

OPEN REPUTATION: PORTABLE REPUTATION AS A PRIMAL USE- CASE FOR DECENTRALIZED IDENTIFIERS

<https://github.com/SmithSamuelM/Papers/blob/master/whitepapers/open-reputation-low-level-whitepaper.pdf>

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REPUTATION

noun:

The estimation in which a person or thing is held, especially by the community or the public generally.

root:

Latin word reputāre, which is equivalent to re + putāre, that is, to re-think or re-consider.

usage:

A considered evaluation (measure) of past behavior used to predict future behavior.

qualification:

Confidence improves with contextual similarity.

WHAT IS REPUTATION?

WHAT IS REPUTATION AI?

Contextual predictor of future behavior to enable a transaction

Closed-loop automated reasoning, not just open-loop pattern recognition

Means to filter and modulate transactions

Curator, recommender, decision aid, IA

Contextual predictors are more powerful

Behavior based predictors are more credible

Transitive predictors are more portable

COMPUTATIONAL REPUTATION

Computational generation of a reputation is to aggregate relevant instances of behavior.

*Instances of behavior = **reputational events** or **reputes** for short*

*Reputation measures are inferred indirectly from **reputes** associated with an entity*


Contrasting Example:

- * Entities provide direct ratings of promptness of another entity
- * Collect instances of behavior of entity in context from which promptness can be inferred.

Reputation from reputed behavior allows for re-scoping, re-weighting, re-combination, and re-evaluation of collected reputes

Enables arbitrary levels of nesting, precision, and granularity in the data aggregation process

REPUTING LEXICON





Repute = Reputational Event (Data)

Reputee = Reputational Entity, (Identity)

Target of Repute

Reputer = Source of Repute

REFLEXIVITY




Reputation is Reflexive:

Reputer is simultaneously both a Source and a Target = Reputee

INDIRECT AND INTERMEDIATED REPUTING

Reputery = Indirect Source (Implied Reputer) or Intermediate Source



REPUTAGE

Reputage: reputational event ancilliary data. Optional or infrequently used information associated with a repute separated from core repute for performance reasons.

REPUTET

Reputet: reputational event transaction. A cryptographically signed and validated transaction of reputes between reputees or reputeries.

Initiator = first party.

Copartent = counter party.

Arbiter = trusted third party (notary).

REPUTE

```
{
  "ruid": "bcd456",
  "stamp": "2015-03-19T10:30:45Z",
  "reputee": "z4def6",
  "reputer": "5efa75",
  "curator": "2bcd4",
  "signer": "2bcd4#0",
  "detail": {
    "rating": {
      {
        "useful": 90,
        "fair": 80,
      },
      "url": "http://myblog.com/article19/"
    }
  },
  "tags": {},
  "reputage": null,
}
/r/n/r/n
"abcdef987654321"
```

```
{
  "puid": "abcefg",
  "ruid": "bcd456",
  "stamp": "2015-03-19T10:30:45Z",
  "comment": {
    "cuid": "1234abc",
    "url": "http://myblog.com/article19/comment19",
    "contents": "You are so awesome."
  }
}
/r/n/r/n
"abcdef9871234567"
```

IDENTIFIERS

UUID: Universally Unique Identifier RFC 4122: UUID type 1 -5

16 byte collision resistant decentralized identifier generated with random number generator and optional name spacing data

Enables distributed applications to create unique identifiers without central authority

Prefixed namespacing allows for sorting and searching properties such as time order, lexical order, nesting etc,

URI: Uniform Resource Identifier, URL: Uniform Resource Locator, URN: Uniform Resource Name RFC 3986

scheme:[/ [user[:password] @] host[:port]] [/path] [?query] [#fragment]

Self-Certifying Identifier: Contains fingerprint of public member of cryptographic public/private key pair

Decentralized Self-Certifying Identifier: public/private key pair is generated by user not central registry

Hierarchical Self-Certifying Identifier: selfcertroot:/path/to/related/data

Tree Hierarchical Deterministic Self-Certifying Identifier: parent/child/child/child

Tupleizable (routable) Identifiers: /channel/host/process/data = (channel, host, process, data)

DID: DECENTRALIZED IDENTIFIER

<https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-spec/>

```
did:method:idstring
```

```
did:rep:Qt27fThWoNZsa88VrTkep6H-4HA8tr54sHON1vWl6FE=
```

```
{  
  "did": "did:rep:Qt27fThWoNZsa88VrTkep6H-4HA8tr54sHON1vWl6FE=",  
  "signer": "did:igo:Xq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148=#0",  
  "friend": "did:igo:Xq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148=/next/door",  
  "name": "John Doe",  
  "zip": "94088"  
}
```

