: FCA S.2(e) of the Bill applicable to Corporations

- S.1(a) included the protection of the "enjoyment of property"

- The attachment in S.2(e) of procedural guarantees to the "determination of rights and obligations"
  - initially courts narrowly interpreted this to acts taking away "strict legal rights"

**Singh v Canada**: 3 members of the SC held the immigration authorities came w/in S.2(e) when deciding a convention refugee claim; "Determining" whether claimant had a statutory "RIGHT" to remain in Canada > expansive criteria than the "life, liberty, security of the person" basis



- The term "everyone"

**Irwin Toy v Quebec**: held S.7 protections attributable to natural persons only, hence "everyone" does not include corporations


- Deliberately did not include 'property rights'

**785072 Ontario Inc v Canada (Minister of Revenue)**

↳ 3

- S.1 = subject to reasonable limits prescribed by law
- Bill does not have an equivalent provision, but

**Air Canada v Canada**: QB CA held: determining the demands of the principles of fundamental justice for the purpose of the Bill S.2(e), the Court should engage in a Charter S.1-style of balancing process akin to that set out in **R v Oakes**



## McKinney v Univ. of Guelph (1990)

Held: Universities were not government therefore not generally amenable to the Charter

## REASONING for Authorization

- ① Bill of Rights does not protect against the expropriation of property by passage of unambiguous legislation
- ② The only due process due to any citizen of Canada is the proposed legislation receive 3 readings in the Senate and House of Commons and receive the Royal Assent.
- ③ s.1(c) guaranteed a degree of procedural due process in the application of the law in an individualized, adjudicative setting, absent here
- ④ s.2(e) does not impose duty on Parliament to provide hearing before enactment of any legislation

**Singh c. Minister of Employment and Immigration , [1985] 1 SCR 177**

**Facts :** The appellants did not have the right to an investigation to determine their refugee status. The Immigration Appeal Board refused to review their records pursuant to s. 71 (1) of the *Immigration Act, 1976*. The Federal Court dismissed the subsequent applications for judicial review .

**Issues in dispute:** Does the procedure established by the Minister of Employment and Immigration to determine the status of a refugee is inconsistent with Article 7 of the *Charter* ? Is such a procedure a denial of fundamental justice? Does section 2 of the *Canadian Bill of Rights* apply?

**Court Discussion :** Under the procedure set out in section 45 of the *1976 Immigration Act*, an inquiry into whether a person is a refugee is necessary. This procedure was denied to the appellants and was a violation of the fundamental principles of justice. The court arrived at this determination by analyzing whether section 7 of the *Charter* applied to the appellants. Wilson J. states in paragraph 34 that immigration is a power of Parliament under s. 91 (25) of the *Constitution Act, 1867* and that the *Charter* applies. Counsel for the Minister admitted that the word "everyone" was broad enough to include the appellants. He also submitted that the rights found in section 7 form only a right as in the appeal *The Queen v. Operation Dismantle Inc.* , [1983] 1. FC 745. This right relates to the issues of death, arrest or physical liberty or incarceration. He says that this right does not protect those who are in violation of the principles of fundamental justice.

Counsel for the appellant maintained that if a refugee's right to remain in Canada is denied, his right to life, liberty and security of the person is impaired. In addition, the law allows immigration officers to deprive the appellants of their liberty in Canada, which is in direct violation of section 7 of the *Charter*. The appellants have also argued that denying these rights found in section 7 risks exposing the appellants to the danger of punishment or death in their country of origin. At paragraph 47, Wilson J. states that "the denial of such a right can only amount to an impairment of the person's security within the meaning of section 7".

**Conclusion :** The application and protection of the *Charter* does not just apply to Canadians and those with legal status, but to all people in Canada. The rights to life, liberty, and security apply to the appellants. The by. 71 (1) of the *1976 Immigration Act* is found to be inconsistent with the requirements of section 7 of the *Charter*. The appeal is allowed with costs. The seven appellants are referred to the Immigration Appeal Board for determination.

# CREVIER

Crevier v. A.G. (Quebec) et al

[1981]

- QB legislation created a Professions Tribunal to hear appeals from the disciplinary committees of most statutory professional bodies in the province.
- The Act included a privative clause that states in effect, the Tribunal's decisions were final, even those about the reach of the Tribunal's own jurisdiction.
- The Supreme Court asked:  
Was the Quebec Professions Tribunal acting like a s. 96 court?

s. 96 of the Constitution Act

- appt. of Superior Court judges is the sole responsibility of the Federal Gov.
- Supreme Courts have the inherent JD to review administrative decision-making
- Supreme Courts are immune from JR, cannot review other superior courts, only review inferior administrative tribunals

- Laskin C.J.:

① A provincial gov. may include a privative clause, if it allowed superior courts to review questions of JD, even if there was limited judicial review of all other kinds of decisions from the tribunal.

② BUT, if the wording of the privative clause purport to oust review by the superior courts over even strict JD 'I' questions, then the clause is  
NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY VALID.

## TLDR :

- Superior Courts have a constitutional role and inherent jurisdiction to judicially review administrative decision making, at least with respect to questions of JD.
  - Privative clauses aiming to completely exclude JD of administrative tribunals is UNCONSTITUTIONAL as it attempts to create a DE FACTO SUPERIOR CT.
  - A superior court is always constitutionally entitled to check the JD of an administrative tribunal, regardless how strongly a privative clause is worded
- CREVIER** - landmark

followed by

### BILBEAULT

D.E.S. Local 298 v. Bilbeault [1988]

### MacMILLAN BLOEDEL

MacMillan Bloedel Ltd v. Simpson [1995]

"the role of the Superior Courts in maintaining the rule of law is so important that it is given constitutional protection"

"The Superior Courts have a core or inherent JD which is integral to their operations. The JD, which forms this core, cannot be removed from the superior courts by either level of the government, without amending the Constitution"

# INTRODUCTION TO JUDICIAL REVIEW & THE RULE OF LAW

## INTRODUCTION

### Origins of JR

- English Royal Courts held supervisory power as part of inherent jurisdiction
- Continued by the **S.96** superior courts in Canada
- Appointed by the King so they have unlimited power

### Constitutional Foundations

- **S.96** superior courts hold inherent jurisdiction, including the power of reviewing inferior bodies
- Only limit is that they cannot limit a future parliament
- Privative Clauses are a sign to limit JR

*Crevier v Quebec(AG) →*

Quebec attempts to create a tribunal that was effectively a **S.96** court, as it could not be judicially reviewed → NOT allowed.

