

SALUS SECURITY

AUG 2023



CODE SECURITY ASSESSMENT

INK FINANCE

Overview

Project Summary

- Name: Ink Finance
- Platform: EVM-compatible Chains
- Language: Solidity
- Repository:
 - <https://github.com/Ink-Finance-Inc/v2-governance-core>
 - <https://github.com/Ink-Finance-Inc/v3-economy-core>
- Audit Scope: See [Appendix - 1](#)

Project Dashboard

Application Summary

Name	Ink Finance
Version	v2
Type	Solidity
Dates	Aug 15 2023
Logs	July 17 2023; Aug 15 2023

Vulnerability Summary

Total High-Severity issues	11
Total Medium-Severity issues	2
Total Low-Severity issues	9
Total informational issues	5
Total	27

Contact

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Risk Level Description

High Risk	The issue puts a large number of users' sensitive information at risk, or is reasonably likely to lead to catastrophic impact for clients' reputations or serious financial implications for clients and users.
Medium Risk	The issue puts a subset of users' sensitive information at risk, would be detrimental to the client's reputation if exploited, or is reasonably likely to lead to a moderate financial impact.
Low Risk	The risk is relatively small and could not be exploited on a recurring basis, or is a risk that the client has indicated is low impact in view of the client's business circumstances.
Informational	The issue does not pose an immediate risk, but is relevant to security best practices or defense in depth.

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Introduction

1.1 About SALUS

At Salus Security, we are in the business of trust.

We are dedicated to tackling the toughest security challenges facing the industry today. By building foundational trust in technology and infrastructure through security, we help clients to lead their respective industries and unlock their full Web3 potential.

Our team of security experts employ industry-leading proof-of-concept (PoC) methodology for demonstrating smart contract vulnerabilities, coupled with advanced red teaming capabilities and a stereoscopic vulnerability detection service, to deliver comprehensive security assessments that allow clients to stay ahead of the curve.

In addition to smart contract audits and red teaming, our Rapid Detection Service for smart contracts aims to make security accessible to all. This high calibre, yet cost-efficient, security tool has been designed to support a wide range of business needs including investment due diligence, security and code quality assessments, and code optimisation.

We are reachable on Telegram (<https://t.me/salusec>), Twitter (https://twitter.com/salus_sec), or Email (support@salusec.io).

1.2 Audit Breakdown

The objective was to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specifications and best practices. Possible issues we looked for included (but are not limited to):

- Risky external calls
- Integer overflow/underflow
- Transaction-ordering dependence
- Timestamp dependence
- Access control
- Call stack limits and mishandled exceptions
- Number rounding errors
- Centralization of power
- Logical oversights and denial of service
- Business logic specification
- Code clones, functionality duplication

1.3 Disclaimer

Note that this security audit is not designed to replace functional tests required before any software release and does not give any warranties on finding all possible security issues with the given smart contract(s) or blockchain software, i.e., the evaluation result does not guarantee the nonexistence of any further findings of security issues.

Findings

2.1 Summary of Findings

ID	Title	Severity	Category	Status
1	Malicious contracts could become agents	High	Business Logic	Resolved
2	Incorrect logic in the enableToExecute() modifier	High	Business Logic	Resolved
3	Anyone can unstake someone else's stake	High	Access Control	Resolved
4	No way to set _ucvManagerEnable in BaseUCV	High	Business Logic	Resolved
5	Malicious users can use InkFund.init() to reset critical states	High	Access Control	Resolved
6	FactoryManager.upgradeImplement() is not working	High	Business Logic	Acknowledged
7	Malicious users can use ProposalHandler.init() to reset critical states	High	Access Control	Resolved
8	Malicious users can use InkFund.startFund() to gain profit	High	Access Control	Resolved
9	BaseDAO.deployByKey() can be used to deploy a contract with unexpected initData in advance	High	Access Control	Resolved
10	Anyone can mint tokens	High	Access Control	Resolved
11	Several critical configurations can be modified by anyone	High	Access Control	Resolved
12	Any committee can advance the processing flow of the proposal	Medium	Data Validation	Resolved
13	Conditional statement error	Medium	Business Logic	Resolved
14	BaseDao allows users who are not Proposers to create proposals	Low	Access Control	Acknowledged
15	The get functions return a fixed value	Low	Business Logic	Acknowledged
16	Inconsistency between code and documentation for keyId calculation	Low	Business Logic	Acknowledged
17	Use safeTransfer()/safeTransferFrom() instead of transfer()/transferFrom()	Low	Risky external calls	Acknowledged

18	Implementation contract could be initialized by everyone	Low	Business Logic	Acknowledged
19	Dead code could lead to the same flowID	Low	Business Logic	Acknowledged
20	The return value is not set correctly for createFund()	Low	Business Logic	Acknowledged
21	Missing validations for input parameters	Low	Data Validation	Acknowledged
22	Incorrect check condition	Low	Data Validation	Acknowledged
23	Inconsistency between codes and comment	Informational	Code Quality	Acknowledged
24	Thoughts on domain management	Informational	Business Logic	Resolved
25	Can use immutable to save gas	Informational	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged
26	Can use local variables to save gas	Informational	Gas Optimization	Acknowledged
27	Redundant code	Informational	Code Quality	Acknowledged

2.2 Notable Findings

Significant flaws that impact system confidentiality, integrity, or availability are listed below.

