Dependency in Refinement Logics

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Abstract

We propose a new generalization of LCF-style refinement logics called ***Dependent LCF***, which allows the definition of refinement rules which express a dependency between subgoals, without the use of unification variables.

Over the past four decades, there have been many incarnations of the *LCF* (Logic for Computable Functions) interface, but the one that will concern us here is its extension to *LCF with Validations* as found in Cambridge LCF, which outfits the proving activity with the synthesis of explicit evidence. The Cambridge LCF signature is as follows:

```
signature CAMBRIDGE_LCF =
sig
  type form
  type thm
  type proof = thm list ⇀ thm
  type goal = form list ⊗ form
  type tactic = goal ⇀ goal list ⊗ proof
end
```

The `goal` type represents sequents, where `form` represents logical propositions. The LCF methodology, however, may be used to give a refinement treatment to many kinds of judgments, not just sequents; therefore, it is better to not include this in the core signature at all, and make the type of judgments abstract; for clarity, we will replace the name `thm` with `synthesis`.

```
signature LCF =
sig
  type judgment
  type synthesis
  type proof = synthesis list ⇀ synthesis
  type tactic = judgment ⇀ judgment list ⊗ proof
end
```

Then, a tactic is something that refines a judgment to a list of judgments (its subgoals), and synthesizes its evidence (provided the syntheses of its subgoals). There are many different tactics which can be implemented generically over this signature; here are a few:

```
signature TACTICALS =
sig
  structure Lcf : LCF
  val ID : Lcf.tactic
  val FAIL : Lcf.tactic
  val THEN : Lcf.tactic ⊗ Lcf.tactic ⇀ Lcf.tactic
  val THENL : Lcf.tactic ⊗ Lcf.tactic list ⇀ Lcf.tactic
end
```

1 *Modernized LCF*: the logic of tactics

In order to study the design space for LCF refiners, we would like to give a judgmental characterization of tactic systems, which we will call *Modernized LCF*. To begin with, note that the type of validations (`proof`) in the ML implementation is is essentially a HOAS (higher-order abstract syntax) encoding of a hypothetical proof or synthesis of a judgment. With this insight in hand, we are in a position to unify the list of subgoals and the validation generated by a tactic into a single concept, namely that of a *hypothetical proof* E whose free variables are explained in a context Ψ of subgoals.

To make the preceding observations precise, we can characterize the behavior of a *Modernized LCF* refiner judgmentally via two forms of judgment, $\boxed{J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi}$ and $\boxed{J \Vdash \tau \Uparrow}$, where J is a judgment of the logical theory, τ is a tactic, Ψ is a context of judgments, representing the subgoals generated by the tactic τ, and E is the synthesis of the judgment J, binding variables $|\Psi|$ which represent the syntheses of the subgoals.

The meaning of $J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$ is that τ is applicable to demonstrating the judgment J, producing synthesis e under the assumptions that the judgments in Ψ can be demonstrated. The divergence judgment $J \Vdash \tau \Uparrow$ expresses the inapplicability of τ to J. In practice, we will explain only the assertion conditions for one of $J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$ and $J \Vdash \tau \Uparrow$, and implicitly take the other to be its complement.

Remark 1.1. The refinement judgments $J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$ and $J \Vdash \tau \Uparrow$ are not higher-order judgments, because the variable J ranges not over judgments of the refinement theory, but of the object theory.

Let $\mathfrak{J}$ be the open-ended collection of judgments in our logical theory, and let $\mathfrak{R}$ be a collection of rule names. Each rule $R \in \mathfrak{R}$ must be interpretable as a tactic, i.e. the meaning of the assertions $J \Vdash R \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$ and $J \Vdash R \Uparrow$ must be explained for $J \in \mathfrak{J}$. We say $\boxed{\tau \ tactic}$ in case for all object-judgments $J \in \mathfrak{J}$, the assertion conditions for $J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$ and $J \Vdash \tau \Uparrow$ are disjoint, and moreover, if $J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$, then $FV(E) \subseteq |\Psi|$.

Numerous general purpose tactics can be defined over a logical theory, including identity, failure, disjunction and sequencing:

$$\overline{J \Vdash \mathtt{id} \Rightarrow \alpha \dashv \alpha\!:\!J} \qquad \overline{J \Vdash \mathtt{fail} \Uparrow}$$

$$\frac{J \Vdash \tau_1 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi}{J \Vdash \tau_1|\tau_2 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi} \qquad \frac{J \Vdash \tau_1 \Uparrow \quad J \Vdash \tau_2 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi}{J \Vdash \tau_1|\tau_2 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi}$$

$$\frac{J \Vdash \tau_1 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Phi \quad |_\alpha \Phi(\alpha) \Vdash \tau_2 \Rightarrow F_\alpha \dashv \Psi_\alpha \ (\alpha \in |\Phi|)}{J \Vdash \tau_1;\tau_2 \Rightarrow [F \ / \ |\Phi|]\,E \dashv \bigoplus_{|\Phi|} \Psi}$$

Remark 1.2. The nominal treatment that we have given here allows for a much more economical presentation of the standard tacticals, which are quite ardruous to define in the HOAS treatment used in ML implementations.

