

Annex 1: Case Studies

The cases studies in this Annex are mostly aligned with the sections in the *Sphere Project: Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response*.

1. Participation

Situations

I. A village meeting was called by the aid agency and everyone came. The participants were asked to prioritise which areas should be first to receive assistance. There were strong differences of opinion between different groups over who was most affected and needy. A fight broke out and the meeting had to be abandoned.

II. The village head stood up in the meeting and said "I know my people and I will tell you what their needs are." No-one else stood up to speak.

III. Incidences of violence have increased between neighbouring disaster-affected and non-affected communities. Members of the non-affected community claim that although they are much poorer and more disadvantaged than those affected and that none of the aid agencies had even bothered to ask them.

IV. All parties to the conflict were affected by the disaster and a ceasefire was declared between them to facilitate relief operations. The international community hoped that this would serve as a platform from which a permanent solution could be developed.

V. Establishing a participatory approach for the provision of assistance was viewed as an excellent opportunity to include women in public decision making for the first time.

VI. The Government accused the aid organisation of attempting to legitimise the rebel's status by inviting them to participate in the emergency planning meeting.

Guidance notes

I. In planning your approach to participation consult closely people who know the context best. These are most likely to be local staff and other key informants such as locally based internationals with other aid agencies and diplomatic missions. Be aware that peoples expectations will be raised by your presence, and if these are not met then a conflict may result.

II. Allow sufficient time to plan participation exercises in advance.

III. Compile a comprehensive stakeholder list.

- IV. Prioritise who from this stakeholder list needs to be consulted.
- V. Assess the risks of inclusion, exclusion and intra-group and inter-group dynamics.
- VI. Identify any legal, security related, cultural or other considerations that need to be taken into account in planning participation exercises.
- VII. Identify the gatekeepers, their motives and assess access options.
- VIII. Assess and select appropriate participation strategies.
- IX. Develop contingency plans to deal with any problems that might arise during the participation process.
- X. Be clear from the outset whether and to what extent social empowerment or peace building is to be a part of the participation agenda and identify the associated risks.

2. Initial Assessment

Situations

I. The Indian Ocean tsunami disaster struck Sri Lanka during the third year of a ceasefire agreement between the Government and the rebel Tamil Tigers. Although this agreement was already unravelling at the time many aid agencies failed to account for this in their initial assessments and what it might mean for provision of emergency assistance. They later experienced access, programming, political manipulation and security issues which they could have either avoided or been better prepared for if their early assessments had picked up these issues in the first place.

II. During the search, rescue and initial relief stages of the post-tsunami emergency response in Sri Lanka there were many examples of cooperation between local Government officers, military personnel and the Tamil Tigers. There were also high levels of inter-ethnic collaboration within the general population and the involvement of the private sector in the delivering assistance to both Government and Tamil Tiger controlled parts of the country. Although many of these linkages soon eroded as the underlying tensions and conflict dynamics resurfaced, they may have presented peacebuilding opportunities had emergency teams the resources to recognise them as such.

Guidance Notes

- I. Include conflict sensitivity advisor positions within initial assessment teams and / or ensure that other team members have sufficient pre-deployment training and expertise in this field to identify and assess conflict sensitivity issues in their own specialisations.

