

# 1 | Cold War Research Paper

## 1.1 | General Information

Due Date	Topic	Important Documents
3/17/21	Cold War in the Developing World	JSTOR, Palmer 23

## 1.2 | Prompt

New accounts push past a bifurcated world to present the Cold War as a triangular struggle between the two great powers and developing nations to show how those involved in decolonization struggles adapted strategies shaped by the Cold War dynamic.

Your task is to explore this triangular relationship within a single case study. Your task is to analyze how your sources suggest a way to capture this triangular cold war dynamic.

In a ~4 page paper, evaluate how a global perspective for the Cold War helps to understand events in your case study.

**\*\*How did the Cold War system shape development and/or decolonization in your region?**

<!--You might ask how the "cold war lens" led Soviet and American policy makers to pursue counter-productive policies. How leaders and revolutionaries took advantage of the Cold War dynamic to advance their own interests, playing one power off of another? You might even identify policies and strategies that were separate from Cold War imperatives--What is the relation, for example, of populism, Arab Nationalism and/or Pan-Africanism to Cold War priorities?-->

## 1.3 | Quotes Bin

- "Beijing and Paris moved from military and political antagonism over the Indochina conflict in 1946-1954 and over the Algerian liberation struggle in 1954-1962 toward a partial alignment of views." AA
- "It was the shared uneasiness over the deteriorating situation in Vietnam and over the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), signed by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in Moscow in early August 1963, that helped to usher in the process of recognition." AB
- A five point reason for establishment of relationships as argued by historian Garret Martin L1
  1. "First, the end of the Algerian War in the spring of 1962 removed a major point of Sino-French conflict." L1A
  2. "Second, the Cuban missile crisis in October of the same year revealed that neither superpower wanted global war. In turn, this provided new opportunities for medium powers to follow independent policies." L1B
  3. "Third, Sino-French recognition was a natural follow-up to de Gaulle's attempts to break Anglo-American dominance in the West in early 1963 through the Franco-German treaty." L1C
  4. "Fourth, de Gaulle perceived the LTBT of August 1963 as an attack on French global interests." L1D
  5. "Finally, the political instability in South Vietnam in 1963 brought China and France to agree in their criticism of Ngo Dinh Diem's regime." L1E
- "The shared nuclear isolation and the partial agreement on Vietnam in August 1963 by Beijing and Paris symbolized a new stage in the trajectory of their mutual relationship from antagonism toward mutual recognition" AC

- "From the day the PRC was founded in the fall of 1949, it had striven for universal diplomatic recognition. Not only did this policy express the old nationalist aim of restoring China to its former glory and greatness in international relations; it also conveyed the aspiration of the Communist leaders to obtain recognition from non-Communist states, based on the "principles of equality"" AD
- "The PRC explicitly warned the Soviet Union against assuming legal "responsibilities in lieu of China. Even now, decades after the signing of the LTBT, Chinese publications still claim that the treaty deprived the PRC of the right to develop and test nuclear weapons." AE
- "President John F. Kennedy, who feared the Chinese acquisition of nuclear weapons in 1962-1963, was at times more interested in the proliferation aspects of the treaty than in the banning of testing in multiple environments" AF
- "De Gaulle was highly critical of the LTBT. In reality, however, France was not affected by the accord's provisions. The underground tests it was conducting in Algeria were permitted by the Soviet-British-American pact as the only way to test nuclear weapons. But the French president saw the trilateral agreement as yet another Yalta-style deal among the three most powerful countries on earth, concluded behind the backs of less powerful states, and designed to preserve the three great powers' preeminent status in international relations" AE
- "Even if France and the PRC disagreed on the future course with regard to Vietnam, they both believed in the necessity of U.S. political and military withdrawal from the country" AF
- "The desire for recognition by the outside world also included the wish to join the UN and, as the ultimate goal, to take up the permanent seat of the ROC on the UN Security Council." AG
- "The PRC took pains to express its interest in better relations through some of its highest officials present at the Laos conference in Geneva." AH
- "The French ambassador had the strong impression that the PRC wanted to give the mutual relationship a "new importance." The Chinese had extended a hand, and they believed it was now up to the French to accept it." AI
- "[Mao's] statement signified a departure from his earlier thinking on intermediate zones, which envisioned a Europe divided in halves belonging to either the socialist or the capitalist camp. But what did Mao's new intermediate zone in Europe really mean? He claimed that the European countries were "unhappy with the U.S. and the Soviet Union." AJ
- "As the LTBT negotiations in Moscow drew to a close—the concurrent Sino-Soviet party-to-party talks in that city, which were intended to bring about ideological reconciliation, had already ended in failure" AK
- The French Foreign Ministry Asia Department Communique: "Asia Department of the French Foreign Ministry prepared a report in early February 1961 advocating rapprochement with Communist China—for reasons of principle and practicality." L2
  - "The Chinese Communists had held de facto power over mainland China for more than ten years. The notion that the ROC in Taiwan ... was the legal representative of the Chinese people ... had long before turned out to be a fiction." L2A
  - "Since the end of the Indochina War in 1954—and despite the Algerian war—France and the PRC ... no longer had any reason to be antagonistic toward each other." L2B
  - "Because many newly independent French colonies in Africa were gravitating toward recognition of mainland China, France had to appear to lead them in recognizing the PRC, otherwise it would lose influence in Africa." L2C
  - "Finally, Communist China had become the most important French trading partner in East Asia." L2D

