Supporting Information: The Draft Cardano Constitution

As of Nov 20th, 2024

The draft of the Cardano Constitution, dated November 20, 2024, reflects the collective output from the efforts of the Constitution Group (CRWG) of the Cardano Civics Ratification Working Committee, the Parameter Committee, the collective work of Cardano community members who participated in 63 global constitutional workshops and the Delegates elected to represent each of the global workshops at the Constitutional Convention taking place in Buenos Aires and Nairobi on December 4-6. In preparing the Constitution, the CRWG also sought input from a group of constitutional and legal scholars from around the world. The draft Constitution is subject to further revisions until the start of the Constitutional Convention. The Cardano Constitution, assuming it is ratified by the Delegates at the Constitutional Convention, will thereafter be submitted to the Cardano community for its approval via an on-chain governance action presently expected to take place in January, 2025. This document is a guide to assist the Cardano community as they review the Draft Constitution. Whether or not in the future the Constitutional Committee decides to consider this document in their interpretations is a matter for future consideration.

The Delegates and the CRWG are the best resources for understanding the progression of the Constitution text. You can get in contact with the CRWG via the channel #cardano-civics-committee on the Intersect Discord or at civics-committee@intersectmbo.org. A complete list of Delegates can be found here. To provide feedback, please contact your delegate.

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Prerequisite Reading

To fully understand the constitution, please read about the newly-implemented on-chain governance system launched during the Chang Hard Fork and specified in the <u>Cardano</u> Improvement Proposal 1694.

The Community Review Process to Date

On behalf of the Cardano Community, the Constitution Ratification Working Group of the Cardano Civics Committee of Intersect brought together representatives of the Cardano Community, blockchain governance and constitutional scholars and the Cardano Parameter Committee to develop a draft Cardano Constitution to give effect to the community-based governance model as contemplated by CIP 1694. The draft Constitution that was the work-product of this collective effort was then submitted in July, 2024 to representatives from the Cardano Community who volunteered to participate in a series of global community workshops. Between July and October, 63 workshops were held in locations all over the world and involved more than 1,400 participants.

Each workshop, as well as others from the Cardano Community via an online open form, reviewed and provided feedback and recommendations on the July draft. Each workshop also elected a Constitutional Delegate and Alternate to represent the views of their workshop at the

Constitutional Convention that will take place the first week of December, 2024 in Buenos Aires and Nairobi.

As part of helping to organize the 63 global workshops, the CRWG identified the most complex issues that arose from the initial drafting process. The CRWG asked workshops to provide feedback on these issues. Each workshop chose which issues they particularly wanted to focus on. Output from the workshops, together with open-ended community feedback, shaped the edits that have been made since.

The workshop data was reviewed by the CRWG and Parameter Committee at Intersect, as well as the group of blockchain governance and constitutional scholars and turned into proposed revisions. The Delegates and Alternates met in a series of online and in person workshops to synthesize the output from the global workshops and review the resulting proposed revisions to the draft Constitution. In these workshops, Delegates were asked to review the proposed changes in light of their workshop's feedback and work as a group to settle on the best path forward. This often took the form of debates, solutioning, and compromise. Using that output, the Delegates, again working with the CRWG, the Parameter Committee and a group of blockchain governance and constitutional scholars, revised the July draft Constitution. That work has resulted in the November 20 draft Constitution which has been released to the Cardano Community. As noted above, the Delegates will continue to review and potentially propose additional revisions to the November 20 draft. A final draft Constitution will be submitted to the Delegates for approval in Buenos Aires and Nairobi at the Constitutional Convention. The Constitutional Convention will be live-streamed to the entire Cardano Community.

In the Delegate workshops, the Delegates also identified a number of future governance workstreams. The Cardano Community will be invited to organize and participate during 2025 in these various future governance workshops. These future workshops will focus on various governance considerations such as governance processes and procedures that should not appropriately be included in a constitution, governance processes that the Constitution requires the community to implement to give effect to various constitutional mandates, and potential future amendments to the Constitution that may become appropriate based on review and feedback as to how governance processes are working.