*Re: Residential Tenancies →*

Test for whether a body is masquerading as a **S.96** court, look to: Historical inquiry; Judicial v. Legislation or Admin; Contemporary Character → look like a court

*MacMillan Bloedel Ltd →*

→ JR is constitutional protected, supports the rule of law

### What is it now?

**Procedural Fairness:** Did the admin DM use the proper procedures in reaching a decision?

**Substantive review:** Did the admin DM make an error of magnitude that the court is willing to intervene

**Remedies:** If there are procedural or substantive defects in the decision should the court intervene and how?

## TENSION BETWEEN THE JUDICIARY AND THE EXECUTIVE

### Red Light Theory (Wade and Forsyth)

- Judges are useful and important to decision makers (Judge friendly theory)
- It promotes good governance, controls the boundaries
- Prevailing theory amongst legal scholars

### Green Light Theory (Griffiths)

- They have their own political views and opinions and they end up blocking what the legislatures do, what can be progressive and good
- Judges quash the decisions and end up stopping progress
- Should be more confidence in the political process
- Rights are collective and there are going to be winners and losers which should be done by elected officials

## RULE OF LAW IN THEORY

### Formalism: Dicey

- One law for all, law as a restraint (prevent arbitrary exercises of power)
- Law is pure/ good; Politics is dirty/ arbitrary
- External checks on the executive power
- Shouldn't give deference to admin tribunals

### Proceduralist: Fuller and Raz

- Raz**
- "Law must be capable of guiding the behavior of its subjects" and instrumental approach
  - Role of the judge is to bring legislation in line with these legal doctrines
  - RoL is an instrument to achieve democratic values; law has autonomy from politics

### Fuller

- 8 principles of legality: Must not be retroactive, must be clear, can't be ambiguous, has to be general (Can't target an individual), needs to be consistent, needs to be stable (Can change but must be done publicly and according to proper procedures), has to be capable of being obeyed, must be rules constraining discretion of public officers
  - Admin bodies are good but they should have some protection but ensure it's not abused
- Substantive: Dworkin**
- Getting into the content of law
  - Legality premised on respect for rights
  - Takes rights seriously; individual demands enforcement of rights in court
  - A less rigid separation of powers – all branches have a role in upholding the Rule of Law
  - Judges are ultimately charged with guarding the moral integrity of political order
  - Deference as respect



# PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FRAMEWORK

## The Concept of Natural Justice

- **Audi alteram partem** – You must hear the other side;
- **Nemo judex in sua causa** – You cannot be a Judge in your own case (Bias)
- **Ridge v. Baldwin H.L.** Impact Oriented approach to Natural Justice
- **Nicholson v. Hadimand-Norfolk (Regional) Police Commissioner (1979)**: There is a **GENERAL DUTY OF FAIRNESS** in administrative decision-making, involving "something less than procedural protection of traditional natural justice".

### STEP 1: Is the body sufficiently "public" to attract P.F.?

- The source of the board's power
- The function and duties of the body
- Whether the govt action has created the body
- Gov't control of the body
- Power over the Public at large, or only those persons who consensually submit to jurisdiction

### STEP 2: Is there a DUTY OF FAIRNESS owed? (Trigger question)

- Public authority
- Making an administrative decision
- Which affects the "rights, privileges or interests of an individual" (**Cardinal v. Kent Institution**)
- The fact that a decision is administrative and affects "the rights privileges or interests of an individual" is sufficient to trigger the application of the duty of fairness – **Dunsmuir**

### STEP 3: Are there requirements of P.F. for the Decision Maker? (Source)

#### Statutory

- When the Legislation clearly defines/ excludes further procedures the legislation is FINAL
- "To abrogate the rules of natural justice, express language or necessary implication must be found in the statutory instrument"

#### Administrative Tribunal Act SBC 58-59

- Questions about the application of common law rules of natural justice and procedural fairness must be decided having regard to whether, in all of the circumstances, the tribunal acted fairly, and
  - Only applies if it is incorporated in to the enabling act
- **Canadian Bill of Rights s. 2(e)**
  - No law of Canada shall be construed or applied so as to: deprive a person of the right to a fair hearing in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice for the determination of his rights and obligations;

#### Common Law

- Rule of Law: Presumed Parliament intends PF requirements
  - It can be modified or ousted by legislation

#### Cardinal v. Kent Institution 1985

affects the "rights, privileges or interest of an individual" then it is sufficient to trigger the common law duty of fairness. The duty of fairness is a stand alone ground of review.

#### Constitutional

- Applies only where there is a potential deprivation of life, liberty or the security of a person
  - SCC has never justified S.7 breach under S.1 **S.7 of the Charter**

### Step 4: Is the decision exempt from P.F.? What are the limits?

#### Preliminary or Advisory Processes

- Investigations or advisory decisions
- NOT final decisions
- But if there is significant adverse consequences at the preliminary stage then maybe...

#### Halifax (Regional Municipality) v. Nova Scotia (Human Rights Commission) 2012 SCC

Judicial intervention is not justified at this preliminary stage of the Commission's work

#### The Legislative Process

- Legislative decisions or functions are not subject to PF → except Constitutional issues
- JR is about patrolling delegated authority → **NOT** primary authority
- They have their own procedural requirements
- Remedy is at the Ballot Box
- Exception: If it's aimed at a particular person/ group PF is due

#### Reference RE: Canada Assistance Plan (C.C.)

The **DUTY OF FAIRNESS** does **NOT** apply to a body exercising **LEGISLATIVE decisions or functions**.

#### Wells v. Nfld 1999

No duty of PF for legislation; abolishing the position is valid

#### Authorson v. Canada (2003)

The only procedure due to a citizen is that proposed legislation is read three times in the Senate and House of Commons and then receives Royal Assent

#### Canada v. Friends of the Canadian Wheat Board (2012)

Despite earlier legislation, no parliament is bound to another and can make rules that abolish PF in boards

#### Cabinet and Ministerial

**Canada (AG) v. Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami 1980 SCC**: If the executive branch has assigned a function that the

Decisions	executive branch would normally perform, and the subject matter they are deciding on isn't individual or unique to the appellant, then procedural fairness will likely not apply to the decision-making process.
Subordinate Legislation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Subordinate Legislation will be exempt from PF if it is legislative in nature and that it has a general and not specific (person) application</li> <li><b>Honex Realty and Development Co. v Wyoming Village</b> If a bylaw is aimed at a specific entity/ person than a duty of PF is imposed</li> </ul>
Public office holders working under contract	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Administrative bodies may be exempt from Duty of PF if their decisions are legislative in nature "policy" esque.</li> <li><b>Knight v. Indian School Division No. 19 (1990)</b> Duty of PF applies when a decision is administrative and specific</li> </ul>
Emergency Situations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Exemption from duty of PF if emergency circumstance necessitate an urgent decision</li> </ul>
Express Statutory Limits	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Cardinal v. tent</b> with respect to the prison context and the initial segregation order – duty still applies</li> <li>Statute may limit or exclude the common law duty of PF, either expressly, or implicitly where the statute provides its own procedural requirements and "occupies the field"</li> <li><b>Always pay attention to the enabling Act!</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Scope of power: broad/ narrow</li> <li>PF provided for</li> </ul> </li> </ul>