Theorem 1.3. *The above rules all define valid tactics:.*

1. `id` *tactic.*

2. `fail` *tactic.*

3. *If τ_1 tactic and τ_2 tactic, then $\tau_1|\tau_2$ tactic.*

4. *If τ_1 tactic and τ_2 tactic, then $\tau_1;\tau_2$ tactic.*

Proof. It suffices to verify that the synthesis E of each tactical is well-scoped in Ψ; in each case, this follows by induction.

(1–2) Immediate.

(3) By induction on derivations of $J \Vdash \tau_1|\tau_1 \Rightarrow \Psi \dashv E$.

> **Case $J \Vdash \tau_1 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$** Validity follows from the inductive hypothesis τ_1 *tactic.*
>
> **Case $J \Vdash \tau_1 \Uparrow$** Validity follows from the inductive hypothesis τ_2 *tactic.*

(4) We need to show that $FV([F \ / \ |\Phi|]\,E) \subseteq \left|\bigoplus_{|\Phi|} \Psi\right|$. From our inductive hypotheses, it is evident that $FV(E) \subseteq |\Phi|$ and that for each $\alpha \in \Phi$, $FV(F_\alpha) \subseteq |\Psi_\alpha|$; all of the free variables of the term got by substituting each F_α for $\alpha \in |\Phi|$ clearly reside in one of the fibres of the family of contexts Ψ, and so they must comprise a subset of the union $\bigoplus_{|\Phi|} \Psi$ of Ψ's fibres.

$\square$

2 *Modernized LCF* and the constructible subgoals property

An LCF-style refiner has a property called *constructible subgoals*, which means that the subgoals incurred by a rule or tactic may be constructed independently, using only the statement of the main goal. One unfortunate consequence of this principle is that it is impossible to define a refinement rule which expresses a dependency between subgoals. The canonical example is the introduction rule for dependent pairs in Type Theory:

$$\frac{M \in A \quad N \in [M\,/\,x]\,B}{\langle M, N \rangle \in (x : A) \times B}\ PairIntro$$

However, consider what a refinement rule for this would look like; we would like to take the goal $(x : A) \times B\ true$ to two subgoals (one for each conjunct); the first subgoal $A\ true$ is clear enough, but it is not possible to even write down the second subgoal until we know the synthesis of the first one.

Because a tactic in *Modernized LCF* produces only a *context* of independent subgoals, we cannot give a refinement treatment to this rule, and must instead write a family of refinement rules `PairIntro{w}` fibred over witnesses of the left conjunct w:

$$(x : A) \times B\ true \Vdash \mathtt{PairIntro\{w\}} \Rightarrow \langle w, \beta \rangle \dashv \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \alpha : w \in A \\ \beta : [w\,/\,x]\,B\ true \end{array} \right.$$

This is clearly unsatisfactory, since it breaks the natural flow of proof development, whereby multiple goals may be refined simultaneously without committing in advance to a particular solution. However, a more palatable refinement rule that allows $A\ true$ to be demonstrated by refinement is simply not expressible in *Modernized LCF*, since the sense of the second subgoal cannot be expressed except by referring to the synthesis of the first subgoal.

3 *Dependent LCF* and generalized refinement rules

At the crux of our problem is the fact that a tactic produces a context of subgoals without any dependencies; if we were to construe the judgment $J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E \dashv \Psi$ as synthesizing a *telescope* Ψ rather than a mere context, a proper refinement rule for *PairIntro* would be within reach. In fact, whilst the ML signature for LCF refiners rules out this interpretation, the notation we have used for *Modernized LCF* immediately suggests this generalization. Going forward, we will call the theory *Dependent LCF* when we take Ψ to be a telescope rather than a context.

We can now encode *PairIntro* with a single refinement rule, `PairIntro`:

$$(x : A) \times B\ true \Vdash \mathtt{PairIntro} \Rightarrow \langle \alpha, \beta \rangle \dashv \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \alpha : A\ true \\ \beta : [\alpha\,/\,x]\,B\ true \end{array} \right.$$

All that remains is to give a new definition of the sequencing tactical $\tau_1; \tau_2$ which accounts for this dependency. In order to do this, we will need to implement an auxiliary judgment $\boxed{E \dashv \Phi \hookrightarrow_\tau E' \dashv \Phi'}$ that allows us to gradually apply the tactic τ to a proof state, propagating refinements rightward through substitution. This judgment is defined by recursion on the telescope Φ, viewed as a *cons*-list:

$$\frac{}{E \dashv \cdot \hookrightarrow_\tau E \dashv \cdot}$$

$$\frac{J \Vdash \tau \Rightarrow E_\alpha \dashv \Psi_\alpha \quad [E_\alpha / \alpha]\, E \dashv [E_\alpha / \alpha]\, \Phi \hookrightarrow_\tau E' \dashv \Phi'}{E \dashv \alpha : J, \Phi \hookrightarrow_\tau E' \dashv \Psi_\alpha \oplus \Phi'}$$

Now, the sequencing tactical is readily definable:

$$\frac{J \Vdash \tau_1 \Rightarrow E \dashv \Phi \quad E \dashv \Phi \hookrightarrow_{\tau_2} E' \dashv \Phi'}{J \Vdash \tau_1 ; \tau_2 \Rightarrow E' \dashv \Phi'}$$

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