

#flo #ret #hw

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## 1 | Research project

### 1.1 | thoughts

sputnik? - satellite was launched before, sent this massive wave of panic - because the red was ahead technologically! - led to a huge amount of focus on STEM - turns out, we actually had the satellites the whole time - but eisenhower didn't want to launch them because he didn't want to deal with the fuss about how to manage airspace?

eisenhower didn't want to launch - didn't want to escalate? - was already spying, and got found out

// this entire philosophy that

the current modern philosophy that science and technology should be the main focus of education was built off of a politically self-serving lie. the current modern philosophy -> the current educational emphasis on science and technology, expanded in the post-sputnik era, was built on...

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- sputnik was a thing
- sputnik was a lie (we weren't really behind)
- that lie was politically motivated
- and yet...
- sputnik led to an expansion of techno education and social value
- that persists

political self-serving motivates what is perceived as true has this on both sides: eisenhower and the "the gap"

driving 'truths' are formed from politically self-serving lies

the sputnik lie – and its consequent impacts –

– a cultural impact so deep, that the falsehood of its roots has little effect on its adherence – was propagated by aligned political agendas of competing parties

thesis: the Sputnik lie – {} having a cultural impact so deep, that the falsehood of its roots has little effect on its adherence – was

The Sputnik lie, born of political agendas, had a cultural impact so deep that

the need for technological advancement \*

- sputnik shocked the country

sputnik launch,

### 1.2 | sources

- <https://history.nasa.gov/sputnik/sputorig.html> good source of quotes and primaries

- <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/main.html> all the archived nyts from the period
    - <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/sput-15.html> nyt article saying we need to focus on science
    - <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/sput-20.html> Vanguard Rocket Burns on Beach; Failure to Launch Test Satellite Assailed as Blow to U.S. Prestige
  - <https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/sputnik-declassified.html#> the org nova vid
  - <https://guides.loc.gov/sputnik-and-the-space-race/primary-resources>
  - <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/collection/383/space-race>
  - [https://www.bookbrowse.com/excerpts/index.cfm/book\\_number/1249/page\\_number/3/the-mercury-13](https://www.bookbrowse.com/excerpts/index.cfm/book_number/1249/page_number/3/the-mercury-13)
  - <https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/channels/vol5/iss1/3/>
  - <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41821079>
1.
    - <https://web.archive.org/web/20201107232126/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/intelligence-warning-1957-launch-sputnik>
    - <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/science/sputnik-launch-cia.html>
    - <https://web.archive.org/web/20201111165816/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/what-was-missile-gap>
    - <https://web.archive.org/web/20201020003055/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/collection/intelligence-warning-1957-launch-sputnik?page=1>

### 1.3 | route bin

"Decades after Sputnik burned in the atmosphere, we're still talking about science education as a means of security," Miller said.

ce. Deeply shocked, the country responded by pouring vast sum education, science, and the space programme, which reasserted Ame leadership a decade later by putting a man on the moon. For univer science, in particular, sputnik is credited with bringing in a cornuco federal support for research, graduate study, build- ings and laborato

Eventually, this largesse was choked off by the Vietnam war and the presidency.<sup>6</sup> Sputnik was not the direct cause of this chain of events, but conventional wisdom is not entirely wrong in seeing it as the catalys hence their appropriate s

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  - (a) CIA has a long-term interest in the development of true reconnaissance satellite, for which the vehicle con- 2 templated by NSC 5520 would provide valuable data and exper- ience. While the Defense Department would probably be dele- gated responsibility for the planning and launch- ing of a reconnaissance satellite, CIA would be a principal user and beneficiary of the data collected by such means. [https://web.archive.org/web/20201020044621/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0002287889.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20201020044621/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0002287889.pdf) \*
  - (b) Earth Satellite. to develop such a vehicle We estimate that the Soviets are attempting at the earli- est practicable date and could have a relatively uninstrumented, vehicle by 1958. A vehicle which could gather and transmit upper atmosphere scientific data could be available by 1963. [https:// web.archive.org/web/20201104054707/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_](https://web.archive.org/web/20201104054707/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_)

0003192764.pdf \* "Preparations for launching 8A artificial satellite were taking place in the USSR and that the preliminary stages in scientific research for making such a satellite had already been carried out.,8