The Role of the Cardano Constitution

Constitutions provide the highest level of governance framing - the rules for making rules. Most nation states have their own constitutions. In the blockchain industry, very few blockchain protocol constitutions exist and those that do tend to narrowly focus solely on governance activities that can be self-implemented on-chain through smart contract or similar approaches.

The Cardano Constitution aspires to go beyond what other blockchain protocols have attempted to date, recognizing that that the Cardano Constitution is not a constitution for only a blockchain but rather, it is a constitution for a blockchain ecosystem – a much more ambitious endeavor.

Accordingly, how on-chain governance actions are approved, while extremely important, is not the sole focus of the Constitution. Rather, the Constitution provides the basis and fundamental framework through which all participants in the Cardano Community can come together to govern themselves and form radically new approaches to human interaction and collaboration. For example, codes of conduct are mentioned that are not strictly enforceable by the blockchain but are aspirational and set an expectation around governance norms.

While Cardano is not a traditional nation state and does not strive to become one, the Constitution recognizes that the Cardano Community, in voluntarily coming together, represents a virtual nation that seeks to create its own form of self governance.

Accordingly, the role of the Cardano Constitution is twofold. Firstly, it establishes rights, expectations and principles of governance for the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem. Second, the Constitution provides technical safeguards, such as minimum and maximum parameter settings. The safeguards are enforced by a smart contract or the Cardano ledger where possible. Where it is not possible, the Constitutional Committee (or CC) can prevent unconstitutional governance actions from being enacted on-chain.

The Cardano Constitution is designed to protect the Cardano Blockchain by requiring that governance actions take into account the impact of such governance actions on the security, performance, functionality and long-term sustainability of the Cardano Blockchain; by laying out principles of good governance within Cardano's CIP-1694 governance structure; and by inspiring and encouraging the Cardano Community to uphold the shared principles that make the Cardano Community unique.

The Contents and Structure of the Cardano Constitution

The Constitution consists of three parts: the Preamble, the Articles of the Constitution and the Guardrails Appendix. The Constitution also recognizes the governance bodies of the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem: DReps, SPOs and the Constitutional Committee. Each of the parts of the Constitution and the governing bodies recognized in the Constitution are discussed below.

Introductory Note: Why Does the Constitution include both Articles and a Guardrails Appendix?

The Structure of the Cardano Constitution

As noted, the Cardano Constitution includes both Articles and a Guardrails Appendix.

The Preamble and Articles provide the governing framework for Cardano. The Articles establish the governance rights and processes for the Cardano Community. The Articles, as discussed below, include tenants which establish foundational guidance as to how the Cardano Blockchain is intended to operate and be maintained. The Articles recognize the branches of Cardano's government–DReps, SPOs and the CC–and set out their respective rights and responsibilities. The Articles establish the rights of the owners of ada to participate in on-chain governance. The Articles also establish the role that Cardano budgets will play in the future operations of the

Cardano Blockchain and recognize the rights of the Cardano Community to access the Cardano Treasury in the future. Finally, the Articles provide the mechanics by which owners of ada can amend the Constitution in the future.

The Guardrails are set forth in the Guardrails Appendix to the Constitution. They fulfill the unique function of governing a technology that traditional constitutions lack. Governance actions can change the settings of the Cardano Blockchain. The Guardrails put limits on these changes to keep the Cardano Blockchain within operational boundaries. These operational details are included separately in the Guardrails Appendix in order to keep the Constitution as a whole more approachable.

Why the Guardrails are part of the Constitution

The primary reason Guardrails are included in the Constitution is for enforceability. Before on-chain governance actions may be implemented on chain, the CC must review the constitutionality of the proposed governance actions. The CC therefore ensures that all governance actions are in accordance with both the Articles and Guardrails Appendix. The CC's remit does not extend to any other documents (described in CIP-1694). If the Guardrails Appendix were moved to a separate document outside of the Constitution, the Guardrails would only be voluntarily enforced by the Cardano Community, adding significant operational risk into the governance system of Cardano. Including both in the same document also allows for linking relevant parts of the main constitutional text to relevant parts of the guardrails.

