


Basics of Cyber Forensics

- For the preservation, identify, extract, doc & interpret of computer media for evidence or cause.
- used to supplement investigations.



Digital forensic science

"The use of scientifically derive & proven methods to preserve, collect, validate, id, verify, interpret, document & present digital evidence deriving from source for the purpose of facilitating or furthering process of forensic investigation (under criminal nature), or to anticipate unauthorized actions".

	1st	Sno	Env't
Law	Prosecute	Procute	Afftr
Military	continuks	Procute	RTS
Business	Aval	Procute	RTS

cf
Network
Small scale devices
Storage
code.

Cyberforensic

↳ the scientific way to examine & analyze data to use as ~~evidence~~ evidence later.

Requirements

1) Hardware

- Familiarity with all devices
- understanding of HDD
- " of M.2 & chipsets
- power & memory use

2) BIOS

- How bios works.
- Setting & limits of bios.

3) OS

- DOS
- UNIX
- LINUX

4) SW

- familiarity with software packages.

5) Tools

- familiarity with tools.

Handling Evidence

Admissibility

- legal rules which determine something can be used.
- obtained in a manner that keeps authenticity & validity

- No evidence must be damaged, destroyed or compromised by the CF.
- Prevent introduction of viruses.
- The Extracted intel is handled properly & stored.
- Maintain chain of custody
- limit amount of business operation effect
- Respect client - attorney info.

Initiating an investigation

Don't work haphazardly on the fs

1. Establish evidence custodian & start a journal with date & time + info
2. designate suspected machine as off limit & include backups, chang.
3. Collect Email, DNS & Network logs.
4. Capture exhaustive TCP & UDP portinfo.
5. Contact all relevant authorities.

Response

1. Identify / designate / become evidence custodian.
2. Review existing journals.
3. Start & maintain the journal.
4. Install the monitoring tools.
5. make a copy of disk without rebooting or affecting running processes.
6. Network info
7. Procs & files in use
8. config info
9. Receipt & sign off

Data

volatile

- └ Network info
- └ Active Procs
- └ Logged on users
- └ open files

Non volatile

- └ info this is persistent
- └ access by disk mapping
- └ make a back up copy.

CF Activities

1. SIEPA

1. Secure data
2. Identifying suspect
3. examine suspect
4. present findings
5. Apply law.

Acquire; Authenticate; Analyze

Crime Scenes

"When a crime is committed, something is always left behind"

Digital evidence

↳ Digital data that establishes occurrence of crime.


Digital Crime Scene

↳ Electronic envt where digital evidence can exist.

Principles

- ↳ Evidence is volatile
- ↳ Any mod is irreversible
- ↳ Acceptance is based on best evidence principle.
↳ Printouts, screenshots.
- ↳ Chain of custody is crucial.

- 1) When dealing with evidence all general principles apply
- 2) Upon seizing data make sure it's not changed again.
- 3) Only trained people should access the OG data.
- 4) All activities should be fully documented.
- 5) An individual is responsible for all actions while the data is in their possession.
- 6) All agencies responsible for buying, storing & handing over must comply.



① Identification

- ID potential containers of evidence
eg small devices, nontraditional media, multiple crime scenes.
- keep context of invert in mind.
- Do not operate in a vacuum.
- Don't forget non electronic media.

② Collection

- minimize contamination.
- collect or seize
- make forensic image.
- Document what you collect.
- Imagine
 - make 2 copies / don't work on OG.
 - copies \approx OG but hot copy \neq OG
- The evidence can be duplicate without degradation.
- use write blockers.
 - HW.
 - SW.
- Copy with bit streams ie bit-by-bit copying data.
- residual data is key.
- make o checksums.

③ Examination

- High level look over sys
- Verify integrity
- Recover deleted files
- Determine b/w list
- Determine time lines
- Examine directory tree.
- do R/W search.
- Look for the obvious.

ISSUES

- Lack of certifying tools
- lack of STD
- lack of certification for Prog
- lack of understanding by Judicous
- lack of curriculum
- rapid change in tech.
- immature discipline.