- II. Integrate the requirement for a rapid conflict analysis to be conducted into the standard operating procedures and checklists for initial assessments.
- III. Ensure that questions relating to the presence, nature and potential impact on emergency assistance of conflict dynamics and societal tensions are sensitively asked in all consultations.
- IV. The preparation of pre-deployment briefing packs on high risk / disaster prone areas would make valuable background reading that could highlight pre-existing conflict dynamics and tensions to initial assessment teams so they are alert to these issues and can better focus their inquiries on how they relate to the emergency context the ground. There are a number of excellent sources of existing briefings and analysis for many countries (e.g. the International Crisis Group¹ and the Feinstein International Center²).
- V. Where possible include people with previous country experience in the assessment team as they are likely to have a more nuanced awareness of conflict sensitivity issues. Response team members should be representative of the lines of division in the areas of the conflict where the agency is working.
- VI. If this is not possible a database of human resources who could provide short-notice pre-departure country briefings for initial assessment teams would be useful.
- VII. In identifying conflict issues and dynamics possible in-country key resources to interview include government representatives, local humanitarian actors and other international aid agencies, foreign diplomats, journalists and other media personnel, political analysts, local peace-workers, think-tanks and policy units, academics, private sector business groups and the clergy.
- VIII. Methods for conducting key respondent interviews could be either in the form of a focus group or face-to-face. A well structured focus group discussion with multiple actors for a minimum 2 hours will reveal a wide range of issues and dynamics. The main limitation in conducting focus group meetings is the risk that some participants may contribute very little whilst others dominate. Individual face-to-face interviews will get around this problem and often a great deal of information can be obtained in under an hour. The main disadvantage of face-to-face interviews is the time factor involved as you may need to interview multiple respondents to get an accurate assessment. Whichever option

¹ www.crisisgroup.org

² <http://fic.tufts.edu/>

is used the key to success is in taking time over the preparation, having a predefined structure and knowing clearly what you want to achieve.

- IX. Include possible short, medium and long term peace building options in initial assessment reports.

3. Response

Situations

I. Although the aid organisation had built conflict analysis tools and checklists into its initial assessment procedures, neither the assessment teams nor their senior managers fully understood their purpose. A commonly expressed sentiment in the field and the planning room was, "They're nothing more than tick-boxes to satisfy donor requirements."

II. Although New Orleans could not be described as a conflict affected area, the response to Hurricane Katrina exposed deep seated social, economic and political tensions and inequities amongst the affected population which were often exacerbated or reinforced by the disaster and had a significant impact on the provision of emergency assistance.

III. Local religious leaders of a Buddhist community believed that a Christian INGO had an agenda of favouring Christian beneficiaries, and of subvertly converting local people to their faith using relief as bait. This not only created conflict between the INGO and Buddhist clergy, but also resulted in local people burning down already established churches and attacking neighbours who were Christian.

Guidance Notes

I. A conflict sensitive analysis should be extended to all emergency contexts irrespective of the presence of open / violent conflict.

II. Ensure that conflict sensitivity is fully understood and valued at all levels of the organisation for its contribution to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of an emergency response. This will require a genuine commitment at a board level and amongst senior managers. Organisational strategies to achieve this could include the setting of organisational, departmental and individual conflict sensitivity learning related objectives and the integration of conflict sensitivity awareness raising and training as part of team and personal development programmes.

III. Expectations Management: make sure that all faith communities participate in discussions and planning for the targeting of aid, and understand why some might have priority. Agency and staff should not indulge in proselytising activities.

IV. A conflict sensitive analysis should include an assessment of humanitarian access issues, the political context of the emergency and any

possible domestic or foreign government and military interactions and associated dynamics.

4. Targetting

Situations

I. In October 2008 conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo's (DRC) North Kivu province escalated and international aid agencies scaled up their emergency response to the region accordingly. Although the needs of the vulnerable population in North Kivu province was not disputed, later analysis observed that in other provinces of the DRC where there was no armed conflict or emergency response the levels of vulnerability also exceed the accepted threshold for humanitarian action. The Governor of one such province, Katanga, reportedly commented "*that he would be well advised to organise a war in order to secure humanitarian aid.*"³

II. In Afghanistan the identification of vulnerable groups is frequently conducted through existing community level consultation, leadership and decision making structures such as the 'shura'. However, an analysis of shura led targeting during the emergency response to flooding in Jowzjan Province in 2006 revealed that the most affected Turkmen community were poorly represented in the shura and consequently largely excluded from assistance.⁴

III. Evidence from Darfur shows that the targeting of food aid in complex emergencies may exacerbate protection threats or risks by exposing certain groups of beneficiaries or aid workers from an increased threat of attack, looting, or armed violence.⁵

IV. After the tsunami devastated the coast of Aceh, coastal communities were the first to benefit from emergency funding earmarked for tsunami relief. This created tension with inland villages who had suffered from decades of conflict and who were also in need of assistance. To the conflict affected communities situated away from the coastal areas this was unfair. From their perception their need was as great, and jealousy between the two sets of communities was created, especially where there were social and economic links.

