Nitro League

Smart Contract Audit Report



October 28, 2022



Introduction	4
1. About Nitro League	4
2. About ImmuneBytes	4
Documentation Details	4
Audit Process & Methodology	5
Audit Details	5
Audit Goals	6
Security Level Reference	6
Finding Overview	8
Contract Name: Race High Severity Issues Medium Severity Issues Low Severity Issues Recommendation / Informational	9 9 9 11 12
Contract Name: RewardManager High Severity Issues Medium Severity Issues Low Severity Issues Recommendation / Informational	14 14 14 14 16
Contract Name: RaceEvent High Severity Issues Medium Severity Issues Low Severity Issues	17 17 17 17
Contract Name: NitroLeague High Severity Issues Medium Severity Issues Low Severity Issues Recommendation / Informational	20 20 20 20 21
Final Audit Low Severity Issues	22 22
	



Additional Details - Inheritance Graph	24
Automated Audit Result	25
Fuzz Testing	27
Auditor Test Cases	27
Test Coverage	29
Concluding Remarks	30
Disclaimer	30



Introduction

1. About Nitro League

Nitro League, an immersive racing world is the ultimate combination of GameFi, DeFi, and NFT. Nitro League is a dynamic hub for collectors, investors, and artists built on a robust virtual economy.

Nitro facilitates ownership, customization, collection, and trade for unique NFT cars and parts. Players may hone their racing skills and earn rewards for their performance. Anyone can fulfill their dream of becoming a racer in the Nitro League.

Nitro League has devised a fully functional virtual economy that enables players to buy land and buildings and build cars. Nitro League facilitates players to expand their guilds and empires.

Visit https://www.nitroleague.com/ to know more about it.

2. About ImmuneBytes

ImmuneBytes is a security start-up that provides professional services in the blockchain space. The team has hands-on experience conducting smart contract audits, penetration testing, and security consulting. ImmuneBytes's security auditors have worked on various A-league projects and understand DeFi projects like AAVE, Compound, 0x Protocol, Uniswap, and dydx.

The team has secured 205+ blockchain projects by providing security services on different frameworks. The ImmuneBytes team helps start-ups with detailed system analysis, ensuring security and managing the overall project.

Visit http://immunebytes.com/ to learn more about the services.

Documentation Details

The Nitro League team has provided the following doc for audit:

- 1. https://nitroblockchain.notion.site/nitroblockchain/Standard-Contract-Nitro-League-9efedf36fcec419 fac5bca5acaa3ee8f
- 2. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1bDHuZuAevdwHT42_INMfA9Yn1D7NSRZ4MtJBZfU6SoQ/edit



Audit Process & Methodology

ImmuneBytes team has performed thorough testing of the project, starting with analyzing the code design patterns in which we reviewed the smart contract architecture to ensure it is structured and safe use of third-party smart contracts and libraries.

Our team then performed a formal line-by-line inspection of the Smart Contract to find potential issues like Signature Replay Attacks, Unchecked External Calls, External Contract Referencing, Variable Shadowing, Race conditions, Transaction-ordering dependence, timestamp dependence, DoS attacks, and others.

In the Unit testing phase, we run unit tests written by the developer to verify the functions work as intended. In Automated Testing, we tested the Smart Contract with our in-house developed tools to identify vulnerabilities and security flaws.

The code was audited by a team of independent auditors, including -

- 1. Structural analysis of the smart contract is checked and verified.
- 2. An extensive automated testing of all the contracts under scope is conducted.
- 3. Line-by-line Manual Code review is conducted to evaluate, analyze and identify the potential security risks in the contract.
- 4. Evaluation of the contract's intended behavior and the documentation shared is an imperative step to verify the contract behaves as expected.
- 5. For complex and heavy contracts, adequate integration testing is conducted to ensure that contracts perform acceptably while interacting.
- 6. Storage layout verifications in the upgradeable contract are a must.
- 7. An important step in the audit procedure is highlighting and recommending better gas optimization techniques in the contract.