1. Malicious contracts could become agents

Severity: High

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol

Description

Agents can be set via the newProposal() function, which can result in malicious contracts becoming agents.

- Proof of Concept

Let's assume that Alice has deployed a malicious contract and wants it to be an agent for the masterDAO.

Alice first calls batchSetKV(aliceAddress, info) in ConfigManager. (The 'info.data' variable should contain the address of the malicious contract)

[v2-governance-core\contracts\utils\ConfigManager.sol:L85-L112](#)

```
function batchSetKV(
    address domain,
    ConfigHelper.KVInfo[] memory keyValueInfos
) external override {
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < keyValueInfos.length; i++) {
        if (
            hasRightToSet(
                domain,
                keyValueInfos[i].keyPrefix,
                keyValueInfos[i].keyName
            )
        ) {
            _domainKeyValues.addKeyValue(domain, keyValueInfos[i]);
        }
        ...
    }
}
```

Alice then gets the configKey for the malicious contract by using [buildConfigKey\(\)](#).

Next, If alice is a proposer, alice can call the newProposal() function and set the proposal.agents parameter to include the configKey for the malicious contract.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L261-L292](#)


```

function newProposal(
    NewProposalInfo calldata proposal,
    bool commit,
    address proposer,
    bytes calldata data
) public override returns (bytes32 proposalID) {
    ...
    _setupAgents(proposalID, proposal.agents, data);
    ...
}

```

As a result, the malicious contract deployed by Alice will become the implementation for an agent contract, allowing Alice to exploit critical functions that are modified by `onlyAgent()` in `masterDAO` (e.g. `updateContract()`, `addDuty()`, `removeDuty()`). This could undermine the project.

Recommendation

We recommend setting agents after the proposal has been resolved, not when it was proposed. Therefore, the logic to set agents should be placed within the `decidedProposal()` function.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [51008b61](#).

2. Incorrect logic in the enableToExecute() modifier

Severity: High

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\ucv\PayrollUCV.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseUCV.sol

Description

[v2-governance-core\contracts\ucv\PayrollUCV.sol:L44-L50](#)

```
/// @dev make sure msgSender is controller or manager, and manager has to be allow to do
all the operation
modifier enableToExecute() {
    if (
        _msgSender() != _ucvController &&
        (_msgSender() == _ucvManager && _ucvManagerEnable == true)
    ) revert OperateIsNowAllowed();
    _;
}
```

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseUCV.sol:L45-L51](#)

```
modifier enableToExecute() {
    if (
        _msgSender() != _ucvController &&
        (_msgSender() == _ucvManager && _ucvManagerEnable == true)
    ) revert OperateIsNowAllowed();
    _;
}
```

In the above codes, the '(_msgSender() == _ucvManager && _ucvManagerEnable == true)' condition should be '!(_msgSender() == _ucvManager && _ucvManagerEnable == true)'.

As a result of this incorrect logic, users that are not _ucvManager can bypass the enableToExecute() modifier and can call [TransferTo\(\)](#) to drain the assets in UCV.

Recommendation

Consider changing the modifier to the following:

```
modifier enableToExecute() {
    if (
        _msgSender() != _ucvController &&
        !(_msgSender() == _ucvManager && _ucvManagerEnable == true)
    ) revert OperateIsNowAllowed();
    _;
}
```

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

3. Anyone can unstake someone else's stake

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol

Description

The unstake() function does not validate the caller, allowing anyone to unstake a stake from any staker.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol:L405-L408](#)

```
function unstake(address basket, bytes32 itemId) external override validBasket(basket) {  
    _unstake(basket, itemId, address(0));  
    emit BasketUnstaked(msg.sender, basket, itemId);  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider validating the msg.sender in unstake().

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [0c62e9c9](#).

4. No way to set `_ucvManagerEnable` in BaseUCV

Severity: High

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- `v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseUCV.sol`

Description

The `_ucvManagerEnable` state variable can only be set by the `_ucvController` when it calls the [enableUCVManager\(\)](#) function. The `_ucvController` is a private state variable in the BaseUCV contract and can be set only by the `init()` function.

Therefore, if a UCV inherited from BaseUCV does not correctly set the `_ucvController`, then the `_ucvManagerEnable` can not be enabled, resulting in malfunctioning for the [enableToExecute\(\)](#) modifier.

This is the case for the InkFund contract:

[v2-governance-core/contracts/products/InkFund.sol:L97-L115](#)

```
function init(  
    address fundManager,  
    address config_,  
    bytes calldata data_  
) external override returns (bytes memory callbackEvent) {  
    ...  
  
