

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Masterarbeit in Informatik

to do title eng

Matthias Konstantin Fischer





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to do, title ger

Author:	Matthias Konstantin Fischer
Supervisor:	Prof. Dr. Claudia Eckert
Advisor:	M.Sc. Paul Muntean
Date:	X November, 2016





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

Ich versichere, dass ich diese Diplomarbeit selbständig verfasst und nur die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel verwendet habe.

München, den 21. Oktober 2016 Matthias Konstantin Fischer

Acknowledgments

If someone contributed to the thesis... might be good to thank them here.

Abstract

An abstracts abstracts the thesis!

This is just an example that shows how long the abstract should be and which parts an abstract should contain.

Many applications such as the Chrome and Firefox browsers are largely implemented in C++ for its perfor- mance and modularity. Type casting, which converts one type of an object to another, plays an essential role in en- abling polymorphism in C++ because it allows a program to utilize certain general or specific implementations in the class hierarchies. However, if not correctly used, it may return unsafe and incorrectly casted values, leading to so-called bad-casting or type-confusion vulnerabili- ties. Since a bad-casted pointer violates a programmer's intended pointer semantics and enables an attacker to corrupt memory, bad-casting has critical security implica- tions similar to those of other memory corruption vulner- abilities. Despite the increasing number of bad-casting vulnerabilities, the bad-casting detection problem has not been addressed by the security community.

In this paper, we present C A V ER , a runtime bad-casting detection tool. It performs program instrumentation at compile time and uses a new runtime type tracing mechanism—the type hierarchy table—to overcome the limitation of existing approaches and efficiently verify type casting dynamically. In particular, C A V ER can be easily and automatically adopted to target applications, achieves broader detection coverage, and incurs reason- able runtime overhead. We have applied C A V ER to large- scale software including Chrome and Firefox browsers, and discovered 11 previously unknown security vulnera- bilities: nine in GNU libstdc++ and two in Firefox, all of which have been confirmed and subsequently fixed by vendors. Our evaluation showed that C A V ER imposes up to 7.6% and 64.6% overhead for performance-intensive benchmarks on the Chromium and Firefox browsers, re- spectively.

Contents

1. Introduction

Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) [32, 29] is one of the most used techniques to secure program execution flows against advanced Code-Reuse Attacks (CRAs).

Advanced CRAs such as COOP [3]

Proposal: Name for our tool:

CCTypeMapper (Caller Calle Type Mapper)

TypeShild

i have selected this name for our tool.

TypeProtector

CCTS (caller/calle type securer or shilder)

TypeFlower

you can also make your sugestion here.

Proposal:

Citation example: [**?**].

The introduction should answer this questions:

1.What is the problem?

Specify The Problem statement.

2-3 sentences.

2.What are the current solutions?

talk about TypeArmor [9]....

3.Where the solutions lack?

4.What is your idea?

5.Contributions.

In summary, we make the following contributions:

1. We did this
2. We did this

3. We did this.

The rest of the MA is organized as follows.

1.1. Motivation

here coms the Motivation.
2-3 sentences.

1.2. Research Goals

here coms the Motivation.
2-3 sentences.

1.3. Outline

here coms the Motivation.
2-3 sentences.
example:

The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides a profound background regarding VMs, VMI, and modern rootkits. We relate our work to previous research in Chapter 3. The design and architecture of WhiteRabbit is discussed in Chapter 4. This chapter comprises assumptions and necessary means that are required to meet the goals previously stated in Section 1.2. The WhiteRabbit prototype implementation is discussed and evaluated in Chapter 5 and Chapter 6, respectively. Finally, we provide an outlook concerning future work in Chapter 7 and conclude this thesis with a brief recapitulation in Chapter 8.

2. Technical Overview

2.1. Types Inference/Recovery from Binaries

2.1.1. Types Recovery in General

2.1.2. Function Parameter Types Recovery

2.1.3. Caller/Callee Parameter Types Recovery

2.2. Code-Reuse Attacks

this section will up to 1 DIN A page. First talk about code reuse attacks in general and then about COOP.

Say why COOP is not affected by the following mittigation approaches Talk about intel CET, talk about Windows CF guard.

