



# BCMUN

*British Columbia Model United Nations 2023*



## Directors Letter:

Dear Delegates,

Hello and welcome to the United Nations Security Council. I am your director, Christopher Silverthorn, and I am very excited you chose to be a part of this fun, fast paced committee. The Security Council is a great opportunity to refine your MUN skills, advance your diplomacy tactics, and make outstanding resolutions.

As a former delegate of the UNSC, I can safely say that the security council is one of, if not the, best committees. You will be able to see another side of diplomacy, doing more than suggesting meaningful changes. Here you will be debating, diplomating, solving, and protecting the people of the world.

The security council has the unique ability to require, or even force, certain resolutions. And veto powers will add an interesting twist to committee experience, that is sure to keep you on your toes. Here the security council will be tackling the Taiwan China Conflict, a pressing global issue.

For the second iteration of BCMUN I will be joined by our amazing staff team. Your fabulous chair Rajveer Agrawal. Your amazing assistant director Eva Zhou. And your creative crisis staff Marie Chiu. These wonderful people and I are more than ready to give you the best possible conference experience we can.

On behalf of this outstanding, and best, dias team I would like to welcome you to UNSC at BCMUN 2023. Good luck, have fun, and save the world!

Best wishes and warmest regards,

Christopher Silverthorn

*Director of UNSC - BCMUN 2023*

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# Taiwan-China Conflict

## Committee Overview

### **Counter-Terrorism Committee**

Guided by Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005), the Committee works to bolster the ability of United Nations Member States to prevent terrorist acts both within their borders and across regions. It was established in the wake of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the United States.

### **Non-Proliferation Committee**

On 28 April 2004, the United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 1540 (2004) under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, which affirms that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and their means of delivery constitutes a threat to international peace and security.

### **United Nations Military Staff Committee**

The Military Staff Committee helps plan UN military measures and regulate armaments.

### **Sanctions Committees**

The use of mandatory sanctions is intended to apply pressure on a State or entity to comply with the objectives set by the Security Council, without resorting to the use of force. Sanctions thus offer the Security Council an important instrument to enforce its decisions. The universal character of the United Nations makes it an especially appropriate body to establish and monitor such measures.

The Council has resorted to mandatory sanctions as an enforcement tool when peace has been threatened and diplomatic efforts have failed. The range of sanctions has included

comprehensive economic and trade sanctions, and/or more targeted measures such as arms embargoes, travel bans, financial or diplomatic restrictions.

### **Working Group established pursuant to resolution 1566 (2004)**

In accordance with paragraphs 9 and 10 of Security Council resolution 1566 (2004), the Working Group is tasked to examine "practical measures to be imposed upon individuals, groups or entities involved in or associated with terrorist activities, other than those designated by the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee" and "the possibility of establishing an international fund to compensate victims of terrorist acts and their families."

### **Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations**

The Security Council Working Group on Peacekeeping Operations was established pursuant to a decision of the Security Council contained in a statement by its President (S/PRST/2001/3) made at the Council's 4270th meeting on 31 January 2001. In the statement, the Council reiterated its agreement to hold consultations with troop-contributing countries in a timely manner at different stages of a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

### **Working Group on Children and Armed Conflict**

The Security Council Working Group, pursuant to resolution 1612 (2005), reviews reports on violations against children affected by armed conflict, committed by parties that are listed in the annexes to the Secretary-General's report on children and armed conflict.

### **Permanent Members: P5**

The UNSC consists of 15 members, of which 5 are permanent and 10 are non-permanent. As the UNSC is a result of WWII, it has been structured to give massive amounts of power to the victors of the war. These Permanent 5 nations are: The Republic of China, the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

### **Non-Permanent Members**

The non-permanent members are elected for a term of 2 years with seats for each geographical area. A non-member state of the council may participate in the debate with the right to vote.

### **Observatory Members**

Observatory states may participate in UNSC discussions without the right to vote.

