Women's Studies International Forum 99 (2023) 102756

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Women's Studies International Forum

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/wsif

Feminized forced migration: Ukrainian war refugees

Josephine Andrews [a], Jakub Isański [b], Marek Nowak [b], Victoriya Sereda [c], Alexandra Vacroux [d,*], Hanna Vakhitova [e]

[a] University of California, Davis; Department of Political Science, 681 Kerr Hall, University of California, One Shields Avenue, Davis, CA 95616, USA
[b] Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań; Sociology Department, Szamarzewskiego st. 91C, 60-568 Poznań, Poland
[c] Forum of Transregional Studies, Berlin; Wallotstraße 14, 14193 Berlin, Germany
[d] Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University; 1730 Cambridge Street, S301e, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA
[e] The University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics, Campusvej 55, 5230, Odense, Denmark and Kyiv School of Economics, Ukraine

ARTICLE INFO

Keywords:
Ukraine
Feminized migration
Refugee
Women
War
Poland
Germany

ABSTRACT

This paper looks at war-induced migration flows from Ukraine to Poland and Germany in 2022 to understand who is migrating and the challenges they face. Data were collected in the spring and summer of 2022 through survey questionnaires and interviews. The results of the research reveal that a) this wave of migration from Ukraine is overwhelmingly female; b) women are often migrating with children, which makes arranging appropriate childcare and school placement essential to their entry into the destination workforce; c) Ukrainian labor migration patterns before the war have had a significant impact on current flows; d) Ukrainian refugees to Poland and Germany often want to be able to travel regularly back to Ukraine; this affects their willingness to apply for temporary protection schemes that oblige them to remain in destination countries, which in turn makes it difficult to precisely quantify the number of refugees in a given country.

1. Introduction[1]

The movement of forced migrants and refugees fleeing from the war in Ukraine that began in February 2022 represents Europe's most significant wave of migration since World War II. At least 7 million people are estimated to have left the country in 2022 (Statista report on Russia-Ukraine conflict 2021-2022 - Statistics & facts, 2023). A similar number are internally displaced, having moved from war zones in the south and east towards western Ukraine. The number of international and internal migrants likely exceeds 12–14 million (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, n.d.; United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2022). This is more than a quarter of the country's population of 44 million. This paper puts this movement of Ukrainians in a historical perspective, describing patterns of movement to and from Ukraine during the Soviet period and in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union (Karpova, 2005; Malynovska et al., 2005; Vollmer & Malynovska, 2016). These earlier patterns, particularly "circular" labor migration patterns to Poland and neighboring European countries after 1991, set the stage for patterns we see today.

This article has three objectives. *First*, it describes the migration of Ukrainian refugees to Poland and Germany, focusing on who the migrants are and how the reception of refugees has differed in these two countries. *Second*, it highlights the impact of the feminized nature of this migration on the concerns and decision-making of refugees, including whether they apply for asylum. *Third*, it begins to explore how the fact that many women are traveling with children – usually but not always their own – affects their needs upon arrival and their ability to meet the challenges of resettlement.

Scholars writing since February 2022 emphasize the distinctive character of this war and the difficulties it creates for classification and analysis (Yekelchyk, 2022). This paper uses a descriptive-explorative approach to data collection and analysis, focusing on defining the major characteristics of war-induced displacement from Ukraine. We focus on Ukrainian migration to Poland and Germany in 2022. The situation on the ground remains fluid as migration patterns respond to an evolving military conflict. For example, Russia's targeting of energy infrastructure in autumn and winter 2022–23 led refugees who hoped to return to Ukraine to delay their return. This research should therefore be

* Corresponding author.
E-mail address: vacroux@fas.harvard.edu (A. Vacroux).

[1] The Ethics Committee of the Department of Sociology, Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznań, Poland) approved the research project entitled, "Social reception and inclusion of refugees from Ukraine in Poland and Germany," on 15 March 2022.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2023.102756
Received 23 January 2023; Received in revised form 6 May 2023; Accepted 8 May 2023
Available online 25 May 2023

taken as a snapshot of the situation one year into this bloody and tragic war.

We do not know exactly who is crossing the border into Ukraine. Is it women who fled but left their elderly parents behind? Are they volunteers delivering humanitarian aid? Or so-called "pendulum" labor migrants who go back and forth every few weeks or months to work? Are the returnees returning for good or just visiting? Our survey of Ukrainian migrants to Poland and Germany tried to answer these questions.

An essential feature of this migration is that people who have left Ukraine often go back and forth over the border for various reasons. Border checkpoint data captures only the number of people entering and out of the country. This explains the otherwise mystifying data updated daily on the UNHCR website: as of 17 January 2023, 7,977,980 "refugees from Ukraine [were] recorded across Europe." 4,940,057 were registered for Temporary Protection or "similar national protection schemes" in Europe.[2] Scrolling down on the UNHCR Operational Data Portal for the Ukraine Refugee Situation, one finds that there have been 17,688,845 border crossings *from* Ukraine since February 2022 to February 2023; and 9,585,700 border crossings *into* Ukraine over the same period.

Our study draws on two streams of literature. The first concerns the feminization of migration, a concept that originated in broader studies of migration and labor migration (Sassen, 2000; Jones, 2008; Piper, 2008a, 2008b; Paiewonsk, 2009). The second includes studies and reports that discuss the demographics, needs, and concerns of war-forced migrants (CMR Spotlights, 2022, 2023; Juran & Broer, 2017; Ambrosini et al., 2019). War-related migration has historically been associated with young men seeking to avoid military conscription; these men would be first to depart, later sending money home or attempting to reunite their families (Dragostinova, 2016). Feminist scholars pointed out that "war and migration too have been generally analyzed and understood as male domains" and argued for a change in focus (Haleh, 2007). To bridge these two streams, we offer a historical perspective that argues that Ukrainian migration to Europe before the war shaped later migration patterns. As with other studies (Goodman et al., 2017), we found it difficult to operationalize the formal legal definition of a refugee. Given that our interest in this paper is in exploring major features of female-dominated displacement rather than the legal definition of a refugee per se, we use the terms "refugee," "forced migrant," and "war-induced migrant" interchangeably.

Throughout history, women have migrated in significant numbers–sometimes more than men– and from different countries. Migration flows to Italy from Ukraine, Cape Verde, and 13 of 30 Latin American countries, for example, have been dominated by women. In the Philippines and Sri Lanka in the 2000s, women constituted the majority among those who moved abroad to work or to live. In the early 2000s, more than half of Indonesians who migrated for work were women. Similarly, Central and South American women accounted for the majority of migrants to Spain. And Caribbean women migrants have outnumbered men in moving to North America since the 1950s (Caritas, 2012).

When researchers refer to the feminization of migration, they are not just flagging the increasing share of women in migration flows. Female migration is not the same as male migration, and it is evolving. Women refugees are among the most vulnerable of migrants. They may be victims of violence, sometimes systematic, including rape and assault, and they often migrate with their children (Regional Representation for Central Europe & United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2008; Bhuyan et al., 2016; Malakooti & Davin, 2015). But only a minority of displaced women are granted refugee status (Harris, 2000). Due to the weaker position of women and girls in their home country, they frequently lack the means to travel and may not know enough about their rights or have the skills to complete the bureaucratic application process (Regional Representation for Central Europe & United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2008). More and more women are migrating independently as breadwinners instead of following their husbands or male relatives as family dependents (Elmhirst, 2007; Leal et al., 2019; Piper & Yamanaka, 2005). The scale of these changes and their impact, in particular for children and other family members left behind, has received increasing attention worldwide and in Ukraine.

