

PLSC 504 – Fall 2020  
Panel/TSCS Data:  
Unit Effects + Dynamics

October 7, 2020

- “Longitudinal”  $\neq$  “Time Series”
- Terminology:
  - “Unit” / “Units” / “Units of observation” / “Panels” = Things we observe repeatedly
  - “Observations” = Each (one) measurement of a unit
  - “Time points” = When each observation on a unit is made
  - $i \in \{1 \dots N\}$  indexes units
  - $t \in \{1 \dots T\}$  or  $\{1 \dots T_i\}$  indexes observations / time points
  - If  $T_i = T \forall i$  then we have “balanced” panels / units
  - $NT$  = Total number of observations (if balanced)
- Averages:
  - $Y_{it}$  indicates a variable that varies over both units and time,
  - $\bar{Y}_i = \frac{1}{T} \sum_{t=1}^T Y_{it}$  = the over-time mean of  $Y$ ,
  - $\bar{Y}_t = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{i=1}^N Y_{it}$  = the across-unit mean of  $Y$ , and
  - $\bar{Y} = \frac{1}{NT} \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T Y_{it}$  = the grand mean of  $Y$ .

- $N \gg T \rightarrow$  “panel” data
  - NES panel studies ( $N = 2000, T = 3$ )
  - Panel Study of Income Dynamics ( $N = \text{large}, T \approx 12$ )
- $T \gg N$  or  $T \approx N \rightarrow$  “time-series cross-sectional” (“TSCS”) data
- $N = 1 \rightarrow$  “time series” data

## Variation: A Tiny (Fake) Example

id	year	gender	pres	pid	approve
1	2014	female	obama	dem	3
1	2016	female	obama	dem	3
1	2018	female	trump	dem	5
1	2020	female	trump	dem	3
2	2014	male	obama	gop	2
2	2016	male	obama	gop	1
2	2018	male	trump	gop	4
2	2020	male	trump	gop	3
3	2014	male	obama	gop	2
3	2016	male	obama	gop	2
3	2018	male	trump	gop	4
3	2020	male	trump	dem	1

# Within- and Between-Unit Variation

Define:

$$\bar{Y}_i = \frac{1}{T_i} \sum_{t=1}^{T_i} Y_{it}$$

Then:

$$Y_{it} = \bar{Y}_i + (Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_i).$$

- The *total* variation in  $Y_{it}$  can be decomposed into
- The *between-unit* variation in the  $\bar{Y}_i$ s, and
- The *within-unit* variation around  $\bar{Y}_i$  (that is,  $Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_i$ ).

## Variation:TSCS Data

> summary(Demos)

cocode	Year	POLITY	GDP
Min. : 2	Min. :1945	Min. :-10.0	Min. : 185
1st Qu.:235	1st Qu.:1969	1st Qu.: -7.0	1st Qu.: 1579
Median :451	Median :1985	Median : 0.0	Median : 4000
Mean :456	Mean :1984	Mean : 0.6	Mean : 8118
3rd Qu.:663	3rd Qu.:2000	3rd Qu.: 8.0	3rd Qu.: 10361
Max. :950	Max. :2014	Max. : 10.0	Max. :134040
		NA's :111	NA's :2349


  

Monarch	lnDemos	ColdWar
Min. :0	Min. :0	Min. :0.000
1st Qu.:0	1st Qu.:0	1st Qu.:0.000
Median :0	Median :0	Median :1.000
Mean :0	Mean :0	Mean :0.563
3rd Qu.:0	3rd Qu.:0	3rd Qu.:1.000
Max. :1	Max. :4	Max. :1.000
NA's :1198	NA's :1149	

# POLITY: Total Variation


```
> with(Demos, describe(POLITY)) # all variation
```

	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
X1	1	9260	0.63	7.47	0	0.71	10.4	-10	10	20	0	-1.68	0.08



# POLITY: “Between” Variation

```
> POLITYmeans <- ddply(Demos,.(ccode),summarise,  
+                       POLITYmean = mean(POLITY))  
>  
> with(POLITYmeans, describe(POLITYmean)) # "between" variation  
vars   n mean  sd median trimmed  mad min max range skew kurtosis   se  
X1     1 162 0.73 5.99  -0.1    0.7 7.36 -10  10   20 0.16   -1.21 0.47
```