### **Decision making process**

Procedural decisions may be adopted by an affirmative vote from 9 members. Other decisions are adopted with the same majority, including the votes of all permanent members. The P5 of the UNSC have the right to veto while voting for a substantive resolution. Should any P5 nation vote “against” the resolution fails to pass. Abstention does not count as a veto.

## Topic Introduction

In 1949, Mao Zedong announced the establishment of the People's Republic of China (RPC). Meanwhile, Chiang Kai-Shek brought the troops of the National Party (KMT) and its supporters back to Taiwan and claimed Taipei as the temporary capital. Influenced by the anti-communist campaign led by the United States during the 1950s, Taiwan then delighted in substantial international recognition as the Republic of China (ROC). However, the PRC objected to Taiwan's newfound power. They garnered enough votes in the UN General Assembly to expel Taiwan as the Republic of China and admit it into the PRC.

The situation across the Strait remains in political stalemate and has been affecting other authoritative countries, including the U.S. and Japan. The keystone of China's policy remains the "One China Principle," claiming that Taiwan is part of China, and that China's sovereignty and territorial integrity cannot be separated. Over the past years, political figures, including Chiang Ching-Kuo and Lee Tung-Hui, have made remarkable efforts to promote greater separation of Taiwan from the mainland both culturally and politically. Moreover, the U.S. has opposed the PRC's attempts to redefine UN Resolution 2758, with the recognition of "the PRC as the only legitimate representative of China to the United Nations," and removed "the representatives of the ROC from the United Nations."

Today, only 13 UN members officially recognize Taiwan as a country, with 59 countries establishing unofficial diplomatic relations. Moreover, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the world, especially the U.S. and Japan, has been increasing their vigilance on a daily basis against armed invasions of Taiwan. China has expected to continuously expand their military capabilities for possible amphibious invasion of Taiwan, yet is unlikely to attack Taiwan in the next two years. With the tension between China and Taiwan, countries like the U.S. and Japan have brought up policies and announcements, supporting Taiwan in providing arms of defensive characters.

## Topic History

After the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895 Japan acquired the Island of Taiwan. When the Qing Dynasty fell in 1911, China was politically fragmented and thrown into social and political turmoil.

During this period two main political groups rose to take power. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was founded in 1921 and aimed to create a communist revolution that led to a future socialist China. The Nationalist Party (KMT) arose as the successor to the Republic of China (ROC), the dynasty after the Qing Dynasty that eventually fell to warlordism. The KMT wanted China to follow western models of government and become a constitutional republic.

In 1928, the two groups worked together to unify China against the warlords, but after they had succeeded the two parties quickly devolved into violent conflict. This fighting generally continued throughout World War II. Then on 1 December, 1943, China, the United States, and Great Britain signed the “Cairo Declaration” requiring that, “all territories Japan has seized from China, such as Manchuria, Taiwan, and the Penghu Islands, shall be restored to China”. After Japan surrendered to this agreement in 1945, a broker was attempted between the CCP and the KMT, however disagreements and cease-fire violations resulted in the abandonment of the mediation efforts on 29 January, 1947.

Then on 1 October, 1949, the chairman of the CCP, Mao Zedong, declared the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing. At the same time Chian Kai-Shek, the generalissimo of the KMT withdrew to Taiwan with two million KMT troops and supporters. They proclaimed Taipei the capital of the new Republic of China (ROC).

The CCP consolidated its power over the mainland by the early 1950's, and the PRC began compiling troops against Taiwan. While in Taiwan the ROC plotted its own attack against the mainland. After the Korean War broke out in June the United States deployed troops to maintain peace in the strait of Taiwan. Small-scale hostilities still continued.

During the Cold War Taiwan gained substantial recognition. Until 1971 when the PRC gained enough votes in the UN General Assembly to admit Taiwan into the PRC and expel it as its own ROC. Throughout the 1970's many countries had official democratic relations with the PRC, but



continued to have unofficial relationships with Taiwan. These countries however continued not to acknowledge Taiwan's statehood.