Audit Details

- Project Name: Nitro League
- Languages: Solidity(Smart contract), Typescript (Unit Testing)
- Github link: https://github.com/sl2-studio/nitro-league-blockchain
- Branch: feedback_candidate, audit_candidate
- Commit hash: 0079ab70e81f4000ef6d6a9828289d0255696ab4(audit candidate)
- Commit hash (Final): 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c(feedback_candidate)
- Platforms and Tools: Remix IDE, Truffle, Truffle Team, Ganache, Solhint, VScode, Contract Library, Slither, SmartCheck



Audit Goals

The audit's focus was to verify that the smart contract system is secure, resilient, and working according to its specifications. The audit activities can be grouped into the following three categories:

- 1. Security: Identifying security-related issues within each contract and the system of contracts.
- 2. Sound Architecture: Evaluation of the architecture of this system through the lens of established smart contract best practices and general software best practices.
- 3. Code Correctness and Quality: A full review of the contract source code. The primary areas of focus include
 - a. Correctness
 - b. Readability
 - c. Sections of code with high complexity
 - d. Quantity and quality of test coverage

Security Level Reference

Every issue in this report were assigned a severity level from the following:

High severity issues will bring problems and should be fixed.


Medium severity issues could potentially bring problems and should eventually be fixed.

Low severity issues are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed but would be better fixed at some point in the future.


Issues	<u>High</u>	<u>Medium</u>	<u>Low</u>
Open	-	-	-
Closed	-	2	10
Acknowledged	-	-	1



SEVERITY



SEVERITY BREAKDOWN vs CLOSED





Finding Overview

S.no	Findings	Risk	Status
01	minPlayers can be greater than maxPlayers if wrongly initialized. Can lead to unwanted behavior	Medium	Closed
02	Wrong function logic leads to invalid emission of events	Medium	Closed
03	Costly loop operations could be avoided	Low	Closed
04	Coding Style Issues in the Contract	Informational	Closed
05	Commented codes must be wiped out before deployment	Informational	Closed
06	Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts	Informational	Closed
07	claimRewards() function should only be executable in AWARDED state.	Low	Closed
08	No input validations to avoid array length mismatch	Low	Closed
09	Costly Loop operations found	Low	Closed
10	Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts	Informational	Closed
11	No Events emitted after imperative State Variable modification	Low	Closed
12	Absence of input validations after important state modifications	Low	Closed
13	External Visibility should be preferred	Low	Closed
14	Coding Style Issues in the Contract	Informational	Closed
15	Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts	Informational	Closed
16	Absence of Zero Address validation	Low	Closed
17	External Visibility should be preferred	Low	Closed
18	Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts	Informational	Closed
19	The reset of mintCount by the owner does not follow the intended procedure	Low	Acknowledged
20	setDailyMintLimit() function doesn't validate the arguments.	Low	Closed



Contract Name: Race

High Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Medium Severity Issues

1. minPlayers can be greater than maxPlayers if wrongly initialized. Can lead to unwanted behavior Line no - 173, 174

Description:

During the manual review, it was found that neither the Race contract nor the RaceFactory contract includes adequate input validations on the arguments passed for the constructor.

As per the current design, there is no input validation statement to verify if the minPlayers is actually smaller than the maxPlayers state variable. Keeping in mind the immutable nature of smart contracts, it's extremely imperative to include proper validations that ensure imperative state variables are initialized with only the right values.

Wrong initialization (if minPlayers is greater than maxPlayers) of the above-mention state variables could lead to the following unwanted scenarios:

a. startRace() function won't be executed unless the max number of players is stored instead of checking the min number of players.

```
function startRace() external override onlyGame { |
    require(block.timestamp > raceStartTime, "Not yet start time");
    require(players.length >= minPlayers, "Not enough players");
    require(raceState == RaceState.SCHEDULED, "Race not scheduled");
```

 Functions like addPlayers() or joinRace() will also behave unexpectedly since they, too rely on maxPlayers state variable.

Recommendation:



It is highly recommended to provide adequate input validations to functions/constructors to ensure only the right values are passed for updating the imperative state variables.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

2. Wrong function logic leads to invalid emission of events

Line no: 294-299

Description:

The addPlayers() function in the contract includes a wrong implementation of the for loop.

