Everyday makers and expert citizens. Building political not social capital

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Chapter 8

Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens: Active Participants in the Search for a New Governance

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Introduction

Since Robert D. Putnam published his article about how Americans were increasingly 'bowling alone' (1995), one has continuously asked whatever has happened to civic engagement in the US and the rest of the Western world. As Russell J. Dalton recently noted (2008: 76) there is 'an apparent consensus among contemporary political scientists that the foundations of citizenship and democracy in America are crumbling' (Dalton 2008: 76):

> Citizens participate in public affairs less frequently, with less knowledge and enthusiasm, in fewer venues, and less equally than is healthy for a vibrant democratic polity (Macedo et al., 2005, p. 1).

However, after having witnessed how millions of volunteers helped Barack Obama to win the American Presidency through a very spectacular and novelty-creating political campaign, it is time to ask: how could mainstream political science possibly overlook the shifts in political orientation and participation that made so many of those whom Putnam described as having 'forsaken their parents' habitual readiness to engage in the simplest act of citizenship' (1995: 69) invade 'the

political' as new volunteers and voters? Why is it that those in the mainstream did not detect this significant political potential for participation and change? Those studying participation outside the formal institutions of government have for at least a decade been claiming that such a potential for revitalizing people's engagement in 'big' politics exists (Bang (ed.) 2003, Corner and Pels (eds.) 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar (eds.) 2003, Heffen, Kickert, and Thomassen (eds.) 2000, Marsh, O'Toole and Jones 2007, Newman (ed.) 2005,). Then why is it that the new participants whom Obama succeeded in mobilizing, in the mainstream framework appears as but a bunch of 'small', 'insignificant', 'ineffective' and often even 'uncivic' forms of engagement (Dalton and Wattenberg (eds.) 2000, Putnam (ed.) 2002, Pharr and Putnam (eds.) 2000, Stoker 2006)?

Barack Obama also mocked the many stories of democratic decay in his victory speech in Chicago (http://elections.foxnews.com/2008/11/05/raw-data-barack-obamas-victory-speech/):

> [The campaign] *grew strength from the young people, who rejected the myth of their generation's apathy; who left their homes and their families for jobs that offered little pay and less sleep. It drew strength from the not-so-young people who braved the bitter cold and scorching heat to knock on doors of perfect strangers, and from the millions of Americans who volunteered and organized and proved that more than two centuries later a government of the people, by the people, and for the people has not perished from the Earth. This is your victory*.

Thus Obama demonstrated that slumping social 'networks, norms and social trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' (Putnam 1995: 67) need not lead to diving engagement in 'big' politics. For example, 66% of the generation between 18 and 29 voted for Obama, an increase of 12% compared to the last election (http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1023/exit-poll-analysis-2008). How could this political mobilization happen in a situation of growing political distrust and declining social capital? Because, I shall hold, even more important to good governance than social and economic capital is the *political* capital required to exercise political power in ways that can do well for people. The kind of community that Obama seeks to establish in

and through his rhetoric of change is *political not social*. It is oriented towards building political networks, reciprocal power and a shared belief in the possibility of communicating and interacting for *making a difference*: (Badiou 2006, Bang 2005, Carens 2000, Chaney, Hall and Pithause (eds.) 2001, Crozier 2007, Foucault 2007, Hay 2007, Wenger 1998).

http://elections.foxnews.com/2008/11/05/raw-data-barack-obamas-victory-speech/

> *And where we are met with cynicism and doubts and those who tell us that we can't, we will respond with that timeless creed that sums up the spirit of a people:*
>
> ***'Yes We Can'***

The Obama campaign's famous action slogan echoes the 'Si se puede' of Ceasar Chavez and his United Farm workers in their fight for better wages and working conditions (http://ufw.org/_board.php?mode=view&b_code=hotissue&b_no=3241). Actually, it says it all. It illuminates that there is another crucial mode of political communication and interaction than the *politics-policy mode*, as I call it, in which the accumulation of social capital is tied to political decision-making for the sake of keeping it effective and responsible (Putnam 1993). This is the *policy-politics* mode of good governance, which depends for its success on actors' practical abilities to 'make a difference' inside 'the political' to the articulation and delivery of salient policy values (Hajer and Wagenaar (eds.) 2003). As David Easton pointed out about political community many years ago:

> Where the members [of a political system] identify strongly with one another, they can tolerate intense and passionate dispute among themselves without jeopardizing the integrity of the community (Easton 1965: 326).

Hence, political community will always exist in tension with social community. Members of a political community cannot thrive in a morally unified and normatively integrated social community, exactly because they derive their political integrity from their reciprocal acceptance and recognition of each other's differences. In the policy-politics mode, political commonality does not primarily

come from responsible, legitimate, informed and reflective political decision making. Rather it springs from communicating and interacting in 'what has to be done', that is in the articulation and delivery of salient policy values. Unfortunately, mostly as a result of the dismissal of political action as 'technical' administration, one has come to forget that political authority primarily derives its acceptability from lay people sharing in a political division of labour. The kind of creative political capacity required for participating in the exercise of political authority and ethically informed political action is spirited away by the mainstream as but a matter of legitimate domination. However, members of a truly democratic political community cannot and will not submit themselves to a hierarchically organized authority requiring their blind or rational obedience. They would insist that the exercise of political authority in the policy-politics mode is not primarily about commanding and disciplining people outside. Rather it has to do with communicating and interacting with people inside 'the political' for the sake of empowering them and improving their political life chances for making a difference, whether they are acting alone or together.

Therefore the primary reason why the mainstream did not foresee what was coming stems from its identification of 'the political' with 'input politics', with how people's wants are given a social voice and politicized as demands that are converted into collective decisions (cf. Little 2008). This leads one to believe that policy, as the programming and implementing action, is simply the domain of non-political administration. The result is that one comes to neglect how a political community first of all requires transformative capacity - that is *power* - to bring about normative and social integration (Bang and Dyrberg 2003). Political community is an action community in which one shares in a political division of labour for being able to *do* things together.

The credo of 'Yes We Can' reintroduces the exercise of political community as lying at the heart of 'the political'. Due to the separation of input politics from administration in mainstream political analysis, political community has since long been relegated to the domain of the social, implying that 'the political' has become synonymous with effective and responsible government. However, it was the policy-politics rhetoric of concerted action for solving common challenges and problems

more than the conventional politics-policy rhetoric of representative democracy that gave the Obama campaign its compelling, mobilizing force. I would suspect that the majority of those participating in the campaign did not think highly of political parties, Congress and government. Indeed, it may actually have been their distrust of conventional politics-policy that convinced them of the authenticity of Obama's communal rhetoric of hope and the prospects for changing things together.

