

Statistical Significance Makes our Mission: Impossible

StanCon @ Wash U

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June 23, 2023



Mathematica's mission



Pitfalls of *p*-values



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AMERICAN STATISTICAL ASSOCIATION RELEASES STATEMENT ON STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE AND P-VALUES

Provides Principles to Improve the Conduct and Interpretation of Quantitative

Science

March 7, 2016



Pitfalls of *p*-values

THE AMERICAN STATISTICIAN 2019, VOL. 73, NO. S1, 1–19: Editorial https://doi.org/10.1080/00031305.2019.1583913

EDITORIAL

Moving to a World Beyond "p < 0.05"



Pitfalls of *p*-values

Retire statistical significance

Valentin Amrhein, Sander Greenland, Blake McShane and more than 800 signatories call for an end to hyped claims and the dismissal of possibly crucial effects.

hen was the last time you heard a seminar speaker claim there was 'no difference' between two groups because the difference was 'statistically non-significant'?

If your experience matches ours, there's a good chance that this happened at the last talk you attended. We hope that at least someone in the audience was perplexed if, as frequently happens, a plot or table showed that there actually was a difference. How do statistics so often lead scientists to deny differences that those not educated in statistics can plainly see? For several generations, researchers have been warned that a statistically non-significant result does not 'prove' the null hypothesis (the hypothesis that there is no difference between groups or no effect of a treatment on some measured outcome)¹. Nor do statistically significant results 'prove' some other hypothesis. Such misconceptions have famously warped the literature with overstated claims and, less famously, led to claims of conflicts between studies where none exists.

We have some proposals to keep scientists from falling prey to these misconceptions.

PERVASIVE PROBLEM

Let's be clear about what must stop: we should never conclude there is 'no difference' or 'no association' just because a Pvalue is larger than a threshold such as 0.05

21 MARCH 2019 | VOL 567 | NATURE | 305

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The Washington Post

Democracy Dies in Darkness

Scores fall coast to coast, especially in math, under pandemic's toll



By Laura Meckler


Updated October 24, 2022 at 2:57 p.m. EDT | Published October 24, 2022 at 12:01 a.m. EDT https://www.washingtonpost.com/education/2022/10/24/pandemic-learning-loss-naep-tests/

... "Most of the 26 large city school districts... saw **no change**, which qualifies as a bright spot given the overall results."



Take-home points

- / Evaluators need to be able to answer the question: "What is the probability that the policy worked?"
- / Under the null hypothesis significance testing framework, the correct answer is: "We don't know."
- / Bayesian methods can provide an answer...
- / ... But they require hard-headed prior evidence.



https://xkcd.com/



Motivating example

/ We evaluated the impact on voting of receiving an offer of admission to Democracy Prep.

/ Research questions:

- 1. What is the probability that Democracy Prep increased voting?
- 2. By at least 10 percentage points?






p-values cannot answer our research question

- / We estimated that DP increased voting by 24 percentage points, more than doubling the expected voting rates of its students, p<0.05.
- / Correct interpretation: If DP had zero effect on voting, there would be a <5 percent chance of estimating an impact of 24 percentage points or greater.
- / This does not tell us the probability that DP increased voting.



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Imagine that federal grants fund 100 locally developed programs

/ The truth (unknown to policymaker):


- 10 program have a meaningful impact
- 90 programs have no effect

/1 program is evaluated via RCT:

- Statistical testing with α = 0.05
- 80% power to detect a meaningful impact

p<0.05 \neq "Eureka!"

- / 8 Green: significant and truly effective
- / 2 Black: insignificant but effective
- / 5 Red: significant but ineffective
- / 85 Grey: insignificant and truly ineffective



Probability a significant result is a false positive =

$$\frac{5 \text{ Red}}{8 \text{ Green} + 5 \text{ Red}} = 38\%$$



$38\% \neq 5\%$: What went wrong?

- / Remember, in the example, just 10 percent of programs truly had meaningful effects.
- / P(significant result is a false positive) would be closer to the expected 5 percent if <u>half</u> of all programs had meaningful effects.
- / But if <u>nothing</u> works then P(significant result is a false positive) = 100%.


To calculate the probability a policy had a meaningful effect we need to know

how often similar interventions have had meaningful effects.



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


Frequentist vs. Bayesian: What's random and what's fixed?

Frequentist	Fixed: True impact Random: Data	"If the true impact is zero, there is a 5 percent chance of estimating an impact of the observed magnitude or larger"
Bayesian	Fixed: Data Random: True impact	"Given our impact estimate, there is a 64% probability that the intervention increased voting by 10 percentage points or more"



No to the flat prior




- / The flat prior was seen as objective and used to be very popular
- / We reject the flat prior because it has no basis in evidence
- / "The general problem I have with noninformatively-derived Bayesian probabilities is that they tend to be too strong"
 - https://statmodeling.stat.columbia.edu/2015/05/01/general-problem-noninformatively-derived-bayesian-probabilities-tend-strong/
- / The flat prior sanctifies misinterpretation of the p-value



Take-home points

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Plausible Priors Precede Persuasive Posteriors

- / No to prior belief
- / Yes to hard-headed prior evidence
- / Appropriate for high-stakes impact evaluations
- / Specifying an evidence-based prior requires answering two questions:
 - What broader population of similar evaluations is your evaluation a member of?
 - What is the distribution of impacts in that population?

hard·head·ed

/ˌhärdˈhedəd/ 🐠

adjective adjective: hard-headed

practical and realistic; not sentimental.




Rules of thumb for picking prior evidence

- 1. If we make the infeasible perfect the enemy of the feasible good, then the worst can win
- 2. Too broad is better than too narrow
- 3. If the mean effect size in your prior evidence base is far away from 0, something might be wrong
- 4. When we set beliefs aside and focus on evidence, picking the prior becomes easier

A hard-headed prior for the impact of Democracy Prep

- / Among 29 published estimates of impacts of educational interventions targeting civic outcomes:
 - 90% were positive
 - Only 10% were greater than 10 percentage points (pp)
- / Is the DP impact estimate (24 pp) driven by noise or signal?
 - **Noise** more likely the wider the CI
 - **Signal** more likely the more often similar interventions have had meaningful impacts

Study





Which evidence best informs decision making?

Null hypothesis sig. test

- / We estimated that DP increased voting by 24 percentage points, *p*<0.05
- / #highfive
- / But...
 - To what extent is this estimate driven by noise?
 - Would it replicate?

Bayesian posterior prob.

- / We estimate a 95% chance that DP increased voting...
- / ... but only a 64% chance that DP increased voting by 10 percentage points or more



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www.andrewgelman.com

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- "What is the "true prior distribution"? A hard-nosed answer April 23, 2016



"We view much of the recent history of Bayesian inference as a set of converging messages from many directions... pointing toward the benefits of including real, subject-matterspecific, prior information." Gelman et al. 2017

Appendix: Meta-regression of estimates from the literature

Impact estimates from the literature...

- Are noisy
- Likely suffer from publication bias
- Are not independent

So our Bayesian metaregression...

$$\widehat{\boldsymbol{\theta}}_{i} \sim N(\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i} + \boldsymbol{\beta} \boldsymbol{s}_{i}, \boldsymbol{s}_{i}^{2})$$

$$\boldsymbol{\theta}_{i} \sim N(\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{j[i]}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}^{2})$$

$$\boldsymbol{\alpha}_{j} \sim N(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \boldsymbol{\tau}^{2})$$

