Project 2 — Financial Transaction Monitoring

Overnight Batch Data Pipeline (Design-Only)

1. Scenario Overview & Scope

This project designs an overnight batch pipeline to detect anomalous payment activity across **Canada**, **India**, **and the UK**.

Each night, ~2 TB of logs arrive from regional payment processors.

The pipeline aggregates and flags possible **anti-money-laundering (AML)** events while meeting privacy, regulatory, and cost constraints.

- **Batch window:** 22:00 → 06:00 local time (8 h)
- **SLA:** p95 completion ≤ 6 h
- Cost ceiling: ≤ \$500 / month (edu tier)
- **Scope:** Design-only no code or running system required.

2. Data Sources & Jurisdictions

Region	Law / Regulator	Approx Volume	Residency Note
Canada	PIPEDA	0.8 TB	ca-central-1
India	DPDP Act 2023	0.7 TB	ap-south-1
UK	DPA 2018 / UK GDPR	0.5 TB	eu-west-2

Cross-border replication blocked; only aggregates shared to HQ.

3. Baseline → Improved Architecture

Baseline: manual ETL on EC2 → timeouts and \$600/mo cost.

Improved: AWS Batch + Glue + Athena + CloudWatch.

```
flowchart LR
  A["Regional Processors"] --> B["S3 Regional Buckets"]
  B --> C["Glue Crawler to Data Catalog"]
  C --> D["Athena Transform Queries"]
  D --> E["S3 Aggregate Store"]
  E --> F["Lambda Notifier to Regulator API"]
  E --> G["CloudWatch Metrics and Logs"]

subgraph Guardrails
  H["Encryption at Rest (KMS)"]
  I["Replication Off"]
  J["TTL <= 90 days (raw), 180 days (agg)"]</pre>
```

K["Audit Role Logging"]
end

% connect to nodes inside the subgraph (not to the subgraph label)
G -. audit .-> H
G -. alerts .-> K

Throughput Feasibility Calculation

2 TB \div 6 h = \approx 92 MB/s aggregate throughput.

Athena + Glue combined throughput > 200 MB/s per query in AWS benchmarks, so 2 TB fits comfortably within the 6 h SLA even with 2× retries.

Trade-offs

Decision Point	Option A	Option B	Chosen	Rationale / Trade-off
Batch Compute	AWS Glue (serverless ETL)	Amazon EMR (managed Spark cluster)	✓ Glue	Glue auto-scales for short nightly jobs ≤ 2 TB, reducing ops overhead. EMR gives more control but costs $\approx 2 \times$ more and requires cluster lifecycle management.
Query Engine / Transform	Athena (pay-per- query)	Redshift (provisioned warehouse)	✓ Athena	The workload runs once nightly, so Athena's on-demand billing avoids idle compute costs. Redshift is only justified for > 10 TB continuous workloads.
Storage Tier	S3 Standard + Lifecycle → Glacier	_	S3 Lifecycle	Raw logs need low-latency access for 6 h; older data automatically moves to Glacier, cutting storage cost ≈ 40 %.
Orchestration	Step Functions (serverless state machine)	Airflow on ECS	✓ Step Functions	Simpler to maintain; built-in retries + kill hooks. Airflow adds infra cost and complexity for a once-per-day job.
Monitoring & Alerts	CloudWatch + SNS	Third-party (Datadog, New Relic)	✓ CloudWatch	Native AWS integration and zero extra cost; sufficient for p95 SLA + cost alarms. External tools add ≈ \$50 / mo.

4. Failure & Retry Playbook

- Auto-retry 2× on transient S3/Glue errors (≤ 2 h delay).
- Kill-switch: Lambda stops jobs > 8 h or >\$15/day.
- Recovery: next run reprocesses ± 1 day.

5. Metrics / SLA / Cost Plan

Metric	Target	Test Method	
p95 completion	≤ 6 h	Synthetic clock probe	
Cost / run	≤ \$15	Budget Alert	
Detection precision gain	+10 %	Offline sample	
Data retention	≤ 90 d raw	Lifecycle unit test	

Monthly Cost Estimate

Service	Usage	\$/unit	\$/mo
Glue Job	60 h	0.44	26
Athena Queries	4 TB scan	5	20
S3 Storage (raw + agg)	3 TB-mo	0.023	69
CloudWatch Logs	20 GB	0.60	12
Lambda Notifications	0.5 M calls	0.20	1

Total ≈ \$128 / mo

Sensitivity Analysis: +25 % storage growth \rightarrow +\$17 / mo (\approx \$145 total); still < \$500 limit.

6. Privacy & Ethics Excerpt (PIA Link)

- Purpose: AML pattern detection without profiling legitimate users.
- Fields: txn_amount, merchant_id, region, timestamp, hashed payer_id.
- Minimization: No names / account numbers.
- **Retention:** raw ≤ 90 d; agg ≤ 180 d; secure delete via S3 lifecycle.
- Access: analyst RO role; audited 1 y.

Telemetry Matrix

Signal	Value	Invasive?	Effort	Keep?
txn_amount	High	Low	Low	~
merchant_id	Medium	Low	Low	▽
payer_id (hash)	Low	Medium	Medium	▽
IP address	High	High	Low	×

Recourse & Remedy: Deletion requests via bank portal \rightarrow auto-ticket \rightarrow Data Steward manual verify + delete.

Full PIA available at pia_financial.md

7. Empty Chair Perspectives

A. Unbanked Customer (India) — "Why is my data analyzed without consent?" \rightarrow Test test_opt_in_enforced()

B. Small Merchant (UK) — "Logs expose my sales volume." → Test mask_logs ledger entry

8. Clause → Control → Test Bundle Summary

Jurisdiction	Clause	Control	Test (Harm)
CA	PIPEDA s.4.5	S3 TTL ≤ 90 d	Over-retention
IN	DPDP § Consent	Opt-in join filter	Unlawful processing
UK	DPA § Anon	Salted hash rotation	Re-id risk ≥ 1 %

Red-bar pytest files in /tests/ethics/; ledger links owners + actions.

9. Risks & Ledger Integration

ID	Risk	Harm	Owner	Status
R1	Over-retention	Privacy breach	Data Platform	
R2	Consent missing	Legal risk	Pipeline Eng	
R3	Merchant logs unmasked	Competitive harm	Obs Team	

10. Ethical Operations Badge (+5%)

This submission includes one red-bar → green-bar transition:

India — DPDP Act §7 (Consent & Lawful Purpose) protecting unbanked / opt-out users.

The full CI output, diff, and updated ledger are available in Ethical_Operations_Bonus.md.