



Atmel ATSHA204 Authentication Modes

Prerequisites

- Hardware
 - Atmel[®] AT88CK454BLACK Evaluation Board
 - Atmel AT88CK109STK8 Kit
- Software
 - Atmel Crypto Evaluation Studio (ACES)

Overview

- Understand which customers the Atmel ATSHA204 device benefits.
- Understand which use cases the ATSHA204 device is useful in.
- Develop an in depth understanding of the ATSHA204 device.

Introduction


This document describes the general application of the ATSHA204 device. Since a minimal amount of system changes are required, the ATSHA204 device is beneficial in securing product accessories. The four basic types of accessory authentication are described more in detail in this document which are:

- Fixed Challenge Authentication
- Unique Challenge Authentication
- Random Challenge Authentication
- Diversified Key Authentication

1. Authentication Types

1.1 Fixed Challenge Authentication

The Fixed Challenge Authentication is an easy way to add security to a product without the added expense of added hardware to the host, interactive testing, or extensive software development.



With the Fixed Challenge Authentication only, the client requires an ATSHA204 device programmed with secrets. The host is able to use any number of precalculated challenge/response pairs to validate that the client includes a valid ATSHA204.

Utilizing an ATSHA204 device in the client enables the Atmel CryptoAuthentication[™] to be off loaded to a secure device with no firmware requirements on the client. The Fixed Challenge allows for the addition of the first level of hardware authentication with a minimal amount of change to the host firmware changes.

| Host | | Client |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|
| Send command to client ATSHA204. | MAC (SlotID, Fixed Challenge) | |
| | | |
| | Response | ATSHA204 |
| Compare | | |



1.2 Random Challenge Authentication

The Random Challenge Authentication improves on the Fixed Challenge by adding a changing challenge to each request. This feature enables the system to defend against replay style attacks.

| Host | | Client |
|-------------------------------|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| New question on each request. | What's the answer to the question x? | |
| | | |
| | The answer is y | Different answer for each question. |
| Compare | | |

By adding an ATSHA204 device to the host, the system is able to generate a challenge for the client on the fly. This allows a unique challenge to be sent for every validation request. In addition, by generating the challenge internally with the host's ATSHA204 device, the response is unknown to the system allowing the use of an unsecure processor without the threat that an attacker will be able to learn the system secrets. This dramatically limits the ability of an unauthorized device from producing the correct response.

| Host | | Client |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|
| Generate Random Number. | | |
| Send command to client ATSHA204. | MAC (SlotID, Random Challenge) | |
| | | |
| | Response | ATSHA204 |
| Compare | | |



1.3 Unique Challenge Authentication

The Unique Challenge Authentication improves on the Fixed Challenge by adding a unique challenge to each request. This authentication feature enables the system to defend against replay style attacks.

| Host | | Client |
|-------------------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| New question on each request. | What's the answer to the question x + time? | |
| | | |
| | The answer is y. | Different answer for each question. |
| Compare | | |

By adding an ATSHA204 device to the host, the system is able to generate a challenge for the client on the fly. This allows a unique challenge to be sent for every validation request. In addition, by generating the challenge internally with the host's ATSHA204 device the response is unknown to the system allowing the use of an unsecure processor without the threat that an attacker will be able to learn the system secrets. This severally limits the ability of an unauthorized device from producing the correct response.

| Host | | Client |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|
| Generate random number. | | |
| Send command to client ATSHA204. | MAC (SlotID, Unique Challenge) | |
| | | |
| | Response | ATSHA204 |
| Compare | | |



1.4 Diversified Key Authentication

The Diversified Key Authentication enables the host to identify the specific accessory that is trying to authenticate with it. This enable the use of access lists (black lists) by the system.

Figure 1-1. Diversified Fixed




Figure 1-2. Diversified Fixed

| Host | | Client |
|----------------------------------|-------------------------------|----------|
| Read serial number from client. | Read (Config, Block 0) | |
| | | |
| | Serial Number | ATSHA204 |
| | | |
| GenDig (SlotID, S/N) | | |
| Send command to client ATSHA204. | MAC (SlotID, Fixed Challenge) | |
| | | |
| | Response | ATSHA204 |
| Compare | | |



Figure 1-3. Diversified Random

| Host | | Client |
|--|--------------------------------------|---|
| | Who are you? | |
| | | |
| | I am | |
| | | |
| New question for you only on each request. | What's the answer to the question x? | |
| | | |
| | The answer is y. | Different answer for me to each question. |
| Compare | | |

Figure 1-4. Diversified Random

| Host | | Client |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|----------|
| Read serial number from client. | Read (Config, Block 0) | |
| | | |
| | Serial Number | ATSHA204 |
| | | |
| GenDig (SlotID, S/N) | | |
| Send command to client ATSHA204. | MAC (SlotID, Random Challenge) | |
| | | |
| | Response | ATSHA204 |
| Compare | | |



2. Configuration

Figure 2-1. Shared Key Configuration

| Host | Client |
|----------------------|----------------------|
| Load Key into SlotID | Load Key into SlotID |

Figure 2-2. Diversified Key Configuration

| Host | Client |
|-----------------------------|------------------------------|
| | Load Master Key into SlotID |
| Load Master Key into SlotID | Read Client S/N |
| Load Master Key into SlotID | Load Client S/N into TempKey |
| | DeriveKey (SlotID) with S/N |

- The master key is loaded into the client slotID.
- The S/N of the client is loaded into the client TempKey.
- The DeriveKey is run on the client updating the key in slotID with a unique key based on the master key and the client S/N.