# POLITY: “Within” Variation

```
> Demos <- ddply(Demos, .(ccode), mutate,  
+               POLITYmean = mean(POLITY))  
> Demos$POLITYwithin <- with(Demos, POLITY-POLITYmean)  
>  
> with(Demos, describe(POLITYwithin))
```

	vars	n	mean	sd	median	trimmed	mad	min	max	range	skew	kurtosis	se
X1	1	8404	0	4.48	0	-0.11	3.16	-13.5	15	28.5	0.19	0.27	0.05



## Model

$$Y_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_i + u_i$$

assumes:

- All the usual OLS assumptions, plus
- $\beta_{0i} = \beta_0 \forall i$ s
- $\beta_{1i} = \beta_1 \forall i$ s

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + u_{it}$$

(same)


## Variable Intercepts

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_1 X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{unit-level})$$


$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0t} + \beta_1 X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{time-level})$$

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0it} + \beta_1 X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{unit- and time-level})$$

# Varying Intercepts



# Varying Intercepts



## Varying Slopes (+ Intercepts)


$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_{1i}X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{unit-level slopes})$$

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0i} + \beta_{1i}X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{unit-level slopes and intercepts})$$

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0t} + \beta_{1t}X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{time-level slopes and intercepts})$$

$$Y_{it} = \beta_{0it} + \beta_{1it}X_{it} + u_{it} \quad (\text{unit- and time-level slopes and intercepts})$$

# Varying Slopes + Intercepts



$$u_{it} \sim \text{i.i.d.} N(0, \sigma^2) \forall i, t$$

$$\text{Var}(u_{it}) = \text{Var}(u_{jt}) \forall i \neq j \text{ (i.e., no cross-unit heteroscedasticity)}$$

$$\text{Var}(u_{it}) = \text{Var}(u_{is}) \forall t \neq s \text{ (i.e., no temporal heteroscedasticity)}$$

$$\text{Cov}(u_{it}, u_{js}) = 0 \forall i \neq j, \forall t \neq s \text{ (i.e., no auto- or spatial correlation)}$$



- Adds data
- Enhances generalizability

$$Y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 X_{it} + u_{it}$$

Implies

- that the process governing the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  is exactly the same for each  $i$ ,
- that the process governing the relationship between  $X$  and  $Y$  is the same for all  $t$ ,
- that the process governing the  $us$  is the same  $\forall i$  and  $t$  as well.

Two regimes:

$$Y_A = \beta'_A \mathbf{X}_A + u_A$$

$$Y_B = \beta'_B \mathbf{X}_B + u_B$$

with  $\sigma_A^2 = \sigma_B^2$ , and  $\text{Cov}(u_A, u_B) = 0$ .

Estimators:

$$\hat{\beta}_{A,B} = (\mathbf{X}'_{A,B} \mathbf{X}_{A,B})^{-1} \mathbf{X}'_{A,B} Y_{A,B}$$

and

$$\widehat{\text{Var}}(\beta_{A,B}) = \hat{\sigma}_{A,B}^2 (\mathbf{X}'_{A,B} \mathbf{X}_{A,B})^{-1},$$

## A Pooled Estimator

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\beta}_P &= (\mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A + \mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B)^{-1} (\mathbf{X}'_A Y_A + \mathbf{X}'_B Y_B) \\ &= (\mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A + \mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B)^{-1} [\beta_A (\mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A) + \beta_B (\mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B)],\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}E(\hat{\beta}_P) &= \beta_A + (\mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A + \mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B)^{-1} \mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B (\beta_B - \beta_A) \\ &= \beta_B + (\mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A + \mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B)^{-1} \mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A (\beta_A - \beta_B)\end{aligned}$$

...and a test:

$$F = \frac{\frac{\hat{\mathbf{u}}'_P \hat{\mathbf{u}}_P - (\hat{\mathbf{u}}'_A \hat{\mathbf{u}}_A + \hat{\mathbf{u}}'_B \hat{\mathbf{u}}_B)}{K}}{\frac{(\hat{\mathbf{u}}'_A \hat{\mathbf{u}}_A + \hat{\mathbf{u}}'_B \hat{\mathbf{u}}_B)}{(N_A + N_B - 2K)}} \sim F_{[K, (N_A + N_B - 2K)]}$$

$$\hat{\beta}_{\lambda} = (\lambda^2 \mathbf{X}'_A \mathbf{X}_A + \mathbf{X}'_B \mathbf{X}_B)^{-1} (\lambda^2 \mathbf{X}'_A Y_A + \mathbf{X}'_B Y_B)$$

with  $\lambda \in [0, 1]$ :