As per the current design of the function, the loop first checks if the player address passed as an argument is already existing in the protocol. And only when the player address is unique, it executes further and adds a new player address in the players array.

```
292
                uint playersNum = 0;
293 🗸
                for (uint256 i = 0; i < players_↑.length; i++) { //@audit</pre>
                     if (!isExistingPlayer(players_1[i])) {
 294 🗸
 295
                         players.push(players_1 [i]);
 296
                         continue;
 297
 298
                     playersNum++;
 299
                     emit AddPlayer(players_1[i], playersNum);
 300
 301
 302
```

However, once it updates the players array, it executes the continue keyword, which makes the execution flow skip the remaining block of code and start the next iteration of the loop immediately.

This leads to an undesirable scenario where lines 299 and 300 are never executed for every new player added, and this lead to the wrong emission of events with wrong values.

This could also lead to a major concern if the events are being tracked and stored off-chain since the data will not be accurate and reliable.

Recommendation:



The function must be adequately redesigned to emit valid events and ensure the right flow of execution.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

Low Severity Issues

1. Costly loop operations could be avoided Line no - 245-247, 293-297

Description:

During the manual review of the contract, it was found that some functions include extremely costly loop operations.

For instance, the endRace and addPlayers() function calls the isExistingPlayer() function inside a loop to verify if a given player address exists in the protocol.

```
for (uint i = 0; i < results_1.length; i++) { //@audit -> Costly loop
    require(isExistingPlayer(results_1]), "Non-player winner");
}
```

However, the isExistingPlayer() function includes a loop within its own body to provide this information. This makes function execution quite expensive in a scenario where there is a comparatively higher number of players in the contract.

```
ftrace|funcSig

function isExistingPlayer(address player_1) internal view returns (bool) {

for (uint i = 0; i < players.length; i++)

if (players[i] == player_1) return true;

return false;
```

Recommendation:

The use of mappings could be introduced to identify existing or non-existing player addresses in the contract instead of looping over the entire player address list.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.



Recommendation / Informational

1. Coding Style Issues in the Contract

Description:

Code readability of a Smart Contract is largely influenced by the Coding Style issues and, in some specific scenarios, may lead to bugs in the future.

```
Parameter Race.setParticipantsURI(string).participants_info_uri_ (contracts/flatFiles/raceFlat.sol#1056) is not in mixedCase Variable Race.participants_info_uri (contracts/flatFiles/raceFlat.sol#903) is not in mixedCase Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions
```

During the automated testing, it was found that the Race contract had quite a few code-style issues. Please follow this <u>link</u> to find details on naming conventions in solidity code.

Recommendation:

Therefore, it is recommended to fix the issues like naming convention, indentation, and code layout issues in a smart contract.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

2. Commented codes must be wiped-out before deployment

Description:

The Race contract includes a few commented lines in the addPlayers() function.

This badly affects the readability of the code.

```
require(raceAccess == RaceAccess.ADMIN, "Not admin access");
require(
players.length + players_1.length <= maxPlayers,
"Too many players"

290
);
require(rewardState == RewardState.UNAWARDED, "Rewards not unawarded"); //@audit-issue -> Commented line
```

Recommendation:

If these instances of code are not required in the current version of the contract, then the commented codes must be removed before deployment.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.



3. Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts

Line no: 2

Description:

During the code review, it was found that the contracts included unlocked pragma solidity version statements.

It's not considered a better practice in Smart contract development to do so, as it might lead to accidental deployment to a version with unfixed bugs.

Recommendation:

It's always recommended to lock pragma statements to a specific version while writing contracts.



Contract Name: RewardManager

High Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Medium Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Low Severity Issues

1. claimRewards() function should only be executable in AWARDED state.

Description:

The current design of the RewardManager indicates that the claim of rewards should only be possible after the positions have been accurately updated by the owner.

In other words, the claimRewards() function should be executable after the rewardSate of the contract is updated to AWARDED state.

However, during the review, it was found that no such checkpoint is included in the claimReward function.

Although the function has been assigned an onlyOwner modifier, it's strongly recommended to ensure that an external function is executable only in the right conditions.

Recommendation:

Valid require statements must be included to ensure accurate function execution.



2. No input validations to avoid array length mismatch

Line no: 101 to 157

Description:

The depositRewards() function allows 6 different array arguments for the function where each of them goes through a for loop iteration.