    _init(dao_, config_, fundManager, address(0));  
  
    ...  
}
```

The same issue also applies to the PayrollUCV contract.

Recommendation

Consider setting `_ucvManagerEnable` to true in the `_init()` function if the controller is set to `address(0)`.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [ef515798](#).

5. Malicious users can use InkFund.init() to reset critical states

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\InkFund.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\ucv\PayrollUCV.sol

Description

The [init\(\)](#) function in the InkFund contract shouldn't be able to be called more than once. However, there is nothing preventing the user from calling the init() function again.

As a result, attackers can call the init() function again to override critical states such as _ucvManager, _fundID, _fund.

The same issue also applies to the [init\(\)](#) function in the PayrollUCV contract.

Recommendation

You should prevent an upgradeable contract from being initialized multiple times.

We recommend you to follow all of the rules for OpenZeppelin's [Writing Upgradeable Contracts](#) article. Specifically, the initializer in the child contract should use the initializer modifier, and the one in the parent contracts should use the onlyInitializing modifier.

Status

The team has resolved this issue with commit [f21b7335](#) and [ac34f411](#).

6. FactoryManager.upgradeImplement() is not working

Severity: High

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\upgrade\FactoryManager.sol

Description

[v2-governance-core\contracts\upgrade\FactoryManager.sol:L133-L158](#)

```
function upgradeImplement(address instanceProxy, address newImplementation)
    external
{
    ...
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < deployedProxies.length(); i++) {
        address proxyAddress = deployedProxies.at(i);
        InkBeaconProxy(payable(proxyAddress)).upgradeTo(
            address(newBeaconAddress)
        );
        ...
    }
}
```

The upgradeImplement() function in the FactoryManager contract makes external calls to InkBeaconProxy's upgradeTo() function.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\upgrade\InkBeaconProxy.sol:L21-L25](#)

```
contract InkBeaconProxy is BeaconProxy {
    address public immutable _owner;

    ...

    function upgradeTo(address newBeacon) external {
        require(msg.sender == _owner, "Only MetaDAO can upgrade the beacon");
        _setBeacon(newBeacon, "");
    }
}
```

However, the upgradeTo() function requires the caller to be the address of the MasterDAO, which causes the external call from the FactoryManager to fail.

Recommendation

Consider redesigning the logic in upgradeImplement().

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

7. Malicious users can use ProposalHandler.init() to reset critical states

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol

Description

The init() function in the ProposalHandler contract shouldn't be able to be called more than once. However, there is nothing preventing the user from calling the init() function again. As a result, attackers can call the init() function again to override the _defaultFlowIDIndex and the _dao state variable.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol:L80-L105](#)

```
function init(  
    address dao_,  
    address config_,  
    bytes calldata data_  
) external override returns (bytes memory callbackEvent) {  
    // super.init(config_);  
  
    /// board vote  
    _defaultFlows.push(  
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000  
    );  
    /// public vote and board vote  
    _defaultFlows.push(  
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001  
    );  
    /// public vote  
    _defaultFlows.push(  
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002  
    );  
  
    _defaultFlowIDIndex = abi.decode(data_, (uint256));  
  
    _dao = dao_;  
  
    return callbackEvent;  
}
```

(Notice the super.init() line is commented out)

Recommendation

You should prevent an upgradeable contract from being initialized multiple times.

We recommend you to follow all of the rules for OpenZeppelin's [Writing Upgradeable Contracts](#) article. Specifically, the initializer in the child contract should use the initializer modifier, and the one in the parent contracts should use the onlyInitializing modifier.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

8. Malicious users can use InkFund.startFund() to gain profit

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol

Description

Although the startFund() function in the FundManager contract requires that the msg.sender is a fund admin, the startFund() function in the InkFund contract lacks proper access control, meaning anyone can call it.

Since the treasury parameter in InkFund.startFund() is a user input address and startFund() sends a fee to this treasury address, attackers can call InkFund.startFund() function with their own address as the treasury input to gain profit that not belong to them.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol:L962-L983](#)

```
function startFund(bytes32 fundID) external override {  
    // authorized  
    require(  
        _isCommitteeOperator(0, msg.sender),  
        "The user is not authorized"  
    );  
  
    ...  
    IFund(_funds[fundID]).startFund(treasuryUCV);  
    ...  
}
```

[v2-governance-core\contracts\products\InkFund.sol:L616-L670](#)

```
function startFund(address treasury) external override {  
    ...  
    takeFixedFee(treasury);  
    ...  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider adding a check for msg.sender in the startFund() function of the InkFund contract.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

9. BaseDAO.deployByKey() can be used to deploy a contract with unexpected initData in advance

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol

Description

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L1013-L1046](#)

```
function _deployByFactoryKey(
    bool randomSalt,
    bytes32 typeId,
    bytes32 contractKey,
    bytes memory initData
) internal returns (address deployedAddress) {
    if (
        randomSalt == false &&
        _deployedContractdByKey[contractKey] != address(0)
    ) {
        // deploy only once
        return _deployedContractdByKey[contractKey];
    }
    ...
}
```

If the randomSalt is false, the _deployByFactoryKey() function returns the deployed address for contractKey when it exists.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L1048-L1054](#)

```
function deployByKey(
    bytes32 typeId,
    bytes32 contractKey,
    bytes memory initData
) external override returns (address deployedAddress) {
    return _deployByFactoryKey(false, typeId, contractKey, initData);
}
```

However, the deployByKey() function lacks access control. Attackers can call deployByKey() to deploy the contract for contractKey in advance, with unexpected initData, so that the users would reuse this deployed contract. Since the initData is set by the attacker, the interaction with this contract is risky.

Recommendation

Consider adding proper access control to deployByKey() function. Additionally, consider deploying a new contract instead of returning the deployed one if the initData is different in _deployByFactoryKey().

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [ef515798](#).