IZVESTIA EO 1352 [https://web.archive.org/web/20201104054820/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0006687257.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20201104054820/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006687257.pdf) \*/ Soviets plan to launch 12 to 14 satellite vehicles from a launching site located in the "middle" of the USSR and on such an orbit that the USSR will have "maximum length of time for observation." [https://web.archive.org/web/20201104054952/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0006687256.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20201104054952/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006687256.pdf) 13 July 1956 /\* We believe that the USSR will make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite. We further believe it has the capability of orbiting a small vehicle, in early 1957, which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military value. [https://web.archive.org/web/20201104055145/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0006687232.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20201104055145/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006687232.pdf) 8 Oct 1956 \* Four days after Sputnik I, poor Quarles was called on the White House carpet. "There was no doubt," he confessed, "that the Redstone, had it been used, could have orbited a satellite a year or more ago." ... Quarles then accentuated the positive: "... the Russians have in fact done us a good turn, unintentionally, in establishing the concept of freedom of international space.... The President then looked ahead five years, and asked about a reconnaissance vehicle."1 Walter A. McDougall - The Heavens and the Earth\_ A Political History of the Space Age-Johns Hopkins University Press (1997).pdf 134

5.

## 1.4 | outline!

THESIS: The Sputnik lie, and with it massive cultural impacts, was born of a confluence of competing political interests.

- Sputnik had a massive cultural impact
  - hysteria, fear, massive focus on STEM in schools
- But it was a lie
  - what actually happened was...
- It was a lie because
  - Eisenhower's reasoning (declassified)
    - \* wanted covert info on Russians
    - \* got caught
    - \* didn't want to escalate further
  - Dems reasoning
    - \* wanted to make the reps look bad (had lost previous election due to being portrayed as "soft on communism" - lost China etc..)
- conclusion?
  - But nobody questions the emphasis on STEM, even though the original premise has been falsified. Thus, history teaches us, the cultural changes live on well beyond their original purpose.

### 1. the cultural impact of sputnik

### 1.4.1 | rougher?

- intro : 1
- cultural impact
  - hysteria : 2
  - STEM focus : 3
- what actually happened : 4
- what actually happened pt.2? : 5
- why it was a lie
  - eisenhower : 6
  - dems : 7
- conclusions? : 8

### 1.5 | f\*ck it. lets write.

{SPUTNIK INTRO AND EXPLANATION} The Sputnik lie, and with it massive cultural impacts, was born of a confluence of competing political interests.

With Sputnik floating amidst the atmosphere, American society was thrown into crisis. In a period defined by national pride – especially over technological superiority – the Russians being first to space was catastrophic for American society: "words do not easily convey the American reaction to the Soviet satellite," writes NASA, "the only appropriate characterization that begins to capture the mood on 5 October involves the use of the word hysteria." (CITE nasa) Not only was the nation's pride damaged, but its very identity was thrown into question. Lyndon B. Johnson, the Senate Majority Leader at the time, commented that "Now, somehow, in some new way, the sky seemed almost alien. I also remember the profound shock of realizing that it might be possible for another nation to achieve technological superiority over this great country of ours." (CITE find source) Sputnik was equipped with a radio, sending out what America "believed to be impulse signals from the Soviet satellite." (CITE <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/sput-04.html>) This eerie and alien reminder of failure was not only received by The National Broadcasting Company, who "broke into their radio and television programs to enable their audiences to hear the pinging sound of the 'moon's' signal," but as the Soviets frequently mentioned, by anyone with a radio. Virtually anyone could – and did – hear and track what otherwise would have been an "invisible emissary." The radio transformed Sputnik into something "very real and very close," capturing and frightening "the public's imagination." (CITE <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/main.html>) Sputnik had launched, America was in crisis, and the Space Age had officially begun. The blame had to fall somewhere.

Widely accused for letting the Soviet Union overtake the U.S., the seemingly unfazed President Eisenhower became a target of national ridicule. Eisenhower was already widely viewed as a "do-nothing [...] golf and goof" of a president, and Sputnik's launch was no help to his public perception (CITE <https://digitalcommons.cedarville.edu/channels/vol5/iss1/3/>). However, despite the rest of the nation, Eisenhower seemed unfazed by what became known as the "Sputnik Crisis" – "it seemed as though President Eisenhower," writes Space Age expert Martha Ackmann, "was the only American who did not initially understand the military, scientific, or cultural significance of Sputnik's chirp." (CITE [https://www.bookbrowse.com/excerpts/index.cfm/book\\_number/1249/page\\_number/3/the-mercury-13](https://www.bookbrowse.com/excerpts/index.cfm/book_number/1249/page_number/3/the-mercury-13)). G. Mennen Williams, the governor of Michigan at the time, characterized public perception of the Eisenhower administration with a poem: "Oh little Sputnik, flying high With made-in-Moscow beep, You tell the world it's a Commie sky and Uncle Sam's asleep."

