Introduction (v0.1):

This document is currently a draft for the community version of the DRep (Delegated Representative) Code of Conduct both for the Catalyst DRep and the CIP 1694 DRep. Its origins are traced back to the Catalyst DRep Code of Conduct document and will be further improved through the efforts of the community and the Catalyst grant for DRep Recruitment, Training, and Ethical Code Development Workshops. We additionally start making recommendations for the constitution to guard against malicious behavior from DReps, however, this is a challenging task given that there is still little information on the Cardano constitution so this will evolve as we gain more feedback and knowledge together with the rest of the community. Finally, we also recommend that CIP 1694 DReps also follow the general Cardano community code of conduct as was previously recommended for the Catalyst DReps, but this will not be discussed further in v0.1 of the document until we have more feedback from others on the document as a whole if this should be included in the document or just referenced as we do now.

For feedback on this document for now, you may use this link:
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScayvAfkg6bFjVYnmpV9JSo1J_S2ZF9R4xfO6o62UzO8wOp4g/viewform

Preamble (v0.1):

Values, not rules:
In working on this document the group developing the original draft had to make some choices in how we approach the code of conduct for DReps. We believe that a value-based approach will over time be more flexible to what we think could be a changing governance system, instead of a rules-based approach. For this reason, we are first given our considered values and then examples of how such a value-based approach could be solved for the individual DRep. The first draft of this document has been based on the values of immutability of the blockchain, resilience of the blockchain, transparency of the blockchain, security of the blockchain and finally the accountability of the users of the blockchain for the long term benefit of everyone.

Erring on the side of freedom:
Whenever we had to make a choice in how we give examples of implementing values we would prefer to have the risks and chance of erring on the side of freedom. For example, when considering DAO's potential added complexities to DRep governance we also looked at the potential this has to unlock new ways of governance and new ways of expressing yourself. A system of governance like the one nations states already have would not be to try to push for the potential of decentralized governance. In the end, while catastrophic for the blockchain if it failed, we would gain more as a human species if we pushed for further freedoms and unlocking new governance forms through blockchain technology.

Risks related to CIP 1694 DRep governance (v0.1):

In the process of making this document draft we also identified several risks that DRep needs to be aware of and that we believe should be important aspects to look into for training of DReps. Some of these risks are from the great work done by the Cardano Governance Security Working Group led by Rick McCracken.

Risk	Code of Conduct element
DReps losing keys, stolen or sold to a bad actor.	(1-1) Knowledge
Widespread amount of DReps that do not have sufficient knowledge to have an efficient governance system.	(1-1) Knowledge
Lack of Technical understanding by DReps causing them to misunderstand or fail in governance actions.	(1-1) Knowledge
Widespread amount of DReps that has not enough resources to properly conduct votes (incentives, time etc).	(1-2) Resources
Widespread sybil behavior from DReps.	(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures
Regulation risks to DReps in a geographical region.	(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures
DReps are not held accountable through both lack of transparency in blockchain and socially in being held to the promises they make regarding voting behavior, causing an inefficient governance system.	(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures, (2-2) Organization disclosures
DAO & Organization risks with the smart contract or multi-wallet technology they interact with (may require audits?)	(2-2) Organization disclosures
Powerful Voter Collusions between DReps (could cause voter fatigue among other things)	(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures, (3-1) Coalition measure
DRep botting with random voting behavior for incentives or to keep DRep active without fulfilling any useful governance purpose.	(3-1) Voting Decision Rules
Superstar/Overpowering DRep - with no saturation limit this is a potential risk again for voter fatigue as well as resource-draining attacks from the overpowering DRep.	(3-1) Voting Decision Rules, (3-2) Interests of the Proposer
Game theory risks such as selling voting power in a token offering similar to the ISPO model or tokenized DAO or Organization voting power and reselling.	(3-2) Interests of the Proposer

CIP 1694 DRep Code of Conduct (for DRep workshop) v0.1:

As in the original Catalyst DRep Code of Conduct we identified that ensuring competence, diversity, and fairness among DReps is important for a healthy governance system also for the CIP 1694 DReps. While the original Code of Conduct for Catalyst stresses collaboration metrics that does not harm diversity - we highlight that organizations and other forms of collaboration can help the DRep gain the knowledge needed to be able to cast votes efficiently. The design of the CIP 1694 clearly opens up for DReps that utilize a native or plutus script for credentials such as a smart contract-enabled DAO or a multi-signature type of credential. Another key difference is that the technical capabilities needed are more clearly defined and actively being worked on in the SanchoNet testnet as well as the tooling for DReps is being worked on, such as the GovTools. Overall we believe diversity for the CIP 1694 should focus more on the delegators knowing who they are delegating voting power and ensuring that we do not have Sybil attacks from the CIP 1694 DReps.