The People's Liberation Army (PLA), the primary military force of the CCP, conducted ballistic missile tests and a series of war games. The next year they resumed ballistic missile frings, with targets close to Taiwan's biggest ports. In order to prevent attack the US again dispatched fleets to the straight.

In the years following the 1995 missile crisis, China began to invest in upgraded military capabilities to use against Taiwan. After a large defense package was sent to Taiwan in 2001 tensions increased. This complicated and violent history brings us to the crisis China and Taiwan face today.

## Past Action

Political reforms in the 1980s led to the birth of the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986. The party supported an independent Taiwan. Shortly after, in 1988, Lee Teng-hui became the island's first Taiwanese-born leader, and was nicknamed "Mr. Democracy". National Assembly elections in 1991 were hailed as Taiwan's first true democratic elections.

Alongside the democratization came the growing desire of the Taiwanese people for independence, much to the dismay of leaders in Beijing. The mainland responded with the 1995 Missile Crisis which was previously mentioned in the Topic History. The purpose of the Missile Crisis is to threaten and frighten the Taiwanese people into not voting for Lee Teng-hui. The United States responded with the biggest display of military might in Asia since the Vietnam War.

Despite the claims that China wants a peaceful reunification with Taiwan, an anti-secession law was passed in 2005 in China, authorizing the use of military force should Taiwan formally declare independence. The Chinese government states that the passed legislation is also a sign in which they resolutely oppose Taiwanese independence and that it has been elevated to become the national will to do so.

Although the purpose of such a measure is to intimidate the Taiwanese people, it also largely discourages unification across the Strait and frames this action as undesirable, especially to younger Taiwanese people. It is important to mention that mainland China had previously attempted to achieve unification across the Strait. The mainland insisted on the one-China principle, in which they do not accept two Chinas, or one China and one Taiwan.

As economic growth surged on both sides of the Strait, Taiwan and China let down their barriers. Following the increase in imports and exports between Taiwan and China, the Chinese government saw this business interaction as a phenomenally useful opportunity to integrate the economies together. The plan was to make the two economies so interconnected that it would be economically suicidal for any government in Taiwan to come to a confrontation with China. This would prompt Taiwan to form unification with China as an act to preserve its economy. However, the attempt at integration failed due to the rising power of democracy in Taiwan at the end of the 1990s and the start of the 2000s. Though most of the world no longer recognizes Taiwan as a country, there is still strong sympathy in the West for Taiwan unofficially. The

Taiwan Relations Act is a policy that requires the United States to protect Taiwan no matter the circumstance.

## Current Situation

Officially known as the Republic of China (ROC), Taiwan is a multi-island territory of 23.78 million people in the western Pacific Ocean. The situation between China and Taiwan has been continuously exacerbated ever since Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in August of 2022. It is said that the tension across the Strait reached levels not seen in the past thirty years. The U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi was the highest-ranking American official in 25 years to visit the island. Pelosi claims that the purpose of her visit was to further promote and support democracy when "the world faces a choice between autocracy and democracy." The trip is intended to be part of a broader mission at this time. In response to Pelosi's visit, Beijing launched joint military exercises around the island and suspended or canceled eight official military dialogues and cooperation channels with the United States. Taiwan faced unprecedented provocations, including ballistic missile launches over the island, air and naval operations across the centerline and on the edge of Taiwan's territorial waters, and 23 times more cyber attacks than previously recorded.

According to its one-China policy, the mainland government only recognizes Taiwan as a rebellious region, rather than an independent country. The Chinese parliament views foreign interaction or intervention in the Taiwan-China conflict as unacceptable. China deems intervention in domestic political affairs as largely infringing on its national sovereignty. As stated in the PRC Anti-Secession Law, China is also not hesitant to start a war and use military forces against the island if it was to declare its independence.