³ Lilly, D. and Bertram, A. (2008) 'Targeting humanitarian assistance in post-conflict DRC', *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine*, Issue 41, December 2008.

<http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=2980>

⁴ Savage, K. et al (2007) *Corruption perceptions and risks in humanitarian assistance: an Afghanistan case study*, Humanitarian Policy Group (HPG) Working Paper, July 2007.

<http://www.odi.org.uk/resources/download/3180.pdf>

⁵ Young, H. and Maxwell, D. (2009) *Targeting in Complex Emergencies: Darfur Case Study*, Feinstein International Center, Tufts University, April 2009.

<https://wikis.uit.tufts.edu/confluence/display/FIC/Targeting+in+Complex+Emergencies+++Darfur+Case+Study>

Guidance Notes

- I. Response teams need to understand divisions and conflict causes that might exist in affected communities and how, within this context, their targeting might impact on these particularly with respect to those most at risk.
- II. Agency targeting decisions should be informed by a robust analysis of local authority and community level beneficiary identification mechanisms and criteria; a risks assessment of targeting options (how these might impact negatively or positively upon beneficiaries, non-beneficiaries or excluded parties, those delivering the assistance and the wider conflict context). A thorough situation analysis is required to understand the history of the region especially with regard to latent, actual, and potential conflict flashpoints.
- III. Such an analysis could be initially informed by consulting with a wide range of key informants and stakeholders. This entails (within the constraints of an emergency environment) engaging communities in helping to define targeting criteria and managing expectations of the affected community.
- IV. Consultation, collaboration and close coordination with other agencies is essential in providing an accurate assessment of targeting gaps or issues and how to overcome them.
- V. Besides the important focus on immediate emergency targeting needs, analyses and recommendations should include a more medium and long term perspective.
- VI. Continual monitoring and review of targeting decisions for possible changes in vulnerability and need is required.

5. Monitoring

Situations

- I. In 2007 violence erupted in Darfur's Kalma refugee camp when the Zaghawa tribe refugees accused the Fur and Dajo of trying to drive them out. Early indicators of an emerging conflict included sensitive political developments in the region over the possibility of rebel groups taking part in peace talks with the government and the establishment of an armed military committee in the camp by the Fur.
- II. In 2006 seventeen local Tamil aid workers with Action Contre La Faim (ACF) were found massacred in a Moslem village in the east of Sri Lanka after advancing Government forces drove out the LTTE. Although responsibility for the murders was never independently established, village sources later reported that local contacts had warned the ACF staff about the increasing risks of remaining in the area⁶.

⁶ University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna), Special Report No. 30, 1st April 2008.
http://www.uthr.org/SpecialReports/Spreport30.htm#_Toc194769935

III. Although issues of land tenure often receive little attention in the early days of an emergency response they are frequently sources of tension longer term when people start to return to their homes. Days after the Haitian earthquake analysts were urging humanitarian agencies to think about land issues immediately in order to reduce the risk of future conflict when returnees discover that their homes have been seized by opportunists or other desperate families.⁷

Guidance Notes

I. *What to monitor*: Conflict sensitive monitoring needs to take place at a number of different levels: a) project – input or activity; b) programme; c) beneficiary and immediate community; d) inter-agency; e) wider political and security environment.

II. *When to monitor*: Informally and perhaps ideally, conflict sensitive monitoring can be an intuitive ongoing process that is integrated into all daily activities and conducted by all personnel and the communities themselves.

III. *Who should monitor*: Different people need to be tasked with monitoring at different levels. For instance, at a project level the agency's local field officers are most likely to be amongst the first to notice any significant warning signs or changes in the operating environment at a community level. Field workers may also be useful to establish beneficiary contacts with whom they can inquire about emerging issues. They will of course need to be aware of what to look for and why. It is therefore important to conduct a minimum ½ day training course for field staff on conflict sensitivity awareness and monitoring as early as possible.