Before the war, research on feminization of migration flows from different countries including Ukraine concentrated on changing employment and demographic trends in destination countries as a pull factor. Later on the focus shifted to specific gendered experiences of female migrants (see: Harney, 2011; Kindler, 2011; Mudrak, 2011; Solari, 2017; Volodko, 2011, 2015). More recent literature has examined new phenomena like the so-called "social care" or "social gap," "mobility orphans" and "grandmothering" (Fedyuk, 2016; Vollmer & Malynovska, 2016; Kupets, 2016). These studies also highlighted the risk of human trafficking these women were facing (Kindler, 2011; Caritas, 2012). Our study develops this line of research further by looking at one of the first war-forced wave of migration from Ukraine. This study builds on the broader paradigm and considers women's subjectivities to supplement descriptive (Vang et al., 2016).

2. Results and discussion

This paper examines the demographic characteristics, migration journey, and concerns of Ukrainian refugees in Poland and Germany (see Table 1). The research was undertaken in early March 2022 as the first waves of war refugees fled from Ukraine. The data were collected on-site at refugees reception points (CAPI) and online (CAWI) (Isański et al., 2022). In June a similar survey was run in Germany; in depth interviews were conducted May–September 2022 in both Poland and Germany. Trained interviewers conducted 523 surveys at Polish reception centers for Ukrainian refugees in Ukrainian (413), Russian (77), and English (42). The questionnaire asked respondents about their education, language proficiency, and professional experience as well as about their plans, needs and concerns. In Germany 571 respondents answered in Ukrainian (399) or Russian (172). Semi-structured interviews were then conducted May–June 2022 with 22 displaced Ukrainians in Poland (18 women, 4 men) and in May–September 2022 with 10 displaced Ukrainians in Germany (9 women, 1 man). Intertwined respondents were chosen based on their agreement to participate in further study during the survey. The research project was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Department of Sociology, Adam Mickiewicz University (Poznań, Poland), with special attention paid to the fact that research subjects belonged to the vulnerable group of displaced persons (see Table 1).

Polish survey respondents had worked in many professions, with several reporting multiple occupational categories. 14 % of respondents were entrepreneurs or IT specialists. A quarter had previously worked as scientists, engineers, and health or education specialists. The Ukrainians in Poland were somewhat less highly skilled than those in Germany but many of those interviewed were professionals (21 % in Poland vs. 44 % in Germany), white-collar workers (12 % in Poland vs. 26 % in Germany), or had service skills (27 % in Poland) in high demand (see section below for details). Ten percent, for example, had hotel and

[2] All EU Member States have implemented the Temporary Protection Directive which offers expedited stay, residence and work status for Ukrainian citizens and eligible Ukrainian residents leaving Ukraine. The Directive applies to Ukrainian citizens; foreign citizens residents in Ukraine; and spouses or partners, minor children, and cohabiting dependent family members of these individuals resident in Ukraine on or before February 24, 2022. However, EU Member States may introduce variations in the scope of support provided, scope of eligible applicants and local application processes. In Germany, applicants are registered in a specific place and changing location is difficult. If a person applies for the asylum, s/he will be assigned to a Federal Länder (state); each county has fixed admission quotas designed to ensure a fair distribution of asylum seekers among Federal Länder. The asylum seeker is obliged to remain in that state over the course of the asylum process, which may last years.

Table 1
Demographic characteristics of refugees surveyed in Poland and Germany.

	Poland	Germany
Total number of adults	704[a]	620[b]
Women	565	472
	(80.3)	(76.1)
Men	139	148
	(19.7)	(23.9)
Children	504	592
Total number of groups	372	380
Average group size (individuals)[c]	3	3
Groups traveling with children	242	312
Average number children in groups with children	2	2
Average age (all group members)		
Women	40–49	42.8
Men	N/A	43.7
Children	Infant to 18	9.2
Respondent sex[d]		
Female	298	239
	(81.87)	(74.45)
Male	66	82
	(18.13)	(25.55)
Self-assessed language proficiency[e]		
English		
Basic/medium	150	205
	(21.3 %)	(33.1 %)
Advanced	209	39
	(29.7 %)	(6.3 %)
German		
Basic/medium	40	130
	(5.7 %)	(21 %)
Advanced	33	13
	(4.7 %)	(2.1 %)

[a] The 704 total adjusted for 79 children incorrectly indicated as adults and 40 adults incorrectly indicated as children.
[b] 620 adults and 592 children indicated their sex; whereas, 564 adults and 577 children indicated their age.
[c] Some groups may have included more than 8 members (adults + children), but we asked only about the first four adults and first four children.
[d] 364 respondents in Poland and 321 in Germany answered this question.
[e] Means were calculated based on total adults for Poland and for Germany.

restaurant experience. About 16 % of respondents had worked as personal caregivers or domestic staff, and 19 % had been drivers, farmers, construction, or sales workers. The most commonly spoken foreign language among adult refugees surveyed was English: 26 % said they were fluent and another 18 % claimed elementary knowledge; Polish was second with 3 % fluent and 12 % having elementary skills. 6 % of adults claimed some knowledge of German, 7 % of Italian, and 3 % of French.

Respondents interviewed in Germany in June had similar characteristics: three-quarters were women; 54 % had traveled with children; 15 % were over 60 years old; 79 % had higher education and 13 % had completed vocational training. The findings are consistent with the results of a survey conducted by the German government in March 2022, in which 86 % of respondents were women; 55 % arrived with children; and 6 % were over 60 years old. 73 % had higher education and 19 % had vocational education; 64 % were previously employed and another 22 % were self-employed (German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland (BMI), 2022). In terms of previous employment, the top three sectors included management (15 % of respondents), education (15 %), service (8 %), and 17 % were self-employed. 19 % said they knew some English, though 13 % categorized their proficiency as basic; 13 % knew German (12 % basic), and 5 % knew Polish (4 % basic).

Before discussing these populations in detail, a few words about how two countries, Poland and Germany, have met the challenge of Ukrainian forced migration. We focus on these countries because they have received the highest number of Ukrainian refugees since the full-scale war began in February 2022. Of the roughly 5 million Ukrainian refugees in Europe, 1.5 million are in Poland and about 1 million are in Germany (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2023). Poland and Ukraine have centuries of shared history and before the full-scale war, and Poland hosted Europe's most extensive Ukrainian labor migration diaspora. Germany was the leading destination for Ukrainian asylum seekers. Russian aggression against Ukraine in 2014 and especially after the full-scale attack in February 2022 triggered solidarity and spontaneous aid initiatives for Ukrainian refugees in both Poland and Germany (Duszczyk & Kaczmarczyk, 2022; Isański et al., 2022; Sereda et al., 2022; Staniszewski, 2022).

2.1. The response in Poland

According to Polish Border Guard data, in the first year of the war, over 9.5 million people crossed the Polish-Ukrainian border into Poland (UNHCR data portal), with over 100,000 crossing each day at the peak in March–April 2022. During the first days of the war, thousands of volunteers and NGOs rushed to the border to offer material aid to the arriving refugees. A report by the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants noted in July that authorities in Poland worked to simplify procedures and maximize border entry capacity to facilitate the speedy entry of refugees. Reception centers and a first-point contact network were set up to address medical and humanitarian needs and provide transportation and accommodation information (Morales, 2022).

The arrival into Poland was often a huge relief for the Ukrainians, who had been waiting in lines, in the cold, often without food, water or toilets for up to 12 h. One woman now in Poland explained what it was like to approach the border:

> 'We got out of the taxi and saw this huge line. The queue was several kilometers long… There were bio-toilets, and Polish volunteers entered Ukrainian territory and pitched tents. They kept us warm. They offered us instant noodles, tea, and all sorts of bars. The children were very happy. There was fire and blankets. We lasted from 12 am to 5 am in this terrible cold.'

