SIEMA HASHEMI

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Nationality: German
Married, one daughter (2 years old)

Academic Position

Lecturer in Finance   **2024**
University of Liverpool Management School

Education

Ph.D. in Economics   **2024 − 2020**
Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI)

Master in Economics and Finance   **2017 − 2020**
Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI)

Master in Management: Finance and Accounting   **2010 − 2013**
Goethe University Frankfurt

Bachelor in Industrial Management   **2006 − 2010**
University of Tehran

References

Rafael Repullo *(Main Advisor)*   **Gerard Llobet**
CEMFI   CEMFI
repullo@cemfi.es   llobet@cemfi.es

Anatoli Segura
Banca d'Italia
Anatoli.SeguraVelez@bancaditalia.it

Research

Banking on Resolution: Portfolio Effects of Bail-in vs. Bailout
Job market paper (CEMFI working paper 2410)
This paper investigates the impact of supervisory resolution tools, specifically bail-ins versus bailouts, on the ex-ante banks' portfolio composition and resulting ex-post default probabilities in the presence of both idiosyncratic and systematic shocks. Banks make decisions regarding short-term versus long-term risky investments while considering the expected resolution policy. I find that both types of shocks can generate financial instability, which the two resolution tools address through distinct channels. With only idiosyncratic shocks, creditor bailouts, acting as debt insurance, eliminate the equilibrium with bank defaults, while bail-ins induce banks to invest less in the risky short-term asset, which may also prevent defaults. In the presence of both shocks, creditor bailouts can prevent systemic defaults, while bail-ins are less effective in preventing them and could even contribute to systemic risk.

The Effect of Bank Mergers on Lending and Risk-Taking
This paper studies the trade-off between competition and financial stability generated by banking consolidation. I consider an economy with $n \geq 3$ banks where two of them merge for exogenous reasons. I assume that banks monitor borrowers, which lowers their probability of default, and that monitoring is costly and unobservable which creates a moral hazard problem. With insured deposits as the single source of funding, a merger generates higher loan rates, which in turn increases banks' margins and monitoring intensities. Thus, bank consolidation hurts competition, but increases financial stability. Introducing equity capital as an additional source of funding enhances monitoring incentives, due to a "skin-in-the-game" effect, which increases lending. This creates a trade-off that results in nontrivial changes in post-merger capital, loan rates, and risk-taking. If loan rates increase following the merger, both the merging bank and its competitors increase their leverage. Higher loan rates and higher leverage exert opposing effects

on monitoring intensity and, consequently, on bank risk. Therefore, advocating banking consolidation as a means of achieving financial stability is no longer evident.

Banking Supervision and Bank Risk-Taking
joint with Rafael Repullo
This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the effects of banking supervision on bank risk-taking. The model features a risk-neutral bank that raises one unit of insured deposits and invests them in a large portfolio of loans with a random return. The bank chooses the correlation in loan defaults, ranging from independent to perfectly correlated defaults. Meanwhile, the supervisor receives an imprecise signal regarding the proportion of loan defaults and intervenes by closing the bank early when the signal exceeds a threshold. The question is: will this combination of supervisory information and supervisory closure reduce risk-taking? The paper shows that a strict supervisor or a noisy signal reduces portfolio risk. Moreover, a supervisor aiming to close the bank when it is efficient to do so becomes more lenient when the signal noise increases.

Conferences

The Annual Meeting of the Central Bank Research Association (CEBRA) *PhD session* **2024**
13th MoFiR workshop on Banking   *PhD session*
Women in Banking and Finance EFiC Workshop

Teaching Experience

Financial Economics   *Teaching Assistant*   **Spring 2023**
Prof. Enrique Sentana

Economics of Banking   *Teaching Assistant*   **Fall 2021**
Prof. Javier Suarez

Asset Pricing   *Teaching Assistant*   **Spring 2021**
Prof. Enrique Sentana

Work Experience

European Central Bank   *Trainee*   **July 2018 − Mar 2019**
Single Supervision Mechanism

Deutsche Leasing AG   *Credit Risk Analyst*   **2013 − 2017**
Credit Risk International

IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG   *Internship*   **Mar − Aug 2012**
Merger and Acquisitions

Honors & Awards

Ph.D. Scholarship,   CEMFI   **since 2020**

FRM® Financial Risk Manager,   **2016**
Global Association of Risk Professionals, Link to my badge

Direct Acceptance to the Masters' in Management,   University of Tehran   **2010**

Best Student of the Business Faculty,   University of Tehran   **2010**

Best Student of the Business Faculty,   University of Tehran   **2007**

Languages

English (fluent), German (native), Persian (native), Spanish (basic)