



POSITIVE TECHNOLOGIES

Very Mighty eXtension for debugging

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Debugging essentials

Debugging prerequisites

- Ability to pause program execution
 - Any asynchronous event is suitable (exception or interrupt)
- Ability to examine program CPU context (registers state)
- Ability to examine program memory
 - Memory is shared (so as any hardware)



Debugging capabilities

— INT 3 (#BP)

- 0xCC opcode
- Involves memory modification

```
fffff802`9b88fb4c 4053      push    rbx
fffff802`9b88fb4e 56      push    rsi
fffff802`9b88fb4f 57      push    rdi
```

Original code

```
fffff802`9b88fb4c 4053      push    rbx
fffff802`9b88fb4e 56      push    rsi
fffff802`9b88fb4f 57      push    rdi
```

What you see in a debugger


```
fffff802`9b88fb4c cc      int     3
fffff802`9b88fb4d 53      push    rbx
fffff802`9b88fb4e 56      push    rsi
fffff802`9b88fb4f 57      push    rdi
```

What is really happening

Debugging capabilities

— INT 1 (#DB)

- Single stepping
 - Through setting TF in eflags register



- Debug registers
 - Through modifying DR0-DR7 registers
 - Up to 4 linear address breakpoints (Reads, Writes, Executes)
- Involves register modification

Debugging capabilities

— INT 0x0E (#PF)

- Memory access trapping
- Trapping page access (Reads, Writes, Executes)
- Involves page table modification (Bits P, RW, XD)

+	0000000007E60000	Mapped File	68 K	68 K	Read	C:\Windows\System32\C_1252.NLS
	0000000007E71000	Unusable	60 K	60 K		
+	0000000007E80000	Heap (Private Data)	1 024 K	100 K	Read/Write	Heap ID: 1 [LOW FRAGMENTATION]
+	0000000007F80000	Private Data	76 K	76 K	Read/Write	
	0000000007F93000	Unusable	52 K	52 K		
	0000000007FA0000	Free	1 816 832 K			
+	00000000076DE0000	Image (ASLR)	1 148 K	1 148 K	Execute/Read	C:\Windows\System32\kernel32.dll
	00000000076EFF000	Unusable	4 K	4 K		
+	00000000076F00000	Image (ASLR)	1 000 K	1 000 K	Execute/Read	C:\Windows\System32\user32.dll
	00000000076FFA000	Unusable	24 K	24 K		
+	00000000077000000	Image (ASLR)	1 704 K	1 704 K	Execute/Read	C:\Windows\System32\ntdll.dll
	000000000771AA000	Unusable	24 K	24 K		

Anti-...-anti-debugging

OS debugging integration

- Modifies OS structures
 - PEB. BeingDebugged
 - nt!KdDebuggerEnabled
- Modifies control-flow
 - Event suppressing
- Exposes information about debugging session
 - ProcessDebugPort info class
- Refer to “The Ultimate Anti-Debugging Reference” by Peter Ferrie

Debugging impact

— Execution is paused, but time is not


- GetTickCount
- rdtsc, rdtscp
- Performance monitoring
- OS specific (KdpTimeSlipDpc)



VMX basics

Virtual Machine Extensions


- Different processor execution mode
- Mode switching between Host (VMM) and Guest (OS)



VMCS


– Virtual Machine Control Structure

- Guest state
- Host state
- Virtual machine settings
- Can be dynamically switched



EPT

- Second Level Address Translation (SLAT)
- Extended Page Table
 - Guest physical address to host physical address mappings
 - Page-level access control for guest physical addresses (reads, writes, executes)



VM Exits

— Events that cause guest mode switch to host mode

- Interrupts and exceptions
- EPT violations
- Certain instructions execution
- Special periodic timer ticks
- Instruction fetches under certain conditions
- System state related changes

and more...

Adapting VMX for debugging

VMX and debugger similarities

- Guest is paused when Host executes
- Full CPU context access
- Full memory access



Debugging events

— VM Exits can be treated like debugging events

VM Exit	Debugging event
Any VM Exit	Debugger break-in
Any VM Resume	Debugger continue
Monitor Trap Flag	Single-step event
VM Exit Instruction Execution	Breakpoint
EPT violation	Page fault

— A simple debugger needs nothing more

Outstanding capabilities

Additional events

- Address space switching
 - Used for switching between processes
- Special interrupts
 - Gives an ability to trace processor bootstrap code
- System structures modification
 - Used for debugging OS startup code
- Hardware access through IO ports and MMIO
 - Used for debugging hardware

Guest isolation benefits

— Stealth debugging

- Breakpoints hiding through EPT modification
- Hardware filtering through EPT modification, IO ports interception, VT-d, MSR access interception

— Time control

- Ability to conceal host execution time

— Blue-pilling

- Ability to convert your machine into virtual one on-the-fly at any time (well, at any time that you are able to gain execution control)

Full hardware access

- Full memory control
 - Disregarding address space
 - Disregarding privilege level
- Full context control
- Full MSR control



Virtual Machine Introspection

Analyzing the execution environment

- Perform in-place memory forensics
 - Extended with CPU state
- Full hardware access provides full information about software
 - Current module can be detected using module header
 - Current kernel can be detected using CPU state
 - Symbol information can be used to restore high-level OS data structures

Known issues

Virtualized memory is physical memory

- OS memory manager relies on virtual memory
 - Memory pages can be not mapped (on-demand paging)
 - Memory pages can be trimmed
 - Memory pages can be moved
 - Memory manager can interpret non-present pages however it wants



Virtual machine monitor robustness

- VMX Guest operation is different from ordinary operation
 - VMM has to emulate a set of instructions
- Stealthness is not free of charge
 - All detection vectors have to be inspected and tested with care
 - Some anti-detection tricks are highly difficult to implement
- Host mode operation is also not free of charge
 - VMM has to be fast in order the Guest to operate smoothly

Implementation case

User interaction

- Debuggee is a remote machine
 - Difficult to share the hardware between host and guest
- Communication is done via a set of transports
 - Windows KD as an example
- Debugger is small and stupid
 - Heavy analysis is performed by a debugging client
- Minimize data exchange
 - Transport can be slow (like serial)
 - Offload client features to the VMM if possible

Breakpoints

- Ordinary int 3
- Hide through EPT (allow execution only)
 - Can be emulated on read or write
 - Can be single-stepped on read or write
- Global
 - Filter using CR3, VA and GPA

Debugging hints

- Maximize memory pages presence
 - Disable swap
 - DisablePagingExecutive (for Windows)
 - Learn OS memory manager – absent pages can be mapped elsewhere
- Suppress interrupts
 - Modify IF bit in eflags
 - Modify guest interruptibility state

Questions?

- https://twitter.com/honorary_bot
- <https://github.com/honorarybot>
- <https://github.com/ptresearch>
- <https://www.ptsecurity.com/products/#multiscanner>

Thank you!

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