10. Anyone can mint tokens

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkERC721.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkERC20.sol

Description

1.Anyone can call the mintTo() function to mint InkERC20 token.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkERC20.sol:L37-L39](#)

```
function mintTo(address target, uint256 amount) public virtual {  
    _mint(target, amount);  
}
```

2.Anyone can call the mint() function to mint InkERC721 token.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkERC721.sol:L19-L21](#)

```
function mint(address account, uint256 tokenId) public {  
    _mint(account, tokenId);  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider adding proper access control to public mint functions.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

11. Several critical configurations can be modified by anyone

Severity: High

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\cores\KYCVerifyManager.sol

Description

1.The setFlowStep() function lacks access control, this function can be used to set the processing step for any type of flowId.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L1060-L1062](#)

```
function setFlowStep(FlowInfo memory flow) external override {  
    _setFlowStep(flow);  
}
```

2.Anyone can update _identityManager by calling updateIdentityManager().

[v2-governance-core\contracts\cores\KYCVerifyManager.sol:L47-L49](#)

```
function updateIdentityManager(address identityManager_) external {  
    _identityManager = identityManager_;  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider adding proper access control to setter functions for critical states.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

12. Any committee can advance the processing flow of the proposal

Severity: Medium

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol

Description

In the `decideProposal()` function, any committee can advance a proposal process one step according to the defined flow, but there is no verification of whether the committee is the one that should be handling the proposal at the current stage.

This could potentially lead to the Public committee bypassing the Board's resolution process by making multiple calls to the `tallyVotes()` function.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L776-L787](#)

```
function decideProposal(
    bytes32 proposalID,
    bool agree,
    bytes calldata data
) external override onlyCommittee {
    IProposalHandler(_proposalHandlerAddress).decideProposal(
        proposalID,
        agree,
        data
    );
    // _decideProposal(proposalID, msg.sender, agree, data);
}
```

Recommendation

Consider verifying the committee.

For example, pass the caller committee to `ProposalHandler._decideProposal()` and check whether it's the intended committee.

```
function _decideProposal(
    bytes32 proposalID,
    address committee,
    bool agree,
    bytes memory data
) internal {
    ProposalProgress storage info = _proposalInfo[proposalID];
    require(info.proposalID == proposalID, "proposal err");
    require(committee == info.nextCommittee, "Committee that is not under processing");
    ...
}
```

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

13. Conditional statement error

Severity: Medium

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingBasket.sol

Description

The claimRewards() function is not intended to claim before item.endDate.

However, if the current time is between a day before the endDate, the function will allow users to claim because the remainDays will be zero due to loss of precision when calculating the remainDays.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingBasket.sol:L182-L219](#)

```
function claimRewards(
    bytes32 itemId,
    uint256 accruingPeriod,
    bool penaltyFlag,
    uint256 rewardRatio
)
    external
    override
    allowedStakingEngine
    validStakingItem(itemId)
    returns (
        address staker,
        uint256 rewards,
        uint256 remainDays
    )
{
    ...
    if (item.endDate <= block.timestamp) {
        // after staking item matures,
        if (accruingPeriod > 0) {
            uint256 passDays = (block.timestamp - item.beginDate) / _oneDayInSeconds;
            require(passDays >= accruingPeriod, "[STBasket]: Failed by accruingPeriod");
        }
    } else {
        remainDays = (item.endDate - block.timestamp) / _oneDayInSeconds;
    }
    if (!penaltyFlag || remainDays == 0) {
        uint256 rewardsForItem = item.effectiveStakingValue * (rewardRatio -
item.rewardRatio);
        if (rewardsForItem > item.settledRewards) {
            rewards = rewardsForItem - item.settledRewards;
            item.settledRewards = rewardsForItem;
        }
    }
}
```

Recommendation

Consider adding a boolean variable instead of remainDays to check if the current time has passed the endDate.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [0c62e9c9](#).

14. BaseDao allows users who are not Proposers to create proposals

Severity: Low

Category: Access Control

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol

Description

[v2-governance-core\contracts\committee\TheBoard.sol:L38-L57](#)

```
function newProposal(
    NewProposalInfo calldata proposal,
    bool commit,
    bytes calldata data
) external override returns (bytes32 proposalID) {
    // valid have dutyID to create the proposal
    if (!_hasDutyToOperate(DutyID.PROPOSER, _msgSender())) {
        revert YouDoNotHaveDutyToOperate();
    }
    ...
}
```

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L261-L292](#)

```
function newProposal(
    NewProposalInfo calldata proposal,
    bool commit,
    address proposer,
    bytes calldata data
) public override returns (bytes32 proposalID) {
    ...
}
```

While the newProposal() function in the TheBoard contract requires the caller to be a PROPOSER, the newProposal() in BaseDAO lacks proper access control. As a result, non-proposer can use BaseDAO.newProposal() to create a proposal.

The complete invocation chain for creating a new proposal is: committee => dao => proposalHandler. Therefore, the newProposal function in dao should require the caller to be the committee.