- "He explicitly remarked that the LTBT did not prevent the PRC or France from continuing nuclear testing. Expecting an imminent Chinese nuclear test, de Gaulle elaborated that once China had obtained nuclear capacities it would become a major actor in international relations." AL
- "Zhou concluded that the Sino-Soviet split and the temporary U.S.-Soviet rapprochement on nuclear issues had created the basis for a major rearrangement in international relations, which would logically include Sino-French rapprochement." AM
- So why did Zhou decide this was a good idea? L3
  - They "believed that rapprochement with the most important European continental power, France, would progressively lead to increased political and economic relations with other West European countries, which in turn would break the U.S. economic blockade of the PRC while simultaneously increasing China's international status." L3A
  - "Sino-French rapprochement would be beneficial in isolating and opposing U.S. imperialism on a global scale." L3B
  - "Finally, China could align with France's policy of national independence designed to break the superpower monopoly in international relations." L3C
- "As de Gaulle saw it, France was willing to work for the admission of the PRC to the UN and to scale down French-Taiwanese relations to an informal level, but it was not willing to offer a French initiative to break relations with the ROC." AN
- "De Gaulle wanted both to proceed cautiously and to portray France as a great power unwilling to submit to the dictates of any other country." AO
- "Zhou lauded France's decision to grant Algeria independence the year before and commented on the fact that both France and China, as aspiring nuclear powers, opposed the LTBT." AP
- "Zhou attempted to bring up the One-China principle, whereas Faure demanded the exclusion of the issue from this preliminary session." AQ
- "Faure insisted that de Gaulle would never take the initiative in breaking relations, so he suggested that France and the PRC simply exchange ambassadors, while the French government would downgrade the ROC representation in Paris to a level to be specified later." AR
- "The situation in Indochina had deteriorated further; the relations of Great Britain and the United States—France's two competitors for global influence—with the Southeast Asian countries had worsened in parallel." AU
- "De Gaulle parted from Faure with the comment that he would go through with French recognition of the PRC if his conversations in Washington did not change U.S. views.... de Gaulle's encounters with Johnson did not go well." AV
- "De Gaulle instructed de Beaumarchais ... only "to define a procedure: /the simpler the better/" AW
- "Zhou proposed a fourth procedure in case France was not able to agree to the One-China principle. In that case, Li should state the Chinese position on the issue but not insist on the inclusion of a sentence to that effect in any draft joint communique. ... de Beaumarchais insisted that France would not agree to any reference to the One-China principle in the joint communique. Li, following the instructions he had received, dropped the issue" AX
- "if de Beaumarchais insisted on France maintaining a Two-China policy, Li was supposed to state clearly that such a position would mean a departure from earlier French positions and a sign of disrespect to the PRC, but Zhou's instructions did *not* call for a termination of negotiations in such a case" AY
- "De Gaulle's insistence on a simple text left the agreement vague with regard to the ROC on Taiwan." AZ

- So why did deGaulle think this was such a good idea? L4
  - "He stated that China was the world's largest country, that it was no longer under the control of the Soviet Union, that its Communist government was a fact of life, and that all "political realities" of Asia" L4A
  - "Thus, he continued, it would be absolutely "impossible" to envision a solution to the problems of East Asia without China" L4B
  - "de Gaulle also stressed that recognition of the PRC entailed approval of neither its institutions nor its policies" L4C