You say on fairway and on rough The Kremlin knows it all, We hope our golfer knows enough To get us on the ball. (CITE find) “The Eisenhower administration, with its alarmingly unalarmed supposed “smiling incompetent” of a spearhead was put under immense pressure. This pressure, combined with the national panic, led to lasting and extensive shifts in American society at large.

After the initial panic, Sputnik was met with an insurgence of focus on science and technology in American Society. The importance placed on science and technology today, especially in education, in large part resulted from this seemingly “dated and irrelevant” launch of “Sputnik I, [which] provoked a monumental transformation in the nation’s science policy.” (CITE <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41821079>). At the time, along with the pressure on President Eisenhower, the consensus became that “the nation’s youth must be taught to appreciate the importance of science,” said the New York Times in 1957. “The United States’ way of life is ‘doomed to rapid extinction,’ the director of the American Institute of Physics said yesterday,” unless “future generations appreciate the role of science in modern society.” (CITE <https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/partners/aol/special/sputnik/sput-15.html>). Thus, the Eisenhower administration launched NASA, as well as created “a cornucopia of federal support” for science and technology. The country was using “science education as a means of security.” (CITE <https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2007/10/how-sputnik-changed-u-s-education/>). The culture had shifted, and science and technology became viewed as not only vital but as the path to prosperity, ushering in a new age of techno-utopianism. This new cultural ideology was “what it was all about,” says former rocket-scientist Maclen Marvit, born just after the Sputnik Launch. “Technology was the way to go [...] if you wanted a better world,” he continued. “I now recognize that the historical context I grew up [in], and much of my personal ideology, is the product of Sputnik.”

but it was a lie!

what was the lie? there wasnt some big tech gap. america was not really behind. america already had the tech for the satellite. america knew sputnik was about to launch sputnik launch was viewed as a good thing

Despite the immense impact of the Sputnik launch, the popular narrative that drove this crisis was woven from lies. In reality, the Sputnik launch was not a surprise to the Eisenhower Administration, nor did the supposed Missile Gap exist. The government was able to predict the launch of Sputnik with high accuracy years before the launch. “We believe that the USSR will make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite,” wrote Assistant Director of Scientific Intelligence Herbert Scoville Jr. in a classified government briefing released sixty years later. “We further believe it has the capability of orbiting a small vehicle, in early 1957, which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military value.” (CITE [https://web.archive.org/web/20201104055145/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0006687232.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20201104055145/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006687232.pdf)). Until its recent release, the public was not informed of any of these predictions, explaining President Eisenhower’s unsurprised and thus unusual demeanor. Furthermore, not only did the government predict Sputnik’s launch, but they had the technology to have beat it.

Despite the immense impact of the Sputnik launch, the popular narrative that drove this crisis was woven from lies. In reality, the Sputnik launch was not a surprise to the Eisenhower Administration, nor did the supposed Missile Gap exist. The government had actually predicted the launch of Sputnik with surprising accuracy well before the launch. “We believe that the USSR will make a major effort to be the first country to orbit an earth satellite,” wrote Assistant Director of Scientific Intelligence Herbert Scoville Jr. in a 1956 classified government briefing released sixty years later. “We further believe it has the capability of orbiting a small vehicle, in early 1957, which could acquire scientific information and data of limited military value.” (CITE [https://web.archive.org/web/20201104055145/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC\\_0006687232.pdf](https://web.archive.org/web/20201104055145/https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0006687232.pdf)). Until its recent release, the public was not informed of any of these predictions. However, President Eisenhower knew them well and this explains his unsurprised (and misinterpreted) demeanor. Furthermore, not only did the government predict Sputnik’s launch, but they had the technology to have outraced it, and the Soviets, into space. Donald A. Quarles, the Deputy Secretary of Defense at the time, confessed just four days after the launch that “there was no doubt that the Redstone, had it been used, could have orbited a satellite a year or more ago.” (CITE Walter A. McDougall - *The Heavens and the Earth\_ A Political History of the Space Age*-Johns Hopkins University Press (1997).pdf 134). But the Eisenhower Administration simply chose not to use it, or reveal that they could.