Recommendation

Consider adding the onlyCommittee modifier to the newProposal() function in BaseDao.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

15. The get functions return a fixed value

Severity: Low

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol

Description

1. `getProposalStatus()` always returns `uint256(ProposalStatus.AGREE)`.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol:L50-L53](#)

```
function getProposalStatus(bytes32 proposalId) external pure override returns (uint256) {  
    require(proposalId != bytes32(0), "Invalid Id");  
    return uint256(ProposalStatus.AGREE);  
}
```

2. This function always returns true even if `daoUser` doesn't have any duty.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol:L56-L58](#)

```
function hasAnyDuty(address daoUser) external pure override returns (bool) {  
    return true;  
}
```

3. This function always returns true for non-zero `proposalIds` that are not in `deletedIds`.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol:L96-L100](#)

```
function isValidProposalId(bytes32 proposalId) external view override returns (bool) {  
    if (proposalId == bytes32(0) || _deletedIds[proposalId]) return false;  
  
    return true;  
}
```

4. This function always returns true for non-zero `dutyIds` that are not in `deletedIds`.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol:L102-L106](#)

```
function isValidDutyId(bytes32 dutyId) external view override returns (bool) {  
    if (dutyId == bytes32(0) || _deletedIds[dutyId]) return false;  
  
    return true;  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider returning the correct values.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

16. Inconsistency between code and documentation for keyId calculation

Severity: Low

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\utils\ConfigManager.sol

Description

According to the comment below, the keyId should be `keccak256(keccak256(<prefix>) + keccak256(keyName))`.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\utils\ConfigManager.sol:L13](#)

```
/// 3. keyID = keccak256(keccak256(<prefix>) + keccak256(keyName))
```

However, it is implemented as `keyID = keccak256(prefix + keccak256(keyName))`.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\utils\ConfigHelper.sol:L57-L69](#)

```
function packKeyID(string memory prefix, string memory keyName)
    internal
    pure
    returns (bytes32 keyID)
{
    string memory actualPrefix = getPrefix(prefix);
    keyID = keccak256(
        abi.encodePacked(
            abi.encodePacked(actualPrefix),
            keccak256(abi.encodePacked(keyName))
        )
    );
}
```

Recommendation

Consider updating the code to ensure it is consistent with the documentation.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

17. Use `safeTransfer()/safeTransferFrom()` instead of `transfer()/transferFrom()`

Severity: Low

Category: Risky external calls

Target:

- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\EmissionPool.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseUCV.sol

Description

Tokens not compliant with the ERC20 specification could return false from the transfer function call to indicate the transfer fails, while the calling contract would not notice the failure if the return value is not checked. Checking the return value is a requirement, as written in the [EIP-20](#) specification:

Callers MUST handle false from returns (bool success). Callers MUST NOT assume that false is never returned!

[v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\EmissionPool.sol:L117](#)

```
IERC20(token).transfer(to, amount);
```

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseUCV.sol:L110](#)

```
IERC20(token).transfer(to, _value);
```

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseUCV.sol:L167](#)

```
IERC20(token).transferFrom(msg.sender, address(this), amount);
```

Recommendation

Consider using the [SafeERC20](#) library implementation from OpenZeppelin and call `safeTransfer` or `safeTransferFrom` when transferring ERC20 tokens.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

18. Implementation contract could be initialized by everyone

Severity: Low

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- All upgradeable contracts

Description

According to [OpenZeppelin](#), the implementation contract should not be left uninitialized.

An uninitialized implementation contract can be taken over by an attacker, which may impact the proxy. For the upgradeable contracts in the Ink codebase, there is nothing preventing the attacker from calling the initializers in the implementation contracts.

Recommendation

To prevent the implementation contract from being used, consider invoking the `_disableInitializers` function in the constructor of the implementation contract to automatically lock it when it is deployed.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

19. Dead code could lead to the same flowID

Severity: Low

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol

Description

[v2-governance-core\contracts\products\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol:L136-L185](#)

```
function _getProposalFlow(bytes32 proposalID)
    internal
    view
    returns (bytes32 flowID)
{
    bytes32 proposalFlowID =
    0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004;

    ...

    if (
        proposalFlowID ==
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004
    ) {
        flowID = _defaultFlows[_defaultFlowIDIndex];
    } else {
        bool support = false;
        for (
            uint256 i = _defaultFlowIDIndex;
            i < _defaultFlows.length;
            i++
        ) {
            if (_defaultFlows[i] == proposalFlowID) {
                support = true;
                flowID = proposalFlowID;
                break;
            }
        }
    }
}
```

The value of proposalFlowID is not changed before the if clause, hence the code in the else branch is dead code.

Recommendation

Consider rewriting the logic of conditional branches.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

20. The return value is not set correctly for createFund()

Severity: Low

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol

Description

The ucvAddress is defined as the returned value for createFund() but not correctly set by the function.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol:L902-937](#)

```
function createFund(NewFundInfo memory fundInfo)
    external
    override
    returns (address ucvAddress)
{
    ...
    // valid treasury exist
    address fundAddress = _deployByFactoryKey(
        FactoryKeyTypeID.UCV_TYPE_ID,
        fundInfo.fundDeployKey,
        initData
    );
    ...
}
```

Recommendation

Consider returning the fundAddress correctly.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

21. Missing validations for input parameters

Severity: Low

Category: Data Validation

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol

Description

The following functions lack proper validations for input parameters.

1. [v2-governance-core\contracts\products\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol:L80-L105](#)

```
function init(
    address dao_,
    address config_,
    bytes calldata data_
) external override returns (bytes memory callbackEvent) {
    // super.init(config_);

    /// board vote
    _defaultFlows.push(
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
    );
    /// public vote and board vote
    _defaultFlows.push(
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001
    );
    /// public vote
    _defaultFlows.push(
        0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002
    );

    _defaultFlowIDIndex = abi.decode(data_, (uint256));

    _dao = dao_;

    return callbackEvent;
}
```

The init() function should add the following require statement.