## 1.4 | Claim Synthesis

### 1.4.1 | The Claim

#### 1. Scholarly View

- AA France and China moved away from military political conflict and towards view alignment

#### 2. Shared View

- AB shared uneasiness over LTBT that triggered French recognition
- AF although PRC and France disagreed on what happens to Vietnam, they both hated the US boogymen meddling with Vietnam

#### 3. French View **Value-Based Decisions**

- The French approached Sino-French relations cautiously, not wanting to give in too much, and AO portray France as a great, unwilling to submit power
- For instance, when
  - AQ Zhou tried to bring up One-China principle, and Faure said: No.
- is a scene where French were willing to risk inacceptance over their formal diplomatic relations
  - AR Faure maintained that deGaulle would never directly break RoC relations, and suggest waiting for RoC to break diplomatic contact
  - AZ So, DeGaulle left it vague what they are going to do about 2 China policy

w.r.t. "Two China Policy" — a Chinese values-based demand — the French clearly pushed back and because there is no interest in them giving up RoC relations, did not actively use it as a bargaining chip.

#### **Realism-Based Decisions**

- AQ Zhou tried to bring up One-China principle, and Faure said: No.
- AR Faure maintained that deGaulle would never directly break RoC relations, and suggest waiting for RoC to break diplomatic contact
- AV last straw deGaulle tried to convince Johnson to do something about diplomacy with China. Johnson did not listen. So, deGaulle did diplomacy with China (connection BA)
- AN deGaulle thinks that the French is willing to help PRC go to UN and scale Franco-RoC relations down but not directly offer a breaking of Franco-RoC relations

However, given things that are realist tenants to what the French could do to help China (UN), the French did not push back.

#### **Value-Based Reflections**

- AE The actualy LTBT doesn't really matter to the French, but its more about deGaulle not wanting to be the dog of British-American-Soviet relations
- L4C deGaulle also stressed that PRC recognition is not an approval of it policies/institutios
- L2C the French need to set an example in approaching China, otherwise china is going to approach the Indep. French colonies first, which would be awkward
- AL deGaull know that LTBT did not prevent PRC/France from trying Kaboom; so, expecting China to try blowing things up soon, deGaull reasoned that China will soon become a superpower once they could make things go Kaboom.

The French wanted to help China as a way of advacing its own nationalistic goals in the department of international leadreship and representation.

#### Realism-Based Reflections

- AI the french ambassidor had the impression that "The Chinese had extended a hand, and they believed it was now up to the French to accept it."
- L1B cuban missile crisis showed that american/russia did not want to make world go kaboom, so medium states feel better to persue independent policies
- L4A deGaull thinks that China's large economy no longer controlled by USSR is a fact of life, so #dealwithit
- L4B deGaull reasoned that it would be impossible to solve the East Asia problem w/o China

The French also see that China being in asia as a fact of life, so they have to #dealwithit; might as well do so whilst it is so fresh and China is open to it.

#### 4. Chinese View **Value-Based Decisions**

Conspicuously missing.

#### Realism-Based Decisions

- AE PRC did not want USSR to represent China wrt LTBT b/c of discontent; to this day PRC claim LTBT deprived them of nuclear development rights
- AK the reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing did a die after LTBT negotiations in Moscow (connection BA)
- L3A Zhou believed that reappoarchment with France will eveuntally cause US to stop blocading PRC + increase Chineses status
- AX Zhou decided that if the French was really not up to the one-china thing in the comminqe, it is ok to just drop it. the French was no ok, so they dropped it!
- AY Zhou was even open to negotiatinos even if deBeaumarchais (deGaull
  - friends) wanted to maintain a Two-China policy

China wanted to use realistic strategies that may not necessarily align with its political goals to advance its goals of getting a "spot in the light" ideologically.

#### Value-Based Reflections

- AD China drove for diplomatic recognition from capitalists from day one aiming to restore nation-  
alist glory and the "principles of equality"
- AJ Mao departed from his earlier thinking of Europe in two **a la cold war** and moved to a European  
countries is unhappy with both US and Soviet stance (connect CA)
- L3C china could align with French's National Independence to break superpower monopoly
- L3B Sino-French corroporation will oppose US + imperialism

China reasoned that the Cold War will probably splinter Europe and cause smaller European countries to resist superpower monopoly. Hence, partnership with France will break the imperialistic and capitalistic systems.