2.3. Control-Flow Integrity

2.4. Cntrol-Flow Integrity

Part I.

Snippets

3. Snippet [AddressTaken]

As of now we used the full set of possible calltargets, which is the set of addresses of all function entry basic blocks. To further restrict the possible calltargets per callsite, we explored the notion of incorporating an address taken analysis into our application. The notion is that any indirect control flow instruction might only target addresses that are considered taken. An Address is considered to be a taken address, if it is loaded to memory or a register usually this is a constant, !optional! however it is also possible that simple calculations using multiplication and/or addition are used. We are not concerned with more complex calculations, because we have not observed compilers resorting to more complex methods and literature so far does agree [**?**].

Based on the notions of [**?**], introduced several types of indirect control flow targets of which only !shorthand! Code Pointer Constants (CK) and !shorthand! Computed Code Pointers (CC) are of interest to us. The reason for that is that the others are usually the target of indirect jumps, however we are (as of now) only interested in callsites.

!optional!

Definition 3.1 *!shorthand! Computed Code Pointers (CC) are, addresses that are computed during binary execution. In [**?**] this set only contains targets to intraprocedural indirect jumps and is thus of no interest for us*

Our approach of indentifying taken addresses is a two pronged approach. First, we iterate over the raw binary content of data segments additionally identifying possible dereferencable addresses. Second, we iterate over all instructions in functions within the disassembled binary.

3.1. step 1

We rely on Dyninst to tell us the boundaries of the .plt section !todo! add more information here and the .text section, which contain the executable part of the binary and thus are use to precheck any addresses that we might find in this step.

As suggested in [**?**], we slide a !todo!, how much byte ? 4 or 8 ? what happens on X86-64 compared to x86window over the data sections of the binary (namely the .data, the .rodata and the .dynsym).

3.2. step 2

We rely on Dyninst [**?**] to supply us with the correct function bounadries and addresses of instructions, which we then pass onto our instruction decoder, which is based on DynamoRIO. In essence there are types of analysis that are performed on each instruction. First we identify all relevant constants from the instruction

1. If the instructions is a control flow instructions, we completely ignore it, as it cannot give us any information that is relevant. !todo! can we trace back from memory addresses and registers, what essentially is being called ?
2. We look a the sources and !todo! targets of the instructions and add it to the list of potentially interesting targets
3. If the target is a RIP-based address, we rely on DynamoRIO to decode it and also add it to the list of potentially interesting target
4. !todo what is with constant functions ?
5. !todo! can we have DynamoRIO infer the result of simple lea instructions ?

Then for the resulting set of addresses, we check whether each either point to the entry block of a function, points within the .plt section, or is present in our reference map, which we calculated earlier. !todo! is the reference map needed ?

4. Implementation

In the Master thesis this section should be no longer than 1 DIN A page:
example of implementation text from USENIX caver Paper.
Please write in the same style.

We implemented C A V ER based on the LLVM Compiler project [43] (revision 212782, version 3.5.0). The static in- strumentation module is implemented in Clang's CodeGen module and LLVM's Instrumentation module. The runtime library is implemented using the compiler-rt module based on LLVM's Sanitizer code base. In to- tal, C A V ER is implemented in 3,540 lines of C++ code (excluding empty lines and comments). C A V ER is currently implemented for the Linux x86 platform, and there are a few platform-dependent mech- anisms. For example, the type and tracing functions for global objects are placed in the .ctors section of ELF . As these platform-dependent features can also be found in other platforms, we believe C A V ER can be ported to other platforms as well. C A V ER interposes threading functions to maintain thread contexts and hold a per-thread red- black tree for stack objects. C A V ER also maintains the top and bottom addresses of stack segments to efficiently check pointer membership on the stack. We also modified the front-end drivers of Clang so that users of C A V ER can easily build and secure their target applications with one extra compilation flag and linker flag, respectively.

5. Evaluation

We evaluated our tool X with Y popular servers, by instrumenting them with our tool. We performed runtime performance test with the following applications.