The Cardano Community absolutely retains the right to change Guardrails by amending the Constitution. Because the Guardrails Appendix is deemed to be a part of the Constitution—thus requiring that a change to the Guardrails be implemented through an amendment to the Constitution—assures that the Guardrails always remain aligned with the rest of the Constitution. Additionally, including the Guardrails within the Constitution recognizes the relationship between the Gurdrails Appendix and the rest of the Constitution. Including the Guardrails within the Constitution also assures consistency between the Constitution and Guardrails script. CIP-1694 allows Constitutional amendments to update both the Guardrails script and Constitution text in the same governance action. This encourages both to be updated in tandem to keep the text and code aligned. Removing the Guardrails Appendix from the Constitution text would leave no enforceable connection between the Guardrails script and the Constitution.

Two additional considerations are worth noting. First, the Constitution amendment provisions of Article VII allow for different voting thresholds for amending Articles of the Constitution and amending specific Guardrails contained in the Guardrails Appendix. Second, many Guardails include parameters that can be changed from time to time. These changes can be made by ada owners through on-chain governance actions without triggering an amendment to the Constitution.

A Section by Section Summary of the Constitution as Well as the Revisions Resulting from Workshop Feedback and Discussions with Constitutional Delegates

The Preamble

What is the Purpose of a Preamble?

The preamble of a constitution helps to set the aspirations and very high level principles of the governing system and its constituents. Often preambles are intentionally inspirational and set intent for the constitution itself.

How Should a Preamble be Interpreted?

In practice, some courts use preambles to guide interpretation but others do not. In most cases, the articles of a constitution provide greater detail and are used as the primary source for decision making. However, there may be cases where a preamble's principles can offer additional guidance as to the intent of that constitution's founders. Unless a constitution dictates that the preamble may not be used to provide interpretational guidance, courts are traditionally free to use the preamble as an additional source of interpretation.

The Cardano Constitution Preamble

The Preamble for the Cardano Constitution establishes high-level principles around which the Cardano Community aligns. It is also intended to be inspirational in the vision it contains and its encouragement for the Cardano Community to come together and participate in Cardano's governance.

In response to broad community feedback that the Preamble needed to be more inspirational, the CRWG, in direct consultation with many community members and Constitutional Delegates, redrafted the Preamble as reflected in the current draft to include:

- "Why" Cardano
- Principles
- A definition of the ecosystem, community and its participants
- The purpose of a Constitution for Cardano

When polled, the Constitutional Delegates' top principles were transparency, decentralization, security, trust and accountability. Delegates overall wanted to keep some history in the Preamble, which has been included in the Framing Notes.

It should be noted that there is nothing in the Preamble that precludes the Constitutional Committee from looking to the Preamble as it interprets the Constitution. It should also be noted that the Framing Notes which, beside providing historical background, provide some thoughts on how to approach the Constitution. The Framing Notes, however, are not intended to be a part

of the Constitution but to provide context. The Constitutional Committee may not look to the Framing Notes as it interprets the Constitution.

Article I. Cardano Blockchain Tenets and Guardrails

While the preamble provides principles that the Cardano Blockchain Ecosystem aspires towards, tenets offer more detail about how the community evolves technology over time.

The Guardrails are designed to avoid unexpected problems with the operation of the Cardano Blockchain. They are intended to guide the choice of sensible parameter settings and avoid potential problems with security, performance, functionality or long-term sustainability. The tenets are in the Constitution to help support these Guardrail goals. Consistent with the Guardrails, the tenets provide direction for how the Cardano Blockchain is developed over time. The tenets are intended to guide the Constitutional Committee in accessing the constitutionality of on-chain governance actions.