However, the function doesn't include any checkpoints to ensure that there is no array length mismatch while calling this function.

The absence of such validations might lead to unwanted function execution and is, therefore not an adequate function design.

Recommendation:

Functions should include adequate require statements to validate the arguments being passed.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

3. Costly Loop operations found

Line no: 160-214

Description:

The RewardManager contract includes a for loop in its claimRewards() function that uses a state variable like .length of a non-memory array, i.e, positionRewards, in the condition of the for loops.

As a result, these state variables consume a lot more extra gas for every iteration of the for loop. The following function includes such loops at the mentioned lines:

• claimRewards() at Line 335

Recommendation:

It's quite effective to use a local variable instead of a state variable like .length in a loop. This will be a significant step in optimizing gas usage for this function.



```
For instance,
local_variable = positionRewards.length;

for (uint256 i = 0; i < local_variable; i++) {
    ....
// for loop body
}
```

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

Recommendation / Informational

1. Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts

Line no: 2

Description:

During the code review, it was found that the contracts included unlocked pragma solidity version statements.

It's not considered a better practice in Smart contract development to do so as it might lead to accidental deployment to a version with unfixed bugs.

Recommendation:

It's always recommended to lock pragma statements to a specific version while writing contracts.



Contract Name: RaceEvent

High Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Medium Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Low Severity Issues

1. No Events emitted after imperative State Variable modification

Line no: 269-275

Description:

Functions that update an imperative arithmetic state variable contract should emit an event after the state modification.

The setWinningPositions function modifies crucial arithmetic state variables, i.e, winningPositions RaceEvent contract but doesn't emit any event after that:

Since there is no event emitted on updating these variables, it might be difficult to track it off-chain.

Recommendation:

An event should be fired after changing crucial arithmetic state variables.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

2. Absence of input validations after important state modifications

Line no: 123-146, 240-257

Description:

During the review, it was found that some important functions do not include any input validations before updating the crucial state variables of the contract.



Some of the important ones are

- constructor():
 - The constructor lacks zero address validations on imperative addresses like nitroleague, rewardfactory etc.
- createRace():
 - The createRace() function lacks zero address validation as well as some crucial uint256 validations passed in the int_settings array argument.

Recommendation:

An event should be fired after changing crucial arithmetic state variables.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

3. External Visibility should be preferred

Explanation:

Functions that are never called throughout the contract should be marked as external visibility instead of public visibility.

This will effectively result in Gas Optimization as well.

Therefore, the following function must be marked as external within the contract:

getRewardState()

Recommendation:

If the PUBLIC visibility of the above-mentioned functions is not intended, then the EXTERNAL Visibility keyword should be preferred.



Recommendation / Informational

1. Coding Style Issues in the Contract

Description:

Code readability of a Smart Contract is largely influenced by the Coding Style issues and in some specific scenarios may lead to bugs in the future.

Parameter RaceEvent.createRace(address,string[3],uint256[6]).raceID_title_uri (contracts/flatFiles/raceEventFlat.sol#1670) is not in mixedCase Parameter RaceEvent.createRace(address,string[3],uint256[6]).int_settings (contracts/flatFiles/raceEventFlat.sol#1671) is not in mixedCase Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation#conformance-to-solidity-naming-conventions

During the automated testing, it was found that the RaceEvent contract had quite a few code-style issues. Please follow this link to find details on naming conventions in solidity code.

Recommendation:

Therefore, it is recommended to fix the issues like naming convention, indentation, and code layout issues in a smart contract.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

2. Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts

Line no: 2

Description:

During the code review, it was found that the contracts included unlocked pragma solidity version statements.

It's not considered a better practice in Smart contract development to do so, as it might lead to accidental deployment to a version with unfixed bugs.

Recommendation:

It's always recommended to lock pragma statements to a specific version while writing contracts.



Contract Name: NitroLeague

High Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Medium Severity Issues

No issues were found.

Low Severity Issues

1. Absence of Zero Address validation

Description:

The NitroLeague contract includes a few functions that update some imperative addresses in the contract.

However, during the automated testing of the contact, it was found that no Zero Address Validation was performed on the following functions before updating the state variables of the contract:

- setRewardFactory()
- setTreasuryWallet()

Recommendation:

A require statement should be included in such functions to ensure no zero address is passed in the arguments.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

2. External Visibility should be preferred

Explanation:

Functions that are never called throughout the contract should be marked as external visibility instead of public visibility.