The notion of political community is what makes it impossible to understand Obama's victory solely as portraying the age old battle between neoliberalism and statism (Hay 2007). The campaign did not manifest the defeat of the former or the return of the strong, regulatory control ambition of the latter. The campaign appealed to the existence of a 'third way' between economically effective and socially responsible government in which the political community is situated. Its key message was that sharing in a political division of labour is the condition of developing a sense of mutual identification with each other and with one's capacities for making a real difference (Bang and Esmark 2007, 2008, cf. Crozier 2007, Fischer 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar (eds.) 2003), Dean 1999, 2007, Rose 1999). At least this is what I shall argue for in this essay.

My purpose is primarily to show the limits of studying participation solely in the politics-policy mode. Empirical references serve only as illustrations of my theoretical points. I shall first expand on what it means to study 'the political' in its two different modes as politics-policy and policy-politics. Then I shall show how politics-policy became the dominant political mode of participation studies in the mainstream via Almond and Verba's conception of *the civic culture* (1963) as composed of three subcultures: the participatory culture, the parochial culture and the subject culture. The concept of civic culture, I shall show, is still the dominant framework within which political participation and non-participation are approached in the mainstream. This does not only hold for Putnam's model (1993, 2002). It even applies to new approaches, moving beyond the analysis of social capital and responsible and effective government to cause-oriented critical

citizens (Norris 1999, 2003, 2007) and forms of micro-personal political activity (Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley 2004).

My first step beyond the mainstream goes through a new model of *politics as lived experience* (Marsh, O'Toole and Jones 2007). This seeks to show how 'governance initiatives can open up political spaces for young people to organize around and articulate the issues that concern them' (ibid: 221). Although this model is assuming the existence of political commonality as a potentially significant and relevant political force, it remains anchored on the input side as 'a means of giving people a political voice' (ibid.). Obama's 'Yes We Can', I shall conclude, turns us towards the output side, as a rhetoric which in particular is appealing to what I call everyday makers and expert citizens (Bang and Sorensen 2001, Bang 2005, cf. Li and Marsh 2008). Such political participants have a project identity more than a legitimating or oppositional one. They engage, not primarily for the sake of giving voice to repressed interests and identities but for helping to empower people and develop their action capacities for solving common concerns. This they do so by combining ethics and new Information and Communication Technologies as concrete prescriptions for those who 'can', 'will' and 'understand' how to 'make a difference'

(cf http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/10/obamas-secret-w.html).

It shall be exciting to witness whether American politics with Obama as President will be able to convince its new participants about the urgent need to forge an alliance in practice between democracy in its 'old' politics-policy mode and their 'new' policy-politics mode of good governance. Democracy and good governance are, of course, inseparable in practice. However necessary good governance is to fulfilling the hope for a better future among political authorities and in the political community, it only becomes democratic to the degree and extent that it manages to balance the relations of autonomy and dependence between them by:

> *reclaiming the meaning of citizenship, restoring our sense of common purpose, and realizing that few obstacles can withstand the power of millions of voices calling for change* (Presidential Announcement February 10 2007,

http://obamaspeeches.com/099-Announcement-For-President-Springfield-Illinois-Obama-Speech.htm).

On the Two Modes of 'the Political'

Let us start all over and ask: *If participation is considered an inevitable part of societal life, how can we best help in facilitating it?* (cf Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold 2007).

One finds two clusters of different answers to this question in the literature:

I. By *emancipating* people from domination and provide them with free and equal possibilities to get heard in *democratic decision-making* (Dryzek 2000, Habermas 1997).

II. By *empowering* people and enable them to make a difference to the exercise of *good governance* (Bang 2004, Barnes, Newman and Sullivan 2007)

Often the study of (I) and (II) are treated as liberal democracy + something more such as network management and public-private partnerships. Good governance is mostly regarded as 'coming after', or as existing 'in the shadow' of democratic government, as if good governance must express approval of liberal democracy with its free market economy, autonomous civil society and hierarchical state (cf. Smith 2007: 3-6). However, I would rather consider democracy and good governance indicative of the difference between studying 'the political' in two interconnected and yet intrinsically different modes:

i. The *politics-policy* mode, which revolves around the question of how demands are converted into collective decisions.

ii. The *policy-politics* mode, which concerns the question of how such decisions are acted upon and delivered to people.

Politics-policy expresses the dominant way in which participation is studied in the mainstream. One focuses on how interest and identity conflicts are voiced and politicized as demands that press themselves upon the political agenda to become collective decisions. Policy in this politics-policy mode is but the 'neutral' and 'loyal' instrument and medium of democratic politics. As Putnam states (1993: 63):

> A good democratic government does not only consider the demands of its citizenry (that is, is responsive), but also acts efficaciously upon these demands (that is, is effective) (Putnam 1993: 63).

Participation in the mainstream model is specified as linked to representative government for the sake of fostering more informed and reflective decision-making which in turn can lead to the exercise of more responsive and effective government. This means beginning by asking how participation can be made conducive to the pursuit of collective goals, and thereby 'more trusting, more joining, more voting, and so on' (Putnam 2002: 414). Then one proceeds by asking how government can be bonded to show more concern for 'inequalities, especially growing inequalities, in the social capital domain' (ibid.). The choice here stands between individualism and collectivism, preference aggregation and normative integration, market competition and state regulation. For example, when globalization runs amok and creates global warming as well as financial and economic meltdowns, it is in Putnam's model because the socially responsive, regulatory state has declined into an effective market-driven state, turning virtuous citizens into individual consumers. Thus the only way out of the crises go through 'refilling' the reservoirs of social capital and mutual trust in the formal institutions of democratic government. As Benjamin Barber put it recently in the Guardian newspaper (UK) (http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/20/economics-globaleconomy-creditcrunch)

> The dirty little secret is… that market capitalism works only when it can feed parasitically off active democratic social capital

However, there is another mode in which the study of 'the political' is conducted other than as the tool and medium of economic and social capital. This is the mode of *policy-politics*. Aristotle instituted this when stating (1995:14):

> Life is action not production.