### STEP 5 : Where does PF Fall on the Spectrum? (Baker 5)

Nature of the Decision made and the process	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>What sort of powers does the board have?</li> <li>Do you act like a court?</li> <li><b>Baker</b> → Great Protections in adjudicative decisions</li> <li><b>Honex</b> → if the decision is legislative in nature but aimed at a person then greater PF</li> </ul>
Nature of the statutory scheme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How much discretion is given to the courts? More = more deference</li> <li>Is an appeal possible? If not you receive more PF (<b>Baker</b>)</li> <li>Is it a Final Decision? (<b>Singh</b>)</li> </ul>
Importance of the decision to the individual	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>How important is this decision? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Baker</b> immigration and children, deserved a lot due to the potential of the outcome</li> <li><b>Cardinal</b>, prison – impact to privileges and interests</li> </ul> </li> <li>How significant is it to your life and career? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Blencowe</b>, reputation and employment</li> <li><b>Surech &amp; Singh</b>, security of the person</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
Legitimate expectations	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Mari</b> → "Clear, unambiguous, unqualified"</li> <li>Was the person made to believe they get a particular set amount of PF?</li> <li>Representation contained in pamphlets, policy documents or resolutions</li> <li>Can look to past practices: <b>Agrairav. Canada 2013 SCC</b> procedures were published and detailed, they were clear and procedural in nature and did not conflict with the decision maker's statutory duty</li> <li>Contractual Promise made by the Ministry <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Mount Sinai Hospital v. Quebec 2001</b>, seeking a permit, minister promised if the hospital was relocated to Montreal, relocated and no permit given</li> <li>Does not have to show detrimental reliance</li> </ul> </li> <li>Even if you don't know about the expectations at the time of the decision and you find out after you can claim PF → <b>Mari</b></li> <li><b>Limitations:</b> The court can only provide procedural remedies → i.e. if you were promised the school won't close for 2 years, and it closed without any PF the issue can be retried but the court will not supplant a sub. opinion</li> <li>What procedure do they have?</li> <li>Do they have the power to make rules? If yes more deference (<b>Baker</b>)</li> </ul>
Choice of procedure made by the agency	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b>Administrative Tribunals Act S. 11 - 14</b> (<i>This must be incorporated into the enabling act</i>) → The tribunal has the power to choose its own procedures (subject to home statute)</li> <li><b>Knight</b> – the aim is not to create procedural protection, but to achieve balance between the need for fairness, efficiency and predictability of outcome</li> </ul>

### MAXIMUM (criminal trial)

- notice
- decision made w/in reasonable time
- Disclosure
- Right to Counsel
- Call for Evidence & Cross-examination
- Written Reasons



### MINIMUM (informal decision)

- prison example
- don't implement on all decisions
- does the procedure have to be fair?
- legislation can overrule CL requirement
- PF is not a "right" in civil cases **Imperial Tobacco**

## STEP 6 : Where on the spectrum does the PF sit?

Conclude whether a high, medium, or low level of PF is required.

### Step 7 : What is the person entitled to?

**Canada v. Mavil**: "The requirements of the duty are in the particular cases are driven by their particular circumstances. The simple overarching requirement is fairness, and this central notion of the just exercise of power should not be obscured by jurisprudential lists developed to be helpful, but not exhaustive"

### Step 7.5 : Constitutional Dimension, applicable only if it says:

Is a person's life liberty, or security of person implicated by the decision?

Is the decision in accordance with principles of fundamental justice?

**Insite**: Decision was arbitrary as it undermined the purpose of the legislation and grossly disproportionate as it would negatively impacts public health

- **Ex Parte Hearings**: **Charcoal v Canada**: Secrecy of scheme denies person to know case against them and undermines judge's ability to decide based on all relevant facts and law. This fails to assure fair hearing that s. 7 requires before state deprives person of "life, liberty or security of person"

- **Suresh**: Disclosure – claimant had a right to the disclosure of information on which the Minister would make the decision. And a right to reply to claims set out in the evidence.

- **Singh**: Oral hearing was required because of the serious interest at stake and issues of credibility (is this person a refugee or not → need conclusive evidence)

- **Canada v Khadr**: S.7 was infringed but remedies are limited because it is part of the prerogative power.

- **New Brunswick (MHS) v G.J. 1999**: Fundamental justice required state funded legal counsel due to the complexity of hearings, seriousness of decision, limited capacities of the individual

Cross-examination may be required if there is a credibility issue (**Singh**)

- **Blenroe**: Allegations are the most important part, and will experience stress, stigma and anxiety but it did not rise to interfering with his security of person

- **Suresh**: Procedural protections req'd by S.7 in this case do not extend to requiring oral hearing or complete judicial process, but require more than procedure required by Act – none! Person facing deportation to torture

### Notice

- Enables participation in the process
- Must provide a reasonable opportunity to present arguments and respond to the case
- Sufficient information

### Disclosure

- Less than what is required in the criminal
- Information about the decision
- Must be sufficient for parties to challenge it
- **Srisikandarajah v USA**: You don't always get full disclosure (especially in alleged Terrorists)
- **Knight**: required disclosure for termination

### Oral Hearings

- Often not required as they will slow down the process
- But can be appropriate where witness credibility is important **Singh v. Ministry of Employment and Immigration**
- Written hearings are often more suitable **Baker**

### Right to Counsel

- No general right but counsel often used in practice (though limits may be imposed)
- No right outside of criminal hearings or **s.7 or s.10(b)** Charter engaged **Christie**
- Written submission can be written by a lawyer, but not always allowed in an oral hearing

### Cross Examination

Cross-examination may be required if there is a credibility issue (**Singh**)

### Timeliness and Delay

- Usual time requirements for a similar matter
- Within or outside the norm of the delay?
- Cause of the delay
- Impact of the delay – How significant is it for the person affected by it?

### Reasons (Probably the most important menu item)

- Not required in all cases
- Sometimes it is too onerous on admin tribunals to provide written reasons
- Necessary where decision has important significance for an individual or where there is a statutory appeal process
- **Lafontaine 2004**: They gave reasons the first time, but failed to the second time. Reasons were required to fulfill their duty of procedural fairness
- **Canada v Mai 2011**: Reasons were not required but the legitimate expectation was that notice is to be given to enable a response. Sponsors understand the consequence – it's part of the application.
- **NF Nurses**: The arbitrator gave reasons and was within the range of reasonable outcomes, assessing whether those reasons were inadequate is a matter of substantive review.