IV. *Designing a monitoring plan*: During the first 30 days the monitoring plan might be a very simple one that briefly sets out when, by whom and how information at different levels will be collected and analysed. Local staff and community representatives should be closely involved in setting this up.

V. *Collecting information*: Collecting information on conflict sensitive issues does not need to be a separate series of formal questionnaires, interviews and focus group discussions. At an early response phase it is probably most useful if a conflict sensitive awareness is built into all interactions (interagency meetings, sectoral meetings, community meetings, food distributions etc) and that the staff involved understand how to ask relevant and useful questions about conflict issues as the opportunities arise.

VI. *Analysing information*: Daily or weekly feedback sessions between key community contacts and field staff / and between field staff and senior managers are useful to flag up any immediate or longer term conflict issues which have been observed. These do not need to be time consuming and

⁷ ODI BLOG Monday, January 18, 2010 4:58 PM by Alison Evans

http://blogs.odi.org.uk/blogs/main/archive/2010/01/18/haiti_long_term_recovery.aspx#50743

often ½ an hour would be adequate. Any serious issues can then be allocated for follow-up in more detail.

VII. *Responding to analysis*: Once a conflict issue has been identified and analysed in some detail there then needs to be a review of whether any programme or activity changes are required at a result.

6. Evaluation

Tools

I. The Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) developed a resource guide to producing real-time evaluations (RTE)⁸. An Inter Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Real Time Interest Group has been established and together with UNOCHA they commissioned and published a review of real-time methodologies.⁹

II. UNOCHA coordinated an Inter-Agency Real Time Evaluation of the Humanitarian Response to the Haiti Earthquake to provide independent assessment and real-time feedback addressing those issues most relevant during the initial phase of operations

III. The Emergency Capacity Building Project¹⁰ provided a set of basic guidelines on 'how to be accountable to local people and measure programme impact in emergency situations. Its 'good enough' approach uses tools that are 'safe, quick and easy to implement'

Guidance Notes

I. The triggers for conducting real-time evaluations should include both the emergence of conflict related risks and peace-building opportunities.

II. Real-time evaluation teams should include personnel skilled in identifying conflict sensitivities and peace related opportunities.

7. Aid Worker Competencies and Responsibilities

Situations

⁸ Cosgrave, J., Ramalingam, B., and Beck, T. (March 2009) *Real-time evaluations of humanitarian action: An ALNAP Guide Pilot Version*, Overseas Development Institute, London.

<http://www.alnap.org/resources/guides/evaluation/rte.aspx>

⁹ Telford, J. (July 2009) *Review of Joint Evaluations and the Future of Inter Agency Evaluations*, commissioned by UNOCHA. <http://www.alnap.org/resources/guides/evaluation/rte.aspx>

¹⁰ *Impact Measurement and Accountability in Emergencies. The Good Enough Guide* (2007). Oxfam GB, Oxford, UK. <http://www.oxfam.org.uk/publications>

I. An international water and sanitation engineer respondent who asked about his approach to conflict sensitivity commented "*I don't know anything about that, I just sink wells and build toilets.*"

II. An emergency health worker respondent commented that it was only after attending a course on conflict sensitivity that she began to consider the potential tensions and conflicts that might arise in her own work over such issues as where a field hospital should be located, the ethnic backgrounds and gender of the nursing staff and medical teams and the implications of treating suspected former combatants alongside civilians.

Guidance Notes

I. Aid worker competencies in conflict sensitivity should be formalised through their participation on a relevant training course. Such a course should be conducted by an appropriately qualified member of the team, the services of a consultant training provider or by recognised accredited institution. Such courses do not have to be long. A 1 to 3 day programme would provide a basic introduction to fundamental principles of conflict sensitivity in emergencies. These could be provided pre-departure.

II. All emergency aid workers – local and international – should undertake a basic training on conflict sensitivity. International aid workers should also undertake a course or orientation on cultural sensitivity specific to the context.

III. Conflict sensitivity qualifications and experience at a level appropriate to the position should form a part of the job description / person specification and selection criteria for key emergency posts (especially field workers, coordinators and managers).