- $\lambda = 0 \rightarrow$  separate estimators for  $\hat{\beta}_A$  and  $\hat{\beta}_B$ ,
- $\lambda = 1 \rightarrow$  “fully pooled” estimator  $\hat{\beta}_P$ ,
- $0 < \lambda < 1 \rightarrow$  a regression where data in regime  $A$  are given some “partial” weighting in their contribution towards an estimate of  $\beta$ .

*“(R)oughly speaking, it makes sense to pool disparate observations if the underlying parameters governing those observations are sufficiently similar, but not otherwise.”*

# One- and Two-Way Unit Effects

Two-way variation:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \gamma V_i + \delta W_t + u_{it}$$

→ two-way effects:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \eta_t + u_{it}$$

One-way effects:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \eta_t + u_{it} \quad (\text{time})$$

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + u_{it} \quad (\text{units})$$

“Brute force” model:

$$\begin{aligned}Y_{it} &= \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + u_{it} \\ &= \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_1 I(i=1)_i + \alpha_2 I(i=2)_i + \dots + u_{it}\end{aligned}$$

Alternatively:

$$\bar{X}_i = \frac{\sum_{N_i} X_{it}}{N_i}$$

and

$$\tilde{X}_{it} = X_{it} - \bar{X}_i.$$

Yields:

$$Y_{it} = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \boldsymbol{\beta}_B + (\mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i) \boldsymbol{\beta}_W + \alpha_i + u_{it}$$

Means that:

$$\begin{aligned}Y_{it}^* &= Y_{it} - \bar{Y}_i \\ \mathbf{X}_{it}^* &= \mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i\end{aligned}$$

$$Y_{it}^* = \beta_{FE} \mathbf{X}_{it}^* + u_{it}.$$

≡ “Within-Effects” Model.



Standard  $F$ -test for

$$H_0 : \alpha_i = \alpha_j \forall i \neq j$$

versus

$$H_A : \alpha_i \neq \alpha_j \text{ for some } i \neq j$$

is  $\sim F_{N-1, NT-(N-1)}$ .

# An Example: Demonstrations, 1945-2014


Data:

- 180 countries
- 70 years
- $i$  indexes countries,  $t$  indexes years


Model:

$$\ln(\text{Demonstrations} + 1)_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{POLITY}_{it} + \beta_2 \text{POLITY}_{it}^2 + \beta_3 \ln(\text{GDP})_{it} + \beta_4 \text{Monarch}_{it} + \beta_5 \text{Cold War}_{it} + u_{it}$$

# Visualizing Panel Data: Continuous $X$



# Visualizing Panel Data: Discrete $X$



(Created using [panelView](#).)

```
> OLS<-lm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
+         data=PDF)
>
> summary(OLS)
```

Call:

```
lm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
    ColdWar, data = PDF)
```

Residuals:

Min	1Q	Median	3Q	Max
-0.450	-0.293	-0.218	-0.075	4.107

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value	Pr(> t )
(Intercept)	-0.124639	0.058208	-2.14	0.032 *
POLITY	0.006296	0.001179	5.34	9.5e-08 ***
I(POLITY^2)	-0.002267	0.000255	-8.90	< 2e-16 ***
lnGDP	0.057679	0.007513	7.68	1.9e-14 ***
Monarch	-0.046393	0.028572	-1.62	0.104
ColdWar	0.027883	0.013961	2.00	0.046 *

---

Signif. codes: 0 \*\*\* 0.001 \*\* 0.01 \* 0.05 . 0.1 1

Residual standard error: 0.526 on 6499 degrees of freedom  
(2863 observations deleted due to missingness)

Multiple R-squared: 0.0261, Adjusted R-squared: 0.0253

F-statistic: 34.8 on 5 and 6499 DF, p-value: <2e-16

# "Fixed" (Within) Effects

```
> FE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,  
+         data=PDF, effect="individual",model="within")  
>  
> summary(FE)  
Oneway (individual) effect Within Model
```