Characteristics required for DRep	Breakdown	Definition
(1) Competence	(1-1) Knowledge	Have the knowledge to cast a CIP 1694 vote.
	(1-2) Resources	Have the time (or staff) to conduct a CIP 1694 vote.
(2) Organization	(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures	You are not running multiple DReps[1]
	(2-2) Organization disclosures	You are disclosing any organization you are part of.[2]
(3) Fairness	(3-1) Voting Decision Rules	The voting behavior rules are open to the public, and it can be verified that voting is not done arbitrarily.[3]
	(3-2) Interests of the Proposer	Rules for voting behavior for voting destinations with interests are made public, and it is possible to verify that there is no corruption such as bribery.(Including how dRep discloses the nature of its involvement (direct/indirect) in the projects it votes for)

[1] However organizations running one or more DReps and disclosing this is not one person running multiple DReps
[2] However there can be valid reasons for selective disclosure and a rationale for this could be provided.
[3] Specifically DRep bots who randomly voted for rewards could be a problem if there is no such verification.

(1) Self-regulation of CIP 1694 DReps

DRep creates and publishes voluntary rules based on values to demonstrate that the above characteristics are met. Here are some helpful tips and examples.

	List of questions that each DRep can use as hints for setting their own rules	**Examples of rules set independently by each DRep**
(1-1) Knowledge	What are your or your organization's qualifications or areas of expertise? Have you educated yourself on the CIP 1694 and understand its governance system?	A SDK (Self-Disclosure of knowledge) detailing your or your organization's technical skills, knowledge of the constitution, and knowledge of the CIP 1694 process.
(1-2) Resources	How much time do you have available to spend on DRep work? How many people, if any, do you have on your team? Can you provide evidence of this?	A SDR (Self-disclosure of Resources) detailing your available resources, availability, and organization and affiliations.
(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures	How can you prove to the community that you are not applying to multiple dReps under the cover, that you are not a BOT, etc.?	A SDI (Self-disclosure of Identity) detailing how to reach the DRep as well as open up for future proofs of identity when the governance tooling allows this.
(2-2) Coalition measure	How do you consult the opinions of other DReps? Is there any possibility of forming a team that includes the nature of a coalition that aligns your views with those of other DReps? If you refer to the opinions of other DReps and the opinion groups to which you belong, how will that show the process, and how will you get feedback?	A SDC (Self-disclosure of Coalition) detailing your available resources, availability, and organization and affiliations.
(3-1) Voting Decision Rules	Are you / an organization part of a DRep that will vote on all governance actions or are there some governance actions you will not vote on? What criteria will you use to select the governance actions you will be voting on and how do you decide to abstain from voting? What decision process do you use for deciding to vote for or against a governance action?	A SDV (Self-disclosure of voting process) detailing how you or your organization intends to do voting processes in the CIP 1694 governance process - what type of governance actions are you voting on and what is the process behind deciding yes / no / abstaining from voting.
(3-2) Interests of the Proposer	What is the DRep policy on economic interests related to the governance process such as trading votes, economic interest in a proposal voted on, or policy on token marketplaces for governance if applicable.	A SDEP (Self-disclosure of economic policy) Where the DRep discloses policy on buying & selling votes, any economic interest they have in a proposal they are voting for, and policy on token marketplaces of governance if applicable.

1-1 Knowledge:

SDK (Self-Disclosure of knowledge)

Preamble:

A self-disclosure of knowledge should contain some requirements that try to not limit how individual dreps express themselves but at the same time create an efficient governance system. You want knowledge on DReps for such values as efficient and safe governance. An example would be the following:

Knowledge of CIP 1694

A minimum requirement for CIP 1694 DReps who want to follow a code of conduct should be to disclose if they have read the CIP 1694 and are capable of the technical skills required to operate as a DRep such as storing and rotating keys safely. Rationale: While hard to control this will encourage more knowledge among DReps, and in the future, there could be certification methods for asserting this knowledge.