## STEP 8 : Determine if the Duty has been met?

- What were they given?
- What did they deserve?
- The denial of a right to a fair hearing must always render a decision invalid (does not matter if tribunal would likely come to the same result)

## Summary of Cases

### PF - Decision Quashed

- Cardinal
- Homex
- Lafontaine
- Suresh
- Singh
- Charkaoui

### PF - But was Given

- Knight
- Baker
- Sriskandarajah
- Blencoe
- Mavi
- NF Nurses

### No P.F.

- Halifax v. Nova Scotia (HRC)
- RE Canada Assistance Plan (BC)
- Wells v Newfoundland
- Authorson
- Friends of the CAN Wheat Board
- Inuit Tapirsat
- Agraira

### Singh v Canada (1985)

Held: Refugees entitled to hearing before adjudicated on their asylum case

Decision: ordered IAB to grant applicant full oral hearings

~~Knight~~

### Canada v Mavi (2011)

- gov owes duty of P.F. to sponsor of immigrants to Canada under the family class in deciding that they must pay for any social assistance given to the sponsored immigrant
- albeit fairly minimal - allowing for sponsor to be heard, their issues considered eg notifying last known address, consider relevant circumstances
- = in Mavi P.F. given, rejected argument for more elaborate process in decision making

\* good authority for moderate P.F.

After P.F established, next issue is if Claimant was ~~entitled~~ <sup>available</sup> with an impartial

## BIAS FRAMEWORK

Decision Maker?

legal maxim

*Nemo judex in causa sua*: cannot judge your own cause

"What would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through – conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that [the decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly?"

Process

- Step 1: Allegations of bias should be raised first with the decision-maker who may recuse him/ herself if this doesn't work...
- Step 2: Judicial Review

Keep in mind that an allegation of bias is SERIOUS – and therefore, attracts a high threshold. Mere suspicion is not enough.

### PERSONAL BIAS

Direct Pecuniary Interest

*Dimes v Grand Junction Canal Co*

F: Chancellor making a decision about a canal permit. He held shares in the company applying for the permit and they would increase substantially = DPI

R: Any DPI in the outcome is not permitted. This rule is applied strictly, no matter how small the interest

Indirect Pecuniary Interest

*Energy Probe v Canada (AECL)*

F: Decision about renewing license for a nuclear plant in Ontario. Member of the board was a former shareholder, director and president to a company that supplied materials to the plants.

R: If one member of a board is biased, the entire decision fails but... the interest is too indirect

Other Material Interest

*Obichon v Heart Lake First Nation No. 176 1998 FTD*

F: A decision of a band council to evict someone from their house. The issue was that one of the councilors who made the decision had family members who were waiting to move in.

R: Non-pecuniary, but a "material interest" can quash a decision under bias

Personal Relationships with Parties

*Committee for Justice and Liberty v National Energy Board 1987, SCC*

F: Chair of the Board had been involved in the pipeline previously in discussions around their application and not on the board that approves it.

R: The participation of the Chair in this decision would be seen by the RP as bias → so he was disqualified from sitting on the panel.

*RE Pinochet 1999 UKHL*

F: Pinochet arrested in London. Chile wanted his extradited. 3/2 decisions. Lord Hoffman was on the panel but he worked for amnesty who was seeking his deportation.

R: Lead to RAB, so the decision was quashed and new trial ordered

*Imperial Oil Ltd. v Quebec 2003 SCC*

F: Land contaminated that was used by IO for 50 years. Water was contaminated. Ministry sued IO for failing to clean up. IO said they had an interest because then they wouldn't have to pay for clean up.

R: No bias, minister was acting in the public interest.

Prior Knowledge of the Dispute

*Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada*

F: Binnie, years before, had participated in a meeting for a land dispute between two first nation groups. Dispute ultimately came up to the SCC and was resolved 9-0. Losing band challenged decision because of Binnie.

R: Even if there was a slight RAB, a RP with knowledge of the S's process would know one judge could not taint a unanimous panel of 9

Attitudinal Predisposition  
"Bad Attitude"

*Turoczi v The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, 2012 FCTD*

F: No person from Hungary had ever been accepted by this adjudicator (but they had a really low acceptance rate over all)

R: Test is "what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically conclude", RP would have demanded more from the stats.

Elected Officials Cases

\*Different test, because elected official are elected based on their platforms. Not the RP test but the, "closed mind test" a relaxed standard.

Party alleging disqualifying bias MUST establish that there is prejudgment of matter to extent that any representation at variance with view, which has been adopted, would be futile.

*Old St. Boniface Residents Assn v. Winnipeg 1990 SCC*

F: Councilor supported a development project. Moved it through the finance committee and then in the Community committee.

R: An elected official can only be disqualified if you are incapable of being persuaded and future representations are futile

*Save Richmond Farmlands v. Richmond 1990 SCC*

F: C. favours economic development than farmland. Made a statement that he would not change his mind, but he would listen to contrary view → he was elected on this basis.

*Chretien v Canada 2008 FCRD*

F: Judge made comments in media about the honesty of Chretien, and other officials.

R: Report was quashed.

CLOSED MIND

CASE

## INSTITUTIONAL BIAS

reasonable apprehension of bias

*Canadian Pacific Ltd v. Matsqui Indian Band, 1995:* Will there be a RAB in the mind of a fully informed person in a substantial number of cases decided by the institution?

### Policy Making

*Geza v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) 2005 FCA*

F: Increase in Roma applications from Hungary. They established a non-binding "lead-case" on Roma refugee claims. Got advice from ministry and a Roma lawyer, applicants agreed to participate in this "lead case" and their claims were rejected. The lead case initiative was designed to reduce the successful applications.

R: Yes, biased. A RAB can arise from the totality of evidence as opposed to single determinative facts

*Thamatharem v Canada*

F: Guideline 7: Witnesses were cross-adjudicated and these hearings were totally different than the normal procedure. Allowed the chair to initiate the question. It was alleged that this would have a bias and it should be a lawyer asking questions not a tribunal member.

R: Just because lawyers think this is not ok doesn't mean that it is going to cause problems of bias, promotes consistent practice and has an expedited process. No bias.

### Overlapping Functions

*Ocean Port Hotel LTD v. BC, 2001 SCC*

R: It is always open to the legislature to authorize overlapping functions that would otherwise contravene the rule against bias → CL is ousted

Overlap in a single agency is often necessary

*Sam Levy & Associates Inc. v. Mayrand, 2005 FCA*

F: Superintendent with both investigatory and adjudicatory powers could not be said to have a reasonable apprehension of bias as he had delegated adjudicatory functions.

*Currie v. Edmonton Remand Centre, 2006 ABQB*

F: Prisoners can be charged with various offences in the system → charge included prison guards as the adjudicators

R: Institutional overlap created a RAB.

## TRIBUNAL INDEPENDENCE

Comes from Judicial Independence, the key two elements are: **Tenure** and **Salary Rights**. There is tension b/w independence and accountability.

**Valente:** suggested that the guarantees for JI could also be applied to admin tribunals. Since then litigants have pushed for tribunals to be held to a high standard

*Judicial independence*

Tribunals do not require the same independence as Courts

**TEST (Matsqui):** Whether a reasonable, well-informed person having thought the matter through would conclude that an administrative decision-maker is sufficiently free of factors that could interfere with his or her ability to make impartial judgments. Must be applied in light of the functions being performed. The requisite level of institutional independence will depend on:

- The nature of the tribunal
- The interest at stake, and
- Other indices of independence such as oaths of office.