Call:

```
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +  
      ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "individual", model = "within")
```

Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505

Residuals:

Min.	1st Qu.	Median	3rd Qu.	Max.
-1.3556	-0.2120	-0.0768	0.0193	4.0496

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	Pr(> t )
POLITY	0.001526	0.001553	0.98	0.32604
I(POLITY^2)	-0.001942	0.000296	-6.55	6.1e-11 ***
lnGDP	0.054586	0.015200	3.59	0.00033 ***
Monarch	0.047976	0.068071	0.70	0.48097
ColdWar	-0.035487	0.016235	-2.19	0.02887 *

---

Signif. codes: 0 \*\*\* 0.001 \*\* 0.01 \* 0.05 . 0.1 1

Total Sum of Squares: 1410

Residual Sum of Squares: 1400

R-Squared: 0.013

Adj. R-Squared: -0.0102

F-statistic: 16.7177 on 5 and 6355 DF, p-value: <2e-16

# A Nicer Table

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE
POLITY	0.006*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)
POLITY Squared	-0.002*** (0.0003)	-0.002*** (0.0003)
ln(GDP)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.015)
Monarch	-0.046 (0.029)	0.048 (0.068)
Cold War	0.028** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.016)
Constant	-0.125** (0.058)	
Observations	6,505	6,505
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.013
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010
Residual Std. Error	0.526 (df = 6499)	
F Statistic	34.820*** (df = 5; 6499)	16.720*** (df = 5; 6355)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

# Issues (?) with “Fixed” Effects

## Pros:

- Specification Bias
- Intuitive
- Widely Used/Understood

## Cons:

- Can't Estimate  $\beta_B$
- Slowly-Changing  $\mathbf{X}$ s
- (In)Efficiency / Inconsistency (Incidental Parameters)



From:

$$Y_{it} = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \beta_B + (\mathbf{X}_{it} - \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i) \beta_W + \alpha_i + u_{it}.$$

“Between” effects:

$$\bar{Y}_i = \bar{\mathbf{X}}_i \beta_B + u_{it}$$

- Essentially cross-sectional
- Based on  $N$  observations

# “Between” Effects

```
> BE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
+         data=PDF, effect="individual",model="between")
>
> summary(BE)
Oneway (individual) effect Between Model

Call:
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +
     ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "individual", model = "between")
```

Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505  
Observations used in estimation: 145

Coefficients:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t-value	Pr(> t )
(Intercept)	-0.30601	0.20837	-1.47	0.1442
POLITY	0.00597	0.00489	1.22	0.2244
I(POLITY^2)	-0.00302	0.00112	-2.69	0.0079 **
lnGDP	0.06883	0.02734	2.52	0.0130 *
Monarch	-0.04966	0.10320	-0.48	0.6312
ColdWar	0.25872	0.08482	3.05	0.0027 **

---

Signif. codes: 0 '\*\*\*' 0.001 '\*\*' 0.01 '\*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1

Total Sum of Squares: 8.75  
Residual Sum of Squares: 7.64  
R-Squared: 0.127  
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0961  
F-statistic: 4.06164 on 5 and 139 DF, p-value: 0.0018

# A Nicer Table (Again)

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE	BE
POLITY	0.006*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.005)
POLITY Squared	-0.002*** (0.0003)	-0.002*** (0.0003)	-0.003*** (0.001)
ln(GDP)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.069** (0.027)
Monarch	-0.046 (0.029)	0.048 (0.068)	-0.050 (0.103)
Cold War	0.028** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.016)	0.259*** (0.085)
Constant	-0.125** (0.058)		-0.306 (0.208)
Observations	6,505	6,505	145
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.013	0.127
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010	0.096
Residual Std. Error	0.526 (df = 6499)		
F Statistic	34.800*** (df = 5; 6499)	16.700*** (df = 5; 6355)	4.060*** (df = 5; 139)