Aristotle did not only deny that policy is simply politics' instrument of production. He also separated the general logic of decision-making inscribed in the democratic constitution from the singular logics of particular policy actions (ibid: 66, my italic).

> What is written down must be in general terms, but actions are concerned with particulars.

Today, many political scholars outside the mainstream turn to Aristotle to show the crucial importance of *phronesis* for the exercise of good governance in latemodern societies. Flyvbjerg is one of them, insisting that (2006: 70):

> The person who possesses practical wisdom (phronimos) has knowledge of how to manage in each particular circumstance that cannot be equated with or reduced to knowledge of general truth about managing.

Many regard the revival of *phronesis* as the prolongation of the age old discussion whether the study of governmental politics is a science or an art or whether public administration links to the development of *general knowledge* or *practical wisdom* (Schram and Caterino (eds.) 2006, Raadschelders 2008). I would rather consider the return of *phronesis* an attempt to reinvent the kind of political imagination which is tied to the hope that things could be done otherwise in and through a political community. As Obama puts it:

> *In the end, that is God's greatest gift to us, the bedrock of this nation; the belief in things not seen; the belief that there are better days ahead*
>
> (http://obamaspeeches.com/002-Keynote-Address-at-the-2004-Democratic-National-Convention-Obama-Speech.htm)

The hope and belief in good governance is the means and goal by which Obama in his rhetoric attempts to make political communication whole again as a loosely coupled system of *both* decision *and* action. In this system political authorities necessarily link with laypeople in the political community for the structuring of the political regime (cf. Easton 1965a+b). Thus, Obama comes close to the new generations of reflexive individuals who in and through their participation on the output side of political processes have coupled policy and politics in a political way, demonstrating that 'administration' is far more than a 'techne' for the exercise of legitimate domination (Ascheson and Williamson 2007, Davies 2007, Fisher 2003, Greenwood 2007)

We should stop separating politics from administration and reducing political science to policy ethics. Instead we should reconnect the rational decision and the prudent action as manifesting the two modes of 'the political' as politics-policy and policy-politics (Bang and Esmark 2007, 2009). If Barrack Obama can do it in his political communication so can we as students into the science and art of governing. We must begin acknowledging that whereas the code for politics-policy is legitimate vs. non-legitimate political *decisions*, the code for policy-politics is acceptable versus-non-acceptable political *actions*. Political authority can be accepted for many reasons other than its legal and moral legitimacy, such as by the ethical belief that it will be able to do well rather than badly for people (Easton 1957, 1958). Yet, its legitimacy is what counts if it is to be regarded as democratic, which is precisely why actions that aim at doing good will often stand in tension to the structures of democratic decision-making.

I will elaborate on the distinction between legitimating and accepting authority elsewhere (cf. Bang 2003a, Bang and Esmark 2009). Here I only introduce it to indicate how democratic government and good governance may be approached as loosely connected through the two different modes of 'the political'. The fact that the one does not necessarily lead to the other adds to the significance and importance of finding ways to combine and mediate them in rational and prudent manners in theory as well as in practice. For example, students of deliberative democracy seem justified when arguing that:

> Legitimacy in the theory of deliberative democracy exists to the extent that those subject to a collective decision have the right, opportunity and capacity to contribute to deliberation about the decision in question (Hendriks, Dryzek and Hunold 2007: 362).

However, even if such a fully deliberative democratic practice should come into being, this would not in and of itself provide 'the political' with the discursive management capacities required for coping in an acceptable and good way with the high consequence risks that confront people in their everyday life in a political community. As Hajer and Waagenar from deliberative policy analysis put it (2003:11):

> If the traditional forms of government are unable to deliver – either because of a lack of legitimacy or simply because there is a mismatch between the scope of the problem and the existing territorial jurisdiction – then networks of actors must create the capacity to interact and communicate.

There is an obvious link between this statement and Obama's rhetoric of change: it is exactly such a lack and mismatches that they both promise to be able to fill out in practice. Obama's campaign appealed to people who feel estranged by, or external to, the 'old' allocative politics-policy mode, and also consider it untrustworthy and unable to deliver (Little 2008). It managed to politicize the whole domain of administration, convincing participants that the prospects for solving our common challenges and problems depend on out reconnecting in new policy-politics communities for the exercise of good governance (Bang (ed. 2003), Bevir and Trentmann (eds.) 2007, Hajer and Wagenaar (eds) 2003, Heffen, Kickert and Tomassen (eds.) 2000).

The Civic Culture Revisited

If we are to understand the turn to community policy-politics, we must first go back and consider how the insulation of politics from administration was brought about in mainstream political science

and with what consequences for the study of the relation between political participation and rule. Almond and Verba's study into the civic culture is here a convenient starting point, since they were among the first to state that (1963: 14):

> incumbents and decisions may…be classified broadly by whether they are involved either in the political or "input" process or in the administrative or "output" process. By "political" or "input" process we refer to the flow of demands from the society into the polity and the conversion of these demands into authoritative decisions.

By distinguishing between whether individual orientations towards the polity were directed towards politics or administration, political inputs or non-political outputs, they developed a notion of civic culture by asking (I) what knowledge individuals have of their nation and the polity in general terms (history, size, location, etc.); (II) what knowledge they have of how their 'inputs' relate to their polity's basic structures, roles and policies; (III) what knowledge they have of the structures and actors involved in the production of 'outputs' and policy enforcement; and (IV) what knowledge they have of their rights, power, obligations and possibilities of access to influence (ibid: 16). These questions, distinguishing the orientations of individuals towards (i) the polity as a general object, (ii) input objects, (iii) output objects and (iv) themselves as active participants enabled Almond and Verba to develop a notion of the civic culture of democracy as composed of 3 types of culture, namely the parochial, subject and participant culture (ibid):

Table 1: Orientations in the civic culture

Orientation / ***Culture***	*Polity as general object*	*Input objects*	*Output objects*	*Oneself as active participant*
Parochial	0	0	0	0
Subject	1	0	1	0
Participant	1	1	1	1

In the *parochial culture* people's knowledge about specialized political objects approximate zero. We are dealing with 'unsophisticated', 'close-minded', and 'insular' individuals engaging in the culture in their pre-modern tribal or local consciousness in which there is no knowledge of occupying specialized political roles, and no separation between one's political role and one's other roles.