Knowledge of the Constitution

Every DRep who wants to follow a code of conduct should have read the Constitution and be able to prove they have read the Constitution. DReps can still vote on any proposal, even something that is unconstitutional, but with the knowledge of the constitution, they will better be able to argue why they are voting as they are. It may be beneficial for Intersect to develop an online training course on the Cardano Constitution with the opportunity for the DRep to produce an essay or portfolio showing how they interpret the Constitution as a knowledge artifact that can be shared with the community.

Knowledge of the technical implementation of Cardano Governance

DReps who want to opt in to a code of conduct should not be required to be experts on the technical implementation of Cardano Governance, however, they should know the basics such as how a vote is actually made, how a governance proposal is made, and how the protocol prioritizes different governance actions. Finally, they should be aware of the different protocol parameters and how they affect each other so they are able to judge them for voting. Rationale: If adopted by many it will ensure we have DReps who are able to understand technical limitations as well as have some understanding for any edge cases in technical behavior such as during a scenario of no confidence, and finally, will reduce the risk of voting for dangerous protocol parameters that also ideally we would have a high participation rate on voting on.

(1-2) Resources

SDR (Self-disclosure of Resources)

Preamble

A self-disclosure of resources should try not to enforce a DRep to dox needlessly. In general good values could be to ensure that vote delegators are knowledgeable about any conflicts of interest, availability, and if the DRep is part of an organization or has some affiliations. Here is an example:

Disclosure of minimum hours allotted to the governance process

Any DRep who wants to follow the code of conduct should be able to disclose minimum hours for governance during a time period. This can be flexible and does not require public proof but ideally should also be followed by some form of output from the governance process. Rationale: This could lead to a more efficient voting system where the delegators of voting power can make a more data-driven call on who they want to delegate voting power to.

Disclosure of availability

DReps who follow a code of conduct should be reachable in some way so that the delegators they have can give feedback unless specifically stated and disclosed by the DRep that they want full anonymity to the point of no feedback. This does not mean that the code of conduct requires DReps to disclose identity, for example, they can be reachable through an address-linked communication system such as Adamail.

Disclosure of the organization and affiliations

DReps following the code of conduct should be able to disclose organizational resources as well as teams and affiliations. While the code of conduct believes in preserving the privacy of the individual DRep who needs it, at an organizational level the DRep should default to disclosure unless a specific rationale can be given for selective disclosure of organizations, teams and affiliations. Typical examples could be to disclose a DAO they are part of, a team active in the Cardano ecosystem, or a corporation that provides resources for, or stand to benefit from any governance action. This should also include any sort of voting alliance where users are bound or encouraged to support the proposals of others in the alliance.

(2-1) Anti-Sybil attack measures
SDEP (Self-Disclosure of Identity)

Preamble

A self-disclosure of Identity needs to thread a careful balance between the safety of the DRep both if an individual or organization and the needs of the blockchain to avoid sybil attacks on its governance process. On the other hand, being a reachable DRep also could lead to more efficient governance with delegators being able to bring up issues for the DRep to consider. A good starting point is in the social layer with being able to communicate with the DRep and this in itself shows some activity that can help differentiate between bots and humans. However, we believe that DReps should strive to disclose needed identity information to prevent sybil attacks if possible. The CIP 1694 also mentions that "we hope that the community will strongly consider only voting for and delegating to those DReps who provide something like a DID to identify themselves." Here is an example:

Disclosure of contact information

A DRep who wants to follow the code of conduct should disclose contact information. This could for example be through email from Adamail to only disclose an address or other means such as regular email, discord, or any other platform where others could reach out to and get some verification the DRep is real and can be contacted regarding issues.