Evidence Guideline


1. Shutdown sys (consider volatile data)
2. Document H/W of system
3. Transport to safe location
4. Make Bitstream copies.
5. Authenticate all devices
6. Document Sys Date & time.
7. Make list of I/O
8. Eval swap
9. Eval stack
10. Eval unalloc space.
11. ~~Eval~~ Search Files, stack for keywords.
12. Document names, dates.
13. ID anomalies
14. Evaluate functionality.
15. Document findings
16. Retain everything used.

IP header Analysis


- IP is the transmission mech of TCP/IP @ Network.

Datagram

- Packets @ Network layer.
- Variable length
- 20-60 byte header
- In 4 byte sections.



IP HEADER



Service :

code point	2
------------	---

XXX 000
precedence

XXX ##
Differentiated

0 → Int.
1 → Local
01 → Temp.

Total len gives total len of datagram not header.

data < 40 bytes then add padding.

Q1>

01000010 first 8 bits are acc/reg

$$VER = 0100 = 4$$

$$IHLN = 0010 = 2 \times 4 = 8 \text{ bytes corrupted}$$

Q2

$$IHLN = 1000 = 8 \times 4 = 32 = IHLN \Rightarrow 28 \text{ bytes} \quad (12)$$

Q3.

$$IHLN = 5_{16} \text{ Total len} = 0028_{16}$$

Header = 20 bytes.

Total = 40 ⇒ 20 bytes of data

Q4 45 00 00 28 00 01 00 00 01 02

get no of hops

$$\Rightarrow \text{TTL} = 8 \text{ bytes} = 16 \text{ hex chars}$$
$$= 01 = \text{only one hop.}$$


Fragmentation

- goes through diff networks
- each router decaps & encaps to another.
- received = frameword of arriving
- sent = frameword of sending.

MTU: Max transmission unit.

— only the datagram is fragmented.

Flags :



Q5 M = 0

It is the last frag but we cannot say if it was a part of frags

Q6 : M=1

→ Frag ?: Yes ; Location ? No

Q7 : N=1 ; offset = 0

⇒ First of the frags


8 : offset = 100 ; HLEN = 5 ; total = 100

First = 800 total = 8100 hlen = 20

⇒ ~~first~~ ⇒ first = 800 last = 879.



Options

↪ Not needed but can be used for testing & debugging.



Number

Eop 0; Nop; Lsc 3;
4 Ts; 7: Record route; 9 Strict sr



Check sums

- ↪ Error detection method.
- ↪ done at sender value add & count.
- ↪ only covers the ~~header~~ header not the data.

Android Malware Detection

- Mobile OS's made OS's more popular
- Types of OS's increased each having security holes
- security holes made attackers interested + No AV.
- New tasks needed.

Android Malware

- Mostly made on a Java backbone
- Run on the Android Runtime Engine (4.4 + up)
- + Apps are kept as APK files.
- + App is first compiled and then archived to APK will all parts.
- + APK = Zip(Bytecode, resources, certificates, manifests)
- + On installing its copies to
 - System apps : /system/app and
 - user : /data/app.

Forensics

- ↳ Apk has 3 main parts : Signatures, Bytecode , Resources .
- Signature: # of the APK to check integrity.
 - . experts can collect signatures to speed up id process.
- ByteCode : The executable part @ classes.dex in the APK
 - has the compiled classes as bytecodes.
 - Bytecode → instructions @ Android Runtime VM
 - ARVM is register based
 - Apk can also have a catalog lib.
- Resources : The non executable part
 - UI
 - Manifest.XML : contains permission info for the app : some apps use these .
 - : Analyzing this is the most important .

Malware Detection

- using hash.
- collect hash from a database i.e playstore.
- If the two hashes don't agree, the app may be a malware.
- Also can be done by checking for suspicious permission reqs.
↳ many people ignore it.

Anti forensics + Counter Measures

1 Obfuscation

- Save a function in a way to maintain its utility making the code hard to analyze & understand.
- Expert makes decompilation before the obfuscating.
- ApkTool gets the .dex bytecode
- Dex2Jar and JD-CUI are used to decompile to Java.
- Edit the Java code, delete empty classes, correct errors, rename etc.