In the *subject culture* people do have a sense of the polity as a general object and of specialized roles associated with those who exercise commands over oneself and others when enforcing their policies. This is the 'we must obey' or 'government knows best' orientation characteristic of people having nearly no sense of themselves as active, influential participants and possessing virtually no knowledge of how their engagement in the culture relates to the conversion of demands into collective decisions.

In the *participant culture* participants are collectively and explicitly oriented towards their polity as a whole; they can distinguish between incumbents and structures in relation to inputs and outputs; and they are fully aware of their important and significant roles and possibilities as those who give voice to common concerns, and who seek to influence the demand conversion process as virtuous citizens. We are dealing with 'truly modern' individuals who know how to act collectively together for acquiring access to and recognition in the democratic decision-making process.

I shall not delve further into the notion of civic culture here, but only remark that it has managed to set the tone and direction for nearly all mainstream studies of democracy in the *politics-policy* mode, culminating in Fukuyama's famous 'end of history' thesis, claiming the victory of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government (1992). By coding the civic culture as a choice between 'either existing liberal democracies or totalitarianism' (Pateman 1989: 97), Almond and Powell contributed to consecrate a view of equal freedom as involving a 'flight' from political power in its own right as illegitimate, coercive, omnipotent domination. Thus, at least four basic oppositions appear:

1) *Public reason vs. political power*. Implicit to the idea of the civic culture as a bulwark against the abuse of political power, one finds the presumption that the only way in which 'the people' can become free is to run away from the threat of political power and establish their own private and public sphere outside of government. Foucault traces this insulation of the civic culture from democratic government in modern industrialized society to a 'contract of rational despotism with free reason [or emancipation]' (2007: 203). By this he means that modernity never beheaded the sovereign King of feudal society but instead tried to make his hierarchical rule and will to be obeyed an instrument and medium of public reason in the civic culture. Therefore, (a) when the participatory culture is specified as standing outside of government, actively trying to give voice to people's grievances by politicizing their wants as demands; (b) when the parochial culture is seen as a governmentally protected domain for the spontaneous and free accumulation of social capital; (c) when the subject culture is regarded as a potential irrational nuisance to be kept into benign and obedient apathy by a centralized bureaucracy treating its subjects as clients, Almond and Verba are simply echoing Kant's original claim that:

> 'the public and free use of autonomous reason will be the best guarantee of obedience, on condition, however, that the political principle that must be obeyed itself be in conformity with universal reason' (Foucault, ibid).

In his efforts at showing how to emancipate people on the input side of political processes and convert them into virtuous and rational citizens, Kant, and the whole of the modern tradition after him, simply overlooked the fact that political freedom and equality can never come from the exercise of hierarchy as one-way relations of command and obedience. It can only spring from empowering people on the output side to become reflexive *political* individuals who can, will and know how to turn hierarchical authority into a communicative and interactive authority for balancing existing political asymmetries of autonomy and dependence in and through the exercise of political commonality (Bang 2004).

2) *'Big P' politics'* vs. *'small p' politics*. The notion of parochial culture points to 'small' forms of participation in the locality in which political concerns are woven together with many other concerns, customary, religious, social, etc. This has led many to make a strong distinction between the 'big P' politics of government to which virtuous citizens direct their energies and the 'small p' politics of laypeople in small communities and voluntary associations in civil society (Beck 1996, cf. Stoker 2006: 4-5). One major consequence is that the many new forms of engagement in policy articulation and delivery on the output side are typically discarded as 'small p' politics, simply because they do not buy into the argument that big 'Politics is [only] about collective decisions, balancing conflict and cooperation, in order to promote human purposes' (Stoker 2006: 203-204)

3) *Active citizens* vs. *passive masses*. Virtuous citizens are people who engage in 'big P' politics with a legitimating or an oppositional identity for the sake of making 'the system' more responsible and effective. Local social activists are people who engage in 'small p' politics, building social capital and social trust in their neighbourhoods and communities. The rest are those who are passive and mostly fall under the heading of obedient and apathetic masses populating the subject culture. They prefer to stay clear of all politics and leave it to government to do what has to be done. Some think government knows best and acquiesce in what it does, sometimes even with pride. Others hate all politicians, consider them liars and thieves and remain on the couch even at election days. This polarization of active vs. passive citizens who may oppose or legitimate 'the system' makes one blind to the fact that most individuals today prefer to be neither fully active nor completely passive but to engage in a more 'hit' and 'run' or 'on' and 'off' like fashion (Bang 2005, Marsh, O'Toole and Jones 2007). Unlike the participants in 'big P' politics and 'small p' politics, citizen consumers (Clarke et al 2007) and everyday makers (Bang and Soerensen 2001), as they are often called, do not have a legitimating or oppositional identity but a project one. The reason why they appear as 'apathetic' towards collective decision-making and the

building of social capital is exactly that they mostly prefer to stay clear of the old forms of participation and instead let their tactical deliberations decide when to 'hit' and when to 'run' and when to do so by working against the system, collaborate with it or simply avoid it. Everyday makers and citizen consumers typically engage in order to influence policy articulation and delivery on their own terms, when they feel like it, or have time for it, and for the sake of realizing their various life political projects.

4) *Pluralism vs. elitism*. Inherent to the conceptions of 'Big P' politics and the civic culture is the idea that a pluralized culture with multiple groups with overlapping cleavages and with a 'mix' of active and passive citizens with a local and central orientation are the better way to secure that the political system does not get overburdened with politicized demands and yet can be held accountable to the different interests and identities of people in civil society. Implicit in this pluralist reasoning is an image of policy makers and implementers as potentially evil forces, who, if rendered autonomous from the input chain of democratic steering will fall prey to the 'dark face' of power as monism and illegitimate coercion. As Cerny describes it (2006: 86).

> A pluralist version of modernity therefore provides stability by replacing class conflict with stabilizing, cross-cutting conflicts; gives real or virtual representation to the greatest possible number; provides an institutional bulwark against monism; and rewards those actors who choose enlightened self-interest over predatory or monopolistic politics.