This will effectively result in Gas Optimization as well.



Therefore, the following function must be marked as external within the contract:

getGame()

Recommendation:

If the PUBLIC visibility of the above-mentioned functions is not intended, then the EXTERNAL Visibility keyword should be preferred.

Amended (October 28th, 2022): The team has fixed the issue, and it is no longer present in commit 9d3885c6da27e67fd9e597bb4d59e4662db13c7c.

Recommendation / Informational

1. Unlocked Pragma statements found in the contracts

Line no: 2

Description:

During the code review, it was found that the contracts included unlocked pragma solidity version statements.

It's not considered a better practice in Smart contract development to do so, as it might lead to accidental deployment to a version with unfixed bugs.

Recommendation:

It's always recommended to lock pragma statements to a specific version while writing contracts.



Final Audit

Low Severity Issues

2 New issues were found in Mintable contract

1. The reset of mintCount by the owner does not follow the intended procedure.

Line no - 189-192

Description:

As per the current design of the contract, the reset of mintcount should only happen if the daily mint is exceeded and the lastUpdateTime greater than 24 hours.

However, the **resetMintCount()** function in the contract allows the owner to bypass these checkpoints and directly reset the mint count for any token contract.

This symbolizes excessive power in the hands of owners as the owner address can choose to stop minting at any time by resetting the mint count. This could also lead to a high severity issue if the owner keys are in the hands of the wrong actor in case the owner address is an EOA instead of a multi-sig.

Recommendation:

Imperative functions that influence the flow of tokens or minting of tokens should follow one specific procedure, even if the caller is an owner.

If the above-mentioned design is intentional, it must be made clear to the community members that the owner has such control over the minting procedure of the tokens.

Acknowledged (October 28th, 2022): The team has acknowledged the issue, and it is intended behavior.

2. setDailyMintLimit() function doesn't validate the arguments. Line no- 176-180

Description:

The setDailyMintLimit() function is responsible for updating the maximum daily mint limits of tokens.

However, the function doesn't include any input validations on the uint256 arguments passed to it.



This could lead to an unwanted scenario where any invalid input passed to this function might stop new tokens from being as well.

Recommendation:


Although the function is marked with an **onlyOwner** modifier, it's recommended to include adequate input validations for the function to ensure only the right arguments are passed to it.

Alternatively, functions that update any important arithmetic state variables can also include a maximum or minimum threshold check within its body to ensure the state variable is only updated with a value that falls in the pre-defined range of the contract.




Additional Details - Inheritance Graph


1. NitroLeague



2. RaceEvent



3. Race



4. RewardManager





Automated Audit Result

1. NitroLeague

```
Compiled with solc
Number of lines: 982 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 in tests)
Number of assembly lines: 0
Number of contracts: 13 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 tests)
Number of optimization issues: 4
Number of informational issues: 16
Number of low issues: 5
Number of medium issues: 1
Number of high issues: 2
ERCs: ERC165, ERC721, ERC20
                                   | # functions |
               Name
                                                                        ERCS
                                                                                                  ERC20 info
                                                                                                                             | Complex code |
                                                                                                                                                                    Features
   IRaceEvent
IRaceEventFactory
                                                                                                                                         No
No
                                               8
                                                                                                                                         No
                                                                      ERC20
                                                                                                  No Minting
                                               6
                                                                                                                                         No
              IERC20
                                               10
7
47
                                                               ERC165, ERC721
ERC165
                                                                                                                                         No
No
No
            IERC721
IERC1155
                                                                                                                                                           Send ETH
Tokens interaction
```