Our Evaluation aims to answer the following research questions:

- **R1:** How efective is out tool in securing binary programs against the COOP attack?
- **R2:** How precise is our tool in detecting the types of the caller/caller pairs?
- **R3:** What is the performance overhead of our tool?
- **R4:** What are the instumentation overheads imposed by our tool
- **R5:** How many caller/called pairs are secured by our tool and how many remain unsecured?
- **R6:** Against which kind of attacks can our tool secure programs?
- **R7:** What are the Limitations of our Tool?
- **R8:** List is not exauhustive. Give another relevant research question. if there is one.

Comparison methods. Example: We used UBSAN (compare with TypeArmor), the state-of-art tool for detecting bad-casting bugs, as our comparison tar- get of C A V ER . Also, We used C A V ER - NAIVE , which dis- abled the two optimization techniques described in §4.4, to show their effectiveness on runtime performance opti- mization.

Experimental setup. Example: All experiments were run on Ubuntu 13.10 (Linux Kernel 3.11) with a quad-core 3.40 GHz CPU (Intel Xeon E3-1245), 16 GB RAM, and 1 TB SSD-based storage.

5.1. R1: Effectiveness of our Tool

Table 5.1.: Classification CS

target	opt	#CS	problems	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	non-void-ok	non-void-probl.
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.2.: Compound

opt	#CS	cs args (perfect %)	cs args (problem %)	cs non-void (correct %)	cs non-void (probl. %)	#ct	ct args (perfect %)	ct args (probl. %)	ct void (correct %)	ct void (correct %)
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.3.: Classification CT

target	opt	#CS	problems	0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6	non-void-ok	non-void-probl.
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.4.: Callsite Classification for paramcount

target	opt	problematic	+0	+1	+2	+3	+4	+5	+6
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.5.: Calltarget Classification

target	opt	problematic	-0	-1	-2	-3	-4	-5	-6
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.6.: Coumpound table

target	opt	#	Callsites: param perf. %, probl %	#	Callsites: param perf. %, probl %
x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.7.: MAtching table

target	opt	ct	Ct probl.	at	at prob.	cs	clang cs probl.	padyn cs probl.
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.8.: policy evaluation

target	opt	policy	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	sumarry
x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x	x

Table 5.9.: param wideness

5	4	3	2	1	0	param/wideness
x	x	x	x	x	x	0
x	x	x	x	x	x	8
x	x	x	x	x	x	16
x	x	x	x	x	x	32
x	x	x	x	x	x	64

Table 5.10.: tabelle 7

5	4	3	2	1	0	param/wideness
x	x	x	x	x	x	0
x	x	x	x	x	x	8
x	x	x	x	x	x	16
x	x	x	x	x	x	32
x	x	x	x	x	x	64

Table 5.11.: tabelle 7

5	4	3	2	1	0	param/wideness
x	x	x	x	x	x	0
x	x	x	x	x	x	8
x	x	x	x	x	x	16
x	x	x	x	x	x	32
x	x	x	x	x	x	64

alternative for abobe:

Figure 5.1.: impact of CFI and CFC



Table 5.12.: matching

target	opt	fn_count	fn_problem	at_count	at_problem	cs_count	cs_clang	cs_padyn
x	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0

Figure 5.2.: liveness iteration, dummy



Figure 5.3.: reaching iteration, dummy



Table 5.13.: pairings compares

target	opt	policy	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	summary
proftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
proftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
vsftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
vsftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0

Table 5.14.: policy baseline

target	opt	policy	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	summary
proftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
proftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
vsftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0
vsftpd	x	x	x	x	x	0	0	0	0	0

5.2. R2: Precision of our Tool

5.3. R3: Performance overhead of our Tool

5.4. R4: Instrumentation overhead of our Tool

5.5. R5: Security coverage of our tool

5.6. R6: Which kind of attacks can our tool defend off

5.7. R7: Whar are the limitations of our Tool

5.8. R8: To Do.

it is easier for the reader if we can directly map those section from underneath on the section from above.

5.9. Classification

5.9.1. Callsites

overestimation param count. table. number of parameters.

5.9.2. Calltargets

underestimation param table.

5.10. Patching Policies

Two types of diagrams. Table 5 from TypeArmor and a CDF to compare param count and param type. (baseline).