The pluralist-elitist dichotomy follows logically from the measuring of 'the open society and its enemies' by the degree and extent to which different people with different interests and different identities enjoy free access to and recognition in the political decision-making processes. Hence, to the degree and extent that voters, voluntary associations, parties, interest organizations, governments and administrators suddenly shift their attention towards problems of good governance on the output side this is *ipso facto* dismissed as a derogation of representative

democracy and the civic culture, making concessions to elitism or monism (Putnam and Goss 2002, Habermas 1987, 1989). What then disappears from sight are the multiple new connections between conventional and new political actors on the output side, coping with high consequence-risks across the old boundaries between civil society and the state, private and public, national and international, etc. Old and new political actors here engage and join forces in new networks and partnerships which pay more regard for empowering and involving people for the sake of solving common policy concerns in an acceptable and good manner than for freeing individuals and masses from monism and illegitimate domination (Fischer 2003, Hajer and Wagenaar (eds.) 2003. To dismiss participation in the policy-politics mode as democratic decay is to miss the chance for critically assessing the relation between democracy and good governance without reducing the one to the other.

No matter how much a hierarchical and commanding political authority is legitimated and in pact with universal reason in civil society, it is still hierarchical and commanding (Bang 2003 a; b). However, there is no *à priori* reason why lay people's acceptance and recognition of political authority must always manifest a frozen, asymmetrical relationship of command and obedience corresponding to it. Political authority, as a communicative political power relationship, can assume multiple forms in time and space, and is in principle open to change on a continuum which runs all the way from government by one to government by all (Easton 1957, 1958). As Obama's discourse illuminates, political authority can actually be requesting more than commanding and rely on voluntary acceptance more than an enforced agreement. As he put it after his victory:

'Thank you. Change can happen' (http://www.barackobama.com/index.php)

As this indicates, what form of authority is taken to be legitimate is subject to the communicative discussions and negotiations between members of the political community and between members of the political community and the political authorities. Therefore, if problems of good governance and democracy are to be coupled with one another, we must begin to recognize that political capital and community are distinct from social capital and community in being the direct political

conditions for securing that what is good for people will also be good for democracy and vice versa. Like Obama in his practical discourse, we must in our theoretical discourse try to break the contract of autonomous reason and hierarchy to specify how a new political authority relationship can be forged, manifesting not hierarchy but our reciprocal acceptance and recognition of the difference each and any of us can make, especially when cooperating politically together.

Would the virtuous citizens, provincial people and obedient subjects in the civic culture have felt attracted by Obama's reversing of the relation between social community and political commonality? I severely doubt it:

(a) those in the participatory culture are set up to fight political power with moral and instrumental reason more than a logic of immediate political action:

(b) those in the parochial culture are occupied with creating social networks and accumulating reciprocal social trust in themselves and their social localities, not with creating cooperative political communities and expanding their capacities to 'make a difference' in and through their communicative and interactive political actions;

(c) those in the subject culture are obedient subjects, who either hate politics or feel that 'government knows best'; they are not reflexive and cooperative individuals who stand prepared to accept and recognize themselves as bound by political authority, precisely as long as that authority does *not* threaten or command them to do so.

The Mainstream View of Participation and Beyond

It is widely acknowledged that the old forms of participation in state and civil society are in decay. Party membership has fallen considerably and so has turnout at election time (Hay 2007). Labour

unions and other big interest organizations experience increasing troubles with getting new members and activating the existing ones (Stoker 2006). Engagement in social movements is not as high as it used to be (Putnam (ed.) 2002). Citizens no longer primarily get their political identity from their identification with political parties (Dalton and Wattenberg (eds.) 2002). Even such intrinsic citizen practices as attending political meetings and writing to politicians are shrinking (Hay 2007). There are at least two major responses in mainstream political science to this downward trend in old forms of engagement. There are those who adopt Putnam's early pessimism from 'Bowling Alone' (1995 cf. Wattenberg 2007) and see the decline as an indication of how social capital is plunging, undermining active participation in public affairs and thereby the stability and effectiveness of representative institutions (cf. Putnam (ed.) 2002). A vicious circle is created in which increasing political apathy is leading to more social distrust and disaffection which in turn is escalating political apathy, etc. If we do not manage to stop it, we will be 'cursed with vertically structured politics, a social life of fragmentation and isolation, and a culture of distrust' (Putnam 1993: 15).

However, Putnam's stories of decay, which echo those of Almond and Verba, who also emphasize the intimate connection between the accumulation of social capital in a mixed civic culture and responsive and effective formal political institutions, are not unchallenged in the mainstream. Another group of researchers with Pippa Norris (1999) and Pattie, Seyd and Whiteley (2004) in the forefront, argue that Putnam's pessimistic view of citizenship results from his presumption that civic engagement is only for the sake of helping 'the lonely crowd' to voice and organize their concerns in the formal and institutionalized arenas of modern democratic government. When fewer and fewer people engage in this kind of civic engagement, they have discovered, it is because more and more of them are participating in a range of new modes of protesting, consulting, deliberating, and co-governing beyond conventional organizations and formal institutions. New cause-oriented critical citizens (Norris 1999, 2003, 2007) and forms of micro-personal political activity (Pattie et al 2004) are on the march, revealing how most stories of decline and apathy are merely a product of

'the older focus on citizenship activities designed to influence elections, government, and public policy-making process within the nation-state' (Norris 2007: 641). Participation research, as Norris demonstrates, must move beyond the formal institutions to appreciate how the new protest movements and forms of micro-politics have:

> more fluid boundaries, looser networked coalitions, and decentralized organizational structures. The primary goals of new social movements often focus upon achieving social change through direct action strategies and community building, as well as by altering lifestyles and social identities, as much as through shaping formal policy-making processes and laws in government (Norris 2007: 638).

The old participation studies, Norris here indicates, are dated because they do not grasp how new modes of life politics and identity politics that earlier were rebuffed as peripheral are now moving into the mainstream. Norris also comes close to formulating a policy-politics approach with her distinction 'between citizen-oriented actions, relating mainly to elections and parties, and cause-oriented repertoires, which focus attention upon specific issues and policy concerns' (ibid: 639). Yet she soon withdraws into the mainstream position, tracing the cause-oriented repertoires back to the input side, as evidence of new identity conflicts giving voice to new postmaterialist values beyond materialist interests. As she notes (ibid: 641):

> For Inglehart, the process of cultural change lies at the heart of this development, where the core issues motivating activists have shifted from materialist concerns, focused on bread-and-butter concerns of jobs, wages, and pensions, to greater concern about postmaterialist values, including issues such as globalization, environmentalism, multiculturalism, and gender equality' (ibid 641).