2. RaceEvent


```
Compiled with solc
Number of lines: 1759 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 in tests)
Number of assembly lines: 0
Number of contracts: 24 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 tests)
Number of optimization issues: 6
Number of informational issues: 18
Number of low issues: 13
Number of medium issues: 0
Number of high issues: 4
ERCs: ERC165, ERC20, ERC721
              Name
                                      | # functions
                                                                                    ERCS
                                                                                                                      ERC20 info
                                                                                                                                                           Complex code
                                                                                                                                                                                                        Features
   INitroLeague
IRaceFactory
IRace
IRewardFactory
IERC20
                                                                                                                                                                      No
No
                                                      1
10
                                                                                                                                                                      No
No
                                                                                  ERC20
                                                                                                                      No Minting
          IERC721
IERC1155
                                                    10
7
                                                                        ERC165, ERC721
ERC165
                                                                                                                                                                      No
No
    Counters
RewardManager
                                                    4
41
                                                                                                                                                                     No
Yes
                                                                                  ERC165
                                                                                                                                                                                                        Send ETH
                                                                                                                                                                                             Tokens interaction
Send ETH
Tokens interaction
        RaceEvent
                                                     38
                                                                                                                                                                       No
```



3. Race

```
Number of lines: 1296 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 in tests)
Number of assembly lines: 0
Number of contracts: 15 (+ 0 in dependencies, + 0 tests)
Number of optimization issues: 2
Number of informational issues: 12
Number of low issues: 6
Number of medium issues: 3
Number of high issues: 2
ERCs: ERC721, ERC20, ERC165
                                    | # functions |
              Name
                                                                               ERCS
                                                                                                              ERC20 info
                                                                                                                                               | Complex code |
                                                                                                                                                                                            Features
                                                                                                                                                             No
No
No
        IRaceEvent
     INitroLeague
IRewardManager
    IRewardFactory
IERC20
                                                  1
6
                                                                                                                                                             No
No
                                                                             ERC20
                                                                                                       No Minting
Approve Race Cond
                                                  10
7
47
                                                                     ERC165, ERC721
ERC165
                                                                                                                                                            No
No
          IERC721
IERC1155
                                                                                                                                                                                  Tokens interaction
```

4. RewardManager





Fuzz Testing

```
Running 7 tests for test/Fuzzing.sol:FuzzTest

[PASS] testFuzz_NitroLeague_createRaceEvent(string[3],uint8) (runs: 256, µ: 3944993, ~: 3942200)

[PASS] testFuzz_RaceEvent_createRace(string[3],uint256[6]) (runs: 256, µ: 4533553, ~: 4550509)

[PASS] testFuzz_RacePvent_endRaceEvent(address[]) (runs: 256, µ: 108918, ~: 108833)

[PASS] testFuzz_Race_addPlayers(address[]) (runs: 256, µ: 4335835, ~: 4335930)

[PASS] testFuzz_Race_depositRewards(uint256[],uint8[],address[],uint256[],uint256[],string[]) (runs: 256, µ: 321694, ~: 322373)

[PASS] testFuzz_Race_endRace(address[]) (runs: 256, µ: 4423879, ~: 4423509)

[PASS] testFuzz_Race_startRace() (gas: 4372371)

Test result: ok. 7 passed; 0 failed; finished in 2.78s

forge test --match-path test/EdgeCase.sol
```

```
forge test --match-path test/EdgeCase.sol
[.] Compiling...
No files changed, compilation skipped

Running 5 tests for test/EdgeCase.sol:NitroLeagueTest
[PASS] testFail_createRaceEvent_ShouldRaceEventType_notExist() (gas: 1977293)
[PASS] testFail_createRaceFails_after_canceLRaceEvent() (gas: 8165009)
[PASS] testFail_createRaceFails_after_endRaceEvent() (gas: 8218691)
[FAIL. Reason: Assertion failed.] testFail_samePlayer_added_multipleTimesIn_addPlayer() (gas: 12517334)
[FAIL. Reason: Too many players] test_minPlayer_isGreaterThen_maxPlayer() (gas: 12409671)
Test result: FAILED. 3 passed; 2 failed; finished in 11.06ms

Failing tests:
Encountered 2 failing tests in test/EdgeCase.sol:NitroLeagueTest
[FAIL. Reason: Assertion failed.] testFail_samePlayer_added_multipleTimesIn_addPlayer() (gas: 12517334)
[FAIL. Reason: Too many players] test_minPlayer_isGreaterThen_maxPlayer() (gas: 12409671)

Encountered a total of 2 failing tests, 3 tests succeeded
```