Aid originally organized privately became institutionalized in the first weeks. Private individuals, NGOs and local authorities worked to coordinate their efforts. In cities relatively close to the Polish border, such as Lublin, city officials volunteered to help the forced migrants (Baszczak et al., 2022). The Polish parliament responded to the influx of refugees by passing an Act on Assistance for Ukrainian nationals in March 2022. The act allowed Ukrainian residents to register for a PESEL (the Polish acronym for "Universal Electronic System for Registration of the Population") ID number from mid-April. Once registered, they were allowed to legally stay in Poland for 18 months, work, and get access to free health care. (Previously, one had to be temporarily or permanently in Poland for over three months to get a PESEL number). Ukrainian children could go to school free of charge. Arriving Ukrainians were also eligible for other social benefits, including a monthly child allowance of 105 euros (PLN 500) per child, the same as Polish children (Morales, 2022). Over 950,000 Ukrainian refugees received one-off cash payments of approximately 64 Euros (PLN 300) per person and free in-kind assistance (e.g. clothes, hygiene products, food, internet cards) during the first month of their stay in Poland. The law also transferred funds to municipalities that were used to reimburse Poles for expenses if they provided food and housing to Ukrainian refugees at a rate of 8.6 Euros (PLN 40) for up to 120 days (Polish Economic Institute, 2022). Ukrainians were also given access to free public transportation (railways, buses, city trams). By the end of 2022, the Polish government was on track to have spent $8.3 billion on housing and other support for

Ukrainian refugees (Higgins, 2022).

Yet it was not only the Polish NGOs, local authorities, and government that stepped up to help Ukrainian refugees arriving in Poland. Humanitarian and international organizations set up warming tents and stations where refugees could get hot food, information, medical attention, and rides into Poland. By the beginning of March, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had set up nine Reception Centers along the border to provide support to refugees–Ukrainians and often overlooked non-Ukrainians – including legal counseling and help finding accommodations (IOM, 2022a). Within a week, the IOM was also providing wheelchairs, laundry machines, baby baths, clothing, and mobile charging stations (IOM, 2022b). However, their presence was incomparably smaller than the response of local civil society and self-aid groups.

Poles also responded personally to the crisis (Staniszewski, 2022). By the end of July, the UN estimated that over 2 million Ukrainians were staying in private Polish homes (Isański et al., 2022; Morales, 2022). By April, one in 8 respondents in the bordering south-east Podkarpackie region reported that they had provided housing to Ukrainian refugees (Polish Economic Institute, 2022). The border town of Rzeszów had already grown by over 50 %, Gdansk and Katowice by over 30 %. After a month of the war, the population of Warsaw had grown by 15 %, reaching 2 million souls for the first time (Fusiek, 2022; Union of Polish Metropolies, 2022). A survey of 2200 Poles by the Polish Economic institute in the spring found that over 70 % of respondents reported that they had helped Ukrainian refugees during the first months of the crisis; 59 % had purchased essential items for them, 53 % donated money, 17–20 % volunteered to help sort out problems, 7 % said they made their home or uninhabited properties available to refugees, 6 % helped find employment and 5 % organized transport from the border (Polish Economic Institute, 2022).

The warmth of the Poles waiting just across the border was evident to a 29-year old Ukrainian woman as she crossed the border:

> … I saw crowds of volunteers who ran to meet us. They grabbed bags, children, helped old people and women with children. They invited me to the heating point, there was hot food, tea, coffee, sandwiches. For small children there were diapers, formula, there were strollers for babies. There were also Red Cross tents where you could get medical help. There was a lot of attention and care.'

We wanted to understand what Ukrainian refugees who had settled in Poland and Germany needed, and asked respondents to list their most urgent needs (see Tables 2 and 3). Ukrainian refugees in Poland listed material assistance like food and clothing (57 % of respondents), housing (29 %), and medical care (9 %) (Isański et al., 2022). The fact that housing was a concern for only a third of respondents suggests that they had already managed to secure reliable shelter. Respondents were concerned about finding a job, but much less so than their compatriots in Germany (see Tables 2 and 3).

Although the 2022 wave of Ukrainian arrivals to Poland was driven by war rather than a search for labor, finding work was a priority for many. Legally employed Ukrainians pay into the social security system (ZUS). Before the war, some 627,000 Ukrainians were registered in the ZUS database (Mrugała & Tomczyk, 2022: 9). In 2022, over half a million Ukrainians registered with the system, 66.8 % of whom were women. Most of these women (72.3 %) had temporary work, a number lower than that of men– only 58 % of men had temporary work, with the rest permanently employed. December statistics showed that 766,000 Ukrainians, both labor migrants and refugees, were officially employed in Poland (Nowosielska & Otto, 2022).

In-depth interviews allow us to look behind promising statistics. Almost all our respondents in Poland told us that they already had PESEL IDs and some work. In many cases, however, the work was low-skilled, low-paid, and difficult. One 29-year old woman in Poland described how she is employed: "We work at a factory that makes soft upholstery for sofas and armchairs. … The work is hard, there is too much dust, it is very difficult to breathe there, but since we need money, we agreed to this work. We work from 14:00 to 19:00 every day. … We are registered officially, we pay taxes. But now we also took on additional work at night, as security guards."

A shortage of school openings for Ukrainian children led the Polish government to allow classes taught in Ukrainian, which created jobs for Ukrainian refugees with experience in education. There is also work for "support teachers" hired in classes taught in Polish but with Ukrainian children. But many Ukrainian refugees have trouble finding employment that corresponds to their skills (see Fig. 1).

Sometimes, the refugees don't know how to apply for jobs for which

Table 2
Self-reported most urgent needs of respondents in Poland and in Germany.

	Poland $N = 2123$	Germany Mean
Material assistance – clothes, shoes, food	278 **13.1 %**	282 Mean 3.59
Temporary shelter, overnight stay	110 5.2 %	179 Mean 2.17
Renting a long-term apartment	274 **12.9 %**	**296** **Mean 4.08**
Medical assistance, medications	**343** **16.1 %**	262 Mean 3.80
Psychological assistance	46 2.2 %	191 Mean 2.72
School/kindergarten/nursery for children	176 8.3 %	241 Mean 3.74
Finding a job	**341** **16.1 %**	**274** **Mean 4.03**
Legal assistance in legalizing the stay	75 3.5 %	194 Mean 3.54
Possibility of contact with relatives remaining in Ukraine	92 4.3 %	212 Mean 3.67
Possibility for other relatives to join me	91 4.3 %	203 Mean 3.54
Possibility to travel to another country	32 1.5 %	162 Mean 2.17
Polish/German language course	226 10.7 %	**295** **Mean 4.35**
The opportunity to practice my religion	11 0.5 %	162 Mean 2.02
Physiotherapy, rehabilitation	28 1.3 %	–
Possibility for a short visit to Ukraine	–	234 Mean 3.67
Recognition of my professional status and education	–	**248** **Mean 4.10**

Note: This table reflects the number (percentage for Poland; mean value for Germany) of people who identified a need as most important. The most often mentioned concerns are bolded.

Table 3
"What are your biggest concerns about staying in Poland? Choose the five most important concerns."

	$N = 1775$
Lack of money and livelihood	286 (16.11 %)
Poor knowledge of the Polish language	255 (14.35 %)
Fear that I would not have a proper access to medical support	187 (10.54 %)
I don't know how people will receive us here	62 (3.5 %)
I don't know when I will be able to come back	260 (14.64 %)
Fear for the fate of relatives who stayed in Ukraine	359 (20.22 %)
Fear for the fate of my homeland	333 (18.75 %)
Other	33 (1.8 %)



Fig. 1. Prior work-related experience of respondents in Poland and Germany. Note that questions on skills and jobs were not identical in the Polish and German surveys. We therefore report skills for the 330 respondents in Poland, and prior employment for the 390 respondents in Germany.

they are qualified. One 53-year old respondent explained, 'All Ukrainians who come here expect that they will have to work some hard, dirty work because they do not know the language, they do not know what to do and they are confused. My friend … translated [my CV] into Polish… After a while, I also got a call from a company which offered me a job with refugees because I had also worked as a journalist for many years.'