Like Maslow with his 'hierarchy of needs' Inglehart assumes that postmaterialist values 'come after' materialist ones. I think this is an empirical more than theoretical argument. More consequential is it that Inglehart provides us with no means for distinguishing 'old' postmaterialist values such as love of nation and a protestant ethics from 'new' postmaterialist values, such as a sense of

multiculturalism and gender equality. The former values seem more relevant for building social capital and a 'strong' representative democracy than the latter. These seem to have more to do with political capital and the building of a political community for empowering the disempowered and getting everybody to accept and recognize each other's differences. Thus, in regarding the change as cultural more than political, Inglehart and Norris with him end up in collapsing the difference between politics-policy values and policy-politics into one and the same discussion of a change from interest conflict to identity conflict on the input side. Stoker relates this reduction of new cause oriented policy-politics to participation in the old politics-policy mode (2006: 202).

> The old rules of politics have not changed; politics remains about people expressing conflicting ideas and interests and then finding a way to reconcile those ideas and interests in order to rub along with one another.

By definition, therefore, all new forms of participation on the output side are in the final analysis subordinated to more traditional representative political processes. They are considered an extension of demand-side politics to comprise identity problems and thereby how certain groups are oppressed as a consequence of the lack of recognition of their social and cultural differences (Young 1990, cf. Marsh, O'Toole and Jones 2007: 21). They are assimilated to the study of political participation in the politics-policy mode, in which all engagement directed towards articulating and delivering policy appears as the 'prolonged arm' of collective decision-making. Marcuse would have called it 'repressive tolerance':

http://www.marcuse.org/herbert/pubs/60spubs/65repressivetolerance.htm.

If the new participatory forms are not relegated to the domain of 'small p' politics, they are reduced to a matter of guaranteeing effectiveness and responsiveness in the chain of democratic steering. In any case the new modes of participation are assessed solely by the degree and extent to which they contribute to, or hinder, that different interests and identities can make themselves heard and be organized as demands that can be negotiated into binding decisions.

Politics as Lived Experience

There are 'pre-Obama' participatory research which, if it had hit the mainstream, might have shaken the dominant belief that the 'life style politics' (Beck, Giddens and Lash 1994), 'identity politics' (Giddens 1996) and 'sub-politics' (Beck 1996) of cause oriented critical citizens are but reflections of 'small-p' politics and postmaterialist values. The studies of Marsh, O'Toole and Jones (2007) are a case in point. They break away from the mainstream to study identity politics, not by isolating and privileging particular aspects of identity (sexuality, gender, race, etc), but rather by considering all such particular identities as revealing a politics of lived experience about how people themselves draw the line between what is political and non-political. As they show, many young people may have avoided the 'old' formal politics because they have felt it had nothing to offer them. Thus, to write them off as 'politically apathetic is too simplistic and sweeping a statement' (2007: 22). In fact, these 'apathetic' youngsters may turn out to be the most active in more informal and *ad hoc* based governance networks and practices, such as the new kinds of blogging, making comments on blogs, viewing, posting, and forwarding news stories and videos as forms of participation (Cornfield 2004, Häyhtiö and Rinne (eds.) 2008, Kline and Burstein 2005, Loader (ed.) 2007, These all fall outside mainstream discussions of politics, though the Obama campaign clearly demonstrated how they could become of key importance and significance to forge a viable relationship between representative government and the 'Yes We Can' of good governance (cf. http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2008/11/obamas_network_transforms_demo.html)

Marsh O'Toole and Jones challenge the mainstream, identifying four flaws in its participatory models (2007: 18-19):

(1) Although the mainstream is moving beyond the narrow conception of participation as revealing a relation between social capital, interest politics and the formal institutions of democratic government 'there is little engagement with how young people themselves

conceive of the political and there remains a tendency in their work to imposes a view of 'the political' on their respondents'.

(2) There is a serious lack when it comes to understanding non-participation in democratic government. 'Put simply, it is frequently assumed that if individuals do not engage in the activities that researchers take to represent political participation, they are politically apathetic'.

(3) '[A]ge, class, ethnicity and gender are viewed merely as independent variable rather than as 'lived experience' and, hence, the relationship between these and political engagement is poorly understood'.

(4) '[M]ost researcher pay insufficient attention to the broader context of patterns of governance and citizenship, the ways they are changing and the consequences of these for political participation'.

These four flaws are prompted by a political practice in which government decides what is to be regarded as legitimate and illegitimate. For example, when Tony Blair called the demonstrations against the WTO and G8 meetings in the UK and elsewhere 'mindless thuggery' (quoted in Marsh, O'Toole and Jones 2007: 23), he was attempting to depoliticize their engagement (cf Hay 2007). His underlying presumption was that only political activity sanctioned by formal political authorities is legitimate. By viewing and specifying the protesters as non-political and illegitimate hoodlums, Blair could legitimate their policing by the state. However, in regarding the protesters' informal, unconventional and unorthodox form of political participation as irrational and undemocratic, Blair and the police actually demonstrated that they did not, or would not, understand what was going on. There was an explicit reason why the protestors chose a confrontational tactic rather than a 'civic' one, namely that they had earlier experienced how 'non-violent protests are just completely ignored….despite a massive turnout' (Urban quoted in Mars, O'Toole and Jones 2007: 23). So what Tony Blair and the police experienced as being the irrational behaviour of hoodlums seeking

trouble was actually a calculated event flowing from the belief that ‘a certain amount of trouble is the only way to get the media to cover a protest like this’ (ibid).

> This point made is not to justify violence, but to suggest that what is political is in the eye of the beholder and what is regarded as legitimately political is policed by the state. To analyse politics and political participation, we need to rethink the claim that individuals who do not participate in politics in conventional, orthodox ways are politically apathetic (Marsh, O’Toole and Jones 2007: 23).

From this follows the obvious conclusion that ‘we should distinguish between political participation and political non-participation. This leaves open the question of why individuals do not participate in formal politics’ (ibid). Marsh, O’Toole and Jones describe their position as a critical realism conceiving of the politics of lived experience as a structured and structuring process. This means first of all focusing on participants’ understanding of how age, class, gender and ethnicity to see how it shapes their perception of what are political and non-political. But this should be done within ‘the structural as well as the discursive constraints on how individuals construct and indeed live their identity, or what Butler (1999) calls their ‘performativity’’(2007:29).