Disclosure of identity

While blockchain technologies are built on the idea of enabling personal privacy through permissionless creation of pseudonymous accounts, representative governance systems require the ability for actors to gain a reputation as they transparently interact with the governance structure. We recommend that as governance tooling and techniques advance, DReps should look for ways to utilize Decentralized Identifiers (DIDs) and issue Verifiable Credentials (VC) to selectively reveal information that Delegators will find important. One example is Atala Prism a self-sovereign identity (SSI) platform and another is the IAMX Self-Sovereign Identity (SSI) solution provider. We do understand that there will be a careful balance between transparency and safety, as DReps may need to work at levels in line with their personal risk profiles.

(2-2) Collaboration Metric
SDC (Self-disclosure of Coalition)

Preamble

A self-disclosure of Collaboration should again not require a DRep to dox needlessly. The important value for governance is for the voter to be informed about any coalitions forming so they are delegating voting power in a knowledgeable way. Here is an example of how these values could be expressed in a self-disclosure of collaboration:

Disclosure of coalition

Are you part of a team/organization/DAO/otherwise of DReps? Have you formed a political party and you will vote in the same way as others in that party?

Disclosure of coalition role

Are you an active member of the coalition influencing overall organization votes or are you a passive member whose voting power will be used and utilized by someone else in the organization?

Disclosure of coalition information

Does your coalition have any webpage or platform where information is given in regards to the voting process, members, and any goals of the coalition or otherwise relevant information for someone delegating voting power to the DRep?

(3-1) Voting Decision Rules
SDV (Self-disclosure of Voting process)

Preamble

A self-disclosure of Voting process serves the purposes of making governance decision-making transparent and holding DReps accountable for the decisions they take. The CIP 1694 is built around providing rationales with the Anchor metadata that can be utilized for voting actions and proposals as well as for a DRep to present information such as these disclosures.
We recommend following community standards for metadata such as the proposed CIP-100.
Here is an example of such a voting process disclosure:

Disclosure of voting coverage

Are you an individual or part of an organization that will vote on all types of governance actions? Are there some governance proposals you would likely abstain from voting on? Examples could be specific local/regional treasury withdrawals, governance proposals you do not have the technical knowledge to vote on, etc.

Disclosure of voting anchor usage

Are you planning to use voting anchor and what metadata standard will you follow? Do you intend to provide a rationale for your voting decision? Will you attach information from an individual or organization that has some expert knowledge on a topic and will you consult with them for a vote?

(3-2) Interests of the Proposer
SDEP (Self-Disclosure of economic policy)

Preamble

A self-disclosure of economic policy should help the users of Cardano gain more trust in the DReps on the network and the entire governance system. To be an effective DRep, it's important for the community to know where one is coming from. The SDEP is designed to provide a flexible framework for self-disclosure without requiring a DRep to fully disclose their identity or personal details. The more information that a DRep chooses to provide, the more trust they may inspire in the users who delegate to them.. In general, you want an informed delegator who can make a choice if the DRep is doing something harmful to the governance process or the network. Here is an example of such a disclosure:

Disclosure of policy on buying or selling votes

Any DRep who wants to follow the code of conduct should disclose their policy or the organization they are part of policy in regards to selling or buying votes.

Disclosure of Economic Interests

Any DRep who wants to follow the code of conduct should disclose any economic interest they have in teams or projects related to any proposals they are voting for.

Disclosure of policy on token marketplaces of governance

Any DRep who wants to follow the code of conduct should disclose the policy in regard to token marketplaces. If a DAO is acting as a DRep the DAO should identify how its tokens are traded and the parameters of the governance script. This should extend to secondary token marketplaces such as a DAO selling the DAO DRep voting power through DAO-issued tokens.

The DRep role Constitutional guardrails (v0.1)

DRep actions that could be considered against a Cardano constitution should be based on the established values of the Cardano constitution. For now, it is clear that the blockchain itself is immutable and has liveliness to be a functioning blockchain. We need to ensure that dReps cannot change the immutability and liveness of the blockchain and we have this as our starting point for recommendations for the constitution from a DRep perspective. We also argue that the governance system needs to have some form of accountability for the long-term benefit of governance, as well as voter rights to ensure participation in said governance.

We will update here with recommendations as it becomes more clear what the constitution for Cardano upholds as its values if it is a value-based constitution, and what rules that could relate to dReps if it is a more rules-based focused constitution.