Auditor Test Cases

```
Running 26 tests for test/NitroLeague.t.sol:NitroLeagueTest
[PASS] testFail_setGame_callerNotOwner() (gas: 15008)
[PASS] testFail_setRaceEventFactory_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 14986)
[PASS] testFail_setRaceFactory_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 15008)
[PASS] testFail_setRewardFactory_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 14888)
[PASS] testFail_setTreasuryWallet_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 14919)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawERC1155_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 48864)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawERC20_CallerNot0wner() (gas: 67080)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawERC721_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 163367)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawETH_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 12782)
[PASS] test_addRaceId() (gas: 80482)
[PASS] test_createRaceEvent() (gas: 3781643)
[PASS] test_getGame() (gas: 7832)
[PASS] test_getRaceEventFactory() (gas: 9935)
[PASS] test_getRaceFactory() (gas: 9893)
[PASS] test_getRewardFactory() (gas: 10002)
[PASS] test_getTreasuryWallet() (gas: 9958)
[PASS] test_raceIDExists() (gas: 80469)
[PASS] test_setGame() (gas: 21179)
[PASS] test_setRaceEventFactory() (gas: 21084)
[PASS] test_setRaceFactory() (gas: 21083)
[PASS] test_setRewardFactory() (gas: 21172)
[PASS] test_setTreasuryWallet() (gas: 18350)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC1155() (gas: 58530)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC20() (gas: 72429)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC721() (gas: 181485)
[PASS] test_withdrawETH() (gas: 19947)
Test result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; finished in 7.16ms
```



```
Running 26 tests for test/Race.t.sol:RaceTest
[PASS] testFail_cancelRace_CallerNotGame() (gas: 12794)
[PASS] testFail_reclaimFee() (gas: 7791)
[PASS] testFail_setParticipantsURI_CallerNotGame() (gas: 13385)
[PASS] testFail_setURI_CallerNotGame() (gas: 13407)
[PASS] testFail_transferOwnership_CallerNotGame() (gas: 14994)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawERC1155_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 53364)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawERC20_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 67307)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawERC721_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 163354)
[PASS] testFail_withdrawETH_CallerNotOwner() (gas: 12715)
[PASS] test_addPlayers() (gas: 4314845)
[PASS] test_cancelRace() (gas: 32593)
[PASS] test_claimRewards() (gas: 36178)
[PASS] test_depositRewards() (gas: 291396)
[PASS] test_endRace() (gas: 4405227)
[PASS] test_getRewardDescription() (gas: 14883)
[PASS] test_getRewardState() (gas: 13222)
[PASS] test_joinRace() (gas: 173441)
[PASS] test_reclaimFee() (gas: 39224)
[PASS] test_setParticipantsURI() (gas: 44244)
[PASS] test_setURI() (gas: 27166)
[PASS] test_startRace() (gas: 4370787)
[PASS] test_transferOwnership_() (gas: 19529)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC1155() (gas: 66135)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC20() (gas: 80337)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC721() (gas: 189088)
[PASS] test_withdrawETH() (gas: 27510)
Test result: ok. 26 passed; 0 failed; finished in 3.53ms
```

```
Running 19 tests for test/RaceEvent.t.sol:RaceTest
[PASS] testFail_createRace() (gas: 19416)
[PASS] testFail_setWinningPositions() (gas: 12851)
[PASS] testFail_transferOwnership_() (gas: 15037)
[PASS] test_cancelRaceEvent() (gas: 31326)
[PASS] test_claimRewards() (gas: 31154)
[PASS] test_createRace() (gas: 4388675)
[PASS] test_depositRewards_ERC20() (gas: 291165)
[PASS] test_depositRewards_OFF_CHAIN() (gas: 206683)
[PASS] test_depositRewards_tokenTypes_ERC1155() (gas: 297406)
[PASS] test_depositRewards_tokenTypes_ERC721() (gas: 378745)
[PASS] test_endRaceEvent() (gas: 91929)
[PASS] test_getRewardState() (gas: 13063)
[PASS] test_isRaceEvent() (gas: 5456)
[PASS] test_setWinningPositions() (gas: 40199)
[PASS] test_transferOwnership_() (gas: 19527)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC1155() (gas: 61336)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC20() (gas: 75520)
[PASS] test_withdrawERC721() (gas: 181346)
[PASS] test_withdrawETH() (gas: 22270)
Test result: ok. 19 passed; 0 failed; finished in 7.02ms
```