3. Examples

3.1 Fixed and Random Challenge

Table 3-1. Fixed and Random Challenge

| Host S | Host Sends to Client SHA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|--------------------------|-------|-----|------|-----|------|----|-----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 29 | 03 | 27 | 08 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| I2C ADDR | CMD | Count | MAC | Mode | Slo | otID | | Challenge | | | | | | | |
| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| | Challenge | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | BB | 97 | | | | | | | |
| | Challenge | | | | | CF | RC | | | | | | | | |

| Host F | Host Reads from Client SHA | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------------------------|----|----------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 28 | 23 | CA | 9F | 60 | 7C | В7 | 37 | 83 | AE | D7 | 93 | BF | 00 | 2A | A4 |
| I2C ADDR | Count | | Response | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9A | 1A | 86 | 06 | 11 | 87 | 90 | 70 | E3 | 25 | 24 | E4 | 7E | AD | 40 | 11 |
| | Response | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2C | A6 | 4F | 4F 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Resp | onse | CF | CRC | | | | | | | | | | | | |



3.2 Diversified Key

The host will read the S/N from the client and then load that value into tempkey. This is done to allow the host to match the key stored in the client.

Table 3-2. Diversified Key

| Host Sends Read to the Client ATSHA204 | | | | | | | | | |
|--|-----|-------|------|------|-----|------|----|----|--|
| 29 | 03 | 07 | 02 | 80 | 00 | 00 | 09 | AD | |
| I2C ADDR | CMD | Count | Read | Zone | Add | ress | CF | RC | |

| Host F | Reads th | ne Resp | onse fro | om the (| Client A | TSHA2 | 04 | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|----------|----------|-------|-------|-----|----------|----------|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|-----|
| 28 | 23 | 01 | 23 | 4B | 88 | 80 | 01 | 02 | 00 | 8D | 3F | 57 | 7E | EE | 00 | |
| I2C ADDR | Count | | S/N | [0:3] | | | Rev | Num | | S\N[4:8] | | | | | Res | |
| 00 | FF | C9 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | |
| I2C | Res | I2C ADDR | ТО | OTP | SM | Slo | Slot0 | | t0 Slot1 | | Sle | ot2 | SI | ot3 | Slo | ot4 |
| 00 | 00 | 16 | 39 | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Slot5 CRC | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

| Host G | Senerate | es a Key | / that M | atches | the Clie | nt ATS | HA204 | | | | | |
|-------------|----------|----------|-------------|--------------|----------|--------|-------|-------|----|----|----|----|
| 29 | 03 | 0В | 15 | 02 | 00 | 00 | 1C | 00 | 00 | 00 | CA | 69 |
| I2C ADDR | CMD | Count | Gen- Dig | Mem- Zone | SlotID | | | Other | | CF | RC | |

| Host Reads Status | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------------|--------|-----|----|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| 28 | 00 | 03 | 40 | | | | | | |
| I2C ADDR | Status | CRC | | | | | | | |



| Host S | Sends M | IAC to t | he Clier | nt ATSH | A204 | | | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|---------|----------|-----------|---------|------|-----|-------|------|----|----|-----------|----|----|----|----|
| 29 | 03 | 27 | 08 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| I2C ADDR | CMD | Count | MAC | Mode | Slo | tlD | | | | (| Challenge | e | | | |
| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 |
| | | | | | | | Chall | enge | | | | | | | |
| 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | 00 | BB | 97 | | | | | | | |
| | | (| Challenge | е | | | CF | RC | | | | | | | |

| Host F | Reads th | ne Resp | onse fr | om the | Client A | TSHA2 | 04 | | | | | | | | |
|-------------|----------|---------|----------|--------|----------|-------|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|----|
| 28 | 23 | CA | 9F | 60 | 7C | В7 | 37 | 83 | AE | D7 | 93 | BF | 00 | 2A | A4 |
| I2C ADDR | Count | | Response | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 9A | 1A | 86 | 06 | 11 | 87 | 90 | 70 | E3 | 25 | 24 | E4 | 7E | AD | 40 | 11 |
| | Response | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 2C | A6 | 4F | 19 | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| Resp | oonse | CF | RC | | | | | | | | | | | | |

4. Revision History

| Doc. Rev. | Date | Comments |
|-----------|---------|---|
| 8834B | 11/2012 | Update title from Accessory Authentication to Authentication Modes. |
| 8834A | 10/2012 | Initial document release. |





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