Another important issue, finding childcare for younger children, has also proven to be an obstacle to entering the job market and sometimes leads Ukrainians to consider returning home. A 29-year old Ukrainian woman told us, '"The reason I'm not staying here [in Poland] is work. I am here alone with my son.... If I had a mother, a sister, or at least a husband here, I would know that he was under supervision…"

2.2. The response in Germany

According to the UNHCR data portal, Germany is hosting just over one million Ukrainian refugees, the second largest population of Ukrainian displaced persons. Of this million, 815,134 had registered for Temporary Protection status as of November 2022, which entitled them to social benefits, medical care and accommodation, as well as access to schools, the labor market and integration courses (Düvell, 2022). TP status is valid for 1 year but can be extended for up to 3 years. German Interior Minister Nancy Faeser stated in October that 70 % of adult arrivals were women, and one third were teenagers and children. Finding enough housing for everyone has proved to be a challenge (Grieshaber, 2022).

Like Poland, Germany experienced a surge of arrivals in early March and April 2022. Many reported that they had not prepared to flee and had to be persuaded to go by family members or men who were staying to fight. A 72-year-old woman who had arrived in Germany described what had happened in her family as follows: "He [my son] joined the territorial defense. He came and told us, 'pack up and run away!' I started to cry. Where to? My daughter and I really didn't want to go. We don't know anything there." Because Germany does not share a border with Ukraine, the refugees arrived from Poland with a lag. Non-governmental organizations and individuals mobilized to meet Ukrainian refugees at train stations and help them with translation, food, clothes, housing, medical and psychological services, legal assistance, and other support. As in Poland, civil society was first to respond, with state and local governments joining the effort later. As of June, Ukrainians were eligible to receive monthly payments of around 400 Euros per person (DW, 2022) (see Table 4).

Given that they too were looking to find work quickly, as in Poland, Ukrainian refugees in Germany headed to the largest cities. Germany allocates each of its 16 states (lander) a quota for refugees, who are distributed across the country according to an algorithm that takes into account each state's population and tax revenue. Nonetheless, by September 2022, 12 of Germany's 16 states reported that they were at their breaking point (Glucroft, 2022).

Whereas the Polish government prioritized reimbursing receiving families, the German government provided benefits directed to displaced Ukrainians, including free transportation and medical insurance, social housing (or subsidized rent), monthly welfare benefits of about 450 euros and an additional payment for each child. Children are allowed – indeed obligated – to attend school though there are no national guidelines governing how they are placed. In some of Germany's 16 states, children need to attend "welcome classes" before they can go to regular German schools. In others, they are placed in special preparatory classes for up to a year, while still others had the children start German school immediately. By December 2022, 201,000 Ukrainian children had been integrated into German schools, but demand still

Table 4
"Who offered you support upon your arrival to your location [in Germany]?"

Ukrainian volunteers/self-aid groups	323
Did not help	53 (16.4 %)
Somehow helped	97 (30.0 %)
Helped a lot	1–2 (31.6 %)
Not applicable	71 (22.0 %)
Germans you knew before (friends, colleagues, relatives)	315
Did not help	43 (13.7 %)
Somehow helped	30 (9.5 %)
Helped a lot	146 (46.3 %)
Not Applicable	96 (30.5 %)
German volunteers/self-aid groups	321
Did not help	44 (13.7 %)
Somehow helped	82 (25.5 %)
Helped a lot	136 (42.2 %)
Not Applicable	59 (18.4 %)

Note: This question was only asked in Germany.



Fig. 2. The situation for school-age children.
Note: 248 respondents in Poland and 269 in Germany indicated the status of their children's schooling.

exceeded supply (Kinkartz, 2022) (see Fig. 2).

In both Poland and Germany, children thus become the main factor around which refugees' adaptation strategies are structured. Young women without children are also pulled into the problem of providing childcare. Many traveled as helpers or mediators with women who are distantly related, friends, or godchildren. Women leaving Ukraine often offered to take the children of family members or friends who were staying. A 35-year old woman in Germany recounted, "As they began shelling around Kyiv, I was afraid for [my] child. … I called [his] godfather to tell him that I am leaving tomorrow and l could take my god-child. She didn't want to go at first, but I came to them, we talked, consulted and she went with us. She is already 16 years old." The ties between separated family members end up shaping women's strategies in the hosting countries. And once anchored by children, it will be more difficult for refugees to return home. Consider the perspective of a 42-year old Ukrainian mother in Germany,

> 'In this school, no one spoke Ukrainian or Russian. Russian was only spoken by 1-2 female teachers at the school, but they did not teach in the classroom. Today, my son speaks English fluently and he is starting to speak German so confidently. Therefore, I understand that this is a huge plus for his education. In March, my language course ends and I plan to return to Ukraine .... I plan to leave the little one here for a year so that he can learn German. …'

Those receiving temporary protection status are allowed to work but finding work has proven challenging for Ukrainian refugees in Germany. Those with inadequate German language proficiency must take six months of "integration" language courses, which delays their entrance to the job market. In the long term this may help the newly arrived gain the necessary language skills, but it is less efficient than the Polish system which demands only that those who arrive register for a PESEL number before looking for work. A 42-year old woman explained that,

> 'Job prospects are such that if you want to work not in some simple job, such as a cashier in a supermarket or a cleaner… you need to have a language level of B-A, both English and German. …. That is also not easy. For example, I can only work part-time now…. because my language course starts at 1:45 p.m. and it takes me about 40 minutes to get there. And the course lasts until 18:00.'

By October 2022, 51,000 Ukrainians had found jobs, 17,000 had part-time positions, and 423,000 had registered as looking for employment in Germany (German Federal Work Agency, 2022). Our survey suggests that the slow uptake of jobs is explained by the need to acquire language proficiency, slower bureaucracy, and the difficulty of placing children into kindergartens and schools. The option for female migrants to take a 34-hour "Migrant Women Simply Strong in Daily Life" class to practice their German and talk about their daily life (German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, 2022) may seem far out of reach, as a 41-year old mother explained. "I could not go to the courses, because I had no one to leave my children with. And we lived in such a village that there were no courses in our village, so we had to go 40 km away for these courses. And here's the thing, you understand that you can live in this village and adapt somehow, but you can't grow and develop somewhere."

Some Ukrainian refugees are not interested in acquiring the Temporary Protection status that would allow them to receive benefits because it limits their ability to travel back to Ukraine. Germany requires that TP migrants in Germany register in a specific state and municipality; once they do it is very difficult to move, even within Germany. Someone who moves to a different municipality without permission cannot receive social welfare benefits. Thus, unregistered migrants who take advantage of the 90-day visa-free travel regime are more mobile but do not receive benefits.

Though it is difficult to directly compare, it seems that Germans has been somewhat less receptive to Ukrainian migrants than Poles. Our June survey found that a quarter of respondents had experienced some discrimination from the local Russian-speaking diaspora, with only 5 % reporting hostility from other groups. As the war drags on, support for Ukrainian refugees across Europe may flag, driven partly by a Russian propaganda effort (Morris & Oremus, 2022). A quarterly survey of European public opinion found that 77 % of Europeans are willing to accept Ukrainian refugees in their country though the number varies by country, with Spain being the most receptive and France the least (though still at 72 %). In Germany, readiness to accept Ukrainian refugees has declined from 86 % in March to 74 % in September (Hoffman, 2022).

2007 surveys in Europe revealed a high level of openly-expressed xenophobia towards refugees (Regional Representation for Central Europe & United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2008). However contemporary surveys of European citizens show a markedly different attitude towards accepting refugees now compared to attitudes during previous refugee crises: only 3 % of Poles and 4 % of Germans surveyed state that Ukrainians should not be admitted to their countries. Compare that to the 13 % of Poles and 6 % of Germans who had said that no Syrian refugees should be allowed into their countries (Drazanova & Geddes, 2022). Ukrainians in Europe have, for the most part, been met in receiving countries with solidarity that is visibly higher than what was extended to previous waves of refugees.

