### VULNERABILITY IS A LUCKY BUG

BY ARTEM SHISHKIN

#### DISCLAIMER

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## WHOAMI

- Security researcher at Intel Corporation
- Intel STORM team member
- Windows kernel enthusiast

#### SPOT THE POTENTIAL BUG

```
int CaptureInput(PINPUT_TYPE pInputStruct)
   if (pInputStruct->OptionalDataSize > MAX_OPTIONAL_DATA_SIZE)
        return -EINVAL;
    memcpy(pTarget, pInputStruct->OptionalData,
        pInputStruct->OptionalDataSize);
    return 0;
```

#### HERE IT IS

```
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```

# HOW LUCKY THIS BUG IS SUPPOSED TO BE TO BECOME A SECURITY ISSUE?

- Not exploitable
  - Well, who is going to attack the value otherwise?

```
X
e
U
```

T H R E A D

T H R E A D

THREAD

```
int CaptureInput(PINPUT_TYPE pInputStruct)
{
   if (pInputStruct->OptionalDataSize > MAX_OPTIONAL_DATA_SIZE)
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```

- Code is executed within the threads
- Thread is a basic scheduling unit on Windows
- Thread quantum is large (measured in milliseconds)
  - The race window is too small compared to the quantum duration
- Not exploitable in this case
  - Could be in a case with scheduling interruption in the race window

```
int CaptureInput(PINPUT_TYPE pInputStruct)
             if (pInputStruct->OptionalDataSize > MAX_OPTIONAL_DATA_SIZE)
                 return -EINVAL;
Context
             sleep(3000);
             memcpy(pTarget, pInputStruct->OptionalData,
                 pInputStruct->OptionalDataSize);
             return 0;
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- CPU cores execute code simultaneously
- So we can schedule thread execution on different CPU cores
- So, exploitable?

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
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
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```

- Thread 1 executes the vulnerable code
- Thread 2 is trying to modify the controlled data in the structure
- Slow down the first thread
  - Place the data on a page boundary for the first thread
  - Keep flipping the attacked value in the second thread
  - Flip only the part that is spread on a single page




#### MEMORY LAYOUT


```
0: kd> dt someapp!_INPUT_TYPE 0x00000207`f0590ffb
  +0x000 SomeField
  +0x008 OptionalData
                         : [1] "A"
0: kd> db 0x00000207`f0590ff0
00000207`f0590ff0
                 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00-00 00 00 02 00 00 00 04
00000207`f0591000
                00 00 00 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
... ΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑΑ
00000207 \ f0591010
                AAAAAAAAAAAAA
00000207`f0591020 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41-41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41
AAAAAAAAAAAAA
```






SIZE 4







**SIZE 204** 

#### RACE COMPETITION



SIZE 4

# WINDOWS VIRTUAL ADDRESS SPACE LAYOUT (X64)

USER MODE ADDRESSES (NOT PRIVILEGED)

0


NON-CANONICAL ADDRESSES (NOT MAPPED)

ADDRESSES (PRIVILEGED)

0x7FFFFFFFFF

0xFFFF80000000000

OxFFFFFFFFFFFFF



#### WINNER WINNER CHICKEN DINNER

- This doesn't lead to the code execution anyway
- Chaining with some other bug needed
- Every exploitation path is unique
  - Depends on the environment
  - Depends on input limitation
  - Depends on reachability

#### CODE EXEC GAINED

- What's the impact?
  - Privilege escalation
    - Remote code execution
    - Guest to admin
    - User to kernel
  - Trust boundary violation
    - Sensitive data leak
  - Media impact





## DETECTION PRINCIPLES

- Detect consecutive memory accesses
- Static
  - Lack of runtime info
- Dynamic
  - Coverage issues

## DYNAMIC DETECTION APPROACH

- This is an example for Windows kernel vulnerabilities
- Using the full system emulation
  - Bochs (bochspwn)
  - Simics
- Using the live system
  - SMAPwn

### BOCHSPWN

- By Mateusz "j00ru" Jurczyk and Gynvael Coldwind
  - https://research.google.com/pubs/archive/42189.pdf
- Slow but reliable
- Open source
  - https://github.com/googleprojectzero/bochspwn
- Can also try info leaks





#### SIMICS BASED TRACKER

- BSDaemon and NadavCh did that using Simics
  - <a href="https://github.com/rrbranco/poc\_gtfo/blob/master/pocorgtfo15.pdf">https://github.com/rrbranco/poc\_gtfo/blob/master/pocorgtfo15.pdf</a>
- Simics is not a public tool



### SMAPWN WINDBG PLUGIN

- By me
- Thoroughly described at H2HC 2018
  - https://github.com/h2hconference/2018
- The plugin is still not released
  - But can be easily reproduced



#### SUPERVISOR MODE ACCESS PREVENTION OFF



USER MODE ADDRESSES (NOT PRIVILEGED) NON-CANONICAL ADDRESSES (NOT MAPPED)


ADDRESSES (PRIVILEGED)

0x7FFFFFFFFF

0xFFFF80000000000

Oxfffffffffffff

# SUPERVISOR MODE ACCESS PREVENTION ON



0x7FFFFFFFFFF

0xFFFF80000000000

Oxfffffffffffff



WINDBG AGAIN

### SUMMARY

- The bug has to be found
- The bug has to be reachable
- The bug has to be controlled
- The environment has to be aligned
- Security premise must be broken
- Someone must care about it

#### THE FIX

```
int CaptureInput(PINPUT_TYPE pInputStruct)
{
   int OptionalSize = pInputStruct->OptionalDataSize;
   if (OptionalSize > MAX_OPTIONAL_DATA_SIZE)
      return -EINVAL;
   memcpy(pTarget, pInputStruct->OptionalData, OptionalSize);
   return 0;
}
```