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Model:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + u_{it}$$

with:

$$u_{it} = \alpha_i + \lambda_t + \eta_{it}$$

and

$$E(\alpha_i) = E(\lambda_t) = E(\eta_{it}) = 0,$$

$$E(\alpha_i\lambda_t) = E(\alpha_i\eta_{it}) = E(\lambda_t\eta_{it}) = 0,$$

$$E(\alpha_i\alpha_j) = \sigma_\alpha^2 \text{ if } i = j, \text{ 0 otherwise,}$$

$$E(\lambda_t\lambda_s) = \sigma_\lambda^2 \text{ if } t = s, \text{ 0 otherwise,}$$

$$E(\eta_{it}\eta_{js}) = \sigma_\eta^2 \text{ if } i = j, t = s, \text{ 0 otherwise,}$$

$$E(\alpha_i\mathbf{X}_{it}) = E(\lambda_t\mathbf{X}_{it}) = E(\eta_{it}\mathbf{X}_{it}) = 0.$$

“Variance Components”:

$$\text{Var}(Y_{it}|\mathbf{X}_{it}) = \sigma_{\alpha}^2 + \sigma_{\lambda}^2 + \sigma_{\eta}^2$$

If we assume  $\lambda_t = 0$ , then we get a model like:

$$Y_{it} = \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \alpha_i + \eta_{it}$$

with total error variance:

$$\sigma_u^2 = \sigma_{\alpha}^2 + \sigma_{\eta}^2.$$

## “Random” Effects: Estimation

$$\begin{aligned} E(\mathbf{u}_i \mathbf{u}_i') \equiv \mathbf{\Sigma}_i &= \sigma_\eta^2 \mathbf{I}_T + \sigma_\alpha^2 \mathbf{ii}' \\ &= \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\alpha^2 & \sigma_\alpha^2 & \cdots & \sigma_\alpha^2 \\ \sigma_\alpha^2 & \sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\alpha^2 & \cdots & \sigma_\alpha^2 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ \sigma_\alpha^2 & \sigma_\alpha^2 & \cdots & \sigma_\eta^2 + \sigma_\alpha^2 \end{pmatrix} \end{aligned}$$

$$\text{Var}(\mathbf{u}) \equiv \mathbf{\Omega} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{\Sigma}_1 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{\Sigma}_2 & \cdots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \cdots & \mathbf{\Sigma}_N \end{pmatrix}$$

# “Random” Effects: Estimation

Can estimate:

$$\Sigma^{-1/2} = \frac{1}{\sigma_\eta} \left[ \mathbf{I}_T - \left( \frac{\theta}{T} \mathbf{1}\mathbf{1}' \right) \right]$$

where

$$\theta = 1 - \sqrt{\frac{\sigma_\eta^2}{T\sigma_\alpha^2 + \sigma_\eta^2}}.$$

With  $\hat{\theta}$ , calculate:


$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it}^* &= Y_{it} - \hat{\theta} \bar{Y}_i \\ X_{it}^* &= X_{it} - \hat{\theta} \bar{X}_i, \end{aligned}$$

estimate:

$$Y_{it}^* = (1 - \hat{\theta})\alpha + X_{it}^* \beta_{RE} + [(1 - \hat{\theta})\alpha_i + (\eta_{it} - \hat{\theta} \bar{\eta}_i)]$$

and iterate...

# “Random” Effects: An Alternative View





# Random Effects

```
> RE<-plm(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,  
+         data=PDF, effect="individual", model="random")
```

```
> summary(RE)
```

```
Oneway (individual) effect Random Effect Model  
(Swamy-Arora's transformation)
```

```
Call:
```

```
plm(formula = lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch +  
      ColdWar, data = PDF, effect = "individual", model = "random")
```

```
Unbalanced Panel: n = 145, T = 1-62, N = 6505
```

```
Effects:
```

	var	std.dev	share
idiosyncratic	0.2197	0.4687	0.8
individual	0.0563	0.2373	0.2

```
theta:
```

Min.	1st Qu.	Median	Mean	3rd Qu.	Max.
0.108	0.708	0.736	0.724	0.757	0.757

```
Coefficients:
```

	Estimate	Std. Error	z-value	Pr(> z )
(Intercept)	-0.131708	0.104987	-1.25	0.210
POLITY	0.002574	0.001450	1.78	0.076 .
I(POLITY^2)	-0.001953	0.000287	-6.81	9.6e-12 ***
lnGDP	0.057117	0.012443	4.59	4.4e-06 ***
Monarch	-0.006937	0.053291	-0.13	0.896
ColdWar	-0.023580	0.015008	-1.57	0.116

```
---  
Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