This may be partly explained by the cultural affinity of Europeans with Ukrainians, but it is also likely due to the fact that most of the Ukrainians arriving in Europe are women. Previous studies of civic engagement and social integration of refugees in Germany have shown that female refugees tend to be more engaged in a wide range of activities offered by receiving communities including leisure activities, language lessons, sports and art lessons, and counseling on everyday issues. These activities not only help them legalize and receive social benefits faster, but also help create new social networks and practice of a new language through informal interactions (Barreto et al., 2022). The feminization of Ukrainian displacement may thus have created additional ground for solidarity and interaction with receiving communities.

2.3. Ukrainian migration to Europe before 2014, and between 2014 and 2022

While the media has focused on the mass exodus and internal displacement of Ukrainians since Russia invaded in February 2022, Ukrainians have been actively moving within the Eurasian and European space for over a century (Fedyuk & Kindler, 2016). What has changed is the nature of this migration. Prior to 2014, migration from Ukraine was employment-driven. Estimates of the number of Ukrainians who worked abroad in the last two decades vary from 2 to 5 million based on populations surveyed and methodologies that attempt to calculate the number of workers missing from the local labor market (State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSS), 2009; State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSS), 2013). Surveys suggested that on average 70 % were male and most were married. Only one destination, Italy, was dominated by female labor migrants. A survey of female labor migrants in Italy found that only 6 % had no children; over 75 % had left one or two children in Ukraine, while 8 % had left three or more children behind (Malynovska et al., 2005). The same survey found that most migrants had completed secondary school or vocational training.

2014 was a critical year in Ukrainian history. In February, Russian troops invaded and occupied Crimea. In April, Russia began supporting separatist movements in the Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, touching off a civil war that had claimed 14,000 lives by 2022. At least 2.8 million people were displaced according to a needs assessment conducted in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts; 1.7 million people had registered as internally displaced, about one million had moved to Russia, and some 100,000 moved to nearby countries where they registered as refugees or labor migrants (Vakhitova & Iavorskyi, 2020).

Russia had been the most popular destination for Ukrainian labor

migrants in 2012 but ceased to be after 2014 (Pienkowski, 2020). In contrast, political ties with EU strengthened. After the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA) was signed and came into force, labor migration between Ukraine and Europe became easier.

Receiving asylum in the EU remained very difficult, however. The number of Ukrainians applying for asylum in the EU was rather small, peaking at around 22,000 in 2015 (a 20-fold increase over 2013 numbers) before falling to under 10,000 in the next three years (IOM, 2019), and then dropping to just over 5000 in 2020 and 2021 as the conflict in Ukraine stabilized. Between 2013 and 2021, 16,100 Ukrainians were granted asylum in EU member states. Importantly, across the EU, the share of female to male asylum seekers (47.4 % female vs 51.6 % male) increased relative to the proportion among labor migrants. In Germany, the ratio resembled the average (48.4 % female to 51.5 % male), whereas in Poland the ratio was slightly more skewed towards men at 43.7 % female vs 56.1 % male (Eurostat, 2022).

The number of Ukrainians applying for asylum in Europe before 2022 was far less than the number of those traveling to Russia or European countries for work. This was not, however, the narrative put forth by Polish and Hungarian politicians trying to rebuff European calls for them to accept more Syrian refugees. In 2016, for example, Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo rejected the refugee quota assigned by the EU, telling the European Parliament that Poland had taken instead 'a million Ukrainian refugees.' The real number was under ten (Dziennik Gazeta, 2016). Meanwhile, the number of residence permits issued to Ukrainians for employment skyrocketed from 387,000 in 2014 to 1.7 million in 2017 (IOM Ukraine, 2019). Viktor Orban's government in Hungary solved a labor shortage by privileging Ukrainian labor migrants and then using them as an excuse not to accept Syrians (Pancevski, 2019). Ukrainian citizens of Hungarian ethnicity even received Hungarian citizenship.

In short, Ukrainians leaving their country before February 2022 were denied refugee status and pushed towards labor migration, which makes it difficult to categorize refugees as war-driven or labor-driven. Indeed, Vang argues that a "refugee is a 'compositional subject' whose critical position against the violence of colonialism and war, state government and national belonging is configured through these very domains of power" (Vang et al., 2016). However, it is important to note that the link between the wave of migration from Ukraine after 2014 and the war was, in public opinion, quite clear; mass emigration to Poland simply did not exist earlier. As in the cases of emigration waves from Syria and North Africa, it is difficult to assert that we can determine the primary motive driving mass migration.

Among labor migrants in Europe, Ukrainians became a dominant nationality. In 2013, 14 % of the 1.63 million first-time resident permits issued in EU countries were issued to Ukrainians; in 2021, 30 %, or 856,000, permits went to Ukrainians. (The next most prominent group was Moroccans, who claimed only 5 % of permits). Eurostat (2022) data indicate that Ukrainians received the most residence permits of any national group in Poland, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, and Denmark (but not in Germany). Before the war in February 2022, Germany listed roughly 156,000 Ukrainians in the Central Register of Foreigners (AZR); 48 % were women, 8000 said they were unemployed, and another 20,000 registered as job-seekers.

Both Poland (in 2018) and Germany (in 2020) liberalized employment and legalization procedures, extended temporary residence permits, and signed bilateral social security agreements with Ukraine. Both Poland and Germany sought to attract Ukrainian workers but fewer Ukrainians worked in Germany than in Poland; Germany is farther away and the Polish language is close to Ukrainian and was easier for labor migrants to acquire. As a result, Poland became the primary EU destination for Ukrainian temporary workers, students, and permanent labor migrants. The estimated number of Ukrainian migrants in Poland almost tripled, reaching 507,000 in 2017 (Vakhitova & Fihel, 2020). According to a survey conducted in 2018 among Ukrainian migrants in Poland, over 70 % of those surveyed held different types of long-term permits, and only 4.2 % claimed they were undocumented (Mikheieva & Susak, 2019). Before the war the Polish Central Statistical Office estimated that there were 1.35 million Ukrainians working in the country (Duszczyk & Kaczmarczyk, 2022). Most were from Western Ukraine (48 %) or the center of the country (31 %, including 6 % from Kyiv). Only 16 % were from southern Ukraine and 5 % from the east.

Germany also lagged in welcoming Ukrainian labor migrants because its legislative regime was less permissive than those of other countries. Poland courted Ukrainian workers beginning in 2008 when it allowed Ukrainians to work for up to 6 months per calendar year without an employment permit as long as an employer sponsored the worker. Germany relaxed barriers to accessing its labor market only in 2020 when the Skilled Immigration Act came into force (Khrebet, 2020). Moreover, the Ukrainian workers going to Germany were different from those heading to Poland; a 2012 survey found that 90 % of those who had worked in the former had higher education, compared to 12 % of those who had worked in Poland (Libanova, 2013).

The increasing number of Ukrainian labor migrants in the EU in general combined with the liberalization of employment regulations, created a new Ukrainian diaspora. This diaspora actively participated in the accommodation of Ukrainian refugees in after 2014, and was even more supportive after Russia's full scale aggression (Düvell & Lapshyna, 2022; Duszczyk & Kaczmarczyk, 2022). This Ukrainian diaspora, together with local activists and volunteers, became the primary source of support for Ukrainian refugees after February 24, 2022. Respondents to our survey in Germany reported that upon arrival they were offered help by different groups. Over 60 % reported receiving assistance from Ukrainian and German volunteers or self-aid groups. 55 % reported also having been helped by Germans they knew (friends, colleagues, or relatives). Respondents in Poland were asked if they knew local people who could help them (see Table 5).

