

DF - Game theory

What is the definition for zero-sum games?	For each pair of strategies (1) X's gains + Y's gains = 0 (1).																																		
What is a play-safe strategy?	A strategy that gives best guaranteed outcome regardless of what the opponent does.																																		
What is a pure strategy?	When both players play their play-safe strategy every time THUS minimising potential losses for each player.																																		
What is the value of a game to a player?	<p>The payoff to the player if they use their best strategy.</p> <p><i>This best strategy may be their play-safe strategy or an optimal mixed strategy.</i></p>																																		
How can you show there is no stable solution? If so, what must be done?	<table><tr><td colspan="2"></td><th colspan="3">B</th><td></td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"></td><th>K</th><th>Q</th><th>J</th><th>Row minimum</th></tr><tr><th rowspan="3">A</th><th>K</th><td>5</td><td>-4</td><td>2</td><td>-4</td></tr><tr><th>Q</th><td>3</td><td>1</td><td>4</td><td>1</td></tr><tr><th>J</th><td>2</td><td>3</td><td>-1</td><td>-1</td></tr><tr><th colspan="2">Column maximum</th><td>5</td><td>3</td><td>4</td><td></td></tr></table> <p style="text-align: center;">↑ min = 3</p> <p style="text-align: right;">← max = 1</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">By showing that the minimax (worst case for A) ≠ maximin (worst case for B).<ul style="list-style-type: none">Since stable solution exists ⇔ row maximin = col minimax.Use an optimal mixed strategy where you play each move with some probability. <p><i>This stable solution would mean that neither player can gain by changing their play-safe strategy.</i></p>			B						K	Q	J	Row minimum	A	K	5	-4	2	-4	Q	3	1	4	1	J	2	3	-1	-1	Column maximum		5	3	4	
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What should you make sure of when finding an optimal mixed strategy using Simplex?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">All the entries are positive (as simplex requires all variables to be non-negative).If they aren't, add some constant to each entry then subtract this from the value once you've found it. <p><u>This is demonstrated below:</u></p>																																		

		B	
		B_1	B_2
A	A_1	1	-2
	A_2	0	-1
	A_3	-1	0

Add 2 to each table entry.

		B	
		B_1	B_2
A	A_1	3	0
	A_2	2	1
	A_3	1	2

All entries must be non-negative.

Let A play A_1, A_2 and A_3 with probabilities p_1, p_2 and p_3

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Maximise } P &= v \\ \text{subject to } v &\leq 3p_1 + 2p_2 + p_3 \\ v &\leq p_2 + 2p_3 \\ p_1 + p_2 + p_3 &\leq 1 \\ v, p_1, p_2, p_3 &\geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

A's expected profit, P , is the value, v , of the game.

You replace $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$ with the inequality shown so that you can introduce a slack variable for the simplex tableau. The slack variable will be found to be zero.

$$P - v = 0$$

$$v - 3p_1 - 2p_2 - p_3 + s = 0$$

$$v - p_2 - 2p_3 + t = 0$$

$$p_1 + p_2 + p_3 + u = 1$$

Introduce slack variables.

Perform Simplex...

This gives $v = 1.5$ when $p_1 = \frac{1}{4}, p_2 = 0$ and $p_3 = \frac{3}{4}$

So the value of the game is -0.5

Subtract the 2 you added initially.

A's optimal strategy is to play A_1 and A_3 with probabilities 0.25, 0.75 and never play A_2

The value of the game to B is 0.5. Suppose B plays B_1 and B_2 with probabilities q_1 and q_2

$$\text{If A plays } A_1, \text{ the value to B is } -q_1 + 2q_2, \text{ so } -q_1 + 2q_2 = 0.5 \quad [1]$$

$$\text{Similarly, for } A_2, \quad q_2 = 0.5 \quad [2]$$

$$\text{and } A_3, \quad q_1 = 0.5 \quad [3]$$

[1], [2] and [3] are all satisfied by $q_1 = 0.5$ and $q_2 = 0.5$, so B plays B_1 and B_2 with equal probability.

You may want to find the optimal mixed strategy for the other player too.

How should you set up a game theory problem involving Simplex?

1. Ensure the value you're maximising is less than all the probability constants (eg, $v \leq p_2 + 2p_3$).
2. Ensure all probabilities sum to ≤ 1 (you can add a slack variable which will then equal zero).
3. All the variables are ≥ 0 as shown.

	<p>Let A play A_1, A_2 and A_3 with probabilities p_1, p_2 and p_3</p> <p>Maximise $P = v$</p> <p>subject to $v \leq 3p_1 + 2p_2 + p_3$</p> <p>$v \leq p_2 + 2p_3$</p> <p>$p_1 + p_2 + p_3 \leq 1$</p> <p>$v, p_1, p_2, p_3 \geq 0$</p> <p>$P - v = 0$</p> <p>$v - 3p_1 - 2p_2 - p_3 + s = 0$</p> <p>$v - p_2 - 2p_3 + t = 0$</p> <p>$p_1 + p_2 + p_3 + u = 1$</p> <p><i>This is because simplex requires us to be working in the positive region of a graph.</i></p> <div data-bbox="1198 231 1419 291">A's expected profit, P, is the value, v, of the game.</div> <div data-bbox="1198 319 1419 470">You replace $p_1 + p_2 + p_3 = 1$ with the inequality shown so that you can introduce a slack variable for the simplex tableau. The slack variable will be found to be zero.</div> <div data-bbox="1198 497 1419 535">Introduce slack variables.</div>
<p>How can you solve $m \times n$ zero-sum games?</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Look for a stable solution. If none then mixed strategy. 2. Look for dominance and reduce size. 3. If $m \times 2$ or $2 \times n$, sketch graphs. Otherwise use LP.