```
require(_defaultFlowIDIndex < _defaultFlows.length && _dao != address(0));
```

2. [v2-governance-core\contracts\products\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol:L529](#)

When agents.length == 0, the function should revert but not.

```
function _newProposal(
   NewProposalInfo memory proposal,
    bool commit,
    address proposer,
    bytes memory data
) internal returns (bytes32 proposalID) {
    bytes32[] memory agents = proposal.agents;
    if (agents.length == 0) {
        // error
    }
}
```

```
}  
...  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider adding proper validation for input parameters.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

22. Incorrect check condition

Severity: Low

Category: Data Validation

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol

Description

The conditional statements and error messages are inconsistent. It is recommended to separate the multiple conditional checks to precisely identify the issues and facilitate accurate troubleshooting.

Additionally, it seems the condition 'IAgent(existAgents).isExecuted() == true' should be 'IAgent(existAgents).isExecuted() == false'.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\bases\BaseDAO.sol:L938-L944](#)

```
function _setupAgents(
    bytes32 proposalID,
    bytes32[] memory agents,
    bytes memory initData
) internal {
    for (uint256 i = 0; i < agents.length; i++) {
        if (
            agents[i] !=
            0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
        ) {
            address existAgents = _agents[agents[i]];
            if (
                existAgents != address(0) &&
                IAgent(existAgents).isExecuted() == true &&
                IAgent(existAgents).isUniqueInDAO() == true
            ) {
                revert AgentCanBeCreatedOnlyOnceInDAO(agents[i]);
            }
            ...
        }
    }
}
```

Recommendation

Consider writing condition checks separately, and use appropriate custom errors for each one.

Example pattern:

```
if (failCondition1) {
    revert failReason1();
}
if (failCondition2) {
```



```
    revert failReason2();  
  }  
  ...
```

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

2.3 Informational Findings

23. Inconsistency between codes and comment

Severity: Informational

Category: Code Quality

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkFundCertificateToken.sol

Description

mintTo function is expected to revert but it's not reverted.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkFundCertificateToken.sol:L23-L25](#)

```
function mintTo(address target, uint256 amount) public override {  
    // revert NotAllowed  
}
```

Recommendation

Consider adding a revert statement.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

24. Thoughts on domain management

Severity: Informational

Category: Business Logic

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\utils\ConfigManager.sol

Description

In the ConfigManager contract, for keys that belong to a domain, only users that have [rights](#) for the domain can set the values for the keys by using [batchSetKV\(\)](#).

While the setting part has the above design for domain management, the getting part lacks such design. If a function needs to check if a user has the rights to get or use the value from a key, or if the key is valid for the user, it can't do so since we can't get the domain from the key, and we need that domain information to verify the user.

Recommendation

Consider adding a design that verifies whether a key is valid for a user or if a user has the right to use the key.

Status

The team has resolved this issue in commit [f21b7335](#).

25. Can use immutable to save gas

Severity: Informational

Category: Gas Optimization

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkERC721.sol
- v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol

Description

The following variables could be set immutable.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\tokens\InkERC721.sol:L9](#)

```
address public creator;
```

v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol:[L12](#), [L14](#), [L15](#), [L17](#)

```
address private _daoCreator;  
address private _treasury;  
bool private _penalty;  
address public engineV1Factory;
```

Recommendation

Consider defining variables set in the constructor and not changed after deployment as immutable.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

26. Can use local variables to save gas

Severity: Informational

Category: Gas Optimization

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol
- v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol
- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol

Description

1. `_dao` could be replaced with the local variable `dao_`.

[v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol:L168](#)

```
_factoryManager = IDAO(_dao).getDAODeployFactory();
```

2. `stakingEngine` could be replaced with the local variable `_stakingEngine`.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\dao\DaoGovernance.sol:L34-L36](#)

```
if (stakingEngine != address(0)) {  
    pledgeEngine = IStakingEngine(stakingEngine).getPledgeEngine();  
}
```

3. `_baskets.length` is read every time during iteration. Could have a local variable for the length.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol:L675, L726](#)

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _baskets.length; i++) {
```

4. `_principalTokens.length` is read every time during iteration. Could have a local variable for the length.

[v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol:L627](#)