Nonetheless, a survey by the National Bank of Poland between April and May 2022 found that most Ukrainians arriving in Poland had not been there before. About 14 % of the respondents had worked in Poland before but 28 % said that family members had been employed in Poland before and were thus able to orient them to the country. 12 % had friends who had been there. The National Bank report concluded, "an important fact is that for more than 50% of the refugees who came to Poland displaced by the war, it was a completely new experience, unknown from both personal experiences and from the accounts of relatives and friends." The degree to which respondents had friends or family with knowledge of Poland varied depending on which part of Ukraine the refugees had called home (National Bank of Poland, 2022).

Before the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February, it was primarily residents of Crimea and the Donbas that were displaced. After February 2022, military hostilities forced people from central and

Table 5
"Do you know people here that you can ask for help? If so, how many?"

	Poland	Germany
I know Germans/Poles/locals who live here.	386	317
No one	160 (41.5 %)	47 (14.8 %)
1 person	93 (24.1 %)	76 (24.0 %)
2–5 persons	108 (28.0 %)	161 (50.8 %)
6 and more	25 (6.5 %)	33 (10.4 %)
I know Ukrainians who live here.	288	292
No one	58 (20.1 %)	75 (25.7 %)
1 person	99 (34.4 %)	55 (18.8 %)
2–5 persons	96 (33.3 %)	119 (40.8 %)
6 and more	35 (12.2 %)	43 (14.7 %)

eastern Ukraine to flee (see Fig. 3). Whereas Ukrainians in the western part of the country had considerable experience in moving back and forth to European countries to work, those from central and eastern regions had been less involved in cross-border labor migration and movement, and had much less experience crossing the border into other countries. For them, the need to leave suddenly came as a shock (see Fig. 3).

The western part of Ukraine sent proportionately more female workers than the south (46 % vs. 42 %) or the eastern part of the country (41 %). This difference reflected the difference in the sectors to which the regional populations gravitated. The West provided more workers for domestic or public service jobs proportionally. In contrast, the South and East of Ukraine sent migrants to work in industry, transport, construction, and IT, which tend to be male-dominated (Mikheeva & Susak, 2019).

However receptive both Polish and German societies have been towards displaced Ukrainians, we cannot overlook the darker side of feminized migration. Young women traveling alone or with children are a vulnerable group exposed to the risk of trafficking and exploitation. There have been reports pointing to cases of abuse (Bauer-Babef, 2022; Pertek et al., 2022) but among our respondents, interlocutors testified that they were suffering from war-related trauma (mostly psychological) and had not had the bandwidth to pay attention to their security while traveling or even settling with private hosts. None of our respondents spoke of sexual abuse experienced while migrating, but they may have been inhibited by a fear of disclosure or bias; some did mention that they had been threatened with sexual abuse by Russian soldiers while still in Ukraine. In Poland, respondents stressed that Temporary Protection Status was not a solution to enforced dependency situations in which they found themselves. Many complained about labor exploitation and poor working conditions. Given that the Polish government recently terminated the program that provided displaced Ukrainians with financial support accommodations, this aspect of the situation calls for additional research and monitoring.

3. Conclusions

This paper has tried to describe the scale and nature of the Ukrainian refugee migration since February 24, 2022. The toll of war on Ukraine, on those still in Ukraine, and on those who have left the country has yet to be fully understood. What is clear from our research is that those who have arrived in Poland and Germany are both fortunate to have escaped immediate danger, and are confronting tremendous personal, professional, financial and familial challenges. A 28-year old woman from Kryvyi Rih explained during an interview in Poland:

> I am very worried about what may happen not only to the city but also to my parents. Now I am worried because me and my child are safe, but my parents and friends are not. Almost all my friends, co-workers, and everyone I communicated with stayed in Ukraine. I have a guilty conscience that they are there, and I am here.

For decades scholars have tried to adapt migration theory to globalization-driven changes in how people move from one country to another, and even back and forth (Castles, 2002) but circular migration is difficult to capture in research. Even more unusual are situations like what we observe in Poland and Germany, where circular or pendular migration sets the stage for subsequent refugee movements– and then continues as some migrants forsake anchoring practices in their receiving country to preserve the flexibility to return home at will.

Our research suggests couple of important features of the wave of Ukrainian refugees breaking across Europe since February 2022:

First, this new wave of migration is overwhelmingly female. The literature on "feminized forced migration" is usually conceptualized as "the result of violence or [...] an act of opposition to violence at the intersection of various regimes" (Parson, 2010; Urbańska, 2016). This definition focuses on the issue of feminized forced migration in the realm of an individualized relationship to violence. It overlooks other dimensions, including situational conditions or events that leave a mark on the biographies of broader groups. As we consider the experience of Ukrainian refugees, it is clear that we need to reframe the concept of feminized forced migration to include migration driven by collective events like war and other forms of group violence. Wartime-forced migration is significantly different from migration described in the context of individual or structural-legal conditions. In a sense, the self-consciousness of forced migrants creates a mass situational context, it triggers a social process that changes women. The dynamics of this process are also influenced by the fluctuating nature of the stay in exile, linked to departure and return.

Second, refugees from Ukraine are traveling in groups with children, which have an important impact on their concerns and decision-making. Before the war, labor migrants usually left their children behind and traveled alone to another country for work. Now the women take their children with them and leave their husbands behind. Almost all the refugees interviewed in depth had one or more children with them. Many said that they only left Ukraine to keep their children safe. When Russian aggression against Ukraine began in 2014, some families moved only their children because they couldn't afford to move the entire family (Mikheieva & Sereda, 2015). Now those who leave have been taking the most vulnerable family members out of the country – children, older people, or those who need medical care. People who completed our surveys in Poland and Germany usually traveled in groups of two and sometimes three generations, which affects what they needed to arrange before they can enter the job market. One-third of respondents focused on enrolling their children in school upon arrival. Women who cannot find appropriate childcare or educational



Fig. 3. Sending region for refugees in Poland (377 respondents) and Germany (375 respondents).

placement may even be forced to return to Ukraine.

Third, Ukrainian migration patterns before Russia's full-scale invasion of February 2022 have influenced choices and patterns of migration after 2022. The mostly-male migrants from Ukraine before the war created networks and experiences that were important to the mostly-female migrants arriving in Poland and Germany after February 2022. Our survey found that many Ukrainian war refugees arriving in Poland knew not only "someone from Ukraine who is already here" (44 %) but also Poles (43 %).

There are, however, critical differences between what we see now and Ukrainian migration to Europe before Russia's full scale invasion of February 2022. Around three-quarters of Ukrainians in Europe are women (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, 2022), and many are traveling with children and without husbands or elderly parents. They face an acute need for childcare, school, and work, all while trying to keep open the possibility of regularly traveling back to Ukraine to check on relatives. This tension often determines whether or not they apply for temporary protection or asylum status that could "lock" them in place outside of Ukraine.

Fourth, Ukrainian refugees have been driven from Ukraine by war, but many want to regularly go back home from time to time. Because men aged 18–60 are not allowed to leave Ukraine, the women who have left feel the need to return to check on them, or their houses, or elderly relatives as soon as they have set up their children and traveling groups in the destination country in Europe. The movement of Ukrainians back and forth over the border is one of the unique features of this migration crisis. After Russia pulled its troops back from north and northeast Ukraine in May 2022, the frontline stabilized and migration *into* Ukraine became almost as common as migration out of Ukraine. The pattern of moving back and forth across the Ukrainian border tracks with labor migration patterns before 2022, when Ukrainian labor migrants would work in Europe for a few months and then return home before restarting the cycle. Pendulum labor migration was particularly common among female caregivers who worked during their 90-day visa-free stay in the EU and then returned to their families for 90 days.

Practically all our interlocutors declared they are willing to return to Ukraine, but only under certain conditions. Many stressed that without peace and renovated infrastructure (e.g., schools, hospitals, and apartments), it would be challenging to return, especially with children. These respondents are now planning longer stays in Poland or Germany and were willing to overcome the challenges of emigration for their children's safety and future. A 34-year old Ukrainian woman in Poland explained,

> We want these [Russian] orcs to be forced from our land and for us to return home in peace and live our normal lives. But what we are seeing now will be for a long time. There will be offensives, and counterattacks. They will occupy the territory. …I am afraid that many more people, houses, schools, and hospitals will be affected … Already half of Kharkiv is simply destroyed. My grandmother was left homeless because her house was on the outskirts of the city. Artillery worked there every half hour and there … Horror. I think it will still take a long time.