2 String Encryption

- Encrypt the string of MW.
- Eg XOR, Base64, AES, DES
- They not only check system props but also IMSI.

Malware Analysis

static, dynamic Post-pocorn.

- Malicious Activity

↳ Dynamic: Expert deals with behavior features & interacts with system, collected data, network connection.

Study Dyna^mi_c:

- study the program as it runs
- Debugger
- Function call tracers
- Emulators.

→ Dynamic can be done quickly

→ WYSIWYG



↳ Static: No code execution

- tools : Disassemblers.
- : Decompilers.
- : Sourcecode analyzers.

- Reveals behavior under unusual cases.
- Examines parts that usually don't execute.
- It's impossible to fully predict the behaviour.
- The main task is to find the malicious code.

- 1) ApkTool
- 2) Dex2JAR & JD-CUI.

- APK Tool

- ↳ allows disassembly of malware.
- The Android Manifest : permission info
- res catalog .. The XML files to describe app templates & required image files.
- Smali Catalog: - smali files the operational code (Notepad++).

↳ Post Model

↳ Study by looking at the behavior.

↳ Analyzed data includes:

- Local / Remote Loggers.
- Changes to file contents.
- Deleted files.
- Data @ swap space.
- Data still lingering in RAM.
- Information recorded outside the system.

The cyber world

- Cyber space

- ↳ Env't where people, soft & services interact
- ↳ Maintained by WHO M
- ↳ includes : comp's, net's, soft, HDD etc.
- ↳ A virtual medium that active 24x7x365.

Cyber Security

- Tech = procedures to safeguard resources from unlawful admittance.
- ISO 27001 IS mgmt std.

- Policy -


- ↳ An authority framework that defines & guides the activities of security
- ↳ provides the outline to effectively protect info.
- ↳ Manages the entire field of ICT users.


Cyber Crimes

- ↳ crimes @ complexes.
- " a criminal activity where a comp / Net is used as a tool for target of a crime".

As a tool : The individual is the target then comp is a tool
→ stalking, theft.

As a target : done by select people with knowledge by doing series of attacks in a planned manners eg
→ defacement, cyber terrorism.





Unauthorized access

- any access without permission
- Hack / cracking : gaining unauthorized access.


IT Act 2000 : 200k fine + 3 yrs.

Why? : Personal gain

Viruses worms

- self replicating & propagating.
- Piggy backs.

Dos



Email

spoof : fraud email with intent to cheat

spam : Bulk mail

Bombing : Sending huge volume of mail eg > inbox overflow.

Sale : Meth, ARIS, Rhinos.

Phishing : Disguise : 100.

IPR : Piracy, Copy Right Inf, trade mark violations.

Eg Satyam Infoway : Squatting.


Defacement : self explanatory.

Stalking and vandalism : self explanation

Live data Collection

- Windows Environment

Incident response



Goals

- └ obtain enough data to determine response
- └ consider totality of info.

Two Goals

- └ confirm the incident occurred
- └ Retrive system data. (volatile)

Creating a response Toolkit

- Plan to obtain all info without affecting anything
- Collected the targeted files on a CD,
 - └ quick respn,
 - └ Pro.
 - └ succ.

Eg tools: cmd.exe ,NTRK , net stat , cryptcat, Fport .

- └ GUI : Not recommend due to the background activities they do
- └ CLI : Yep.

Preparing

- Label the Toolkit media
- check for dependencies
- create Toolkit checksum
- write protect any floppy's.

Storing the Info obtained

- The powered on system.
 - The envt is untrusted.
1. To a HDD.
 2. To a notebook.
 3. To removable media.
 4. To remote system.

Eg NetCat

→ creates connection b/w workstation & device.

Integrity - [mss sum]

- Protect from modifications
 - do the check sum in front of witness.
- Run trusted commands on NT server
- Send files to work station
- Get MD5
- Do file invert.

Encryption

- Cryptcat (same func & syntax as metacat)
- eliminates sniffers.
- Eliminates contamination.

Volatile Data

- ↳ System date & currently logged in users.
- ↳ Time stamp
- ↳ running processes
- ↳ Apps listening for sockets
- ↳ Systems with recent connections.