```
Total Sum of Squares: 1440
```

```
Residual Sum of Squares: 1430
```

```
R-Squared: 0.0124
```

```
Adj. R-Squared: 0.0117
```

```
Chisq: 81.0788 on 5 DF, p-value: 4.99e-16
```

# Random Effects Remix (using lmer)

```
> library(lme4)

> AltRE<-lmer(lnDemons~POLITY+I(POLITY^2)+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar+
+             (1|ccode), data=Demos)
>
> summary(AltRE)
Linear mixed model fit by REML ['lmerMod']
Formula: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar +
          (1 | ccode)
Data: Demos
```

REML criterion at convergence: 9005

Random effects:

Groups	Name	Variance	Std.Dev.
ccode	(Intercept)	0.0536	0.232
Residual		0.2200	0.469

Number of obs: 6507, groups: ccode, 145

Fixed effects:

	Estimate	Std. Error	t value
(Intercept)	-0.133634	0.104246	-1.28
POLITY	0.002623	0.001447	1.81
I(POLITY^2)	-0.001972	0.000287	-6.88
lnGDP	0.057513	0.012371	4.65
Monarch	-0.015175	0.052863	-0.29
ColdWar	-0.022225	0.014986	-1.48

Correlation of Fixed Effects:

	(Intr)	POLITY	I(POLI	lnGDP	Monrch
POLITY	0.109				
I(POLITY^2)	0.134	-0.135			
lnGDP	-0.968	-0.140	-0.270		
Monarch	0.004	0.172	-0.163	-0.022	
ColdWar	-0.391	0.387	-0.210	0.351	0.014

# A Nicer Table (Yet Again)

Table: Models of Demonstrations

	OLS	FE	BE	RE
POLITY	0.006*** (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	0.006 (0.005)	0.003* (0.001)
POLITY Squared	-0.002*** (0.0003)	-0.002*** (0.0003)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.002*** (0.0003)
ln(GDP)	0.058*** (0.008)	0.055*** (0.015)	0.069** (0.027)	0.057*** (0.012)
Monarch	-0.046 (0.029)	0.048 (0.068)	-0.050 (0.103)	-0.007 (0.053)
Cold War	0.028** (0.014)	-0.035** (0.016)	0.259*** (0.085)	-0.024 (0.015)
Constant	-0.125** (0.058)		-0.306 (0.208)	-0.132 (0.105)
Observations	6,505	6,505	145	6,505
R <sup>2</sup>	0.026	0.013	0.127	0.012
Adjusted R <sup>2</sup>	0.025	-0.010	0.096	0.012
Residual Std. Error	0.526 (df = 6499)			
F Statistic	34.800*** (df = 5; 6499)	16.700*** (df = 5; 6355)	4.060*** (df = 5; 139)	81.100***

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

# “Random” Effects: Testing

Hausman test (FE vs. RE):

$$\hat{W} = (\hat{\beta}_{\text{FE}} - \hat{\beta}_{\text{RE}})'(\hat{\mathbf{V}}_{\text{FE}} - \hat{\mathbf{V}}_{\text{RE}})^{-1}(\hat{\beta}_{\text{FE}} - \hat{\beta}_{\text{RE}})$$

$$W \sim \chi_k^2$$

Issues:

- Asymptotic
- No guarantee  $(\hat{\mathbf{V}}_{\text{FE}} - \hat{\mathbf{V}}_{\text{RE}})^{-1}$  is positive definite
- A general specification test...

Hausman test (FE vs. RE):