DDO

<https://w3c-ccg.github.io/did-spec/>

DDO = *DID Description Object*

```
{
  "@context": "https://example.org/did/v1",
  "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP",
  "owner": [{
    "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP#key-1",
    "type": ["CryptographicKey", "EdDsaPublicKey"],
    "curve": "ed25519",
    "expires": "2017-02-08T16:02:20Z",
    "publicKeyBase64": "lji9qTtkCydxtez/bt1zdLxVMMbz4SzWvlqg0BmURoM="
  }, {
    "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP#key-2",
    "type": ["CryptographicKey", "RsaPublicKey"],
    "expires": "2017-03-22T00:00:00Z",
    "publicKeyPem": "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\r\nMIIB..
    ... sGbFmgQaRyV\r\n-----END PUBLIC KEY-----"
  }],
  "control": [{
    "type": "OrControl",
    "signer": [
      "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP",
      "did:example:8uQhQMGzWxR8vw5P3UWH1j"
    ]
  }],
  "service": {
    "openid": "https://openid.example.com/456",
    "xdi": "https://xdi.example.com/123"
  },
  "created": "2002-10-10T17:00:00Z",
  "updated": "2016-10-17T02:41:00Z",
  "signature": {
    "type": "RsaSignature2016",
    "created": "2016-02-08T16:02:20Z",
    "creator": "did:example:8uQhQMGzWxR8vw5P3UWH1j#key/1",
    "signatureValue": "IOmA4R7TfhkYTYW8...CBMq2/gi25s="
  }
}
```

Guardian Managed DDO

```
{
  "@context": "https://example.org/did/v1",
  "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP",
  "guardian": "did:example:8uQhQMGzWxR8vw5P3UWH1j",
  "control": [ "did:example:8uQhQMGzWxR8vw5P3UWH1j" ],
  "service": {
    "openid": "https://openid.example.com/456",
    "xdi": "https://xdi.example.com/123"
  },
  "type": "http://schema.org/Person",
  "created": "2002-10-10T17:00:00Z",
  "updated": "2016-10-17T02:41:00Z",
  "signature": {
    "type": "RsaSignature2016",
    "created": "2016-02-08T16:02:20Z",
    "creator": "did:example:8uQhQMGzWxR8vw5P3UWH1j#key-1",
    "signatureValue": "IOmA4R7Tf...3CBMq2/gi25s="
  }
}
```

DID FRAGMENT

DID Fragment

`did:method:idstring#keyindex`

A DID fragment *MUST* be used only as a method-independent pointer into the DDO to identify a unique key description or other DDO component.

```
{
  "owner": [{
    "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP#key/1",
    "type": ["CryptographicKey", "EdDsaSAPublicKey"],
    "curve": "ed25519",
    "expires": "2017-02-08T16:02:20Z",
    "publicKeyBase64": "IOmA4R7TfhkY...Mq2/gi25s="
  }, {
    "id": "did:example:21tDAKCERh95uGgKbJNHYP#key/2",
    "type": ["CryptographicKey", "RsaPublicKey"],
    "expires": "2017-03-22T00:00:00Z",
    "publicKeyBase64": "MIIB0g...mgQaRyV"
  }]
}
```


DID PATH

DID Path

```
did:method:idstring/path/to/associated/resource
```

```
did:method:idstring/path/to/associated/resource#05
```

If a DID reference includes a DID path followed by a fragment, that fragment is NOT a DID fragment.

```
{
  "did": "did:rep:Qt27fThWoNZsa88VrTkep6H-4HA8tr54sHON1vWl6FE=",
  "signer": "did:igo:Xq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148=#0",
  "friend": "did:igo:Xq5YqaL6L48pf0fu7IUhL0JRaU2_RxFP0AL43wYn148=/next/door",
  "name": "John Doe",
  "zip": "94088"
}
```

VERIFIABLE CLAIMS

<https://www.w3.org/TR/verifiable-claims-data-model/>

Profile

```
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
  "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
  "type": ["Entity", "Person"],
  "name": "Alice Bobman",
  "email": "alice@example.com",
  "birthDate": "1985-12-14",
  "telephone": "12345678910"
}
```

Claim

```
{
  "@context": "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
  "id": "http://example.gov/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["Credential", "ProofOfAgeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://dmv.example.gov",
  "issued": "2010-01-01",
  "claim": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "ageOver": 21
  }
}
```

