

Key Event Receipt Infrastructure

KERI-2

A Secure Identifier Overlay for the Internet

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version 2.29

<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers>

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/presentations/KERI2_Overview.web.pdf

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf

<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/keri>

<https://github.com/decentralized-identity/keri>

Background References

Self-Certifying Identifiers:

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<http://www.sigops.org/ew-history/1998/papers/mazieres.ps>

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<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/DecentralizedAutonomicData.pdf>

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<https://arxiv.org/abs/1907.02143>

Smith, S. M., “Key Event Receipt Infrastructure (KERI) Design”, 2020/04/22

https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/KERI_WP_2.x.web.pdf

Certificate Transparency:

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<https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=2668154>

Google, “Certificate Transparency,”

<http://www.certificate-transparency.org/home>

Laurie, B. and Kasper, E., “Revocation Transparency,”

<https://www.links.org/files/RevocationTransparency.pdf>

Human Basis-of-Trust “in person”

I can know you – therefore I can trust you



“on the internet”

I can't really know you – therefore I can't really trust you

Replace human *basis-of-trust* with cryptographic *root-of-trust*.


With verifiable digital signatures from asymmetric key crypto –
we may not trust in “*what*” was said, but we may trust in “*who*” said it.

We may verify that the *controller* of a private key, (*the who*), made a statement
but not the validity of the statement itself.

The *root-of-trust* is *consistent attribution* via verifiable integral non-repudiable statements

We may build trust over time in *what* was said via histories
of verifiably attributable (to *whom*) consistent statements i.e. *reputation*.

The Internet Protocol (IP) is *bro-ken* because it has no *security* layer.





Instead ...


We use *bolt-on* identity system security overlays.
(DNS-CA ...)

Identity System Security Overlay

Establish authenticity of IP packet's message payload.





The overlay's security is contingent on the mapping's security.



Identifier Issuance

Administrative Identifier Issuance and Binding






Admin-Certifying Identifier Issuance



DNS Hijacking

A DNS hijacking wave is targeting companies at an almost unprecedented scale. Clever trick allows attackers to obtain valid TLS certificate for hijacked domains.

<https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/01/a-dns-hijacking-wave-is-targeting-companies-at-an-almost-unprecedented-scale/>




Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance and Binding





Self-Certifying Identifier Issuance


Identity System Security Overlay



Spanning Layer




Hourglass




Platform **Locked** Trust



Platform Locked Trust






Each trust layer only spans platform specific applications
Bifurcates the internet trust map
No spanning trust layer






Waist and Neck






Basic






Self-Addressing






Multi-Sig Self-Addressing




Delegated Self-Addressing



Self-Signing



Ledger Registration



Access identifier may have self-certifying primary root-of-trust but registered identifier does not, even if its format appears self-certifying.

Autonomic Identifier (AID) and Namespace (AN)

auto nomos = self rule

autonomic = self-governing, self-controlling, etc.

An *autonomic* namespace is

self-certifying and hence *self-administrating*.

ANs are *portable* = truly self-sovereign.

autonomic prefix = self-cert + UUID + URL = universal identifier

Autonomic Identity System

why, how – *who* controls *what, when*, and *how*?

Root-of-Trust

cryptographic autonomic identifier = *why, how*



Source-of-Truth

controller of the private key = *who*


Loci-of-Control

authoritative operation = *what, when, how*


Key Event Message




Event Digest Chaining




Establishment Events



Non-Establishment Events




Full Sequence



Seal (Anchor)

seal provides *evidence of authenticity*



A *seal* anchors arbitrary data to an event in the key event sequence thereby providing proof of control authority for that data at the location of the anchoring event.


Seals make KERI both privacy preserving and *data semantic agnostic*.

Context independent extensibility via externally layered APIs for anchored data instead of context dependent extensibility via internal linked data or tag registries.

Interoperability is total w.r.t. establishment of control authority.

Minimally sufficient means.

Event Sequencing



Inconsistency and Duplicity

Inconsistency vs. Duplicity

inconsistency: lacking agreement, as two or more things in relation to each other

duplicity: acting in two different ways to different people concerning the same matter


Internal vs. External Inconsistency

Internally inconsistent log = not verifiable.

Log verification from self-certifying root-of-trust protects against internal inconsistency.

Externally inconsistent log with a purported copy of log but both verifiable = duplicitous.

Duplicity detection protects against external inconsistency.




Duplicity Game

Cate promises to provide a
consistent pair-wise log.