Workshop participants and delegates felt aligned to the tenets at their core. Workshop participants wanted simpler language. Implementation comments that referenced specific technologies were removed as preferred by Delegates. Workshop participants with Delegates agreement, wanted to explicitly add a 45BN ada supply cap in the Constitution to reflect the social contract that many Cardano Community participants believed would not change. Because the supply cap and financial stability are directly related to how the development of the Cardano blockchain may progress, it was added in the Tenets.

Article II. The Cardano Blockchain Community

Article II importantly acknowledges that all who participate in the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem are beneficiaries of the Constitution and are encouraged to actively support and participate in the ongoing governance of Cardano. No membership of any kind is required to benefit from the rights provided by the Constitution. Article II also notes that the Cardano Community has a responsibility to maintain the integrity of the Cardano Blockchain.

Because the Preamble defines as broadly as possible the universe of participants within the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem that collectively make up the Cardano Community, Article II was revised to be consistent with the Preamble.

Article III. Participatory And Decentralized Governance

Article III introduces and recognizes the notion of decentralized, community driven governance. It also recognizes the branches of Cardano governance: DReps, SPOs and the Constitutional Committee. Most importantly, Article III enshrines the right of all ada owners to participate in voting for all on-chain governance actions.

Authorized Designees and Voting Rights

The November 20 draft of the Constitution now provides further clarity as to how ada owners are able to vote. Workshop participants were largely in favor of allowing ada owners to authorize designees to exercise their voting rights. This sets the expectation that ada owners who use third parties, such as custodians, maintain their governance rights and get to choose whether or not such third parties can vote on their behalf. Note that in this context, designees are not intended to be a reference to DReps.

Allowing authorized designees was a highly debated topic among Constitutional Delegates. The updated text is the best solution that could be found. Many Delegates maintain the opinion that the only guarantee of voting rights is to self-custody ada. While this may be the case, the text still protects the voting rights of ada owners who use third party services to hold their ada to the extent permitted by applicable law and as agreed to by those third parties.

Delegates specifically wanted the language to be clear that ada owners may either provide or withhold authorization from third parties to vote on their behalf. For example, an ada owner that uses a centralized exchange (CEX) could request that CEX not exercise voting rights with the ada in their account. In the future, third party services providers may build tooling to support ada owners to opt into (or out of) voting, similar to how CEX users can opt into staking. Until then, user agreements, as permitted or required by law, can be used to grant or revoke voting rights.

Technical solutions for enabling third parties to vote on an ada owner's behalf has been identified as a critical future workstream.

Budget process

Section 8 of Article III sets out the requirement that the Cardano Community periodically approve a budget as a prerequisite to accessing the Cardano Blockchain treasury. Workshop participants expressed interest in having more details about the Cardano Budget process, specifically who would administer the budget. Delegates determined that the details of the budget process belong outside of the Constitution, at least until such time in the future that the process matures. However, they agreed to add a requirement that Cardano budgets must identify one or more administrators. Although it is anticipated that Intersect will serve as an initial administrator for the budget, Delegates were concerned with explicitly designating by name an administrator in the Constitution because they wanted to ensure there is flexibility over time as to who administers future Cardano budgets.

In addition, workshop participants indicated that they wanted to ensure that contracts funded by the Cardano treasury include dispute resolution provisions. This was included in the text as a requirement for all treasury withdrawals.

Budget Categories

Workshop participants wanted to ensure the Cardano budget specifically cover Constitutional Committee administrative costs and contingency funding. Article VI now provides for the budget to include CC administrative costs in such amount as approved by ada owners. A contingency fund was seen as an emergency measure to access funds quickly. Delegates agreed that contingency planning must be handled as part of a responsible budget process, but mandating

a specified amount for contingency funding was not appropriate to include in the Constitution itself.

A future workstream was identified to ensure the budget process follows best practices, including contingency planning.

Article IV. Delegated Representatives

Article IV covers the role and responsibilities of DReps. It addresses how ada owners can engage DReps. Article IV also addresses considerations such as codes of conduct that DReps are expected to adopt and DRep compensation.