Verifiable Claim

```
{
  "@context": [
    "https://w3id.org/identity/v1",
    "https://w3id.org/security/v1"
  ],
  "id": "http://example.gov/credentials/3732",
  "type": ["Credential", "ProofOfAgeCredential"],
  "issuer": "https://dmv.example.gov",
  "issued": "2010-01-01",
  "claim": {
    "id": "did:example:ebfeb1f712ebc6f1c276e12ec21",
    "ageOver": 21
  },
  "signature": {
    "type": "LinkedDataSignature2015",
    "created": "2016-06-18T21:10:38Z",
    "creator": "https://example.com/jdoe/keys/1",
    "domain": "json-ld.org",
    "nonce": "6165d7e8",
    "signatureValue": "g4j9UrpHM4/uu32NlTw0HdaSaYF2sykskfuByD7UbuqEcJIKa+IoLJLrLjqDnMz0adwpBCHWaqqpnd47r0NKZbnJarGYrBFcRTwPQSeqGwac8E2SqjylTBbSGwKZkprEXTywyV7gILlC8a+naA7lBRi4y29FtcUJBTFQq4R5XzI="
  }
}
```


Zero Trust Computing

Security, Privacy, Agency

Diffuse trust perimeter-less security model

Diffuse trust perimeter-less security principles

The **network** is always **hostile**, internally & externally; **Locality** is not **trustworthy**.

Every **network interaction** or **data flow** must be **authenticated** and **authorized** using best practice **cryptography**.

Inter-host **communication** must be **end-to-end signed/encrypted** and **data** must be **stored signed/encrypted**; Data is **signed/encrypted** in **motion** and at **rest**.

Policies for **authentication** and **authorization** must be **dynamically** modified based on **behavior**.

Policies must be **governed** by **distributed consensus**.

Decentralized Identity Inverts Service Architectures

Conventional (centralized):

- Server creates identifiers (GUID, Database primary keys)

- Server timestamps

 - event ordering relative to server

- Server manages keys, AuthN, AuthZ

- Perimeter Security

 - Signed at rest problematic

 - Encrypted at rest problematic

- Server is source of truth

 - Server controls changes/updates to resources

- Server's role is 2nd party in two party transactions between client and server.

Unconventional (decentralized):

- Client creates identifiers (DIDs)

- Client timestamps

 - event ordering relative to client

- Client manages keys

 - AuthN/AuthZ is Client-to-client

- Perimeter-less Security

 - Client signs at rest

 - Client encrypts at rest

- Client is source of truth

 - Client controls changes/updates to resources

 - Server cannot make changes

- Server's role is either:

 - Trusted 3rd party in 3 (multi) party transactions between 2 (or more) clients and server

 - Agent or proxy for a client in two party transaction with another client.



Decentralized Identifiers

Decentralized Identifiers

Portability

Verifiable Claims

Certification

Consent Decrees

Ledger

Revocation

Arbitration

Provenance

Key Management

Hierarchical Keys

Key Recovery

Key Hiding

Multisignature

Group Keys

Identity Graph

Attribute Based Identity

Contextual Identity

Transitivity

Group Identity

Least Disclosure

Heavyweight

Reputation

Lightweight

Portable

Eventually Portable

Transitive

Domain Specific

Cross-Domain

Graph Based Self Identity/Reputation

Identity = **Identifiers** + **Attributes**

Identifiers = globally unique decentralized **cryptonyms** + **aliases**

Attributes = user data, proofs

Facilitate attribute exchange between entities sufficient to enable transaction to proceed

Identity System Features:

Agency (own your own identity)


Security (impervious to fraud)

Privacy (least disclosure)

Agency = **portable** identifiers + **user** controlled


Security = distributed **consensus** + modern **crypto**

Privacy = granular **graph** based identities + **layered** disclosures + **zero knowledge** disclosures + **group** identities




Graph Based Other Identity/Reputation

Repute Down



Repute Up



ISSUES

Data Intensive:

High speed concurrent reads

Multi-version Concurrency Control (MVCC) Data Stores

Concurrent Log Structured Data Store (Immutable)

Data Flow Routing for Distributed Stream Processing

Stored in sorted order for fast block queries

did:rep:ABCD123/ruid/did:rep:XYZ987/what

Repeated Lookups are expensive

Need lightweight cached DDO subset

Signed At Rest verification without external lookups

signer: did:rep:ABCD123#key/01

ISSUES

Associated Repute vs Associated Reputee

Associated Repute = DID/path

Associated Reputee = Hierarchical DID

Unknown Reputer or Reputee to be claimed later

Blinded Reputer or Reputee

Meta-Repute = Repute with a Reputation

Reputation is not a set of verifiable claims but a set of verifiable claims can contribute to a reputation

Representation of Graph Based Identity

Portable Reputation Algorithms

ISSUES

Survivability Paradigm vs IT Security Paradigm

IT Security: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability

Survivability:

Susceptibility: likelihood that the system will be the target of an attack

Vulnerability: degree of damage resulting from an attack

Recoverability: time to repair the damage of an attack

Failure management:

Failure avoidance, Failure Resilience, Failure Repair