Organization & Documentation

- ↳ write info which can be used as evidence
- ↳ Protects the organization.

create tool Hashes
make sure the hashes are signed & verified by witness.

Collecting Volatile Data

1. Execute trusted cmd.exe
2. Record systime & date
3. Determine logged user
4. If files get modified, creates F-accesses. — Dir
5. Determine open ports — fport
6. Apps associated with ports
7. Running apps — PsList
8. all recent connects — Netstat. — [Arp cache → IP : MAC
Nbstat gives remote NetBIOS.
9. Document the commands used. doskey /history.

To know abnormal fun'n we need some baseline.

Scripting the resp.

→ can be done to a .bat file.

```
time /t  
date /t  
Psloggedon  
dir /t:a /o:a /a/s C:\  
netstat -an  
fport  
pslist  
nbstat -c  
time /t  
date /t  
doskey /hist
```

In Depth Live Response

- Date & Time
- PsLoggedon
- NetStat
- PsList Fport
- SeDebug / Encore
- NTRK
- Pwdump 3e
- NTLM

Collecting live data:

- Event logs
- Registry
- System Pass
- Dump RAM

◦ getting Event Logs:

- auditpol : discovers the audit policies
- NTLast : monitor successful & failed logons
- Dumpel : retrieves remote logs.

◦ Reviewing Regs

- Regdump: textfile dump of reg.
- queries only get the key value.

◦ System Passwords

- pwdump32: get pw from sam file.
- crack with John or similar tool.
- Rainbow tables.
- get dump of ram too.

- Decide

↳ Is the dump needed?

- Unix Environment

- └ create Tk
- └ store info
- └ obtain volatile info
- └ collect
 - └ deletion
- └ trusted shell
- └ info gather .

UNIX Quirks: allows deletion of program after it executes
: Versions are neither fast or b/w compatible.

Creating Tk kit

- distros need their own kits
- keep a Tk ready
- only shell trusted .

Best time?

↳ optimum time for response:

Storing Info

- └ Local HDD
- └ mem
- └ netcat / cryptcat.

Get volatile data before dupli

- └ open sockets
- └ Running Procs
- └ RAM
- └ Unlinked files.
 - └ files marked to delete when the process terminates

Data to collect

- └ Date < time →
- └ Current user logged on.
- └ Timestamps for the fs.
- └ running Procs
- └ open sockets
 - └ App's listening open socks.
 - └ sys with curr / recent connections.

[Eq]

+ checksum.

Unix File Deletion

- Unix keeps a file link count.
 - +ve int for no of files using it.
 - count = 0 ⇒ not in use ; delete.
 - when the attack file is deleted
 - Prog is removed from the dir chain
 - LC--
 - del'n time is set
- (The LC ≠ 0 till proc ends).

Running Trusted Shell

- 2 mode . GUI → terminal
- = → Exit xwindow , log onto console as root on tty1.

to mount something

mount	/dev/fdo	/mnt/floppy
-------	----------	-------------

Gather info

- System date & time : date
- User : who.
- Recent file mods , access etc.
$$\begin{array}{ll} ls -alRu / > / \text{Floppy} / \text{atime.} \\ \text{a} \text{lr} \text{u} & / \text{ctime} \\ \text{a} \text{lr} & / \text{mtime} \\ \text{a} \text{ln} & \end{array}$$

Ports

Ports : netstat - on

processes : netstat - anp

Processes in unix > windows

Process : ps command.

Checksums

- Record checksum of all files.
- Script the init response.

In Depth

- use dd, cat, netcat + dos to get logs , configs + others.

Rootkits avail

→ LKM's

→ unix kernel is one big beautiful program (Brian you beast).

→ LKMs can be dynamically linked to the kernel.

→ Rogue LKM can intercept commands + create false.

→ hide info → make backdoors .

Getting System Logs

@ /var/adm or /var/log subdir.

use netcat , crypcat dd + dos.

Point of interest : utmp , wtmp , lastlog .

Process accounting @ /etc/syslog.conf .

Finding Sniffers

- ↳ Increases the severity
- ↳ attacker had root.