Local Consistency Guarantee

How may Cate be *duplicitous*
and not get caught?




private (one-to-one) interactions

Service promises to provide a consistent log to anyone.

Local Consistency Guarantee

Duplicity Game

How may Cate/Service/Agent be **duplicitous** and not get caught?



highly available, private (one-to-one) interactions


Service promises to provide exact same log to everyone.
Global Consistency Guarantee

Duplicity Game

How may Cate and/or service be **duplicitous** and not get caught?

Breaking the promise of global consistency is a provable liability.

Global consistency may only matter **after** A and B need to interact not before.



global consistent, highly available, and public (one-to-any) interactions

KEY Event Based Provenance of Identifiers

KERI enables cryptographic *proof-of-control-authority* (*provenance*) for each identifier.

A *proof* is in the form of an identifier's *key event receipt log* (KERL).

KERLs are *End Verifiable*:

End user alone may verify. Zero trust in intervening infrastructure.

KERLs may be *Ambient Verifiable*:

Anyone may verify *anylog*, *anywhere*, at *anytime*.

KERI = self-cert root-of-trust + certificate transparency + KA²CE + recoverable + post-quantum.

KERI for the DIDified




KERI non-transferable ephemeral with derivation prefix ~ did:key

KERI private direct mode (one-to-one) ~ did:peer

KERI public persistent indirect mode (one-to-any) ~ did:sov etc


KERI = did:uni (did:un) (all of the above in one method)

Pre-Rotation




Digest of *next* key(s) makes pre-rotation post-quantum secure

Dead Exploit






Any copy of original history protects against successful *dead* exploit

Live Exploit





Difficulty of inverting *next* key(s) protects against successful *live* exploit



Key Infrastructure Valence




Repurposed Keys




Repurposed Keys




Interaction Delegation



Rotation Delegation




Scaling Delegation via Interaction



$\Delta \rightarrow X$: Delegation to X
 $\Delta \leftarrow A$: Delegation from A

Scaling Delegation via Rotation




$\Delta \rightarrow X$: Delegation to X
 $\Delta \leftarrow A$: Delegation from A

Protocol Operational Modes


Direct Event Replay Mode (one-to-one)

Indirect Event Replay Mode (one-to-any)

Direct Mode: A to B




Direct Mode: B to A




Indirect Mode

Promulgation Service




Indirect Mode

Promulgation and Confirmation Services




Indirect Mode Full

Indirect Replay Mode



Indirect Mode with Ledger Oracles



Separation of Control

Shared (permissioned) ledger = *shared control* over *shared data*.

Shared *data* = good, shared *control* = bad.


Shared control between controller and validator may be problematic for governance, scalability, and performance.

KERI = *separated control* over *shared data*.

Separated control between controller and validator may provide better decentralization, more flexibility, better scalability, lower cost, higher performance, and more privacy at comparable security.


State Verifier Engine

KERI Core — State Verifier Engine





Delegated State Verifier Engine


KERI Delegated Core — State Verifier Engine



Witness Designation




Witnessed Key Event Receipt



(KA²CE)

Keri's Agreement Algorithm for Control Establishment

Produce Agreements
with Guarantees



Agreement Constraints

Proper Agreement

$$F + 1$$

Sufficient Agreement

$$M > F$$

$$M \leq N - F$$

$$F < M \leq N - F$$

Intact Agreement


$$N \geq 2F + 1$$

One Agreement or None at All

$$|\hat{N}| = N \quad |\hat{M}_1| = |\hat{M}_2| = M$$

Overlapping Sets

$$\hat{M}_1 \cup \hat{M}_2 = \hat{N}$$



One honest witness if:

$$|\hat{M}_1 \cap \hat{M}_2| \geq F + 1$$

$$|\hat{M}_1 \cup \hat{M}_2| = |\hat{N}| = N$$

$$|\hat{M}_1| + |\hat{M}_2| = |\hat{M}_1 \cup \hat{M}_2| + |\hat{M}_1 \cap \hat{M}_2|$$

$$2M = N + F + 1$$

$$M \geq \left\lceil \frac{N + F + 1}{2} \right\rceil$$

$$M \leq N - F$$

Immune Agreement


$$\frac{N + F + 1}{2} \leq M \leq N - F$$

Example Values




Immunity					
F	N	3F+1	$\left\lceil \frac{N + F + 1}{2} \right\rceil$	N-F	M
1	4	4	3	3	3
1	5	4	4	4	4
1	6	4	4	5	4, 5
1	7	4	5	6	5, 6
1	8	4	5	7	5, 6, 7
1	9	4	6	8	6, 7, 8
2	7	7	5	5	5
2	8	7	6	6	6
2	9	7	6	7	6, 7
2	10	7	7	8	7, 8
2	11	7	7	9	7, 8, 9
2	12	7	8	10	8, 9, 10
3	10	10	7	7	7
3	11	10	8	8	8
3	12	10	8	9	8, 9
3	13	10	9	10	9, 10
3	14	10	9	11	9, 10, 11
3	15	10	10	12	10, 11, 12