```
for (uint256 i = 0; i < _principalTokens.length; i++) {
```

Recommendation

Consider reading the same value from a local variable instead of storage to save gas.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

27. Redundant code

Severity: Informational

Category: Code Quality

Target:

- v2-governance-core\contracts\committee\TheBoard.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\committee\TreasuryCommittee.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseVerify.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseUCV.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseDAO.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseCommittee.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\agents\TreasuryManagerAgent.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\cores\KYCVerifyManager.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundManager.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\EscrowManager.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\InkFund.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\lucv\InvestmentUCV.sol
- v2-governance-core\contracts\agents\InvestmentManagementSetupAgent.sol
- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\pools\BasketPool.sol
- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingBasket.sol
- v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol

Description

Commented-out code, code for testing purposes (e.g. import "hardhat/console.sol", console.log...) and unused code (e.g. unused custom errors, unused structs) should be removed before deploying the contract to mainnet.

We have identified the following redundant codes.

- v2-governance-core\contracts\committee\TheBoard.sol:[L8](#), [L30-L33](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\committee\TreasuryCommittee.sol:[L22-L26](#), [L38-L62](#), [L72](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseVerify.sol:[L25-L28](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseUCV.sol:[L56](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseDAO.sol:[L164-L170](#), [L225-L227](#), [L279](#), [L462](#), [L476-L477](#), [L484](#), [L491-L492](#), [L503](#), [L605-L611](#), [L786](#), [L913-L922](#), [L955 - L956](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\base\BaseCommittee.sol:[L264-L265](#), [L269-L278](#), [L372](#), [L461-L468](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\agents\TreasuryManagerAgent.sol:[L90](#), [L100](#), [L103](#), [L108-L110](#), [L115-L116](#), [L180-L254](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\cores\KYCVerifyManager.sol:[L37](#), [L39](#), [L59](#), [L68-L69](#), [L99-L100](#), [L104-L107](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\funds\FundsManager.sol:[L25-L26](#), [L64-L70](#), [L406-L418](#), [L483-L503](#), [L542-L550](#), [L598-L604](#), [L764-L771](#), [L784-L795](#), [L819](#), [L926](#),

- [L939-L947](#), [L982](#), [L995-L1032](#), [L1079-L1089](#), [L1129-L1137](#), [L1148-L1151](#), [L1192](#), [L1194](#)
- v2-governance-core\contracts\products\EscrowManager.sol:[L101-L103](#), [L220-L223](#), [L289](#)
 - v2-governance-core\contracts\products\InkFund.sol:[L18](#), [L106](#), [L133](#), [L281](#), [L304](#), [L306](#), [L341](#), [L351](#), [L448](#), [L520](#), [L565-L567](#), [L619](#), [L710](#), [L783-L786](#), [L808](#), [L820-L821](#), [L888](#)
 - v2-governance-core\contracts\proposal\ProposalHandler.sol:[L418-L432](#), [L453-L455](#), [L463](#)
 - [v2-governance-core\contracts\lucv\InvestmentUCV.sol:all](#)
 - v2-governance-core\contracts\agents\InvestmentManagementSetupAgent.sol:[L9](#), [L95-L97](#), [L106](#)
 - v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\pools\BasketPool.sol:[L29-L30](#), [L101](#)
 - v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingBasket.sol:[L13](#), [L26-L27](#)
 - v3-economy-core\contracts\engines\staking\StakingEngine.sol:[L16](#), [L104](#), [L1116](#)

Recommendation

Consider removing the redundant codes.

Status

This issue has been acknowledged by the team.

Appendix

Appendix 1 - Files in Scope

This audit covered the following files in commit [9534fc9](#) of the v2-governance-core repo:

File	SHA-1 hash
contracts\agents\InvestmentManagementSetupAgent.sol	f9cec6af31f3a45e1f537f1b752b79c63f03c806
contracts/agents/TreasuryManagerAgent.sol	6b9b7d2ceb1306c6a9eff51f3c8a91503d228341
contracts/bases/BaseAgent.sol	ae75ceab0d0fb93cfc2ee019c74f118c777d3535
contracts/bases/BaseCommittee.sol	c38940eb21dac4c98d55ab107333675e3cb71930
contracts/bases/BaseDAO.sol	145a0223c1416d5e48d282787197d5c16ab8101e
contracts/bases/BaseUCV.sol	91ded64bb375efd9a4fada4a5bd47bddf5eb3bba
contracts/bases/BaseUCVManager.sol	033ff1ac7d3fff889605aa7c18a1f3e1ba8d6a87