5.10.1. AT

5.10.2. ParamCount

table, cdf, baseline vs. server. approximations.

5.10.3. ParamType

table, cdf, baseline vs. server. approximations.

5.11. Security Evaluation

5.12. Performance

spec 2006.

6. Related Work

In this section we shortly review the main techniques and tools which are related to *TypeShild*. Section 6.1 presents several techniques which can not fully defend against advanced CRAs. Section 6.2 gives an overview of tools used to recover type inference from binaries. Section 6.3 highlights several tools which can mitigate against the COOP attack on the binary level. Section 6.4 presents tools which can mitigate against the COOP source code level. Finaly, section 6.5 shows some of the most promissing runtime-based mitigation techniques against COOP.

6.1. Mitigation of Advanced Code-Reuse Attacks

COOP [3], Subversive-C [6] and Recursive-COOP [5] are advanced CRAs since these attacks: *i)* can not be addressed with shadow stacks techniques (i.e., do not violate the caller/calle convention), *ii)* coarse-grained CFI techniques are useless against these attacks, *iii)* hardware based approaches such as Intel CET [7] can not mitigate this attack for the same reason as in *i)*, and *iv)* OS-based approaches such as Windows Control Flow Guard [8] does not defend against COOP since the precomputed CFG does not contain edges for indirect call sites which are explicitly exploited during the COOP attack.

CRAs have many manifestations and it is out of scope of this work to list them all here. CRAs can be addressed in general the following ways: *(i)* binary instrumentation, *(ii)* source code recompilation and *(iii)* runtime application monitoring. While there is a pletora of tools and techniques which try to enforce CFI primitives in executables, source code and during runtime, we briefly list few of them in order for the reader to get familiar with the solution landscape. The approaches used to combat against CRAs are roughly based on the following techniques: *(a)* fine-grained CFI with hardware support, PathArmor [17], ((b)) coarse-grained CFI used for binary instrumentation, CCFIR [38], *(c)* coarse-grained CFI based on binary loader, CFCI [39] *(d)* fine-grained code randomization, O-CFI [36], *(e)* cryptografy with hardware support, CCFI [35], *(f)* ROP stack pivoting, PBlocker [41], *(g)* canary based protection, DynaGuard [40], *(h)* checking vTable integrity for protecting against COOP based on CFI for source code auch as SafeDispatch [2], vtv [4] LLVM and GCC compiler based vor vTable protection and binary rewriting such as vfGuard [42], vTint [37] and [5], *(i)* runtime and hardware support based on a combination of LBR, PMU and BTS registers CFIGuard [27] and *(j)* source code recompilation with CFI and/or randomization enforcement against JIT-ROP attacks, MCFI [26], RockJIT [30] and PiCFI [31].

Notice that the above techniques are useless against the aforementioned advanced CRAs, the list is not exaustive and new protection technies arise by combining available techniques or by using newly available hardware features.

6.2. Tyepe-Inference on Executables

Recovering variable types from executable programs is very hard in general for several reasons. First, the quality of the disasembly can very much from used framework to another. *TypeShild* is based on DynInst and the quality of the execuatble disasembly fits our needs. For a more comprehensive review on the capabilities of DynInst and other tools we advice the reader to have a look at [18].

Second, alias analysis in binares is undecidable in theory and intractable in practice [23]. There are several most promising tools such as: Rewards [19], BAP [20], SmartDec [21], and Divine [22]. These tools try with more or less success to recover type information from binary programs with different goals. Typical goals are: *i)* full program reconstruction (binary to code convertion, reversing), *ii)* checking for buffer overflows, *iii)* integer overflows and other types of memory corruptions. For a more exhaustive review of such tools we advice the reader to have a look at the review of Caballero et al. [16]. Intresting to notice is that the code from only a few of this tools is available.

6.3. Binary-based Protection against COOP

TypeShild is most similar to TypeArmor [9] since we also enforce strong binary-level invariants on the number of function paramters. *TypeShild* similarly to TypeArmor targets exclusive protection against advanced exploitation techniques which can bypass fine-grained CFI schemes and VTable protections at the binary level.