8. Supervision, Management and Support of Personnel

Situations

I. After a number of local drivers employed by an international aid agency were kidnapped and killed, a consultant was hired by the organisation to conduct an inquiry into how this had happened and whether it could have been prevented. The consultant's findings concluded that the drivers had been members of militant faction that and that they were probably killed by a rival faction who suspected them of spying. A simple background check of the applicants and the input of a local Human Resource Officer could have revealed this. However the international Human Resource Manager had obtained the drivers through a local recruitment agency without asking any questions and had not been aware that driver backgrounds could pose a problem even though they were required to drive across borders and go to different ethnic areas. Although some of the local field staff were uncomfortable working with these drivers they were too frightened to report their feelings. On at least one occasion there was an unreported incident of an argument between the driver and some beneficiary youths in one of the camps. The organisation itself did not offer any training for managers or field

staff in conflict sensitivity and nor did it have any related policies or guidelines in place for observing or reporting conflict related issues and tensions.

Guidance Notes

- I. Managers need to be accountable for ensuring that conflict sensitive analysis and approaches are an integral component of programming and is adequately resourced with appropriately skilled personnel. HR managers must check whether locally recruited staff reflect lines of division that exist in communities and ensure that they are deployed appropriately.
- II. All personnel are oriented on the cultural and socio-political dynamics and context of the emergency environment in general and the target group in particular.
- III. Technical training for conflict sensitivity is built into staff capacity building programmes.
- IV. Conflict sensitivity related responsibilities and accountabilities should be included in personal and project/programme work-plans and objectives.
- V. The implications of class, caste, clan, ethnicities, religious and political backgrounds of local staff on team and target group interactions need to be considered by human resource managers.

9. Finance, Accounting and Procurement

Situations

- I. When the Sri Lankan Government introduced taxation on aid agency funding it was criticised by pro-LTTE groups for siphoning off humanitarian funds in support of its war effort. When international aid agencies also complained about the tax they were accused by the local authorities and media of being supporters of terrorism.
- II. It was only after an external evaluation that the international aid agency discovered its local partner organisation had been set up by a local ruling party politician and the funds he was receiving were being used only to provide assistance to his own constituents.

Guidance Notes

- I. The key guidance for conflict sensitive financial resource considerations during the first 30 days of an emergency response is to assess what issues exist, the risks they pose and to determine appropriate strategies for mitigating these risks.
- II. Therefore conflict sensitive financial resource considerations need to be incorporated into the initial assessment, response planning and monitoring and real-time evaluation phases during the first 30 days.

III. Donor identification risks, subcontracting, corruption, accounting, procurement and taxation issues need to be raised in discussions with key informants, target communities and other stakeholders.

IV. Special care should be taken to assess the political connections and associated risks of suppliers and subcontracted local aid organisations.

V. Maintaining accountable and transparent financial systems within an organisation and in dealing with partners and suppliers will help reduce the risk of corruption.

VI. Ensure that all staff members, partners and target communities are aware of the agency's policies on preventing corruption and financial abuses.

VII. Establish confidential and safe whistle-blower systems for staff and target communities to report the corruption and the misuse of aid. Ensure that any complaints or reported abuses are fairly followed-up.

VIII. Refer to other related guides for more details.¹¹

10. Gender

Situations

I. In advising upon gender issues in the Haiti earthquake disaster IASC and the Gender Standby Capacity Project (GENCAP) noted "In times of crisis, all forms of gender-based violence, particularly sexual violence, can be exacerbated. Prior to the earthquake Haiti documented high prevalence of gender-based violence, so increases should be expected."¹²

II. During the emergency response phase of a humanitarian disaster, agency staff had to work long hours. On occasions this meant that local staff who were young, unmarried women were often asked to work in offices alone with expatriate male personnel at night. Because the women were afraid of losing their jobs they agreed to do so, even though it caused scandal and gossip within their own community, and conflict within their family, about such perceived inappropriate behaviour.