Values	Breakdown	Definition
(1) Immutability	(1-1) Unchanged Blockchain history	dReps voting on removing previous blockchain data.
	(1-.2) Unaltered Blockchain history	dReps voting on altering previous blockchain data.
(2) Liveness	(2-1) Parameter changes disrupting liveness	dReps voting for parameter changes that would clearly halt the network such as, for example, a 0 block body size.
	(2-2) Governance liveness	dReps voting for parameter changes that would clearly halt or remove any meaningful governance actions to the extent that there is no longer a functional governance system, such as a 0% voting threshold for all parameters.
(3)accountability	(3-1) Voter history	dReps, for example, voting on removing all voter history.
	(3-2) Verifiability (3-3) Responsibility	dReps, for example, vote on removing ways to verify that the inputs of individual dRep votes were tallied, and this can be independently observed. dReps voting on full anonymity that includes addresses used to instigate change, thus removing any responsibility for changes made.
(4) Suffrage	(4-1) Voting rights	dReps voting, for example, on the complete removal of voting rights of all other dReps or specific groups of dReps. More controversial: The banning of selling of votes?
(5) Sustainability	(5-1) Economic properties	dReps, for example, voting on a clearly unsustainable economic practice such as burning all tokens leaving only a single ada to a husky address and metadata of “shit happens”.

Catalyst DRep Code of Conduct (for dRep workshop) v1.2

(1) Purpose of this Document

The purpose of this document is to make the Catalyst DRep system work better by clarifying (A)(B).

(A) Clarify the properties required for Catalyst DRep to optimize the DRep system
(B) Clarify what Catalyst DRep must do to prove to voters that it has that characteristic

This document does not only prescribe a minimum code of conduct but also shows how each DRep should establish its own rule and disclose it to voters. Why? The DRep system allows any entity to run for office and cannot be censored. Therefore, very diverse and uniform restrictions can be very costly and at the same time can be the minimum rule set. It would be ideal if DRep not only adheres to a minimal set of rules but also allows them to publish their own enhanced set of rules, which can be evaluated by delegators.

Consideration of design changes to the DRep system is outside the scope of this document. (4) describes the document management policy.

(2) **Risks related to Catalyst DRep governance (v0.1):**

In the process of making this document draft, we also identified several risks that Catalyst DRep needs to be aware of and that we believe should be important aspects to look into for training of DReps. Some of these risks are from the great work done by the Cardano Governance Security Working Group led by Rick McCracken.

Risk	Code of Conduct element
Widespread amount of DReps that do not have sufficient knowledge to have an efficient treasury system.	(1-1) Knowledge
Lack of Technical understanding by DReps causing them to misunderstand or fail in treasury actions.	(1-1) Knowledge
Widespread amount of DReps that has not enough resources to properly conduct treasury votes (incentives, time etc).	(1-2) Resources
DReps are not held accountable through both lack of transparency in blockchain and socially in being held to the promises they make regarding voting behavior, causing an inefficient treasury system.	(2-1) Collaboration metric. (2-2) Anti-Sybil attack measures.
Powerful Voter Collusions between DReps (could cause voter fatigue among other things)	(2-1) Coalition metric. (2-2) Anti-Sybil attack measures.
Regulation risks to DReps in a geographical region.	(2-2) Anti-Sybil attack measures
Widespread sybil behavior from DReps.	(2-2) Anti-Sybil attack measures
DRep botting with random voting behavior for incentives.	(3-1) Voting Decision Rules
Superstar/Overpowering DRep - with no saturation limit this is a potential risk again for voter fatigue as well as resource-draining attacks from the overpowering DRep.	(3-1) Voting Decision Rules, (3-2) Interests of the Proposer
Game theory risks such as selling voting power in a token offering similar to the ISPO model or tokenized DAO or Organization voting power and reselling.	(3-2) Interests of the Proposer

(3) Catalyst DRep Code of Conduct

In order to maximize the benefits to the Cardano ecosystem, the DRep needs to demonstrate to the community the following three points[4], (1) Competence, (2) Diversity, and (3) Fairness. The community needs to delegate to the DRep with these considerations in mind.