The research described above reflects the first year of the war when migrants left Ukraine en masse and tried to adapt to new circumstances in Europe. How long the war lasts will determine whether refugees decide to settle in Poland, Germany, or other receiving countries, if only to avoid relocating their children again. Refugees who try to integrate themselves into society in a new country will face additional challenges, particularly since most of them have left family members at home – though this time, it is the husbands, not the children, who have remained behind in Ukraine (Polish Economic Institute, 2022: 36). As the war drags on, the needs of refugees will change, and require that receiving societies adapt. A senior official at a Polish bank hosted five Ukrainian refugees at his home in Poland and said, "They need employment, a stable income, free education, and free access to health and public services to create a new life in Poland" (Fusiek, 2022). Even as they dream of returning home to Ukraine.

Declaration of competing interest

The authors declare they have no conflicts of interest. *Adam Mickiewicz University (Poland) provided $2000 in funding to support the survey research.*

Appendix A. Comparison of surveys of Ukrainian refugees, 2022

	UNHCR May–November 7 European countries (United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights, n.d.)	National Bank of Poland April–May (Chmielewska-Kalińska et al., 2022)	UN IOM April – December Poland (IOM, 2022c)	Federal Ministry of Interior & Homeland March 24–29 Berlin/Hamburg/ Munich, Germany (German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland (BMI), 2022)
# surveyed	43,571	3165	7538	1936
% women	85 %	90 %	89 %	84 %
% over 60	13 %	25 %	N/A	6 %
Traveling with children	36 %	60 %	N/A	58 %
# of children	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Education	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Higher	47 %	50 %	N/A	73 %
Vocational training	29 %	35 % (secondary)	N/A	19 %
Languages	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Polish	N/A	5 % (well) 46 % (a little)	N/A	5 %
German	N/A	27 %	N/A	13 %
English	N/A	(English or other European language)	N/A	19 %

References

Ambrosini, M., Van Hootegem, A., Bevelander, P., Daphi, P., Diels, E., Fouskas, T., & Stern, V. (2019). *The refugee reception crisis: Polarized opinions and mobilizations*. Brussels: Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

Barreto, C., Berbée, P., Torres, K. G., Lange, M., & Sommerfeld, K. (2022). *The civic engagement and social integration of refugees in Germany*. Nonprofit Policy Forum. https://doi.org/10.1515/npf-2022-0015

Bauer-Babef, C. (2022). *Trafficking and sexual exploitation of Ukrainian refugees on the rise*. November 30. EURACTIV https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/news/trafficking-and-sexual-exploitation-of-ukrainian-refugees-on-the-rise/. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Bhuyan, R., Vargas, A., & Pintin-Perez, M. (2016). Fleeing domestic violence from a 'safe' country? Refugee determination for Mexican asylum seekers in Canada. *Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees, 32*(1).

Caritas Internationalis. (2012). *The Female Face of Migration: Background Paper*. http://www.caritas.org/includes/pdf/backgroundmigration.pdf.

Castles, S. (2002). Migration and community formation under conditions of globalization. *International Migration Review, 36*(4), 1143–1168. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-7379.2002.tb00121.x

CMR Spotlight by Górny, A., Kaczmarczyk, P. (2023). Between Ukraine and Poland. Ukrainian migrants in Poland during the war, CMR Spotlight No. 2 (48) https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/Spotlight-FEBRUARY-2023.pdf.

CMR Spotlight by Pietrusińska, M. J., Nowosielski, M. (2022). Ukrainian forced migrants and the (in)equalities of the Polish educational system. CMR Spotlight No. 7, July 2022. https://www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Spotlight-2022-07.pdf.

Dragostinova, T. (2016). Refugees or immigrants? The migration crisis in Europe in historical perspective. *Origins: Current Events in Historical Perspective, 9*(4), 1–16.

Duszczyk, M., & Kaczmarczyk, P. (2022). The war in Ukraine and migration to Poland: Outlook and challenges. *Intereconomics, 57*(3).

Düvell, F. (2022). *Flucht aus der Ukraine und aus dem globalen Süden über den Balkan DrIMIS*. Universität Osnabrück.

Elmhirst, R. (2007). Tigers and gangsters: Masculinities and feminised migration in Indonesia. *Population Space and Place, 13*(3), 225–238.

Eurostat. (2022). Ukrainian citizens in the EU. Retrieved from. In *Eurostat statistics: Explained* https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=Ukrainian_citizens_in_the_EU&oldid=584674#Ukrainian_citizens_authorised_to_stay_in_the_EU. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Baszczak, Ł., Kiełczewska, A., Kukołowicz, P., Wincewicz, A., & Zyzik, R. (2022). *How Polish society has been helping refugees from Ukraine*. Warsaw: Polish Economic Institute. https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Drazanova, L., & Geddes, A. (2022). *Europeans welcome Ukrainian refugees but governments need to show they can manage*. EUI Robert Schuman Centre. https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/attitudes-towards-ukrainian-refugees-and-the-responses-of-european-governments/. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Dziennik Gazeta, P. (2016). Szydło w PE o milionie ukraińskich uchodźców w Polsce. W 2015 r. było ich dwóch www.gazetaprawna.pl/wiadomosci/artykuly/918747,szydlo-milion-ukrainskich-uchodzcow-w-polsce.html. (Accessed 20 May 2023).

Chmielewska-Kalińska, I., Dudek, B., & Strzelecki, P. (2022). *The living and economic situation of Ukrainian refugees in Poland: Report of the questionnaire survey conducted by NBP Regional Branches*. National Bank of Poland. https://nbp.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/11/ukrainian-refugees-2022.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR). (2022). *Regional protection profiling and monitoring factsheet: Profiles, needs & intentions of refugees from Ukraine. December 2022*. https://app.powerbi.com/view?r=eyJrIjoiMWU3NjkzYmEtNDYzMC00M2EyLTkwMjctMGIwZTA0MTQwMjU5IiwidCI6ImU1YzM3OTgxLTY2NjQtNDEzNC04YTBjLTY1NDNkMmFmODBiZSIsImMiOjh9&pageName=ReportSectionb9333061a0a2e93930ea. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR). (2023). *UNHCR: One year after the Russian invasion, insecurity clouds return intentions of displaced Ukrainians*. February 2023 https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2023/2/63f78c0a4/unhcr-year-russian-invasion-insecurity-clouds-return-intentions-displaced.html. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Regional Representation for Central Europe, B., & United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights (UNHCR). (2008). UNHCR protection training manual for European border and entry officials, chapter 7: Annex 5 being a refugee. In *Age, gender and diversity mainstreaming report 2007*. http://www.unhcr.org/4d94890e9.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Düvell, F., & Lapshyna, I. (2022). The Russian invasion of Ukraine: Scope, patterns and future development of displacement. IMIS. Retrieved from. In *Short analysis. IMIS working paper 14*. Osnabrück: Institut für Migrationsforschung und Interkulturelle Studien (IMIS) der Universität Osnabrück https://www.imis.uni-osnabrueck.de/fileadmin/4_Publikationen/PDFs/IMIS_WP14_Ukraine_D%c3%bcvell_Lapshyna.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Fedyuk, O. (2016). The Gender Perspective in Ukrainian Migration. In O. Fedyuk, & M. Kindler (Eds.), *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. IMISCOE Research Series*. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9_5.

Fedyuk, O., & Kindler, M. (2016). Migration of Ukrainians to the European Union: Background and Key Issues. In O. Fedyuk, & M. Kindler (Eds.), *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. IMISCOE Research Series*. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9_1.