¹¹ Transparency International (2010) *Combating Corruption in Humanitarian Emergencies: Handbook of Good Practices*.

http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2010/hum_handbook#1

¹²

<http://onerresponse.info/crosscutting/gender/Documents/Gender%20ABC%20Haiti%20emergenc%2020100121.pdf>

III. After the tsunami struck Batticaloa on the east coast of Sri Lanka, in a Women's Disaster Management Committee was quickly established to represent the voices and particular needs of women. They were influential in highlighting issues relating to shelter and other relief items, and later to the importance of ensuring new houses were deeded to women jointly with men.

Guidance Notes

I. Incorporate a gender perspective into any conflict analysis and recognise the wider implications and impacts of gender issues on the conflict and humanitarian relationships.

II. Recognise that women and girls, men and boys have different protection needs in disaster and conflict contexts. Assess these during the initial assessment phase, design and implement appropriate protection responses and mechanisms and regularly monitor for changes throughout the operational period.

III. Observe local gender related norms and cultural expectations in relationships with affected communities.

IV. Include gender issues in cultural awareness training for humanitarian personnel. Foreigners must be educated about local customs and social and ethical norms, standards and behaviour of the communities within which they are working, and devise work practices accordingly.

11. Military / Government / Armed Non-State Actor Interactions

Situations

I. In 2005, shortly after the Banda Aceh earthquake / tsunami, the Indonesian Government announced that it would be restricting foreign aid access because of the threat from the rebel GAM movement. Some analysts believed the presence of international emergency aid workers was preventing the Indonesian Government from carrying out operations against the separatists. GAM offered a truce and the Indonesian Government later backtracked. Local respondents referred to the conflict reducing, witnessing and stabilising influence of the international emergency response presence as being instrumental in enabling a resolution of the conflict in Aceh.

II. In June 2009 the country representative of a Norwegian NGO was deported from Sri Lanka for preventing local staff members from raising a Sri Lankan national flag in their office to celebrate the Government's defeat of the Tamil Tigers. The country representative had stated that the agency should remain neutral. The Tamil Tigers were internationally proscribed as a terrorist organisation and the Norwegian Government had for many years been involved in trying to broker a peaceful resolution of the conflict amidst fierce local medial and political criticism.

III. In March 2010 a BBC investigation revealed evidence of large scale misappropriation for military purposes of international aid money in Ethiopia during the 1984-5 famine by Tigray rebel groups posing as local relief charities.

IV. A report of INGO staff being taken hostage had reached the HQ security unit who immediately issued directives to local staff not to go to the location, or negotiate with the hostage takers, because it was considered too dangerous. The local staff, who were aware of the real reasons behind the incident and knew the parties involved ignored these directives, travelled to the village, and promptly resolved the situation before it worsened. As one experienced agency worker stated “it was pointless that persons based in the capital, who know nothing about our locale, were working from a set of security standards that were neither pragmatic or appropriate in this situation. They need to be more conflict-sensitive to our context, more field-based. So, how about *asking us* about security in our areas, rather than *telling us* about them?”

Guidance Notes

I. During the initial emergency assessment conduct a mapping of all local authority stakeholders, their profiles and the dynamics between them. Assess how the affected target community perceives these different stakeholders.

II. Assess the possible impact of government and military interactions on the deliver of humanitarian assistance / and the possible impact of humanitarian assistance on government, the military and other armed non-state actors.

III. Ensure that the potential risks of interaction between humanitarian aid agencies and local authorities is discussed during the initial assessment phase with local informants and staff and updated regularly during the first 30 days.

IV. Find out about any rules, regulations or restrictions imposed by the national government authority in relation to international humanitarian interactions with non-state armed groups and de-facto authorities. Always observe the laws of local authorities and seek official clarification whenever in doubt.

V. Use the analysis from the guidance above to inform the design and implementation of any response.

VI. Local staff should have clear and understood channels to report conditions of developing tension that could result in outbreaks of violence, and when it is appropriate for them to handle ‘local’ situations.

12. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion

Situations

I. In 2009 widespread fighting and displacement erupted near the border between Ethiopia's Somali and Oromia regions after a dispute over which side of the border newly constructed boreholes were on resulted in drilling rigs being attacked and destroyed.