The United States currently does not officially support Taiwan's independence, but repeatedly vowed to support Taiwan from potential attacks. The country had also previously worked in close proximity with Taiwan's former leader, Chiang Kai-shek. Speaker Nancy Pelosi emphasized that it is "up to Taiwan to decide" whether or not to declare its independence. Therefore, based on this information the Chinese government concludes that there is a coordinated effort underway to shift U.S. policy and that America no longer supports the one-China policy. The foreign minister of China later stated that they considered this act as America's recognition of Taiwan's sovereignty and their potential support for Taiwan's independence. China also acknowledges former secretary of state Mike Pompeo's call for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent country, and former secretary of defense Mark Esper's recommendation to forgo the one-China policy, and sees such changes as being a bipartisan threat.

Taiwan is a region of economic, geopolitical, and political importance. The Mercatus Center estimates that \$3.4 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea, or 21 percent of the global trade, and uses the Taiwan Strait as a vital trade route. The island is also militarily critical for both China and the United States. With that in mind, if Taiwan were to be under threat, it would not only have a severe impact on global shipping and logistics, but it would also have an impact on the political and economic order of the Indo-Pacific area. Thus, it is crucial to ensure peace in Taiwan in order to maintain safety for the Taiwanese citizens and stability in the global economy.



## Case Study - The Wider Regional Context of the Taiwan Strait Conflict

Generally speaking, strategic trends in the Asia-Pacific region had been positive in many respects during the 1990s. The region has made visible progress recovering from its economic crisis of 1999, particularly so in South Korea and Thailand—who have taken steps to rebuild prosperous economies in a global competitive environment. These first steps however, are part of a longer and deeper socio-economic transformation, which will only succeed when transformation strategies are supplemented by coherent political reform aiming at the establishment of genuine democracies and pluralist societies. In this regard, the verdict on the long-term sustainability of the present recovery is still open. Moreover, major security conflicts remain unresolved or have produced new instabilities throughout the entire region since the early 1990s, such as conflict in the Taiwan Strait.

At the same time, the region is approaching an unprecedented arms race, fueled by new economic growth and an increasing globalization of security policies, and partly driven by interregional and global dual-use technology transfers. In contrast with Europe and the Soviet-American strategic relationship during the Cold War, arms control policies continue to rank low on East Asia's agenda. Furthermore, the region's future strategic configuration will be determined by the changing norms of the international system, the revolution in military affairs (RMA), preoccupation of the major powers with their own domestic problems, accelerating trends of democratization—with implications for foreign policies—and spread of market economies, increasing intra- and interregional interdependencies, and a lasting impact of the 1997/98 crisis on domestic and external security.

Even before the recent U.S.-China spy plane standoff, many regional security experts have called the conflict between mainland China and Taiwan the most likely scenario of a major military conflict, after the tension on the Korean peninsula has gradually been reduced during the last years. After the election in the spring of 2000 of Chen Shui-ban, a former advocate of Taiwan's formal independence from China, as Taiwan's new president, many anticipated new tensions in the Taiwan Strait and beyond. When China's Nationalist government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after it lost a civil war to the Communists, the nationalists hoped to return to an united China. But the unification dream ended in the 1980s. Since then, the Republic of China in Taiwan has made impressive steps toward democratization and bridging the divide between those who fled from mainland China and the majority who lived there before. Generational changes have contributed to 13 years of a multiparty system that has resulted in one of Asia's most dynamic democracies.

But these factors were also the main catalyst of an increasing separation of Taiwan from mainland China.

Today, Taiwan's people seem comfortable with being Chinese and Taiwanese. They favor political talks between Taipei and Beijing to bridge the divide and political differences as opinion polls indicate.

But the fact remains that the number of people in favor of independence has steadily increased during the last years. Taiwan's parliamentary and mayoral elections in 2000 have confirmed these trends. Although the Kuomintang's ruling Nationalist Party (KMT) and its candidate Ma Ying-jeou have won the elections, the win by mainland-born Mr. Ma has also underlined the popular appeal of a Taiwanese identity distinctly separate from the mainland. The elections have also confirmed the increasing consensus in Taiwan's society which favors the status quo: Taiwan's de facto independence. Taiwan's society is steadily forging its own identity, and thereby continuously changing in the direction of making reunification irrelevant. But if Beijing becomes increasingly frustrated with these developments underway in Taiwan, mainland China may again be tempted to try force.