/Proc File system

- ↳ pseudo fs to interface kernel DS.
- ↳ /proc \Rightarrow accessing KDS and not files/directories.
- each process gets a subdirectory in the /proc to its PID.
 - . The EXE link in Proc allow recovery of deleted but running files.
 - . By checking the file descriptor we can know all files used by a process.

RAM DUMP

- UV Diff
- Dump /Proc/Kmem to remote.
- Kmem has the Ram but in a non contiguous arrangement.

Investigating Windows Environment

- When to start?

- Initial response is done, further investigation needed
- Consulted from legal council
- Duplication of evidence is done


- Where is the Evidence?

- Volatile data in Kernel Data Structures.
- Slack Space (can retrieve data of file which were deleted).
- Free/unallocated space (can extract data on deleted files) including damaged or inaccessible clusters.
- logical filesystem.
- The event logs.
- The registry.

- Steps in Windows Investigation

1. Retrieve all pertinent logs.
2. Perform keyword search.
3. Retrieve relevant files.
4. Identify unauthorized user accounts or groups.
5. Identify rogue processes and services.
6. Look for unusual or hidden files/directories.
7. Check for unauthorized access points.
8. Examine jobs run by the scheduler service.
9. Analyze trust relationship.
10. Review security identifiers.

- Log Files



Reviewing Logs

1. Determine which users have been accessing.
2. Determine who has been successfully logging in.
3. Determine who has been unsuccessfully trying to log in.
4. Track usage of specific files.
5. Track alterations to the audit policy.
6. Track changes to user permissions.

Viewing Logs on Windows

- Use the Event viewer utility to access audit logs.

Start > programs > Admin tools > Event Viewer.

- Select log to be viewed

Eg Log > open >evt (mention the log type)

- The key decorator on an entry means a successful log
- The ~~key~~ lock decorator on an entry means an unsuccessful log / failure.

ID	Descr
516	Some audit event records discarded.
517	Audit log cleared
528	Successful log
529	Unsuccessful log / failed.
531	Failed log Locked
538	Successful log off
576	Assignment and use of rights.

— common IDs & remember these

- Monitor processes run by an employee / counsel pushed you to have these.

Where to Find Evidence

- Monitor success and failure of detailed tracking
- With detailed tracking turned on, you can monitor every new process created.
592 → New process created 593 → Process has exited.
- Can track virtually everything i.e. any app opened/closed / edited / run.

Offline Investigation

- obtain copies of appevent.evt, secevent.evt, sysevent.evt from the forensic duplicates.
 - ↳ \%systemroot%\System32\Config.
- To obtain these use
 - DOS boot disk.
 - Linux with appropriate NTFS drivers.
 - forensic duplicate.
- If the forensic computer/Workstation cannot read the logs then:
 1. Disable EventLog service of the workstation
controlPanel > Services > Disable EventLog > Reboot.
 2. Use the user Manager to change the forensic workstation's audit policy to monitor nothing at all.
 3. Reboot and verify the steps taken are effective.
 4. Place the 3.evt files into default.evt location of workstation either make backup of the org or overwrite them.
 5. Start the EventLog service from control panel.
 6. Start the EventViewer and proceed.

Drawbacks

- Windows does not log successful logons, file accesses etc.
- Only one event can be viewed at a time.
- Only log the source NetBIOS name rather than the IP address of remote system.
- Size and Time length of each log needs to be set separately.
- The descriptions are populated using DLLs which may be corrupted/not available if viewed offline.

Keyword Search

- String searches on logical file structures or ~~at~~ the physical level to examine the contents of an entire drive.
- Disk search tools do physical level string search, these need to be booted from ~~the~~ ~~boot~~ a boot media.

Eg > DtSearch, EnCase.

- # Pick the exact words that provide useful results
- # The search should not adequately minimize the focus of the investigation

Reviewing Relevant Files

- Windows system writes I/O to so many files at once that almost all actions taken on the system leave some traces of their occurrence.
- Files like
 - Source files
 - Temp files
 - Cache files
 - Registry : keeps track of recently used files.
 - Recycle Bin : keep track of recently deleted files.
- Recognize files by their extensions as well as the file headers.
- Tools: EnCase, QuickView Plus.
- Investigator must be able to identify relevant files.