II. In 2008 a reported attempt by Hindu extremists to poison the water source of a Christian dominated relief camps in Orissa was foiled.

III. Water pumps in Sri Lanka's welfare camps were repeatedly sabotaged during the night by high caste Tamils who could not tolerate sharing a communal water source with people from a lower caste.

IV. Widowed women were not allowed to use wells to collect water because the rest of the camp thought that if this happened during the time of their menstrual cycle, the water would be contaminated. This was worse for women who had no sons or male relatives who would do this for them.

Guidance Notes

I. Emergency water and sanitation personnel should have an understanding of the potential for conflict issues in their sector gained through a minimum basic training. Such issues include location of latrines and wells, gender considerations, whether access is through lines of community division and prioritisation. A history of water resource conflict, cultural and religious communal differences in the use of and access to water and sanitation should be particularly noted.

II. The initial assessment of water and sanitation needs should include an assessment of sector specific conflict related issues and concerns using conflict analysis tools.

III. All sector specific conflict issues should be discussed during the community consultation and design phase and factored into the response.

IV. Ensure that conflict sensitivity issues and concerns are raised and discussed in water and sanitation cluster group meetings with other agencies.

V. Monitoring should take into account any changes in the water and sanitation sector which might have a conflict impact (e.g. further flows of displacement overburdening water supply resources; or the arrival of people from a different group).

13. Food Security and Food Aid

Situations

I. Some agencies advocate the provision of cash in emergency relief instead of food aid as this can be used to spend on locally available produce and contribute to stimulating local economies.

II. To prevent the resale of food aid an agency in the Horn of Africa used bags that were only durable enough to travel the short distance from the distribution site to the recipients dwelling but not enough to survive a long drive to market.

III. The politically convoluted nature and multiple dynamics of food aid is demonstrated by the deteriorating relationship in 2010 between the al-Shabab Somali rebel group and the World Food Program (WFP) announced it was suspending food aid to al-Shabab controlled areas after the group demanded that all food aid should be purchased locally and the group paid a tax. The al-Shabab responded by banning the WFP from its territory saying that the provision of food assistance was destroying local farmer livelihoods. Al-Shabab is also proscribed as an international terrorist organisation by the US Government. The UN has accused the US aid program of deliberately withholding assistance from affected people in al-Shabab controlled areas. US Government conditions for funded aid agencies in Somali have been introduced to curb the extortion of food aid by rebels. These conditions include a prohibition on paying tithes or taxes to al-Shabab.

IV. When World Vision were delivering food aid during early 2003 in Central Mindanao, they were mindful that they were a Christian agency working in tense situation where there had been Muslim-Christian clashes. WV decided that it was important to demonstrate their respect for the culture and values of Muslim beneficiaries. As a result food distribution followed a process which ensured that : no food items containing pork or pork flavouring were included in the distribution. Whilst a favourite food of Christian migrants in Mindanao, such products would, of course, have been forbidden for Muslims. The distribution schedule was arranged so as not interfere with Muslim prayer times, and there were separate lines for men and women in accordance with local Muslim practices.¹³

Guidance notes

I. Emergency food aid strategies should be grounded in agency policies which have been developed taking into consideration their conflict risks and peace building potential.

¹³ World Vision. *Conflict Sensitivity in Emergencies. Learning from the Asia Tsunami Response*. 2006.

II. Emergency food aid personnel should have an understanding of the potential for conflict issues in their sector gained through a minimum basic training.

III. Using conflict analysis tools the initial assessment of food security needs should include an assessment of sector specific conflict related issues and concerns.

IV. Ensure that conflict sensitivity issues and concerns are raised and discussed in food security cluster group meetings with other agencies.

V. Monitoring should take into account any changes in food security which might have a conflict impact.

VI. Involve local decision makers and respected people. For example, when World Vision staff received information that a relief convoy would be targeted, they asked advice from respected local elders and leaders who agreed to join the convoy and help with the distribution of goods ensuring the convoy safety and equitable distribution of food, without resorting to the local practice of using armed guards.