DRep Codes of Conduct

Workshop participants strongly wanted DRep codes of conduct. There was varying interest for codes of conduct to be the same for all DReps or on-chain. Since DReps are expected to take diverse forms, a one-size-fits-all approach didn't make sense at this stage. The Constitution now says that DReps are expected to adopt code of conducts and make them publicly available. The wording 'expected' recognizes that it is up to ada owners to select DReps who publish an acceptable codes of conduct. DReps are now also encouraged to include ethical guidelines in their codes of conduct.

DRep compensation

Workshop participants were comfortable that DRep compensation should be allowed, but there was no consensus for how to compensate DReps, or the appropriate funding source. Delegates settled on saying the "Dreps may be compensated" as it allows for both voluntary and paid DReps. Workshop data made it clear that large parts of the community do not have the luxury of participating as a DRep without compensation, while others felt that DReps should be driven by people fulfilling their civic duty. The language allows for both, and an important future workstream is for the community to define DRep compensation mechanisms and funding sources. Delegates also asked for more robust language clarifying that DReps are not permitted to pay others in exchange for voting

Article V. Stake Pool Operators

Article V recognizes the existing role and responsibilities of SPOs and specifies the new role that SPOs will play regarding voting as a "separate class" for certain types of on-chain governance actions. Article V also encourages SPOs to adopt codes of conduct.

SPO Codes of Conduct

Workshop participants largely agreed that it would be beneficial for SPOs to adopt a code of conduct given their new role in on-chain voting. However, some people were concerned that the new requirements may disrupt SPO operations. Because SPOs have been successfully operating without codes of conduct for years, SPOs are only 'encouraged' to adopt codes of conduct (in contrast to DReps who are 'expected' to adopt Codes of Conduct). SPOs are also encouraged to include ethical guidelines in their codes of conduct.

Separation of powers

Whether or not the Constitution should explicitly mandate a separation of powers among DReps, SPOs and CC members was hotly debated by both workshop participants and Delegates. While many supported the notion that participants should not participate in multiple governance roles, neither the majority of workshop participants nor the majority of Delegates were in favor of mandating such a separation of powers in the Constitution at this time.

Among the concerns expressed against a formal separation of powers mandate were whether there is presently sufficient participation and expertise within the Cardano Community at this time to prohibit participants from "wearing more than one hat." There was also concern as to how such a policy could be policed and enforced. Ultimately consensus was reached to rely on the codes of conduct that participants are encouraged to adopt. In addition, Article V now requires that owners of ada who are both SPOs and acting as DReps publicly disclose that they are participating in on-chain governance actions in both such capacities prior to exercising any on-chain governance rights.

Adding, as necessary, future separation of powers mandates is captured as a future workstream. The workstream is expected to include monitoring what problems and conflicts may be arising with respect to exercising overlapping governance powers across DReps, SPOs and the CC. This workstream recognizes that as Cardano's on-chain governance process matures, it may both be necessary and appropriate to formalize in the Constitution separation of powers requirements..

Article VI. Constitutional Committee

Article VI formally introduces the Constitutional Committee as a branch of Cardano's on-chain governance process. Article Vi provides guidance on operations and the role of the CC. It also addresses how the CC is expected to participate in different types of on-chain governance actions.

Constitutional Committee (CC) Size and Term Length

Workshop participants wanted the Constitution to clarify how the size and term length would be set for the CC, rather than mandating a specific process in Article VI. It was agreed to cross-refence the Guardrail requirements for CC size and term lengths. In addition, Delegates preferred that the CC term length and size be determined by ada owners from time to time through on-chain governance actions. This approach gives maximum power to change the size of and term lengths for the CC as necessary to reflect future desires of the Cardano Community.

CC Elections

Workshop participants debated whether the Constitution should mandate a specific process for electing CC members. However, no consensus was reached as to how the election process should work. Delegates equally were unable to agree on a specific approach. Both workshops and Delegates concluded that the Cardano Community needs time to experiment with off-chain election processes. Based on practical experience, a future workstream will address whether a specific election process should be mandated within the Constitution.