```
> phtest(FE, RE)
```

Hausman Test

```
data: lnDemons ~ POLITY + I(POLITY^2) + lnGDP + Monarch + ColdWar  
chisq = 10, df = 5, p-value = 0.05  
alternative hypothesis: one model is inconsistent
```

# Practical “Fixed” vs. “Random” Effects

- “Panel” vs. “TSCS” Data
- Data-Generating Process
- Covariate Effects

R :

- the `lme4` package; command is `lmer`
- the `plm` package; `plm` command
- the `nlme` package; command `lme`

Stata : `xtreg`

- the `re` (the default) = random effects
- the `fe` = fixed (within) effects
- the `be` = between-effects

# Dynamics



$$Y_{it} = \phi Y_{it-1} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta_{LDV} + \epsilon_{it}$$

If  $\epsilon_{it}$  is perfect...

- $\hat{\beta}_{LDV}$  is biased (but consistent),
- $O(\text{bias}) = \frac{-1+3\beta_{LDV}}{T}$

If  $\epsilon_{it}$  is autocorrelated...

- $\hat{\beta}_{LDV}$  is biased and inconsistent
- IV is one (bad) option...

# Lagged $Y$ s and GLS-ARMA

Can rewrite:

$$\begin{aligned}Y_{it} &= \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{AR} + u_{it} \\ u_{it} &= \phi u_{it-1} + \eta_{it}\end{aligned}$$

as

$$\begin{aligned}Y_{it} &= \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{AR} + \phi u_{it-1} + \eta_{it} \\ &= \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{AR} + \phi(Y_{it-1} - \mathbf{X}_{it-1}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{AR}) + \eta_{it} \\ &= \phi Y_{it-1} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta}_{AR} + \mathbf{X}_{it-1}\psi + \eta_{it}\end{aligned}$$

where  $\psi = \phi\boldsymbol{\beta}_{AR}$  and  $\psi = 0$  (by assumption).

# Lagged $Y$ s and World Domination

In:

$$Y_{it} = \phi Y_{it-1} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\beta_{LDV} + \epsilon_{it}$$


Achen: Bias “deflates”  $\hat{\beta}_{LDV}$  relative to  $\hat{\phi}$ , “suppress” the effects of  $\mathbf{X}$ ...

Keele & Kelly (2006):

- Contingent on  $\epsilon$ s having autocorrelation
- Key: In LDV, *long-run impact of a unit change in  $X$  is:*

$$\hat{\beta}_{LR} = \frac{\hat{\beta}_{LDV}}{1 - \hat{\phi}}$$

# Long-Run Impact for $\hat{\beta} = 1$



# Lagged $Y$ s and Unit Effects

Consider:

$$Y_{it} = \phi Y_{it-1} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + u_{it}.$$

If we omit the unit effects, we have:

$$Y_{it} = \phi Y_{it-1} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + u_{it}^*$$

with

$$u_{it}^* = \alpha_i + u_{it}$$

Lagging yields:

$$Y_{it-1} = \phi Y_{it-2} + \mathbf{X}_{it-1}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \alpha_i + u_{it-1}$$

which means

$$\text{Cov}(Y_{it-1}, u_{it}^*) \neq 0. \rightarrow \text{bias in } \hat{\phi}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\beta}}$$

Bias in  $\hat{\phi}$  is

- toward zero when  $\phi > 0$ ,
- increasing in  $\phi$ .

Including unit effects still yields bias in  $\hat{\phi}$  of  $O(\frac{1}{T})$ , and bias in  $\hat{\beta}$ .

## Solutions:

- Difference/GMM estimation
- Bias correction approaches

# First Difference Estimation

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it} - Y_{it-1} &= \phi(Y_{it-1} - Y_{it-2}) + (\mathbf{X}_{it} - \mathbf{X}_{it-1})\beta + (\alpha_i - \alpha_i) + (u_{it} - u_{it-1}) \\ \Delta Y_{it} &= \phi\Delta Y_{it-1} + \Delta\mathbf{X}_{it}\beta + \Delta u_{it} \end{aligned}$$

Anderson/Hsiao: If  $\nexists$  autocorrelation, then use  $\Delta Y_{it-2}$  or  $Y_{it-2}$  as instruments for  $\Delta Y_{it-1} \dots$

- Consistent in theory,
- in practice, the former is preferred, and both have issues if  $\phi$  is high;
- both are inefficient.

Arellano & Bond (also Wawro): Use *all* lags of  $Y_{it}$  and  $\mathbf{X}_{it}$  from  $t - 2$  and before.

- “Good” estimates, better as  $T \rightarrow \infty$ ,
- Easy to handle higher-order lags of  $Y$ ,
- Easy software (plm in R , xtabond in Stata ).
- Model *is* fixed effects...
- $\mathbf{Z}_i$  has  $T - p - 1$  rows,  $\sum_{i=p}^{T-2} i$  columns  $\rightarrow$  difficulty of estimation declines in  $p$ , grows in  $T$ .



# Another Approach: Orthogonalization

Note: We're rarely substantively interested in the fixed effects  $\hat{\alpha}$ ...

- $\rightarrow$  reparameterize the  $\alpha$ s so that they are *information-orthogonal* to the other parameters in the model (including the  $\beta$ s and  $\phi$ )
- Key idea: Transform the  $\alpha$ s so that (for example):

$$E \left( \frac{\partial^2 L_i}{\partial \alpha \partial \beta} \right) = 0$$

- Can do this via imposition of priors, in a Bayesian framework...
- **In general**, this approach is less assumption-laden and more efficient than the IV/GMM-based approaches discussed above.

## References:

- Lancaster, T. 2002. "Orthogonal Parameters and Panel Data." *Review of Economic Studies* 69:647-666.
- [Pickup et al. \(2017\)](#) [the "orthogonalized panel model" ("OPM")]

# Stationarity and Unit Roots in Panel Data

- Short series + Asymptotic tests  $\rightarrow$  “borrow strength”
- Requires uniform unit roots across cross-sectional units
- Various alternatives:
  - Maddala and Wu (1999)
  - Hadri (2000)
  - Levin, Lin and Chu (2002)
- What to do?
  - Difference the data...
  - Error-correction models

# Demonstrations: Panel Unit Root Tests