Recovery from Live Exploit

Recovery from Live Exploit



Generic Event Formats



Generic Inception

$$\varepsilon_0^C = \left\langle \nu_0^C, C, t_0^C, \mathbf{icp}, K_0^C, \hat{C}_0^C, \eta_0^C \left(\left\langle K_1^C, \hat{C}_1^C \right\rangle \right), M_0^C, \hat{W}_0^C, [data], \hat{s}_0^C \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_0^C$$

$$\hat{C}_0^C = \left[C^0, \dots, C^{L_0^C-1} \right]_0^C$$

$$\hat{C}_1^C = \left[C^{r_1}, \dots, C^{r_1+L_1^C-1} \right]_1^C$$

$$\hat{W}_0^C = \left[W_0^C, \dots, W_{N_0^C-1}^C \right]_0^C$$

$$\hat{s}_0^C = \left[s_0, \dots, s_{s_0^C-1} \right]_0^C$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_0^C = \sigma_{C^{s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{s_{s_0^C-1}}}$$

Generic Rotation

$$\varepsilon_k^C = \left\langle \nu_k^C, C, t_k^C, \eta_k^C \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C \right), \mathbf{rot}, K_l^C, \hat{C}_l^C, \eta_l^C \left(\left\langle K_{l+1}^C, \hat{C}_{l+1}^C \right\rangle \right), M_l^C, \hat{X}_l^C, \hat{Y}_l^C, [seals], \hat{s}_{kl}^C \right\rangle \hat{\sigma}_{kl}^C$$

$$\hat{C}_l^C = \left[C^{r_l^C}, \dots, C^{r_l^C + L_l^C - 1} \right]_l^C$$

$$\hat{C}_{l+1}^C = \left[C^{r_{l+1}^C}, \dots, C^{r_{l+1}^C + L_{l+1}^C - 1} \right]_{l+1}^C$$

$$\hat{X}_l^C = \left[X_0^C, \dots, X_{O_l^C - 1}^C \right]_l^C$$

$$\hat{Y}_l^C = \left[Y_0^C, \dots, Y_{P_l^C - 1}^C \right]_l^C$$

$$\hat{s}_{kl}^C = \left[s_0, \dots, s_{S_{kl}^C - 1} \right]_{kl}^C$$

$$\hat{\sigma}_{kl}^C = \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_{S_{kl}^C - 1}}}$$

Generic Interaction

$$\varepsilon_k^C = \left\langle \nu_k^C, C, t_k^C, \eta_k^C(\varepsilon_{k-1}^C), \texttt{ixn}, [seals], \widehat{s}_{kl}^C \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^C$$


$$K_l^C$$

$$\widehat{C}_l^C = \left[C^{r_l^C}, \dots, C^{r_l^C + L_l^C - 1} \right]_l^C$$





$$\widehat{s}_{kl}^C = \left[s_0, \dots, s_{s_{kl}^C - 1} \right]_{kl}^C$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^C = \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{r_l^C + s_{s_{kl}^C - 1}}}$$

Generic Delegating Event Formats



Generic Delegated Event Formats



Inception Delegation

$$\widehat{\Delta}_0^D = \left\{ D, t_0^D, \eta_k^C \left(\widehat{\delta}_0^D \right) \right\}$$

$$\widehat{\delta}_0^D = \left\langle \nu_0^D, D, t_0^D, \mathbf{dip}, K_0^D, \widehat{D}_0^D, M_0^D, \widehat{W}_0^D, \{perms\} \right\rangle$$

$$\widehat{D}_0^D = \left[D^0, \dots, D^{L_0^D-1} \right]_0^D$$

$$\widehat{W}_0^C = \left[W_0^C, \dots, W_{N_0^C-1}^C \right]_0^C$$

$$\varepsilon_0^D = \left\langle \nu_0^D, D, t_0^D, \mathbf{dip}, K_0^D, \widehat{D}_0^D, M_0^D, \widehat{W}_0^D, \{perms\}, \widehat{\Delta}_k^C, \widehat{s}_0^D \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_0^D$$