Characteristics required for DRep	Breakdown	Definition
(1) Competence[5]	(1-1) Knowledge	Have the knowledge to cast a proper Catalyst vote
	(1-2) Resources	Have the time (or staff) to conduct a proper Catalyst vote
(2) Diversity[6]	(2-1) Collaboration metric[7]	Interaction with other DReps on a level that does not harm diversity
	(2-2) Anti-Sybil attack measures[8]	You are not running multiple DReps
(3) Fairness[9]	(3-1) Voting Decision Rules	The voting behavior rules are open to the public and it can be verified that voting is not done arbitrarily.
	(3-2) Interests of the Proposer	Rules for voting behavior for voting destinations with interests are made public, and it is possible to verify that there is no corruption such as bribery.(Including how dRep discloses the nature of its involvement (direct/indirect) in the projects it votes for)

[4] It is difficult to disprove the other criterion. Therefore, this point should be confirmed through community feedback. At this time, there is no community feedback on the fourth criterion. We are still looking for feedback on the fourth criterion, so please let us know what you think by commenting on this document.

[5] For example, although all DReps have equal and aligned moral compass, inadequate proficiency in the blockchain industry and Cardano will be detrimental towards the legitimacy of DReps.

[6] For example, suppose the DRep is both competent and fair-minded. But what if all the DReps etc. belonged to one unified voting body? No matter how competent and fair he is, there is always a possibility that he will make a certain degree of error or oversight in his judgment. Also, no matter how fair a person may appear to be, the concentration of power can easily lead him toward corruption. Also, such concentration of power goes against the decentralized beliefs of the blockchain.

[7] At the same time, cooperation with other DReps can sometimes be important to the purpose of the DRep system. Groups can more efficiently cover different voting categories and it is likely any individual DRep will not be an expert on all topics. Most important here is the disclosing of any collaborations and how they will affect your vote and to let voters have transparency.

[8] This part may be covered by the registration process. This part will be deleted when it becomes clear that the registration process completely eliminates risk.

[9] For example, suppose there are diverse and competent DReps. But what if the DReps, etc. decide to vote yes or no based on the amount of the bribe?

In order to prove that each DRep satisfies the elements of (1) Competence (2) Diversity (3) Fairness, each DRep sets its own self-imposed rules, publishes execution results, collects feedback, and implements it's own improvements.

(1) Self-regulation of DReps

DRep creates and publishes voluntary rules to demonstrate that the above characteristics are met. Here are some helpful tips and example rules when setting up your rules.

	List of questions that each DRep can use as hints for setting their own rules	**Examples of rules set independently by each DRep**
(1-1) Knowledge	What are your qualifications and areas of expertise regarding Cardano/Business/Catalyst/etc.? How many hours can you spend developing your expertise in the future? How can the community verify this self-improvement? How will you get feedback on what you need to do to further develop your skills?	I have been an SPO for one year.（I will continue to share Catalyst related content once a week as an effort to keep my community continuously updated (can be found on the pool tool)
(1-2) Resources	How much time do you have available to spend on dRep work? How many people, if any, do you have on your team? Can you provide evidence of this?	I am a one-person operation, but I have 100 hours to read 200 proposals for at least 20 minutes each and to document the results, which I will publish.
(2-1) Coalition measure	How do you consult the opinions of other DReps? Is there any possibility of forming a team that includes the nature of a coalition that aligns your views with those of other DReps? If you refer to the opinions of other DReps and the opinion groups to which you belong, how will that show the process and how will you get feedback?	I will not collaborate with other dReps to unfairly influence votes for any project. If we consult other dRreps, we will publish our findings. I will not vote with reference to other dReps that are more than 20% of the same dRep I am voting for
(2-2) Anti-Sybil attack measures	How can you prove to the community that you are not applying to multiple DReps under the cover, that you are not a BOT, etc.?	I will disclose my business address, mugshot, Twitter, etc. [10] Also, I will carry out the proof of life in a public place (YouTube).

[10] In the future a governance body could accept a credential to ensure people are not running multiple DReps.