1. Incident time & time/date stamp

- scour network logs / get oral testimony of the time range when the incident occurred.
- action day i.e. days when the relevant acts took place.
- after identifying these events review time/date stamp encapsulated by them.
- Get a directory listing with file access, modify and creation times using dir.
- Use a tool (FileList) to get the details.

2. Proprietary Email files

- Use appropriate s/w to view suspect emails.

A Netscape Messenger Mail

- maintains mail as plain text files at:
 - \Program Files\Netscape\Users\<user>\Mail
- Each mailbox has: indexfile (.smm), message text - file
- Mail is organized as inbox | SENT.
- The content can be viewed using any text reader.

B Microsoft Outlook Mail

- uses a proprietary format to keep mail.
- uses a *.pst extension, the *.pst file can archive all folders within outlook i.e. cal, deleted files, Drafts, inbox, Journal, notes, etc.
Everything except the contacts folder.
- Location: Setting \<user>\Local Settings\ApplicationData\Microsoft\Outlook
- To investigate, copy the .pst file into the workstation and open with outlook client.

3 Deleted Files and Data

- recovery of lost file which may have been deleted by malicious user.

- Ways:

1. Undelete tools
2. Restoring Files in Recycle Bin
3. Recovering .tmp files
4. Low Level tools to recover file system.

- Undelete Tools

- Require use of native file system.
- This is unfavorable as it will overwrite free space which may have valuable info.
- Tools
 1. File Scavenger: Undeletes as long as the space occupied has not been used.
 2. Norton Utilities Protect: Acts as alt Recycle Bin. Has auto delete after some time.

4. Recycle Bin

- Prevents accidental Deletion.
- Only cover recycle bin aware apps like Explorer.
- Cannot recover items deleted from command line.
- Recovering something from recycle bin
 - Find hidden recycle bin directory.
 - These are on the root directory of a partition /a
 - CD into this folder.
 - Use dir /a to view the hidden folder as well as sub folders.

5. Temporary Files

- Files may originate with any ongoing on windows
- have a *.tmp extension.
- These may recover very old items which were deleted like old PPTs or attachments.

6. BackUp File Recovery

- NTBACKUP.EXE
 - creates a log file recording
 - date of backup
 - # of files backed up
 - # of files skipped during backup.
 - # of errors encountered.
 - time taken for the backup.
- This can be checked by simply searching for Backup.log and check if it was created by NTBACKUP.

7. Windows Registry

- Central hierarchical database to store information necessary to configure the system for >1 users.
- Replaces AUTOEXEC.BAT, CONFIG.SYS and INI files.
- Can reveal s/w installed in the past, security config, DLL trojans etc.

Use of Registry

- view what s/w has been installed
- To track unauthorized software and steganography tools, Lophtcrack & sniffers.
- To find s/w that were installed and then manually deleted.

Registry Root Keys

- HKCR : HKEY_CLASSES_ROOT.
- HKCU : HKEY_CURRENT_USER.
- HKLM : HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE.
- HKU : HKEY_USERS.
- HKCC : HKEY_CURRENT_CONFIG.

- Tools

- Registry Reader.
 - EnCase.
 - Regedit 4 Regedit32.
- # Never work on the original.
Make a copy.

Registry root keys are made from major files:

- SAM.
- Security.
- Software.
- System.

\WINNT\System32\Config.

Offline Registry Investigation

- Investigation using the forensic duplicate.
 1. Copy the registry root from the source to the forensic workstation
 2. Run Regedit.
 3. Import these files by selecting Registry.
 4. Import registry files.

8. Web Browser Files Tools: Internet Explorer History Viewer, Pass, EnCase.

- Track recently used web pages.
- Browsers maintain cache of the recently viewed pages.
 1. NetScape
 - The Netscape.hst file @: \Program Files\Netscape\Users\<user>
 - The fat.db maintains another longer history file.
 2. Internet Explorer
 - Index.dat holds the viewer history.
 - The HTML files are stored in the cache files.
- All of these are binary files.