Indeed, the politics of lived experience brings us way beyond the mainstream. Yet, despite it pointing us in the direction of political community, it seems that Marsh, O’Toole and Jones in their critical realism still give priority to the emancipatory goal of freeing people from exclusion over the empowering goal of enabling them to make an autonomous difference to the articulation and delivery of policy. Their approach is ‘input driven’ more than ‘output directed’ in the sense that ‘in the last instance’ what counts is that policy contributes to inclusion, that is to securing that all interests and identities enjoy free and equal access to, and recognition in, the political decision-making processes. In this way their politics of lived experience also imperceptibly turns into a struggle between having a resistance identity and a legitimating one.

However, was it an ingrained resistance identity and sense of exclusion which made the protestors in Britain chose the tactics they did in their struggle against globalization? Apparently not! When reading what they said, it is not so much hostility or a feeling of exclusion which decided their choice of tactics. Rather it seemed to be their wish for creating public attention for their common concerns that made them decide and act as they did. But self-evidently their efforts at politicizing their wants with what appeared to be illegitimate means did not involve a legitimating identity either. The protestors did neither seem to believe in the legitimacy of 'the system' nor did they appear as feeling entirely estranged from it. They simply wanted to get media coverage for their struggle for better and more humane globalizing policies. The protesters' immediate actions were not primarily targeted to giving voice to repressed interests and identities in civil society. Rather, they revealed their political readiness and ability to work together for solving common concerns to concretely influencing the regime's articulation and delivery of policies from inside 'the political' itself. In this way the protesters can be said to have a project identity more than a legitimating or oppositional one (Castells 1997). Their project identity was put to use not as general norms or reasons but in and through their practical experience of how to make a difference in and through joint political action. Hence, we come back to Barrack Obama's most famous slogan about 'Yes We Can', signalizing as it does that democracy relies for its approximation more on the *transformative capacity of political action* than on one or the other common norm.

When Obama's rhetoric did its job, I think, it is because it presented itself to people as a commonality inspiring political authority, which does not expect a 'blind' or rationally motivated form of obedience. Rather, it combined (a) goals, (b) tactics and (c) ethos, urging people to engage in its exercise as capable and knowledgeable political persons who are important and significant to solving common concerns in and through their participation in a reflexive political community As Obama said in his victory speech (http://elections.foxnews.com/2008/11/05/raw-data-barack-obamas-victory-speech/):

> *I know you didn't do this just to win an election. And I know you didn't do it for me. You did it because you understand the enormity of the task that lies ahead. For even as we celebrate tonight, we know the challenges that tomorrow will bring are the greatest of our lifetime -- two wars, a planet in peril, the worst financial crisis in a century*.

Obama was pleading to lay people to participate in his campaign for developing political commonality as well as a sense of efficacy. He wanted to show them that their sense of sharing a political destiny does not come from unified normative agreement and social solidarity but from the kind of cooperation and mutual identification that arise from the creation of political capital in a reflexive political community. Hence, political solidarity must be regarded as distinct from social solidarity by the fact that it presupposes the reciprocal and mutual acceptance and recognition of difference. Such solidarity comes from laypeople in a reflexive political community:

- who refuse to be treated as obedient subjects;
- who are not at all parochial, but have a very precise sense of the difference between orienting oneself to ‘inputs’ or to ‘outputs’; and
- who think that political participation is way too enjoyable, significant and important to be handed over to virtuous citizens, who do not think of ‘the political’ as an ongoing project but as a chore and an omnipotent threat to their freedom which must continuously be resisted and made legitimate.

Had Obama tried to command obedience, had he appealed to the parochial in people or had he required that his volunteers should be only grave and morally dedicated citizens, I doubt that he would have been able to get so many volunteers engaged in canvassing, block by block, to help get voters to the polls and spreading the rhetoric of ‘yes we can’ to every municipality, neighbourhood, city and village in the US. The participants who engaged in his campaign are probably better described as everyday makers (EMs) and expert citizens (ECs, Bang and

Soerensen 2001, Bang 2003b, Bang and Dyrberg 2003, Bang 2005, Lie and Marsh 2008, Marsh, O'Toole and Jones 2007).

Everyday Makers and Expert Citizens: New Participants in Search of a New 'Big' Politics

Marsh O'Toole and Jones ECs, conceive of ECs and EMs as the very embodiment of their politics of lived experience. They clearly show that those in the mainstream by dismissing ECs and EMs as 'free riders', 'mindless thugs', 'small p' participants, etc. conceal their contributions to creating a more inclusive politics. ECs and EMs often belong to groups which are oppressed as a consequence of a lack of not merely recognition but of a belief in their political capacities for exercising their differences as members of a communicative and interactive political community (cf. Schneider and Ingram 1997), for instance immigrants, gays and lesbians. When the mainstream approaches do not 'see' this, it is simply because their models do not allow them to do so. ECs and EMs often choose *not* to participate in 'big P' politics but to act on their own or join forces with public administrators, network managers and others who show readiness to involve them in policy-politics on their own terms and conditions.

ECs and EMs may be regarded as the living proof of how the resistance identities of social grassroots and social movements in industrialist society are changing into project identities aiming at politically transforming an increasingly globalized network society (cf. Castells 1996: 356-358, Castells 2006). Their participation is governed by a project identity which makes them put concerns for immediate and prudent action above worries over rational decision-making. Whether they engage in protests, collaborate in public-private or state-civil society partnerships, make alliances with the media, do voluntary work in their neighbourhoods or whatever, they always have a concrete project in mind that they aim at realizing. They can be out fighting against 'the system' in one particular context, and then shift to teaming up with it in another; they can ignore an institution's attempts to involve them, but they can also help the institution in solving its problems on the condition that it simultaneously empowers them to pursue their own life-political projects.

The important thing is that to ECs and EMs participation and support are not solely a matter of being either *for* or *against* 'the system'. They adopt an oppositional or legitimating identity only if it is functional to developing their project identity and thus to meeting their specific life plans or policies.

ECs are most often new professionals, particularly in voluntary organizations, who feel they can articulate and do policy as well, and even better, than politicians and other professionals from the public and private domain. They deal with all types of elites and sub-elites who somehow are significant and relevant to securing the success of their various projects. ECs have:

- a wide conception of the political as a discursive construct; a full-time, overlapping, project identity reflecting their overall life style;
- the necessary expertise for exercising influence in elite networks;
- negotiation and dialogue before antagonism and opposition;
- a view of themselves as an autonomous part of the system, rather than as identical with it or external and oppositional to it.

