

SIEMA HASHEMI

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Nationality: German

Married, one daughter (2 years old)

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Education

Ph.D. in Economics

expected 2024

Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI)

Thesis: Three Essays on Banking and Financial Regulation

Master in Economics and Finance

2017 – 2020

Center for Monetary and Financial Studies (CEMFI)

Master in Management: Finance and Accounting

2010 – 2013

Goethe University Frankfurt

Bachelor in Industrial Management

2006 – 2010

University of Tehran

Research interests

Financial Economics, Banking, Corporate Finance

References

Rafael Repullo (*Main Advisor*)

CEMFI

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Gerard Llobet

CEMFI

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Anatoli Segura

Banca d'Italia

Anatoli.SeguraVelez@bancaditalia.it

Research

Banking on Resolution: Portfolio Effects of Bail-in vs. Bailout

Job market paper

This paper investigates the impact of supervisory resolution tools, specifically bail-ins versus bailouts, on the ex-ante banks' portfolio composition and resulting ex-post default probabilities in the presence of both idiosyncratic and systematic shocks. Banks make decisions regarding short-term versus long-term risky investments while considering the expected resolution policy. I find that both types of shocks can generate financial instability, which the two resolution tools address through distinct channels. With only idiosyncratic shocks, creditor bailouts, acting as debt insurance, eliminate the equilibrium with bank defaults, while bail-ins induce banks to invest less in the risky short-term asset, which may also prevent defaults. In the presence of both shocks, creditor bailouts can prevent systemic defaults, while bail-ins are less effective in preventing them and could even contribute to systemic risk.

The Effect of Bank Mergers on Lending and Risk-Taking

This paper investigates the effect of bank mergers on banks' loan rates, leverage, and risk-taking. I consider an economy with $n \geq 3$ banks where two merge for exogenous reasons. I assume that banks monitor borrowers, lowering their probability of default, and that monitoring is costly and unobservable, creating a moral hazard problem. With insured deposits as the single funding source, a merger generates higher loan rates, which in turn increases banks' margins and monitoring intensities. Introducing equity capital as an additional funding source enhances monitoring incentives due to a "skin-in-the-game" effect, which increases loan demand. This creates a trade-off that results in nontrivial changes in post-merger capital, loan rates, and risk-taking. If loan rates increase following the merger, the merged bank and its competitors increase their leverage. Higher loan rates and leverage exert opposing effects on monitoring intensity and, consequently, risk-taking.

Banking Supervision and Bank Risk-Taking

joint with Rafael Repullo

This paper presents a theoretical analysis of the effects of banking supervision on bank risk-taking. The model features a risk-neutral bank that raises one unit of insured deposits and invests them in a large portfolio of loans. The bank chooses the extent of correlation in defaults, from $\sigma = 0$ (independent defaults) to $\sigma = 1$ (perfectly correlated defaults). The supervisor observes a noisy signal of the default rate (the proportion of loans that will default) and closes the bank early when the signal is above a threshold. The question is: will this combination of supervisory information and supervisory closure reduce risk-taking (the bank's choice of σ)? The paper will shed light on the conditions under which a higher quality of supervisory information and/or a tougher closure rule will reduce banks' risk-taking.

Teaching Experience

Financial Economics *Teaching Assistant*

Spring 2023

Prof. Enrique Sentana

Economics of Banking *Teaching Assistant*

Fall 2021

Prof. Javier Suarez

Asset Pricing *Teaching Assistant*

Spring 2021

Prof. Enrique Sentana

Work Experience

European Central Bank *Trainee*

July 2018 – Mar 2019

Single Supervision Mechanism

Deutsche Leasing AG *Credit Risk Analyst*

2013 – 2017

Credit Risk International

IKB Deutsche Industriebank AG *Internship*

Mar – Aug 2012

Merger and Acquisitions

Honors & Awards

Ph.D. Scholarship, CEMFI

since 2020

FRM® Financial Risk Manager,

2016

Global Association of Risk Professionals, [Link to my badge](#)

Direct Acceptance to the Masters' in Management, University of Tehran

2010

Best Student of the Business Faculty, University of Tehran

2010

Best Student of the Business Faculty, University of Tehran

2007

Languages

English (fluent), German (native), Persian (native), Spanish (basic)