**Realism-Based Reflections** - AM Zhou Enlai concluded that the Sino-Soviet split + US Soviet Nuclear Reapproachment (**product of the cold war??**) means that international BoP will change soon, so might as well build relations with France (connect CA)

Realistically, China believed that the cold war's BOP shift will offer them a chance to have some skin in the game.

More better question: how does the Cold War influence the Franco-Chinese balance of Ideology vs. Pragmatism?

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## 1.5 | The Claim

**<!--The Cold War gave an opportunity for the capitalist French Republic and the communist PRC an opportunity of cross-aisle collaboration: leveraging shared gains under political pragmatism and rallying plans via a sense of nationalistic pride whilst resisting fundamental changes of values and morals.-->**

\*Cold war dynamics of the 1960s created a diplomatically timely opportunity for the development of Sino-French relationships for both states to assert their nationalism-fueled need for increased international recognition; to garner heightened recognition, both had to leverage diplomatic pragmatism in balancing their values with their realities to ultimately achieve their nationalistic goals of added recognition.\*

*Finally, define the results of the author's focus on the sidelines of the Cold War. Engage with the projects of the author / their choices.*

- Cold war create an opportunity => foreground it with how the author is defining the cold war moment. The author is consciously decenter the cold war in order to compare China with France/
- Sino french leverage opportunity with pragmatic ways
- Nationalism as a end whilst value maintenance as a means to that end
- The cold war created the ideal circumstance for sino-french collaboration
  - On the Chinese side, they saw the Cold War as an opportunity of growth and assertion of national identity amidst European chaos:
    - \* AM Zhou Enlai concluded that the Sino-Soviet split + US Soviet Nuclear Reapproachment — a product of the cold war — means that international BoP will change soon, so might as well build relations with France (connect CA)
    - \* AJ Mao departed from his earlier thinking of Europe in two **a la cold war** and moved to a European countries is unhappy with both US and Soviet stance (connect CA)
    - \* AE PRC did not want USSR to represent China wrt LTBT b/c of discontent; to this day PRC claim LTBT deprived them of nuclear development rights
  - On the French side, the combination of the the Cuban missile crisis + LTBT gave the French a carrot and a stick to pursue independent diplomacy from major European powers
    - \* *The carrot*: L1B Cuban missile crisis showed that American/Russia did not want to make world go kaboom, so medium states feel better to pursue independent policies
    - \* *The stick*: AE The actual LTBT doesn't really matter to the French, but it's more about deGaulle not wanting to be the dog of British-American-Soviet relations
- Both countries reasoned the reconciliation on practical grounds

- The French reasoned the necessity of Sino-French relationships based on the fact that China will be a major player at least in the East whether it liked it or not, so...
    - \* AL deGaulle knew that LTBT did not prevent PRC/France from trying Kaboom; so, expecting China to try blowing things up soon, deGaulle reasoned that China will soon become a superpower once they could make things go Kaboom.
    - \* L4B deGaulle reasoned that it would be impossible to solve the East Asia problem w/o China
    - \* L2C the French need to set an example in approaching China, otherwise China is going to approach the Indep. French colonies first, which would be awkward
  - The Chinese approached it from a need of international recognition, and potentially the advance of the 1 China policy.
    - \* AK the reconciliation between Moscow and Beijing did a die after LTBT negotiations in Moscow (connection BA)
    - \* L3A Zhou believed that rapprochement with France will eventually cause US to stop blockading PRC + increase Chinese status
    - \* L3B Sino-French cooperation will oppose US + imperialism
    - \* L3C China could align with French's National Independence to break superpower monopoly
  - Both parties approached the negotiations cautiously; but the Chinese were willing to give up ideological grounds for practical gain while the French guarded their ideological bottom line
    - The French approached Sino-French relations cautiously, not wanting to give in too much, and AO portray France as a great, unwilling to submit power
    - L4C deGaulle also stressed that PRC recognition is not an approval of its policies/institutions
    - AX Zhou decided that if the French was really not up to the one-China thing in the communique, it is ok to just drop it. The French was no ok, so they dropped it!
    - AY Zhou was even open to negotiations even if deBeaumarchais (deGaulle + friends) wanted to maintain a Two-China policy
1. Discussions with Tom Asserting a French power to reaffirm the "specialness" of France => nationalism! Not ideology.
- Maintenance of ideological commitments as a means to National preeminence => ideology is trans-national
- France maintains ideological commitments to not appear as capitulating
  - Disentangle nationalism from ideology
- "Why is it important for the French to maintain their conservatism?"
- (a) In the 1960s, CW dynamics created a timely opportunity for China + US to assert national position on the international stage
  - (b) To do so, however, countries had to balance values and pragmatism in order to ultimately support their goal of doing so.