*S.93 (1) Interpretation Act Canada* → appointments at pleasure unless otherwise specified

*S. 20 (1) Interpretation Act BC* → appointments at pleasure unless otherwise specified

*S.2-10 Admin Tribunals Act* → Guidelines for chair and members

*Canadian Pacific LTD v.*

*Matsqui Indian Band, 1995*

*SCC*

F: M designed a tax regime for CP, they disagreed but skipped 2 admin appeal stages and went straight to FC for JR arguing no adequate remedy bc bias and independence → Non-FN members lacked security of tenure, uncertain remuneration thus may be concerned about decision adverse to band.

R: This was a very close call in the end it was decided that they did not have institutional independence, bc no financial security or tenure and appointment issues.

F: OPH lost liquor license for 2 days. Argued the Liquor Appeal Board was not independent enough.

R: Tribunal are NOT courts and there is NO general constitutional guarantee of tribunal independence

F: JPs exercise judicial functions directly related to the enforcement of law in the court system, though not judges the principle of judicial independence should extend to JPs

R: Test is whether a reasonable and informed person viewing the relevant statutory provisions in their full historical context would conclude that the court is independent

R: Constitutional principle of judicial independence should apply to the RTB as its jurisdiction was carved out of the jurisdiction of the ordinary court. If you move it to administrative tribunals, constitutional protection of judicial independence will go with it.

F: K was president of Nuclear Safety Commission and wanted to close plant during isotope crises. Minister said no because of concern around medical isotopes. M said K would be removed if she didn't follow the directive. Act said NSC member held office "during good behavior".

R: Position was held "at pleasure" and satisfied the PF for the appointment. Gov't is NOT legally prevented from removing appointees "at pleasure" for decisions they make

*McKenzie v Minister of Public Safety and AG, 2006*

*BCSC*

*Keen v. Canada (AG)*

# SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW FRAMEWORK

## INTRODUCTION TO SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW

How closely will judges scrutinize the outcome?

How likely will judges interfere if they perceive that something was wrongly decided?

### 2 standards:

- **Reasonableness:** deferential, if the decision of the DM is reasonable that it is justified and will stand. Doesn't have to be what the judge would have done but HAS to be reasonable
- **Correctness:** Not deferential, DM would have to make the exact same decision the judge would have done

## SELECTING THE STANDARD (Dunsmuir Test)

<b>Step 1: Prior Jurisprudence</b>	Courts ascertain whether the jurisprudence has already determined in a satisfactory manner the degree of deference to be accorded with regard to a particular category of question ( <i>Dunsmuir</i> )
<b>Step 2: Standard of Review Analysis</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Deference and the application of the reasonableness standard will be the default, unless the question falls into a category where the correctness standard continues to apply</li> <li>• No longer a balancing test.... Ish (<i>Dunsmuir</i>)</li> </ul>
<b>Presumptively Correctness</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Constitutional questions (i.e. division of powers).</li> <li>• "True" question of jurisdiction (tribunal had statutory authority to make inquiry) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ <i>New Brunswick Liquor Co (1979)</i> – statutory interpretation</li> <li>◦ <i>AB Teachers 2011</i>: Interpretation of the home statute = Reasonableness... UNLESS it falls into a category that Correctness applies... a question about time is not of central importance and is specific to that tribunal</li> <li>◦ <i>Rogers Communication v SOCAN (2012)</i> Legislation had shared jurisdiction between the board and the court – Abella's dissent: Standard is reasonableness because of interpretation of home s.</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Questions of law of "central importance" outside expertise of admin decision-maker (<i>Toronto v CUPE</i>) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Precedential value requires uniform and consistent answers</li> <li>◦ <i>Dunsmuir (2008); Pushpanathan (1988)</i> – Human Rights Context</li> <li>◦ <i>Mossop (1993)</i>; Same-sex (Question of statutory interpretation)</li> <li>◦ <i>Barrie Utilities</i>: correctness (pure statutory interpretation)</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Questions regarding jurisdictional lines between tribunals</li> <li>• Note: correctness standard also applies to review for procedural fairness</li> </ul>
<b>Reasonableness will usually apply to</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Privative clause (i.e. statutory direction from Parliament or legislature indicating need for deference).</li> <li>• Discrete/ special administrative regime in which DM has special expertise (i.e. specific statutory contexts).</li> <li>• Nature of question (i.e. fact, discretion or policy ALSO mixed fact and law) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ <i>Canada (Director of Investigation and Research) v. Southam Inc. (1997)</i></li> </ul> </li> <li>• Tribunal interpreting its own statute <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ <i>Telus Communication Company v. CRTC (2010)</i></li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Step 3: If it doesn't fall into a category</b>	Where the first inquiry proves unfruitful, courts must proceed to an analysis of the factors making it possible to identify the proper standard of review. Analysis MUST be contextual, dependent on a number of relevant factors: <i>Pushpanathan (1998)</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presence or Absence of privative clause <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ <i>Khosa</i> – Rothstein says no privative cause = default correctness (concurring opinion)</li> <li>◦ Strong privative clause = greater deference</li> <li>◦ Indication of legislative intent to defer to administrative actor's expertise</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Purpose of the tribunal as determined by enabling legislation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Do statute and particular decision at issue present "polycentric" purposes (balancing interests)</li> <li>◦ How does the specific provision fit within the legislative scheme?</li> <li>◦ Where "polycentric" purposes = greater deference</li> <li>◦ Bi-polar (Opposition) between 2 discreet parties = less deference</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Nature of question at issue, and; <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Greater precedential impact = greater assessment of expertise tilts towards the courts</li> <li>◦ Factual question = greater deference</li> <li>◦ Legal questions = less deference</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Expertise of the tribunal <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ May derive from: (1) specialized knowledge of topic; (2) Specialized procedures, or; (3) Non-judicial means of implementation</li> <li>◦ Three steps to analyzing expertise: (1) Determine specialized knowledge of the decision maker; (2) Consider own expertise relative to tribunal; (3) Identify nature of the issue relative to expertise of decision maker</li> </ul> </li> </ul>
<b>Step 4: Conclude</b>	Is the standard Correctness or Reasonableness?