To ECs, politics exists in 'the shadow' of policy as a fusion between representation and participation. They are not afraid of using their knowledge, skills and strategic judgment to influence others. They build networks of negotiation and cooperation with politicians, administrators, interest groups, media and private companies across conventional boundaries, and in the process they develop their project identity and network consciousness. As compared to more traditional activists, ECs are not in the game to fight or cherish 'the system'. They may do so, if it suits their projects, but mostly they want to be taken serious as prudent and serious partners to the exercise of good governance. Consequently, ECs are also a resource or political capital for the going system. In particular, they have a fund of everyday experience about how to deal with policy problems of exclusion based on 'race', gender, poverty etc.

EMs are in many ways a response to ECs whom they confront in nearly all the institutions, network and projects that they traverse through in their everyday life. EMs do not feel defined by the state either and they are neither apathetic nor opposed to it. They don't want to waste time getting involved in the 'old style' civil society politics; they prefer to be involved as reflexive individuals participating with other reflexive individuals for getting a particular and very concrete project going, right where they are. They typically think globally but act locally. They normally are interested in 'big' politics, but they do not derive their primary identity from it. They are somewhat sceptical of ECs, whom they think are too system conforming and too concerned with 'winning' the games that the professionals play. EMs make a distinction between participating to feel engaged and develop oneself and participating to acquire influence and success; they draw a clear line between participating in policy-politics as laypeople and as professionals. They aim to encourage more spontaneous and lowly organized forms of involvement than those of ECs, who typically will seek to professionalize all 'spontaneity', such as collaborating with media in the timing and spacing of a certain protest project. Unlike ECs, EMs don't want to mould the identity of others in the direction of certain goals. They rather want to pursue a credo of everyday experience, stating:

- Do it yourself
- Do it where you are
- Do it for fun, but also because you find it necessary
- Do it *ad hoc* or part-time
- Do it concretely, instead of ideologically
- Do it self-confidentially and show trust in yourself
- Do it with the system, if need be.

Like ECs, EMs do not believe that representative democracy can be rescued, either by governing as a unity from above or by accumulating more and more social capital from below. They present a practical alternative to Putnam's notion of 'strong government' and 'thick community'. EMs identify

themselves with neither. Their commonality does not build on a common good but on acceptance and recognition of difference, which is precisely why they do not stand satisfied in being obedient supports or 'virtuous' citizens of the state. EMs, like ECs are concerned with creating political capital by enhancing political capacities for self-governance and co-governance in and through various communicative and interactive projects and networks.

ECs and EMs could appreciate that their contribution to Obama's project should not consist in helping him to 'tame' political domination by rational means. They would also have refused to subordinate themselves to any political form of rational domination anyway, however legitimate it may proclaim itself to be. But they would willingly accept a political authority, requesting them to participate in its exercise on equal terms and for the sake of doing well for humans. This was exactly what the Obama campaign did. It made use of a political rhetoric aimed at 'luring' reflexive individuals into participating not simply for the sake of democracy but also for the practical reason of doing well. This showed them how 'the political' in its policy-politics mode could be targeted to developing themselves and their life-plans - but for a greater cause and in and through their political communication and interaction with others in a reflexive political community. In this sense, the Obama campaign in my view indicated how the rhetoric of democracy and good governance may be combined, in theory as well as in practice by reforging the crucial link between political authorities and laypeople in the political community. This would reveal how political and democratic effectiveness and responsiveness are primarily generated from inside 'the political' itself in and through the exercise of good governance.

The Turn to Policy-Politics

A key problem in the mainstream approaches to participation, we have seen, is that no one raises doubt that political participation links 'in the last instance' to keeping government responsive and effective in relation to the fulfilment of people's wants as economic individuals and social collectivities. Most research is conducted according to Putnam's formula (1993: 9):

‘Societal demands□□Political interaction□□Government□□Policy choice□□Implementation’

This formula, as we have seen, dates back to Almond and Verba and their separation of ‘political politics’ from ‘non-political administration’. Like Kant they employ this distinction to show how to make a contract of autonomous reason and political despotism, separating legitimate domination from illegitimate domination. The result is that orientations towards ‘outputs’ become indicative of a subject culture in which people either think that ‘government knows best’ or behave as ‘mindless thugs’ in need of policing. Progressive and virtuous citizenship in contrast is identified with those in the participatory public of civil society who burn and strive for keeping government effective and responsive. Finally, there are the locally and socially oriented participants in the parochial culture who do not discriminate between ‘inputs’ and ‘outputs’ but rather strive for integrating the obedient subjects, the mindless thugs, and the virtuous citizens into networks of social interaction and trust that can help in preventing demand overload and thereby an ‘overpoliticization’ of ‘the system’. As Almond and Verba state: (1963: 50):

> Attitudes favourable to participation within the political system play a major role in the civic culture, but so do such non-political attitudes and trust in other people and social participation in general. The maintenance of these more traditional attitudes and their fusion with the particular orientations lead to a balanced political culture in which political activity, involvement, and rationality exist but are balanced by passivity, traditionality, and commitment to parochial values

This tendency to derive the study of political participations from a modern logic of consensus vs. conflict, decision vs. non-decision, legitimacy vs. illegitimacy, rationality vs. irrationality, modernity vs. traditionality, instrumental choice vs. normative commitment, active citizens vs. passive subjects, etc. has held the political discipline in its ‘iron fist’ ever since. As Barrack Obama’s discourse indicates, it is time for change. As he told people in California during the campaign:

> *It’s time to turn the page. There is an awakening taking place in America today. From New Hampshire to California, from Texas to Iowa, we are seeing crowds we’ve never*

> *seen before; we're seeing people showing up to the very first political event of their lives. They're coming because they know we are at a crossroads right now. Because we are facing a set of challenges we haven't seen in a generation – and if we don't meet those challenges, we could end up leaving our children a world that's a little poorer and a little meaner than we found it*.

Everyday makers and expert citizens all over the globe could become important resources in this crusade for a better world to live in. They would willingly and energetically help political authorities in the 'packaging' of salient policy values and in getting them programmed and delivered on time and in ways that can do well for people all over the globe. At least they would do so as long as those authorities would not try to dominate their political existence but to the contrary would empower them and show respect of their capacities for political thinking and acting as autonomous members of a reflexive political community.

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