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How does the Chinese people get sold on the idea of establishing relationships with the French? Was it authoritarianism?

How does nationalism inform the decision between deGaulle and Mao? deGaulle's wish to play/dominate European politics + Mao's wish to establish "principles of equality" => both sentiments of Nationalism.

Perhaps both states employed *realpolitik* treatment to politics and to advanced their state goals.

Cold war established a balance between pragmatism and ideology, and reality does/does not matter?

Revolutionary sentiments used and the sense of "fellow revolutionary" mentality as a tool to pursue a realist sense of partnership

### 1.5.1 | Garbagish

- "The nature of the documents ... does not provide a comprehensive view into top-level decision-making. Most of that kind of documentation is stored in the Central Party Archive in Beijing, which is closed to foreign researchers."
- "Although de Gaulle's proposal was welcomed in Laos and Cambodia, the two Vietnams suspected the French president of trying to regain French influence. The United States did not take the announcement well either, in part because de Gaulle had assured Kennedy in 1961 that he would keep his disagreement on Vietnam to himself."
- "Whereas the establishment of Sino-French diplomatic relations remained stuck in the Cold War and blocked by the Algerian war, trade relations developed following the collapse of Sino-Soviet economic relations in mid-1960."
- "Isolated in the Arab world, Egypt reciprocated with a gesture to the Chinese: it recognized both North Korea and North Vietnam in early October."
- "explaining that the French government considered the time "ripe" to recognize the Chinese government."
- "The goal of Zhou's seven-week tour to ten Middle Eastern and African countries ... was to improve bilateral contacts but also, according to the memoir of Zhou's interpreter, to gain support for UN membership."
- "During the meal on 20 August, Faure asked point-blank for an invitation to visit China in October for the purpose of meeting Chinese leaders and "visiting peoples communes.""
- "France had not been against recognition in principle, but de Gaulle's decision to reach out to the PRC happened against the background of the evolving Vietnam crisis, albeit *before* the introduction of martial law in South Vietnam on 20 August and the French president's call for neutralization nine days later."
- "Given that the PRC had challenged the Soviet Union since the late 1950s, the Chinese foreign minister lauded France for standing up to the United States, the head of the capitalist camp. He also expressed his desire to see a strong France—one that would restrain the United States and West Germany in Europe and help to contain the United States and Japan in Asia"
- "[Mao's] analysis hinted at one seemingly obvious outcome: the advent of multipolarity and a rearrangement of international relations."
- "The report thus suggested using the "Cuban method" of making a public agreement on recognition in principle, accompanied by a secret agreement regarding the nature of diplomatic relations."
- "Faure replied that the circumstances seemed to have changed in recent times in favor of recognition: the Algeria problem had been resolved, China was in dire straits after the Sino-Soviet split, and France had already succeeded in marking out a stance in international relations that was independent from the United States—particularly on Vietnam."
- "Playing on de Gaulle's anti-American attitudes, Faure asserted that the Chinese leaders believed that only three non-Communist powers in the world ... had some sympathy for the PRC ... although the Chinese leaders were convinced that only France had "escaped the American feudalization.""

### 1.5.2 | The Dump

- AH China actively brought up better relations with France at Laos conference
- AF JFK wanted Chinese nuclear proliferation more than test banning



- AC nuclear isolation + partial agreement on Vietnam developed sino-french relations
- AG chinese desire of recognition also included inclusion to the UN
- L2 The French Foreign Ministry established a communique regarding the principle and practical reasons of chinese reapproachment
  - L2A the notion that RoC was legally China is just not true
  - L2B the French had no practical reason to hate on China
  - L2D also, trade is cool! And china does asia trade goodly.
- AP Zhou commended French decision to make Algeria independent + also believed both countries hated LTBT
- AU indonesia deteriorated. further. GB and US relations in Southeast asia worsened
- AW deGaulle wanted Occam's Razor Chinese Relations
- L1 a five point argument of why relationships established
  - L1A End of the Algerian war eased tensions
  - L1C Sino-French recognition is a follow up to deGaulle's de-angloamerican dominance campaign
  - L1D deGaulle felt LTBT was an attach on French interests
  - L1E south Vietnam instability became triggering point for shared political agreement against Ngo Dinh Diem

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There is always UCLA Writing Lab