## Applying the Standard - Reasonableness

1) Process	Concerned with justification, transparency and intelligibility of the decision making process
2) Outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Whether the outcome falls within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible with respect to facts/ law</li><li>• Look to past jurisprudence on similar issues</li><li>• It recognizes legislative intent to confer decision-making powers on an administrative</li></ul>
A) Reasons:	Reasons should justify the decision and show that the DM has considered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Relevant facts and law</li><li>o Applied legal principles and tests correctly</li><li>o Able to explain the decision so the individual and court can understand</li><li>o Must be transparent and show the basis for the outcome</li></ul> <p><b>NFLD Nurses</b> – the adequacy of reasons is not a standalone basis for quashing a decision, must fall within the range of reasonable outcomes</p> <p><b>AB Teachers</b> – the standard should be applied, as it was a question of law relating to the home statute<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o No reasons given in this case but the issue of timelines was not raised before the DM</li><li>o In some cases the court may send the matter back to the tribunal for reasons before finding that the decision was unreasonable</li></ul></p> <p><b>Nor-Man Regional</b> – Reasons are reasonable and sufficient – arbitrator explained why the remedy was given</p> <p><b>Catalyst Paper</b> – Municipal By-Laws are given broad deference given legislative nature. In this case the council considered a broad range of both objective and social factors and was within the range of reasonable outcomes</p>
B) Municipal Bylaws	
C) Reasonable Outcomes:	<p><b>McLean v BC</b> - In some cases, there may be only one reasonable outcome, in which case it must be the one adopted by the decision-maker.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o But if there is more than one reasonable option: Decision maker can adopt any of them, then the Burden is on the JR challenger to show that the decision was unreasonable</li><li>o How is this different than correctness?</li></ul> <p><b>Celgene Corp</b>: Took into consideration consumer protection, but this was the most important part of the act (policy) Reasonableness because the board was interpreting their home statute and took into consideration the purpose and policy behind it.</p> <p><b>Agraira</b>: 1) Was the interpretation of "national interest" reasonable? 2) Was the application of the interpretation to deny the relief requested reasonable?<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Courts cannot engage in a new weighing process of the factors</li><li>o The reason, though brief, were justiciable, transparent and intelligible and showed all evidence was considered</li><li>o Decision is within a range of possible acceptable outcomes defensible in the facts and the law</li></ul></p>
D) Charter issues	<p><b>Dore</b> – Fundamental values, including those of the Charter, infuse the inquiry of an administrative decision-maker.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Reviewing applications of Charter values by decision makers must align with the Dunsmuir focus on deference</li><li>o Reviewing court should not apply S.1 analysis to see whether tribunal decisions can be justified.</li><li>o Unless, the court is considering the constitutionality of a law, in which case it will be reviewed for correctness.</li><li>o Instead, the reviewing court should apply the contextual reasonableness standard, as the tribunal has to balance the Charter with its statutory objectives</li></ul>

## Applying the Standard - Correctness

If we choose Correctness what does this mean? (Dunsmuir)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Courts will not show deference to the DM's reasoning process</li><li>• Courts will undertake their own analysis and apply the judicially determined outcome over the decision</li><li>• Presumes there is only one legally correct answer. Judges don't always agree.</li><li>• Promotes consistency in the law</li></ul>
Pre Dunsmuir: Statutory Interpretation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Canada v. Massop (1993)</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Same-Sex Marriage issue → Question of statutory interpretation and therefore a question of law</li><li>o Decision will have a direct influence on society and relates to basic social values</li></ul></li><li>• <b>Barrie's Public Utilities v. Canadian Cable TV (2003)</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o CRTC's interpretation was incurred as it used policy of the leg. to ignore clear leg intent</li><li>o Bastarache (Dissent) Reasonable simplicity should be applied. Substituting the court's interpretation of statutory language eliminates the decision-maker's autonomy and expertise and their decision was a plausible construction of the leg.</li></ul></li></ul>
Post-D - Statutory Interpretation Shared Jurisdiction	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• <b>Telus Communication Company v CRTC</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Reasonableness applied in relation to question of statutory interpretation of the home statute</li></ul></li><li>• <b>Northrup Grumman Overseas Service Corp v. Canada AG</b><ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Correctness standard applied after considering past jurisprudence on the decisions of the Tribunal with respect to its jurisdiction under the enabling statute</li><li>o Tribunal's interpretation was incorrect and it could not hear claims by non-Canadian corporations</li></ul></li><li>• <b>Rogers v. SOCAN</b> - Shared jurisdiction with the Copyright Board led to a correctness standard<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Rebutts the presumption of reasonableness for an interpretation of the home statute</li></ul></li></ul>

# Substantive Review and the Charter

"An administrative decision is not a law that can be justified as a reasonable limit of Charter right under S.1" Dore 2012, expands on Slaight 1989

**Step 1:** Does the law infringe the Charter on its face? = Ordinary constitutional case

**Step 2:** Does an Administrative decision implicate a Charter right or value?

**Step 3:** Challenge the statute if it expressly or by necessary implication authorizes the infringement of the Charter

- Burden of proof on the agency or government defending the law
- Reviewed on a correctness standard - S.1 analysis... Slaight
- Constitutionally invalid law is of no force and effect: makes all decisions made under it invalid since there is no legal authorization
- If the law is upheld you can still challenge the decision itself

**Step 4:** Challenge the decision that implicated Charter rights or values (Dore)

Statute upheld under S.1 is constitutionally compliant, but Admin decision infringes Charter

- Each decision is a *prima facie* infringement of the Charter
- Post Dore: Each decision must be upheld on a reasonableness Review
- Burden of proof on the claimant to show why the decision is unreasonable
- Court should apply contextual reasonableness to see if a tribunal has balanced the Charter with its statutory objectives
  - Not reviewing the constitutionality of a law
  - Challenging the decision
  - Has the admin tribunal taken sufficient account of Charter values?

Statute does not authorize Charter Infringements

- But the admin decision has engaged Charter rights or values
- *Multani* - leg did not implicate a Charter infringement
- Decision did and was subject to constitutional scrutiny - Majority applied full Charter analysis here
- *Nova Scotia (WCB) v Martin* - provision said you have 4 week program to overcome chronic pain → infringed S.15 rights, board struck it down as unconstitutional. Canadians should be able to assert their rights and freedoms in the most accessible forum. The board has the best sense of how the constitution fits into their legislation, as long as they can decide questions of law
  - Is this explicit? In their statute
  - Implicit? Consider the statute as a whole and see whether deciding questions of law is necessary to fulfill its mandate; Whether the tribunal is adjudicative in nature;
- *Administrative Tribunals Act*: Opt in legislation
  - S.43 Discretion to refer question of law to court, including Charter challenges
  - S.44 Tribunal without jurisdiction over constitutional questions
  - S.45 Tribunal without jurisdiction over Charter issues
  - S.1 defines "constitutional question", meaning as when notice is required under s.8 of the *Constitutional Question Act*
- *Rio Tinto Inc. v. Carrier Sekani* - S.44 gave constitutional jurisdiction to the tribunal but could not allow to consider the adequacy of the duty to consult
- *Sechelt Indian Band v. BC* - Would give effect to the ousting of constitutional jurisdiction by virtue of S.44 ATA

**Step 6:** Can S.24(1) Charter remedies be applied to the tribunal

- Does a tribunal have the jurisdiction to grant Charter remedies generally as a "court of competent jurisdiction"?
- Test is the same as Martin
- As long as the tribunal can decide questions of law through their statute, implicitly or explicitly
- If the tribunal is a "court of competent jurisdiction" then consider whether it has the authority to grant the remedy that is sought
  - Look at the legislative intent in the statute
  - The board's structure
  - And its function

## Statutory Standards of Review - Patent Unreasonableness

*Administrative Tribunals Act S.58-59*

- A complete code for the standard of review where they apply to the tribunal
- S.58 makes question of law subject to the privative clause attracts the standard of patent unreasonableness
- *Khosla*
  - Standard lives on due to legislation but its content must evolve according to devp in admin. law
- *Lavender Cooperative Housing*
  - Look to the legislation first before applying common law standard of review analysis

Lives on in Ontario too!