```
> purtest(lnDemons,exo="trend",test=c("levinlin"))
```

Levin-Lin-Chu Unit-Root Test (ex. var.: Individual Intercepts and Trend)

data: lnDemons  
z = -3.2, p-value = 0.0007  
alternative hypothesis: stationarity

Warning message:  
In selectT(1, theTs) : the time series is long

```
> purtest(lnDemons,exo="trend",test=c("hadri"))
```

Hadri Test (ex. var.: Individual Intercepts and Trend)  
(Heterosked. Consistent)

data: lnDemons  
z = 671, p-value <2e-16  
alternative hypothesis: at least one series has a unit root

```
> purtest(lnDemons,exo="trend",test=c("ips"))
```

Im-Pesaran-Shin Unit-Root Test (ex. var.: Individual Intercepts and Trend)

data: lnDemons  
Wtbar = -24, p-value <2e-16  
alternative hypothesis: stationarity


# Some Dynamic Models

	LDV	First Difference	FE	LDV + FE
Intercept	-0.104 (0.053)	0.010 (0.007)		
Lagged ln(Demonstrations)	0.440* (0.012)			0.267* (0.013)
POLITY	0.003* (0.001)	0.001 (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	< 0.001 (0.002)
POLITY Squared	-0.001* ( $< 0.001$ )	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.002* ( $< 0.001$ )	-0.002* ( $< 0.001$ )
ln(GDP)	0.038* (0.007)	-0.108 (0.079)	0.055* (0.015)	0.049* (0.015)
Monarch	-0.017 (0.026)	-0.004 (0.139)	0.048 (0.068)	0.070 (0.067)
Cold War	0.011 (0.013)	-0.134* (0.052)	-0.035* (0.016)	-0.029 (0.016)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.200	0.004	0.013	0.077
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.199	0.003	-0.010	0.055
Num. obs.	6419	6360	6505	6419

\*  $p < 0.05$

# FE + Dynamics Using Orthogonalization

```
> library(OrthoPanels)
> set.seed(7222009)
> OPM.fit <- opm(lnDemos~POLITY+POLITYSQ+lnGDP+Monarch+ColdWar,
  data=PDF,index=c("ccode","Year"),n.samp=1000)
```



# OPM Results: Short- and Long-Run Effects

For  $\hat{\phi} \approx 0.32$ :

Parameter	Short-Run	Long-Run
POLITY	0.0010	0.0015
POLITY Squared	-0.0018	-0.0027
ln(GDP)	0.0655	0.0956
Monarch	0.0629	0.0913
Cold War	-0.0206	-0.0310

## Final Thoughts: Dynamic Panel Models

- $N$  vs.  $T$ ...
- Are dynamics nuisance or substance?
- What problem(s) do you *really* care about?