In all cases, the CC election concludes with an on-chain governance action whereby DReps and SPOs elect a new CC, replacing the previous committee. Additional off-chain processes ahead of on-chain voting may be developed through future workstreams. The Cardano Community is encouraged to undertake such a workstream and propose an off-chain election process by mid-2025 before the Interim Constitutional Committee's term expires.

The role of the Constitutional Committee

Sections 4 and 5 address how and when the CC is expected to participate in on-chain governance actions. However, both workshops and Delegates expressed a strong desire to provide additional clarity as to the role of the CC, particularly with respect to "Info" actions which are recorded but not implemented on-chain.

As revised, Article VI permits, but does not require, the CC to vote on "Info" actions with the exception of "Info" actions with respect to the Cardano Budget or proposed treasury withdrawals.

Although, as discussed above, an "Info" action does not trigger any on-chain implementation, CC members can nevertheless vote on the "Info" action in order to express their view on the "Info" action, including whether or not the "Info" action, were to subsequently be implemented on-chain, would be, in the member's view, constitutional. However, the text now clarifies that the outcome of any such vote cannot prevent the "Info" action from being recorded on-chain.

The text now also clarifies that the CC is expected to vote on Cardano budget and treasury withdrawal "Info" actions. In the case of budget and treasury "Info" actions, the vote by the CC is a determination as to whether a proposed budget, if implemented on-chain, and whether a proposed treasury withdrawal, if and when made, would be constitutional. A future workstream was identified to consider whether the Guardrails should be amended to treat budget approvals and treasury withdrawals as a new and distinct category of on-chain governance actions.

CC Code of Conduct

Workshop participants wanted to require that the CC adopt and publish a code of conduct with potential ongoing oversight by the Cardano Community. Delegates also agreed to require a code of conduct for CC members. It was determined that enforcement of such codes of conduct would best be handled by ada owners choosing whether or not to vote in a CC member by assessing their posted code of conduct or in extreme cases through triggering a vote of no-confidence. No consensus was reached as to whether there should be one code of conduct for the CC as a whole or whether CC members should each be allowed to adopt their own codes of conduct.

Constitutional Committee Compensation

Workshop participants and Delegates both strongly supported the right of CC members to receive compensation. However, they stopped short of mandating compensation or specifying a

specific amount. Instead, Article VI was clarified to state that CC members *may* be compensated to the extent that the Cardano Community determines to include CC compensation in future budgets. However, as discussed above, Article VI was revised to mandate that Cardano budgets include appropriate funding to cover CC administrative costs.

Article VII. Amendments

Article VII addresses how the Constitution can be amended in the future. It also addresses circumstances in which Guardrail amendments can occur with voting thresholds different from the amendment threshold otherwise specified by Article VII.

Although discussed in several workshops, the idea of expressly including different amendment thresholds for Guardrails was not adopted. This decision reflected both the fact that there are presently no technical solutions available to implement variable amendment thresholds and that the Parameter Committee did not make a formal recommendation to do so. However, the present language is flexible enough to adopt different amendment thresholds in the future. Future workstreams are expected to focus on amendment processes going forward.

Separately, the Delegates raised a desire to acknowledge that the Constitution should be treated as a living document. As a result, a new section was added to Article VII acknowledging that technical advancements, changes in the desires, needs and expectations of the Cardano Community, and unforeseen circumstances could give rise to the need in the future to amend this Constitution. The new text encourages the Cardano Community, if and when so desired, to come together in such forums as they deem appropriate, to propose amendments to the Constitution. The general sentiment acknowledges that, as the Cardano Community learns from its collective experience with on-chain governance, it may be desirable, or even necessary, to consider amendments to the Constitution in its first years, yielding a sustainable and durable constitution over the long-term. This also gives recognition to the fact that the Cardano Community may wish to continue to experiment and mature governance processes—especially off-chain, before enshrining them within the Constitution.