- *Shaw v. Phipps, 2010 Ont Div. Ct.*
  - Statutory standard should be what the legislature knowing the CL applicable at the time enacted

# VAVILOV

## Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov: The Supreme Court of Canada Gifts Administrative Law a New Standard of Review Analysis

BY REBECCA ROSSI · DECEMBER 26, 2019

<https://www.thecourt.ca/canada-minister-of-citizenship-and-immigration-v-vavilov-the-supreme-court-of-canada-gifts-administrative-law-a-new-standard-of-review/>

The much-anticipated Bell-NFL-Vavilov trilogy of administrative law appeals was released on December 19, 2019, providing answers to lawyers and legal scholars who have long speculated the fate of the standard of review to be applied in administrative decisions in Canada. The appeals, heard together in the Supreme Court of Canada (the “Court”) in December 2018, were intended to “provide an opportunity to consider the nature and scope of judicial review of administrative action, as addressed in *Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick*, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190 (Application for Leave, 2018) [Dunsmuir].”

In giving judgement just over a year later, a majority of the Court used the decision in the third appeal, *Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v Vavilov*, 2019 SCC 65 [Vavilov], to do exactly that and articulate a new approach to determine the applicable standard of review.

### Background Information

Mr. Vavilov was born in Canada. His parents were foreign nationals working on assignment for the Russian foreign intelligence service, posing as Canadians under assumed names. Vavilov was unaware of his parents’ secret until 2010, when they were arrested in the United States and charged with espionage.

Following his parents’ arrest, Vavilov attempted to renew his Canadian passport. His efforts proved unsuccessful until 2013, when he was issued a certificate of Canadian citizenship. In 2014, the Canadian Registrar of Citizenship cancelled his certificate. Under section 3(2)(a) of the *Citizenship Act*, children of a “diplomatic or consular officer or other representative or employee in Canada of a foreign government” are exempt from the general rule that individuals born in Canada acquire Canadian citizenship by birth. According to the Registrar’s interpretation of the Act, since Vavilov’s parents were “employees” or “representatives” of Russia at the time of his birth, he was exempt from the general rule. Vavilov applied for judicial review of the Registrar’s decision. According to the Supreme Court of Canada, the Registrar’s interpretation of the *Citizenship Act* was unreasonable, the decision was quashed, and the Court directed that Vavilov is a Canadian citizen (*Vavilov*, para 194-196).

### SCC Majority Decision

While the facts are intriguing, it is the majority decision in Vavilov that has attained considerable interest, in that it has delivered clarity on the applicable standard of review analysis to be applied in administrative decisions. In what follows, I will provide an overview of the Vavilov standard of review analysis.

#### Step 1: Presumption of Reasonableness

The starting point of the majority’s “revised framework” for determining the standard of review a court should apply where the merits of an administrative decision are challenged is a “presumption of reasonableness,” which applies to all matters under judicial review (Vavilov, para 16). This is not much of a change from existing jurisprudence, given the entrenchment of deference in pre-Vavilov cases. However, what is new are the circumstances in which this presumption of reasonableness may be rebutted.

#### Step 2: Rebutting the Presumption of Reasonableness

The presumption of reasonableness review can be rebutted in two situations:

1. Where there is a clear indication of legislative intent that the reasonableness standard does not apply.

According to the majority, where the legislature explicitly prescribes through statute what standard courts should apply when reviewing decisions of a particular decision maker, the presumption of reasonableness may be rebutted (Vavilov, para 33). It follows that where a legislature has indicated that courts are to apply the standard of correctness, that standard must be applied (Vavilov, para 35).

The presumption of reasonableness may also be rebutted where the legislature has provided a statutory appeal mechanism from an administrative decision to a court. Where a legislature has provided that parties may appeal from an administrative decision to a court, either as of right or with leave, the majority held that a court hearing such an appeal is to apply appellate standards of review to that decision (Vavilov, para 37). For example, if the scope of the statutory appeal includes questions of fact, the appellate standard of review for those questions is palpable and overriding error (Vavilov, para 37).

This emphasis on statutory appeal rights departs from the Court’s jurisprudence, where the case law had not previously placed any weight on such rights. However, the Court commented that this shift is necessary to bring coherence and balance to the standard

applies to all matters under JR. This presumption can then be rebutted under two situations

- ① Where legislation explicitly prescribes through statute that the courts are to apply the standard of correctness and ② Where the Rule of Law requires the S.o.C. be applied - i.e. for certain types of legal questions, the SCC in Vavilov held S.o.C. will apply

In the recent and highly anticipated Bell-NFL-Vavilov (2019) SCC trilogy, the SCC articulated a new approach to determine the applicable S.o.R. Per Vavilov, ~~the~~ when an administrative decision is challenged, the court should apply a “presumption of reasonableness” which

of review analysis, where statutory appeal mechanisms are a clear signal of legislative intent with respect to the applicable standard of review (*Vavilov*, paras 38, 49).

## 2. Where the rule of law requires that the standard of correctness be applied.

The majority in *Vavilov* held that the rule of law requires courts to apply the standard of correctness for certain types of legal questions. When applying the correctness standard, the reviewing court may choose either to uphold the administrative decision maker's determination or substitute its own view (*Vavilov*, para 54).

The majority provides a non-exhaustive list of the types of questions where a correctness standard is required:

1. **Constitutional questions:** questions regarding the division of powers between Parliament and the provinces, the relationship between the legislature and the other branches of the state, the scope of Aboriginal and treaty rights under section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982, and other constitutional matters require a "final and determinate answer" from the courts (*Vavilov*, para 55). On such matters, the standard of correctness must be applied.
2. **General questions of law of importance to the legal system as a whole:** these questions require a "single determinate answer." A correctness standard provides a greater degree of legal certainty than reasonableness review allows and hence, must be applied to these questions. The Court's jurisprudence provides examples of questions of law that have been held to be of central importance to the legal system as a whole, including: the appropriateness of limits on solicitor-client privilege or when an administrative proceeding will be barred by the doctrines of res judicata and abuse of process (*Vavilov*, para 60). Interestingly, the majority clarifies that the expertise of an administrative decision maker is no longer a consideration in identifying such questions. The majority also stressed that merely because a question is "of wider public concern" it may not amount to a question of central importance (*Vavilov*, para 61).
3. **Questions regarding the jurisdictional boundaries between two or more administrative bodies:** while administrative decisions are rarely contested on this basis, the majority held that the rule of law requires courts to intervene where one administrative body has interpreted the scope of its authority in a manner that is incompatible with the jurisdiction of another (*Vavilov*, para 64).