(3-1) Voting Decision Rules	What criteria will you use to select the candidates to be considered for voting and to decide whether to abstain from voting, how will you disclose this process, and how will you obtain feedback? What decision process do you use to vote for and against votes? How will voting behavior outside the voting decision rules be disclosed?[11] How do you demonstrate that you are following the minimum voting rules required by the Catalyst platform?[12]	Proposals for ballot consideration are those that received at least 3 in the advisor evaluation. We will vote yes or no with teams that have a proven track record of contributing directly or indirectly to the financial infrastructure of billions of people. We will vote no on proposals that we believe are not feasible or auditable. All of these will be documented and feedback will be accepted.[13]
(3-2) Interests of the Proposer	How will you make decisions, especially if the proposer has a financial interest, such as financial capital, a member of the team, a DRep himself/herself, a close personal friend, a relative, etc.? How will you disclose this decision-making process and obtain feedback? How could we minimize conflicts of interest of dReps to champion specific groups/projects only ?[14]	We will evaluate the extent to which these relationships would blunt the fairness of our consideration of the voting mentioned above destinations, and if we believe that they would create a significant bias, or would objectively create a bias, we will remove them from consideration for voting. If the recipient is considered acceptable, the reasons for this will be clearly stated. The process of these considerations will be made public, and decisions will be made based on feedback.

[11] We will not ever come to the point where you can know in advance exactly all the measurements that went into your votes. Voting is a complex behavior where the information needed and how you decide will depend on what you are voting on. You should not be considered unethical or be excluded from drep work if you do more than what you have disclosed in voting decisions rules.

[12] There are two layers of voting decision rules, which are minimally required by the Catalyst platform, and further voting decisions rules actively determined by DRep itself. Clearly separating these and disclosing the rules will help the delegator's decision making. The former is assumed to be secured in the form of a checklist.

[13] It is generally considered unethical to automatically down-vote all proposals that have not been considered. (If you think this has some rationality, please comment.) If you think of other voting policies that are not generally recommended, please comment. Note as of F11 there is no downvote.

[14] It does not mean that a DRep who is a member of a particular group must abstain from all of that group's proposals. In order to ensure transparency, it means that it is necessary to disclose whether the policy is to abstain, and if not, what criteria will be used for voting.

(2) Publish the rules, execute them, publish the execution results, collect feedback and refine the rules themselves based on that. (including penalties)

Ideally, (1) also declares how (2) is executed. It is useful to have penalties for breaking the rules. [15][16]

(3) List of minimum codes of conduct that all DReps should follow

1. Community Code Of Conduct (See link for violation penalties.)

(4) The management policy of this document

If you would like to be the direct editor of the document, please let us know in the comments within this document.
Yuta reserves the right to add and delete direct editors until the document version reaches v1.0.
After version v1.0 we would like to manage this document in a more decentralized way.
Let me know in the comments if you have any ideas.
Once v1.0 is done, we will create videos and integrate them with the website.

(5) Edit history

v0.1 release - 11/22/2022

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[15] For example, we can think of a mechanism that locks a certain amount of funds, and if a third party determines that the rules have not been followed, the funds go to Cataslyt's funds.
[16] In principle, it is up to the community to verify that DRep adheres to the code of conduct. As a natural punishment, DRep's delegation may be reduced next time if evidence of rule execution cannot be published. The reason why we are not envisioning a special monitoring organization at present are 1)There is not enough source of cost to support it (probably the reason why there is no SPO oversight group). 2) The purpose of this document is to enable community oversight. However, if such costs could be afforded, the establishment of an oversight group could be possible and desirable. If we can operate a mechanism that can continuously generate such costs, we may incorporate that mechanism. Please comment if you have such an idea.

v0.2 release - 11/26/2022 (Much improved content thanks to Em Russom ,Eystein Magnus Hansen ,Felix Weber, Yan Tirta ,Luke Mahoney (Mlabs) and Tevo Saks)
v0.3 release - 12/08/2022 (Much improved content thanks to Vladimir Pekic, Nick OLEUM Stakepool and June Akra)
v0.4 release - 12/20/2022 (Much improved content thanks to Ha nguyen)
v1.0 re;ease - 12/27/2022
v1.1 re;ease - 12/27/2022 (Much improved content thanks to Fuuko Lu)
V1.2 11/19/2023 Added risk segment and connected to each recommendation, constantly use term DRep. (Eystein Hansen) in adopting the document to the DRep Code of Conduct document that will be used for DRep workshops.

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We welcome feedback via comments!!

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