- Dial Up Networking

- Determine browsing activities of user by reviewing DUN settings
- Dial-on-demand allows automatic connection by apps.
- The autodial keeps a list of IP addresses.
- Rasautous allow to view autodial database.

Identifying Unauthorized User account or groups

- use we stat from NTRK to view all domain accounts.
- Examine the security logs using Event viewer

632 New Account

626 New user enabled

636 changing acc group

642 user acc changed.

- Check the profiles directory:
 - If user acc exists and directory not found then no user acc has log on yet
 - If directory is found and the user account is not listed then the acc no longer exists
- Review SID where the user acc is deleted, it remains in the Registry Microsoft\WindowsNT\CurrentVersion\ProfileList.

Identifying Rogue Processes and Services

- Use the most up-to-date virus scanner on whole volume of evidence.
- Tool : Pest Patrol

Looking For unusual or hidden Files/ Directories

- To uncover hidden files which may be of some importance.
- NTFS Files streams can be used to hide data behind legitimate files. A to store multiple instances of file data in one file entry.
- Explorer cannot indicate presence of additional streams.

Eg) Netcat .(nc.exe) can be hidden as:

cp nc.exe logo.jpg : nc.exe.

The nc.exe within logo.jpg file entry is not reflected by file size but only in the time stamp.

Review Security Identifiers

- User /User groups are identified using SID.
- Each system has its own ID and each user has its own ID as well.
- Computer ID + User ID = SID, SID can uniquely ID user accounts.
- SID do not
 - : apply to share security
 - : apply when remote access to a domain is provided.
- SID are like digital footprints that prove that a remote system was used to log on to a machine and access a domain.

Eg S-1-5-21-[10 digit]-[10 digit]-[10 digit]-500.

The diagram shows the SID structure S-1-5-21-[10 digit]-[10 digit]-[10 digit]-500. Brackets group the components: S-1-5-21, [10 digit]-[10 digit]-[10 digit], and 500. Arrows point from these brackets to labels: 'denotes a SID' under S-1-5-21, 'Revision Level' under S-1, 'ID authority' under 5, 'Subauthority value' under [10 digit]-[10 digit]-[10 digit], and 'Relative ID.' under 500.

File auditing and Theft of info.

To identify users who has placed unauthorized files on a server.

1. Use a network based sniffer to monitor access to the file server or implement host based log. [if the FS is not NTFS then built not that easy]
2. Select directory to be monitored and choose the appropriate auditing.

Adding Success-and-Failure of File and Object access we can enable:

- 560 object open.
- 561 Handle Alloc
- 562 Handle closed
- 563 Object Open for Delete
- 564 Object Deleted.

in Windows 2000 :

- 565 object open
- 566 object operation.

Checking For Unauthorized access points

- Any service which allows for some level of remote access.
Eg> Terminal, SQL, telnet Daemons, Windows TelNet Server, FTP daemons
Web servers, Port 5800 and Port 5631, PPP and PPTP, X servers.
- Tools: Netstat & Fport.
- These use API calls to read the contents of kernels and user space TCP and UDP.
- Remote Control and Access Services
 - Remote Control : PC Anywhere, VNC and Reach Out.
 - o Allows absolute control over the system.
 - o only one user at a time.
 - Tools: netstat, Fport, PsList.
- Remote Access : Windows RAS
 - o allows for multiple users (upto 256 connections)
- Tools: rasusers to list all the users, Net start to view running service.

Examine Jobs Run by the Scheduler Service

- An attacker can reconnect to the victim's system by examining the jobs run by the victim system.
- remote /s "cmd.exe" batman5.
This makes it such that no other system cannot connect.
remote /s <hostname>batman5.
↳ Name of NetBIOS of remote system. → key phrase to connect.
- Jobs are scheduled using at or soon. At will show any jobs scheduled.

Analyze Trust Relationships

- Windows NT
 - Supports nontransitive / one-way trust.
 - If your NT-PDC trusts another domain, it doesn't need to trust your PDC.
- Windows 2000
 - Provides two-way / transitive trust.
 - Domains located within an active Directory forest require two-way access.