In 1995, Beijing decided to break off high level political contact with the United States of America because of Taiwan's president Lee Teng-hui's visit to the USA. Both sides also differ on the nature of the new dialogue.

China has argued that it will never renounce the right to use force to halt Taiwan's independence policy. Simultaneously, Beijing still insists that it will invade if the island declares independence. From a European point of view, it is important to recall that armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, on the Korean Peninsula, or in the South China Sea could have not only regional but global economic and security implications. Unless carefully managed, conflicts in those three theaters have the potential to escalate into global conflict. Given the complex and rapidly changing nature of East Asia's strategic chessboard, crisis and conflict prevention have become urgent requirements for East Asia. In this context, given the increasing "globalization of security policies" and acknowledging that present policies have not translated into real European influence in the Asia-Pacific region—and have particularly failed to do so at times of crisis and conflict—Europe and the EU should recognize the imperative to play a more substantial role. This could include the launching of a strategic dialogue with China and Taiwan about the consequences of an unprovoked attack or conflict. The unavoidable globalization of both economic and security policies compels Europe – together with the US. and Japan – to shoulder a greater diplomatic and political burden than it has in the past.

## Bloc Positions

### **One-China Policy Supporters**

These countries adhere strictly to the One-China Policy and believe that Taiwan is a province of China. Many of these countries do not form diplomatic or trading relations with Taiwan at all. Some of these countries, like India, oppose an extreme shift to utilitarian control over Taiwan and believe China shouldn't force Taiwan into submission. But most of the nations in this group, especially Ghana, believe in upholding China's national sovereignty, and that this conflict is an internal dispute that warrants no outside interference.

### **Supporters Republic of Chinese Independence**

The countries in this block strongly believe in protecting Taiwan from China's aggressions. Some countries like Ireland, are opposed to using military force to do this. But others, Like France and the US, already have military keeping the peace in the Strait. Some countries, like France, vocally support Taiwan joining international organizations, while others continue to officially recognize Taiwan as a province. This group wants an immediate solution to the conflict and sees China as a very dangerous threat to Taiwan and others

### **Countries With Relations with Both Parties**

These countries formally recognize the People's Republic of China as the sole government of China and all of its provinces, including Taiwan. However these countries continue to maintain trade relations with Taiwan. Some of these countries also informally and unofficially recognize or support Taiwan becoming an independent nation, like in the UK where many members of parliament have accidentally referred to Taiwan as a nation. Some countries, such as Norway, have faced serious repercussions for opposing the PRC and prefer to remain neutral on the topic. But all the nations in this group believe in a non-violent solution to this conflict

## Guiding Questions

1. Which countries will be mainly influenced by this potential conflict? How will these countries be specifically affected (e.g. economy, political, etc.)? How will your country be affected by this conflict?
2. What is the original causation of this conflict? Is that issue resolved currently?
3. Considering that the new Taiwanese generation is largely alienated from the mainland, how can you ensure the Taiwanese citizens' opinions if reunification was to be considered?
4. With a permanent, long-term solution in mind, what are the ways to guarantee continuous peace across the Strait, specifically preventing additional violence toward Taiwanese citizens?
5. Is there an immediate need to resolve this conflict? Or could it be solved in a slowly but surely fashion?
6. Is this crisis a humanitarian conflict? Is aid needed? What has or is your country willing to contribute?



## Further Research

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Provides an overview of the history and current situation of the topic with graphics and data.
2. <https://thediplomat.com/2022/10/china-and-taiwan-the-geopolitical-crisis-hiding-in-plain-sight/>  
Provides global responses and impacts of the topic to the world in different aspects.
3. [https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28673.10?seq=1#metadata\\_info\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep28673.10?seq=1#metadata_info_tab_contents)  
Provides three predicted scenarios for China's military conflict over Taiwan.
4. <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/230513952.pdf>  
Provides expert research about how and what the UN has responded to the Taiwan-China conflict.

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