contracts/bases/BaseVerify.sol	b15f0e0ffb6ac5bc4a126554f0682f3b2770cff1
contracts/committee/InvestmentCommittee.sol	c93b45489adc3961a69a0e1cac388449518a98cc
contracts/committee/TheBoard.sol	7b0eec6c1f676c1785c93502dddcefaebcd1b853
contracts/committee/ThePublic.sol	9a3bd90ca772df8c1972de4c22971f3860481e20
contracts/committee/TreasuryCommittee.sol	25753f88fdd483d8fcdc5fa35a4b48c146b8f243
contracts/cores/IdentityManager.sol	d4fff05872d6357c4e82d8cfb5441a8f6c4cc853
contracts/cores/KYCVerifyManager.sol	b2fccaabef29ee1fd4f3c010a0ab0f35fbc0f485
contracts/daos/MasterDAO.sol	806d60ff76dc878a5acd5e529b4c8cb916384a65
contracts/products/EscrowManager.sol	31ed96af336a0c3929645e030ee0be285eae1745
contracts/products/InkEnvelopeFactory.sol	7160ae6e94c5889583519e08666f9f643162698f
contracts/products/InkFund.sol	60043cc1eb6e9513cd29eb491ba61b010a5e6687
contracts/products/funds/FundManager.sol	1ee1bc038411789ff44a09d317417b45c54528f7
contracts/products/tokens/WrappedERC1155.sol	c78c14b3cce501162c25731b24ddf24944591875
contracts/products/tokens/WrappedERC20.sol	fe4f4f8447187cf70d8425a643e9dad42fc5f5f0
contracts/products/tokens/WrappedERC721.sol	ea6240989cecba3a36484e566799e4bee963dfd2
contracts/products/tokens/WrappedToken.sol	efeaaea7b72cf8d38ce2fc061ea80dceeea782b5

contracts/proposal/ProposalHandler.sol	652197abd602694a66a81a54afad14966cd98d9c
contracts/tokens/InkBadgeERC20.sol	4c1d60328de5a271c42694db59e126a95ce48b78
contracts/tokens/InkERC20.sol	1cb45fa76e8ca6e1aca6dac2d5a3d7c3058f7d3b
contracts/tokens/InkERC721.sol	eda9ac18b3c00a74d96ceaa7cb9092711118542d
contracts/tokens/InkFundCertificateToken.sol	7fcc4d0ea9f1ca0ce8140306f50b310245b6c1c6
contracts/ucv/InvestmentUCV.sol	0de59a513be7bcbcac542cfe3216f3bd6f9ed964
contracts/ucv/InvestmentUCVManager.sol	efabf30d9f877bffe5f69b5fab3c46d58e88f447
contracts/ucv/PayrollUCV.sol	902a8696cfb0477157afb236f307a16a11e01512
contracts/ucv/PayrollUCVManager.sol	f00804554d6d3bcca155a79a694182e0b739a6bd
contracts/ucv/TreasuryIncomeManager.sol	13fe1db781679f4c140822b8752fd4fc64fc1ed5
contracts/upgrade/FactoryManager.sol	40ed55b6e3abc785fcea72c1d68360942c5c7dc0
contracts/upgrade/InkBeaconProxy.sol	21ebd9292e3345705111c6d9e1b14f7122d4c312
contracts/utils/BytesUtils.sol	ce23b72d9db0830ef5dea3c66b6d26b6c6da2ad4
contracts/utils/ConfigHelper.sol	4e85352fa7f40df4ab26a35808de75d9f06adb0c
contracts/utils/ConfigManager.sol	9460ac592d25c05c163334976f204404410c18f7
contracts/utils/TransferHelper.sol	4f5612cf785dc930888d8fdb18d458cdac1dd2de

and the following files in commit [a779da4](#) of the v3-economy-core repo:

File	SHA-1 hash
contracts/config/EconomyAddressesProvider.sol	7502191c54570605f03448f101e263abe1cc65b1
contracts/dao/DaoGovernance.sol	c0154eb1980012900fd39496bcee4913f67593dd
contracts/dao/IDaoGovernance.sol	99bb51605387f6974032ad5bf2cd3d531d7d8e63
contracts/interfaces/IBasketPool.sol	07bd02f5f22d0604587e07bff4b0ca3f3740b166
contracts/interfaces/IBufferPool.sol	4bfdab74917b0ff1b828d4f16cb4bc9985a38510
contracts/interfaces/IEconomyAddressesProvider.sol	a8a3fe3e131d24e4944d302a26295b9fa20a0497
contracts/interfaces/IEconomyEngineV1Factory.sol	10d1c3078ba7c4dbd719911fc4c7fa82329ab929
contracts/interfaces/IEmissionPool.sol	8d01b1a78623719f38c1a7b27f24afeec13bd682
contracts/interfaces/IPledgeEngine.sol	c1a4203375a7b6139501bf6fae7d08674cd21016

contracts/interfaces/IReclaimPool.sol	27a4476c209f5cdb0dafdb07511b00d79a20d86e
contracts/interfaces/ISponsorEngine.sol	eac3bc1bfc170f68df1e4785f6db1e945d61b52b
contracts/interfaces/IStakingBasket.sol	7e67162363bc610eb1eea0616b4f1308a4ec85b6
contracts/interfaces/IStakingEngine.sol	830388bfe29a92367fb8c90ad25ebb0e3745c715
contracts/libraries/LDatetime.sol	ba70f707c033388419491e1adeea58ad7fe68b2d
contracts/libraries/LPledgeEngine.sol	46e9d271852f9e08e258514b7538ca6d43d1bf70
contracts/libraries/LStakingBasket.sol	2ce1af2809bdb1f5afd81c367b379214ebb2a8d7
contracts/libraries/LStakingEngine.sol	7afb695d61e8c328c94c06d0684c2379ce1498f
contracts/libraries/LStakingItem.sol	3e039a1efa9ae0d0b4b89a572dbc8ac518032222
contracts/libraries/PRBMath.sol	4d5e61cba5a6750063e765dc1806e3a766a93c5f
contracts/libraries/PRBMathUD60x18.sol	8bf9d6b6f975dc9cc776bd7108ecacdb0c634b41
contracts/engines/pledge/PledgeEngine.sol	2d57e3332cad337bb9d6a7dd48c35275c9ae9f37
contracts/engines/pools/BasketPool.sol	7eebc02e605e9d836fa93295a0821d32bd92d68b
contracts/engines/pools/EmissionPool.sol	f8914abfd012ebb597c519f07cf530319de30d6e
contracts/engines/sponsor/SponsorEngine.sol	8a90a9263078b6e4cf6eedeebef6b1b38a466059
contracts/engines/staking/StakingBasket.sol	c75b44510c1ecdd727ee5ef9e189ae161d12cc77
contracts/engines/staking/StakingEngine.sol	6f86a18d2eb17a2d2572e281f6d44181dc5fc572
contracts/engines/trust/TrustEngine.sol	b98e90a96ec719db93b11b2f2a2189fdaeec1deb