Appendix I. Cardano Blockchain Guardrails

As previously mentioned, in order to implement Cardano Blockchain on-chain governance, it is necessary to establish sensible guardrails that will enable the Cardano Blockchain to continue to operate in a secure and sustainable way. The Guardrails Appendix includes the Guardrails that must be applied to Cardano Blockchain on-chain governance actions, including changes to the protocol parameters and limits on treasury withdrawals. The Guardrails cover both essential, intrinsic limits on settings, and recommendations that are based on experience, measurement and governance objectives.

As stated in the Guardrails Appendix, the Guardrails have been designed to avoid unexpected problems with the operation of the Cardano Blockchain. "They are intended to guide the choice of sensible parameter settings and avoid potential problems with security, performance, functionality or long-term sustainability."

The Guardrails Appendix also acknowledges that while some Guardrails are automatable and will be enforced via an on-chain script or built-in ledger rules, other Guardrais require human involvement to be implemented or interpreted. In the latter case, it is the responsibility of the CC to evaluate on-chain governance actions, taking into account the language in the Guardrails Appendix and the language in the body of the Constitution, particularly the tenets contained in Article I.

Parameter guardrails review

The Parameter Committee proposed several changes to the Guardrails Appendix which are now reflected in the November Constitution draft.. All of the revisions related to Guardrail descriptions. None of the Guardrail values were changed.

FAQs

- 1. Who contributed to the draft constitution and the community consultation process?
 - a. Contributors to the draft constitution, past and present who wished to be attributed include:
 - CRWG members: Adam P. Rusch, Alex Pestchanker, Charles Hoskinson, Chelsea Jewell, Danielle Stanko, Eystein Magnus Hansen, J.J. Siler, José Miguel De Gamboa, Lloyd Duhon, Mercy Fordwoo, Michael Madoff, Nicolas Cerny.
 - ii. Parameter Committee, who developed the Guardrails Appendix: Alex Moser, Adam P. Rusch, Jonathan Kelly, Karl Knuttson, Kevin Hammond, Marcin Szamotulski, Markus Gufler, Neil Davies, Nicolas Cerny, Oscar West, Riley Kilgore, Samuel Leathers, Vijay Bhuvangiri
 - iii. Constitutional, legal, and governance scholars included BlockScience (Eric Alston, Jakob Hackel), Henry Kim, Ivan Beschastnikh, Joel Telpner, Joshua Tan and others.
- 2. How can the Constitution be changed over time?
 - a. The Constitution contains Article VII that explains amendments. The Constitution can be amended by an on-chain governance action with the approval of the Constitutional Committee (67%) and DReps (75%). The amendment threshold for DReps can be changed within the limits of the guardrails (65% 90%). Further, Article VII allows for different amendment thresholds to be applied to specific Guardrail changes if deemed necessary or appropriate in the future.
- 3. What is the final ratification process for the Cardano Constitution?
 - a. The draft Constitution must be approved by a majority of the Constitutional Delegates at the Constitutional Convention. The approved version will be put on chain as a "New Constitution" governance action. This is expected to occur in the beginning of 2025. This will require approval of 67% of the Interim Constitutional Committee and 75% of DReps voting.
- 4. Why are provisions that cannot be enforced on-chain included in the Constitution?

- a. This Constitution aims not only to protect the Cardano Blockchain network, but to equally identify the principles-based behavioral expectations for participants in the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem and attract participants to the Cardano Blockchain ecosystem as well as anyone who may benefit from the Cardano Blockchain. Expanding beyond technology parameters that can be self-effected and implemented on-chain differentiates Cardano by setting lasting ground-rules for how the community both interacts and governs itself.
- 5. How can I provide feedback on the draft Constitution?
 - a. The Delegates and CRWG are the best resources for understanding the progression of the Constitution text. You can get in contact with the CRWG via the channel #cardano-civics-committee on the Intersect Discord or at civics-committee@intersectmbo.org. A complete list of Delegates can be found here. To provide feedback, please contact your delegate.