


Intro to Quantum Computing

Recap...and Beyond



QC in a Nutshell

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- A new computational model

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
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- Quantum algorithm zoo: quantumalgorithmzoo.org

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
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- Not always possible! Many (most!) QC algorithms *do* require noise-free, full-scale quantum machines!

Some Quantum Algorithms

Algorithm	Function	Speed-up	Era
Shor	factoring	super-polynomial	full-scale
Grover	search	polynomial	full-scale
HHL	linear algebra	super-polynomial	full-scale
QPE	chemistry	super-polynomial	full-scale
VQE	chemistry	heuristic*	NISQ
Annealing	optimisation	heuristic	NISQ
QAOA	optimisation	heuristic	NISQ

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- And probably won't ever be discovered...

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- *Do you see why?*

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- *Exponential* running time!!
- *The running time is exponential in $n=\log(N)$, which is the number of digits needed to specify N*
- Best classical algorithm $O((N)^{\frac{1}{3}})$

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- Based on *Quantum Fourier Transform / Quantum Phase Estimation*

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- *We go from time domain to frequency domain.*

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- It is applied on the vector of amplitudes of some composite quantum state of n Qbits
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- Classical Fourier Transform would need $O(n2^n)$ such operations.


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- S, T are phase change matrices (map $|0\rangle \rightarrow |0\rangle$ and $|1\rangle \rightarrow e^{i\phi}|1\rangle$).
- The last gate performs a SWAP.

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- We can find r *efficiently* by *Quantum Fourier Transform*!

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
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- But, *does it actually matter in practice?*
- Or it is just one more toy problem only mathematicians care about?

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- Nobody can decrypt the encrypted messages unless they know p, q !

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- And so R-S-A took all the glory.

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- But still, we should start thinking about Quantum-resistance Crypto protocols.

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- (ii) a quantum channel of communication (to send Qbits).
- Alice and Bob have access and can measure Qbits in states $|0\rangle, |1\rangle, |+\rangle, |-\rangle$

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- Otherwise, they **discard** the bit.

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- So, this results to a secure key distribution!

BB84 Quantum Protocol for QKD: Example

Alice's Bit	Alice basis	QBit	Bob's Basis	Bob's Bit
0	$ 0\rangle, 1\rangle$	$ 0\rangle$	$ 0\rangle, 1\rangle$	0
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BB84 Quantum Protocol for QKD: Example

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- *Why this is perfectly secure?*
- Let's assume that Charlie hears on the quantum channel Alice and Bob share.

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- Let's see how this works out...

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Alice's Bit	Alice basis	QBit	Charlie's Basis	Charlie's Bit	QBit	Bob's Basis	Bob's Bit
0	$ 0\rangle, 1\rangle$	$ 0\rangle$	$ 0\rangle, 1\rangle$	0	$ 0\rangle$	$ 0\rangle, 1\rangle$	0
1	$ +\rangle, -\rangle$	$ -\rangle$	$ 0\rangle, 1\rangle$	0 or 1	$\{ 0\rangle, 1\rangle\}$		

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And that was it...

- Thank you all!
- Hope you enjoyed and you learned something interesting 😊
- Best of luck on your exam(s) and everything else 😊