Test Coverage

Analysing contracts Running tests		1	1	
File	% Lines	+ % Statements	+ % Branches	+ % Funcs
src/NitroLeague.sol	100.00% (27/27)	100.00% (28/28)	50.00% (2/4)	======================================
src/Race.sol	82.54% (52/63)	78.21% (61/78)	42.00% (21/50)	100.00% (19/19)
src/RaceEvent.sol	100.00% (26/26)	100.00% (27/27)	50.00% (4/8)	100.00% (14/14)
src/lib/EIP712.sol	0.00% (0/5)	0.00% (0/5)	0.00% (0/2)	0.00% (0/3)
src/lib/ERC1155.sol	47.83% (44/92)	47.37% (54/114)	20.00% (8/40)	57.14% (12/21)
src/lib/ERC1155ClaimContext.sol	100.00% (3/3)	100.00% (3/3)	50.00% (1/2)	50.00% (1/2)
src/lib/ERC20.sol	63.64% (35/55)	62.90% (39/62)	36.36% (8/22)	61.11% (11/18)
src/lib/ERC721.sol	64.62% (42/65)	63.77% (44/69)	36.67% (11/30)	46.43% (13/28)
src/lib/ERC721Enumerable.sol	51.43% (18/35)	52.63% (20/38)	57.14% (8/14)	44.44% (4/9)
src/lib/MetaOwnable.sol	25.00% (2/8)	25.00% (2/8)	25.00% (1/4)	20.00% (1/5)
src/lib/MinimalClaimContext.sol	100.00% (3/3)	100.00% (3/3)	50.00% (1/2)	50.00% (1/2)
src/lib/MinimalForwarder.sol	12.50% (1/8)	10.00% (1/10)	0.00% (0/4)	33.33% (1/3)
src/lib/Mintable.sol	32.00% (8/25)	29.63% (8/27)	16.67% (2/12)	31.25% (5/16)
src/tokens/Nitro1155.sol	100.00% (6/6)	100.00% (6/6)	100.00% (0/0)	100.00% (4/4)
src/tokens/NitroNFT.sol	91.67% (11/12)	91.67% (11/12)	50.00% (2/4)	83.33% (5/6)
src/tokens/onERC721Received.sol	0.00% (0/1)	0.00% (0/1)	100.00% (0/0)	0.00% (0/1)
src/tokens/rNitro.sol	100.00% (4/4)	100.00% (4/4)	100.00% (0/0)	100.00% (2/2)
src/utils/Gameable.sol	50.00% (1/2)	50.00% (1/2)	100.00% (0/0)	50.00% (1/2)
src/utils/RaceEventFactory.sol	100.00% (3/3)	100.00% (4/4)	100.00% (0/0)	100.00% (1/1)
src/utils/RaceFactory.sol	100.00% (3/3)	100.00% (4/4)	100.00% (0/0)	100.00% (1/1)
src/utils/RewardFactory.sol	100.00% (3/3)	100.00% (4/4)	100.00% (0/0)	100.00% (1/1)
src/utils/RewardManager.sol	75.51% (37/49)	76.79% (43/56)	36.36% (8/22)	100.00% (10/10)
src/utils/TokenWithdrawer.sol	100.00% (5/5)	100.00% (6/6)	50.00% (1/2)	100.00% (4/4)
Total	66.40% (334/503)	65.32% (373/571)	35.14% (78/222)	67.89% (129/190



Concluding Remarks

While conducting the audits of the Nitro League smart contracts, it was observed that the contracts contain Medium and Low severity issues.

Our auditors suggest that Medium and Low severity issues should be resolved by the developers. The recommendations given will improve the operations of the smart contract.

Disclaimer

ImmuneBytes's audit does not provide a security or correctness guarantee of the audited smart contract. Securing smart contracts is a multistep process; therefore, running a bug bounty program as a complement to this audit is strongly recommended.

Our team does not endorse the Nitro League platform or its product nor this audit is investment advice. Notes:

- Please make sure contracts deployed on the mainnet are the ones audited.
- Check for code refactoring by the team on critical issues.

ImmuneBytes