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^C = \left\{ C, t_k^C, \eta_0^D \left(\varepsilon_k^C \right) \right\}$$

$$\widehat{s}_0^D = \left[s_0, \dots, s_{S_0^D-1} \right]_0^D$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_0^D = \sigma_{D^{s_0}} \dots \sigma_{D^{s_{S_0^D-1}}}$$

Rotation Delegation

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^D = \left\{ D, t_k^D, \eta_k^C \left(\widehat{\delta}_k^D \right) \right\}$$

$$\widehat{\delta}_k^D = \left\langle \nu_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^D \right), \text{drt}, K_l^D, \widehat{D}_l^D, M_l^D, \widehat{X}_l^D, \widehat{Y}_l^D, \{perms\} \right\rangle$$

$$\widehat{D}_l^D = \left[D^{r_l^D}, \dots, D^{r_l^D + L_l^D - 1} \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{X}_l^D = \left[X_0^D, \dots, X_{O_l^D - 1}^D \right]_l^D$$

$$\widehat{Y}_l^D = \left[Y_0^D, \dots, Y_{P_l^D - 1}^D \right]_l^D$$

$$\varepsilon_k^D = \left\langle \nu_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D \left(\varepsilon_{k-1}^D \right), \text{drt}, K_l^D, \widehat{D}_l^D, M_l^D, \widehat{X}_l^D, \widehat{Y}_l^D, \{perms\}, \widehat{\Delta}_k^C, \widehat{s}_{kl}^D \right\rangle \widehat{\sigma}_{kl}^D$$

$$\widehat{\Delta}_k^C = \left\{ C, t_k^C, \eta_k^D \left(\varepsilon_k^C \right) \right\}$$

$$\widehat{s}_{kl}^D = \left[s_0, \dots, s_{S_{kl}^D - 1} \right]_{kl}^D$$

$$\widehat{\sigma}_{kl} = \sigma_{C^{+r_l^D + s_0}} \dots \sigma_{C^{r_l^D + s_{S_{kl}^D - 1}}}$$

Delegated Interaction

$$\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_k^D = \left\langle \boldsymbol{v}_k^D, D, t_k^D, \eta_k^D \left(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}_{k-1}^D \right), \texttt{ixn}, [data], \hat{s}_{kl}^D \right\rangle \hat{\boldsymbol{\sigma}}_{kl}^D$$

Witness Rotations

$$\widehat{W}_0 = [W_0, W_1, \dots, W_{N-1}]$$

$$\widehat{W}_l = (\widehat{W}_{l-1} - \widehat{X}_l) \cap \widehat{Y}_l$$

$$\widehat{X}_l \subseteq \widehat{W}_{l-1} \quad \widehat{Y}_l \not\subseteq \widehat{W}_{l-1} \quad \widehat{X}_l \not\subseteq \widehat{W}_l$$

$$N_l = N_{l-1} - O_l + P_l$$

$$M_l \leq N_l$$

$$|\widehat{X}_l| = O_l \quad |\widehat{Y}_l| = P_l \quad |\widehat{W}_l| = N_l$$

$$\widehat{U}_{l-1} \subseteq \widehat{W}_{l-1} \quad |\widehat{U}_{l-1}| \geq M_{l-1}$$

$$\widehat{U}_l \subseteq \widehat{W}_l \quad |\widehat{U}_l| \geq M_l$$

$$|\widehat{U}_{l-1} \cup \widehat{U}_l| \leq M_{l-1} + M_l$$

Complex Weighted Signing Thresholds

$$\widehat{C}_l = [C_l^1, \dots, C_l^{L_l}]_l$$

$$\widehat{K}_l = [U_l^1, \dots, U_l^{L_l}]_l$$

$$0 < U_l^j \leq 1$$

$$\widehat{s}_k^l = [s_0, \dots, s_{s_k^l-1}]_k^l$$

$$\bar{U}_l = \sum_{i=s_0}^{s_{S_k-1}} U_l^i \geq 1$$

$$\widehat{C} = [C^1, C^2, C^3]$$

$$U_l^j = 1/K_l$$

$$\widehat{K} = [1/2, 1/2, 1/2]$$

$$\widehat{K}_l = [1/2, 1/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4]_l$$

$$\widehat{K}_l = [[1/2, 1/2, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4, 1/4], [1/2, 1/2, 1/2, 1/2], [1, 1, 1, 1]]$$

BACKGROUND

Derivation Code Tables

Length of crypt material determines number of pad characters. One character table for one pad char. Two character table for two pad char.

One Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code Selector

Derivation Code	Prefix Description
0	Two character derivation code. Use two character table.
1	Four character derivation code. Use four character table.
2	Five character derivation code. Use five character table.
3	Six character derivation code. Use six character table.
4	Eight character derivation code. Use eight character table.
5	Nine character derivation code. Use nine character table.
6	Ten character derivation code. Use ten character table.

One Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
A	Non-transferable prefix using Ed25519 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
B	X25519 public encryption key. May be converted from Ed25519 public signing verification key.	32	1	1	44	33
C	Ed25519 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
D	Blake3-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
E	Blake2b-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
F	Blake2s-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
G	Non-transferable prefix using ECDSA secp256k1 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
H	ECDSA secp256k1 public signing verification key. Basic derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
I	SHA3-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33
J	SHA2-256 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	32	1	1	44	33

Two Character KERI Base64 Prefix Derivation Code

Derivation Code	Prefix Description	Data Length Bytes	Pad Length	Derivation Code Length	Prefix Length Base64	Prefix Length Bytes
0A	Ed25519 signature. Self-signing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0B	ECDSA secp256k1 signature. Self-signing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0C	Blake3-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0D	SHA3-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0E	Blake2b-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66
0F	SHA2-512 Digest. Self-addressing derivation.	64	2	2	88	66

Base64

Base64 Decode Binary from ASCII

Base64 Binary Decoding from ASCII															
ASCII Char	Base 64 Index Decimal	Base64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base 64 Index Decimal	Base 64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base 64 Index Decimal	Base 64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary	ASCII Char	Base 64 Index Decimal	Base 64 Index Hex	Base64 Index 6 bit Binary
A	0	00	000000	Q	16	10	010000	g	32	20	100000	w	48	30	110000
B	1	01	000001	R	17	11	010001	h	33	21	100001	x	49	31	110001
C	2	02	000010	S	18	12	010010	i	34	22	100010	y	50	32	110010
D	3	03	000011	T	19	13	010011	j	35	23	100011	z	51	33	110011
E	4	04	000100	U	20	14	010100	k	36	24	100100	0	52	34	110100
F	5	05	000101	V	21	15	010101	l	37	25	100101	1	53	35	110101
G	6	06	000110	W	22	16	010110	m	38	26	100110	2	54	36	110110
H	7	07	000111	X	23	17	010111	n	39	27	100111	3	55	37	110111
I	8	08	001000	Y	24	18	011000	o	40	28	101000	4	56	38	111000
J	9	09	001001	Z	25	19	011001	p	41	29	101001	5	57	39	111001
K	10	0A	001010	a	26	1A	011010	q	42	2A	101010	6	58	3A	111010
L	11	0B	001011	b	27	1B	011011	r	43	2B	101011	7	59	3B	111011
M	12	0C	001100	c	28	1C	011100	s	44	2C	101100	8	60	3C	111100
N	13	0D	001101	d	29	1D	011101	t	45	2D	101101	9	61	3D	111101
O	14	0E	001110	e	30	1E	011110	u	46	2E	101110	-	62	3E	111110
P	15	0F	001111	f	31	1F	011111	v	47	2F	101111	_	63	3F	111111

Certificate Transparency Problem

“The solution the computer world has relied on for many years is to introduce into the system trusted third parties (CAs) that vouch for the binding between the domain name and the private key. The problem is that we've managed to bless several hundred of these supposedly trusted parties, any of which can vouch for any domain name. Every now and then, one of them gets it wrong, sometimes spectacularly.”

Pinning inadequate

Notaries inadequate

DNSSEC inadequate

All require trust in 3rd party compute infrastructure that is inherently vulnerable

Certificate Transparency: (related EFF SSL Observatory)

Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs

End-verifiable duplicity detection = Ambient verifiability of duplicity

Event log is third party infrastructure but zero trust because it is verifiable.

Sparse Merkle Trees for revocation of certificates

Certificate Transparency Solution

Public end-verifiable append-only event log with consistency and inclusion proofs

End-verifiable duplicity detection = ambient verifiability of duplicity

Event log is third party infrastructure but it is not trusted because logs are verifiable.

Sparse Merkle trees for revocation of certificates

(related EFF SSL Observatory)




Figure 1




Figure 2




Figure 3




Figure 4