However, *TypeShild* is much more precise than TypeArmor since its enforcing policy is also based on the types of the function parameters. This results in a more precise selection of caller/calle pairs on which the fine-grained CFI policy is enforced. Thus, we achieve a reduced runtime overhead than TypeArmor since we enfoce our CFI policy on fewer caller/callee pairs than TypeArmor.

6.4. Source Code based Protection against COOP

There are several source code based tools which can succesfully protect against the COOP attack. Such tools are: ShrinkWrap [10], IFCC/VTV [4], SafeDispatch [2], vTrust [13], Readactor++ [15], CPI [11] and the tool presented by Bounov et al. [12]. These tools profit from high precision since they have access to the full semantic context of the program though the scope of the compiler on which they are based. Because of this reason these tools target mostly other types of security problems than binary-based tools address. For example some last advancec in compile based protection against code reuse attacks address mainly performance issues. Currently, most of the above presented tools are only forward edge enforcers of fine-grained CFI policies with an overhead from 1% up to 15%.

We are aware that there is still a long research path to go until binary based techniques can recuperate program based semantic information from executable with the same precision as compiler based tools. These path could be even endless since compilers are optimized for speed and are designed to remove as much as possbile semantic information from an executable in order to make the program run as fast as possible. In light of this fact, *TypeShild* is another attempt to recuperate just the needed semantic information (types

and number of function parameters from indirect call sites) in order to be able to enforce a precise and with low overhead primitive against COOP attacks.

Rather than claiming that the invariants offered by *TypeShild* are suffiecient to mitigate all versions of the COOP attack we take a more conservative path by claiming that *TypeShild* further raises the bar w.r.t. what is possible when defending against COOP attacks on the binary level.

6.5. Runtime-based Protection against COOP

There is something available out there but I can not used it: anonymus. Long story short conclusion: There are several promissing runtime-based line of defenses against advanced CRAs but none of them can succesfully protect against the COOP attack.

IntelCET [7] is based on, `ENDBRANCH`, a new CPU instruction which can be used to enforce an efficient shadow stack mechanism. The shadow stack can be used to check during program execution if caller/return pais match. Since the COOP attack reuses whole functions as gadgets and does not violate the caller/return convention than the new feature provided by interl is useless in the face of this attack. Nevertheless other highly notorious CRAs may not be possible after this feature will be implemented main stream in OSs and compilers.

Windows Control Flow Guard [8] is based on a user-space and kernel-space components which by working closelly together can enforce an efficient fine-grained CFI policy based on a precomputed CFG. These new feature available in Windows 10 can considerably rise the bar for future attacks but in our opinion advanced CRAs such as COOP are still possible due the typical characteristics of COOP.

PathArmor [17] is yet another tool which is based on a precomputed CFG and on the LBR register which can give a string of 16 up to 32 pairs of from/to addressed of different types of indirect instructions such as `call`, `ret`, and `jump`. Because of the sporadic query of the LBR register (only during invocation of certain function calls) and because of the sheer amount of data which passes thorugh the LBR register this apporach has in our opinion a fair potential to catch different types of CRAs but we think that against COOP this tool can not be used. First, because of the fact that the precomputed CFG does not contain edges for all possible indirect call sites which are accessed during runtime and second, the LBR buffer can be easily triked by adding legitimate indirect call sites during the COOP attack.

7. Discussion

We have to define which points make sense and then talk about each other
Suggestion:

7.1. How to make the type inference more precise?

1/2 page

7.2. Comparison with TypeArmor and why are we better than TypeArmor?

1/2 page

7.3. Whys is not TypeArmor working as it should to?

1/2 page

7.4. What is not clear bout TypeArmor?

1/2 page

7.5. What can for sure not work as in TypeArmor paper explained?

Furthermore, bla ...

8. Conclusion and Future Work

This section should be no longer than 2 pages. idealy exactly 2 pages would be sufficient.

8.1. Conclusion

In this research, we presented our tool X, ...

Specify the points you want to talk about. Write 2-3 sentences about each point.

Point 1
Point 2
Point 3

8.2. Future Work

In future we bla.
Point 1
Point 2
Point 3
Specify the points you want to talk about. Write 2-3 sentences about each point.

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