What is notable about the majority decision in *Vavilov* is that it eliminated two circumstances where the courts could previously rebut the presumption of

The SCC went on to provide a non-exhaustive type of questions where S.O.C is required : 1 - 3 . Apply facts

To 1-3 , Y or N ?  
*Vavilov* further provided the way to determine a reasonable review : ① + ②  
Apply facts Y or N .

reasonableness: where an administrative decision raised a "true question of jurisdiction" and where a "contextual inquiry" determines that a correctness standard of review should apply (*Vavilov*, paras 65, 69).

## Performing Reasonableness Review

The majority explains that the focus of reasonableness review must take into account both the decision maker's reasoning process for a decision, as well as the outcome that was reached (*Vavilov*, para 83). To determine whether a decision is "reasonable," a reviewing court must ask whether the decision bears the hallmarks of reasonableness – justification, transparency and intelligibility – and whether it is justified in relation to the relevant factual and legal constraints that bear on the decision (*Vavilov*, para 99).

The burden is on the party challenging the decision to show that it is unreasonable. The reviewing court must be satisfied that there are sufficiently serious shortcomings in the decision that it cannot be said to exhibit the requisite degree of justification, intelligibility and transparency (*Vavilov*, para 100).

The majority outlined two ways in which an administrative decision can be unreasonable:

### 1. An unreasonable decision is based on internally incoherent reasoning.

To be reasonable, a decision must be based on reasoning that is both rational and logical. According to the majority, a decision will be unreasonable if the reasons for it, read holistically, fail to reveal a rational chain of analysis or if they reveal that the decision was based on an irrational chain of analysis (*Vavilov*, para 103). Decisions may be called into question if the reasons exhibit clear logical fallacies, such as circular reasoning, false dilemmas or unfounded generalizations (*Vavilov*, para 104). Ultimately, a reviewing court must be satisfied that the decision maker's reasoning "adds up" (*Vavilov*, para 104).

### 2. A decision can be unreasonable in light of the legal and factual constraints that bear on the decision.

To be reasonable, a decision must be justified in relation to the law and facts that are relevant to the decision and operate as constraints on the decision maker in the exercise of its delegated powers. The majority highlights some elements that are relevant in evaluating whether a given decision is reasonable, including (*Vavilov*, para 106):

- the governing statutory scheme;

conclude

- other statutory or common law constraints on a decision maker;
- principles of statutory interpretation;
- the evidentiary record;
- submissions of the parties;
- an administrative body's past practices and past decisions; and
- the impact of the decision on an affected party.

If a decision fails to adhere to the preceding elements of reasonableness, a reviewing court may find the decision unreasonable.

While in many cases, neither the duty of procedural fairness nor the statutory scheme will require that formal reasons for a decision be given at all, where the duty of procedural fairness or the legislative scheme mandates that reasons be given to an affected party but none have been given, that failure will generally require the decision to be set aside and the matter remitted to the decision maker (*Vavilov*, para 136).

#### Analysis

*↑ Remedy for no reason given*

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in *Vavilov* ought to be praised for providing clarity to the substantive review analysis in administrative law. Since *Dunsmuir*, there has been widespread frustration and confusion about the standard of review analysis. Lawyers and legal scholars have spent considerable time debating when a particular administrative decision should be entitled deference and, if so, how to apply the reasonableness standard of review. Thanks to the Court's decision in *Vavilov*, we now have some answers.

What is notable about the *Vavilov* decision is the emphasis placed on the rule of law, which now plays a more prominent role in standard of review analyses. As well, the majority's guidance on how the reasonableness standard is to be applied – a standard that has long frustrated many in the legal community – deserves recognition.

The legal community has welcomed the decision in *Vavilov* with praise. Some lawyers have commented that the clarity provided by *Vavilov* will help both practitioners and clients, noting that in advising clients on the merits of a judicial review or appeal, lawyers will be able to give a stronger opinion as to what standard of review the court is likely to apply [1]. Others in the legal community have commended the Court's efforts in providing clarity on the role of statutory appeal mechanisms, which have not been given appropriate weight in previous jurisprudence.

Despite its praise, there is criticism of the majority decision in *Vavilov*. The concurring decision of Justices Abella and Karakatsanis in *Vavilov* notes that the majority's approach to the standard of review analysis "will be a roadblock to its promise of

simplicity" (*Vavilov*, para 252). Among their concerns with the majority's decision include its disregard for precedent and stare decisis, its invitation for courts to apply correctness review to legal questions where the administrative scheme includes a right of appeal and that it unjustifiably ignores the specialized expertise of decision makers, (*Vavilov*, paras 230, 245, and 254). With regard to the concurrence's latter issue, I find Justices Abella and Karakatsanis' opinion unconvincing. There are a number of compelling rationales for the legislature to delegate the administration of a statutory scheme to a particular decision maker other than expertise, including a decision maker's ability to render decisions promptly and efficiently (*Vavilov*, para 29). The previous presumption of deference to a decision maker based on expertise is therefore overbroad.

Only time will tell whether *Vavilov* has succeeded in clarifying and simplifying the judicial review of administrative decisions.

[1] <https://nationalmagazine.ca/en-ca/articles/law/rule-of-law/2019/presumption-of-reasonableness>

① Eligible for J.R.? start w/  
A pg. 2

- public body making a decision
- right to appeal - statutory  
OR - JR
- which court? see C
- discretion to deny JR?

Conclude Y/N, what remedy  
is X seeking - mention

② Determine Duty of Fairness Nicholson

(a) Is fairness required @ B-Step 5  
trigger/ threshold (Knight) (Baker)  
Y or N Decide level of PF  
owed, B Step 6

(b) What is the content see B+A  
of fairness Step 7, Step 7.5 (if  
apply)

Exceptions = When duty not owed, Y or N  
(See also B P.F. exemptions, B Step 4)

(c) Determine if X had See B  
an unbiased decision-maker bias  

- individual
- institutional
- tribunal

Conclude answers to (a)(b) 4

(c) Y or N Y factual, has duty  
been met < given  
deserve

(d) Remedies A - general

Discuss potential remedy and  
cases. (no fairness = invalid decision)

⑤ Substantive review

(a) Standard of review

analyze R or C?  
= previously Dzunmir follow B Substantive

= recent Varilov see Varilov Pg. 1

Decide which SoR applies.

(b) Decide if the  
Decision was for C. Varilov  
aka apply the standard

→ Reasons - justifiable?  
→ Outcome - reasonable?

Dzunmir

Varilov: ① irrational reasoning = X R  
② in light of factual/legal constraints = X R

Revisit remedies - B - specific  
In conclusion

⑥ Charter issue (if applicable)  
Substantive, see B Charter Substantive

Issue Roles Application Conclusion