Fusiek, D. (2022). The needs of refugees. https://www.eib.org/en/stories/ukrainian-poland-infrastructure-refugees. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

German Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF). Migrant women simply strong in everyday life (MiA courses). https://www.bamf.de/DE/Themen/Integration/ZugewanderteTeilnehmende/AngeboteFrauen/Kursprogramm-MiA/kursprogramm-mia-node.html. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

German Federal Work Agency. (2022). Effects of refugee migration from Ukraine on the labor market and basic security for jobseekers. In *Report: Job market compact*. https://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de/DE/Statischer-Content/Statistiken/Themen-im-Fokus/Ukraine-Krieg/Generische-Publikationen/AM-kompakt-Auswirkungen-Fluchtmigration-Ukraine-Arbeitsmarkt.pdf?_blob=publicationFile&v=6&fbclid=IwAR1Gx0EM0gqDnOynz_ckBhgiEe5Mm302l1XprPQ8GSnEqF8GrQgu6fyDpc8. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Glucroft, W. N. (2022). *Ukrainian refugees push German cities to their limits*. DW. https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainian-refugees-push-german-cities-to-their-limits/a-63582661#:~:text=%22Welcome%20culture%22%20runs%20into%20resource,getting%20to%20be%20too%20much.&text=They%20have%20the%20space%20to,refugees%2C%20but%20not%20much%20else. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Goodman, S., Sirriyeh, A., & McMahon, S. (2017). The evolving (re) categorisations of refugees throughout the "refugee/migrant crisis". *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology, 27*(2), 105–114.

Grieshaber, K. (2022). *Germany struggles to find housing for more than 1M refugees*. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-business-germany-migration-9422b45ed306a2e426b61749507364b5. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Haleh, A. (2007). Women, wars, citizenship, migration, and identity: Some illustrations from the Middle East. *The Journal of Development Studies, 43*(2), 237–244.

Harney, N. (2011). Migrant strategies, informal economies and ontological security: Ukrainians in Naples, Italy. *International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 32*(1/2).

Harris, J. (2000). Refugee women: failing to implement solutions. Human Rights Brief 7, no. 3 https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/hrbrief/vol7/iss3/12/. (Accessed 20 May 2023).

Higgins, A. (2022). *In Poland, a warm welcome for Ukrainian refugees wobbles*. New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2022/11/15/world/europe/poland-ukrainian-war-refugees.html. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Hoffman, I. (2022). *Support for Ukraine is declining slightly*. Bertelsmann Stiftung. https://www.bertelsmann-stiftung.de/en/topics/latest-news/2022/december/support-for-ukraine-is-declining-slightly. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

IOM. (2019). *Migration in Ukraine: Facts and figures*. https://ukraine.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl1861/files/documents/iom-ukraine_facts-eng_2019.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

IOM. (2022). *Regional Ukraine response: Situation report #1*. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/situation_reports/file/iom-regional-ukraine-response-external-sitrep-28022022-final.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

IOM. (2022). *Regional Ukraine response: Situation report #3*. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/situation_reports/file/iom-regional-ukraine-response-external-sitrep-07032022-final.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

IOM. (2022). Ukraine response 2022: Poland. In *, 2022. Refugee flows to Poland: Needs and intentions survey, end of year factsheet 2022: Data collected 12 April – 10 December 2022*. https://reliefweb.int/report/poland/ukraine-response-2022-poland-refugee-flows-poland-needs-and-intentions-survey-end-year-factsheet-data-collected-12-april-10-december-2022. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Isański, J., Michalski, M., Marek, N., Sereda, V., & Vakhitova, H. (2022). Social reception and integration of Ukrainian refugees. In *UKREF 1*. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.28450.91845

Jones, A. (2008). A silent but mighty river: The costs of women's economic migration. *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* (Vol. 33, no. 4).

Juran, S. (2017). A profile of Germany's refugee populations. *Population and Development Review*, 149–157.

Karpova, Y. (2005). Etnodemograficheskiie aspekty migratsionnykh processov v Rossii i na Ukraine. *Sotsiologicheskiie issledovaniia., 12*, 94–100.

Khrebet, A. (2020). *Germany and Poland compete for Ukrainian migrant workers*. Atlantic Council. https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/germany-and-poland-compete-for-ukrainian-migrant-workers/. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Kindler, M. (2011). *A risky business? Ukrainian migrant women in Warsaw's domestic work sector*. Amsterdam University Press. https://library.oapen.org/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/34536/416051.pdf?sequence=1. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Kinkartz, S. (2022). *Ukrainian refugee kids face a challenge in German schools?* DW. https://www.dw.com/en/ukrainian-refugee-kids-face-a-challenge-in-german-schools/a-64109244#:~:text=Around%20201%2C000%20Ukrainian%20children%20and,%22great%20achievement%20of%20integration.%22. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Kupets, O. (2016). Economic Aspects of Ukrainian Migration to EU Countries. In O. Fedyuk, & M. Kindler (Eds.), *Ukrainian Migration to the European Union. IMISCOE Research Series*. Cham: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-41776-9_3.

Leal, D., Malhotra, R., & Misra, J. (2019). Visualizing feminized international migration flows in the 1990s. In *, 5. Socius: Sociological research for a dynamic world*.

Libanova, E. (2013). *Report on the methodology, organization and results of a modular sample survey on labour migration in Ukraine*. International Labor Organization. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—europe/—ro-geneva/—sro-budapest/documents/publication/wcms_244693.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Malakooti, A., & Davin, E. (2015). Migration trends across the Mediterranean: Connecting the dots. Altai Consulting for the International Organization for Migration. https://publications.iom.int/books/migration-trends-across-mediterranean-connecting-dots. (Accessed 20 May 2023).

Malynovska, O., Petrova, T., Poznyak, O., & Chekhovych, S. (2005). Labor migration in Ukraine (analytical report). In *Document for discussions at the National Tri-partite*

Seminar on outward labor migration within framework of ILO Project "Employment, vocational training opportunities and migration policy measures to prevent and reduce trafficking in women". Kyiv: International Labor Office.

Mikheieva, O., & Susak, V. (2019). Vyklyky suchasnoyi mihratsiyi: ukrayins'ka spil'nota v Pol'shchi: Analitychnyy zvit L'viv: Ukrayins'kyy katolyts'kyy universytet, KolirPro. https://sociology.ucu.edu.ua/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/UA_MIGR_TO_PL_2019.pdf. (Accessed 20 May 2023).

Morales, F. G. (2022). *End of visit statement of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Felipe González Morales, on his visit to Poland and Belarus (12 – 25 July 2022)*. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2022/07/un-expert-praises-generosity-towards-ukrainian-refugees-poland-and-urges. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Morris, L., & Oremus, W. (2022). *Russian disinformation is demonizing Ukrainian refugees.* Washington Post.

Mudrak, V. (2011). *The Italian-Ukrainian care chain: Transnational welfare, transnational families and care drain. SIMT21*. Lund University. https://lup.lub.lu.se/luur/download?func=downloadFile&recordOId=1973872&fileOId=1973873. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Pancevski, B. (2019). Hungary, loudly opposed to immigration, opens doors to more foreign workers. *Wall Street Journal*. https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungary-loudly-opposed-to-immigration-opens-doors-to-more-foreign-workers-11567944008. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Parson, N. (2010). I am not [just] a rabbit who has a bunch of children!: Agency in the midst of suffering at the intersections of global inequalities, gendered violence, and migration. *Violence Against Women, 16*(8), 881–901. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077801210376224

Pienkowski, J. (2020). *The impact of labour migration on the Ukrainian economy. Discussion paper 123*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union. https://doi.org/10.2765/450169

Piper, N. (2008a). Feminisation of migration and the social dimensions of development: The Asian case. *Third World Quarterly, 29*(7), 1287–1303.

Piper, N. (Ed.). (2008b). *New perspectives on gender and migration: Livelihood, rights and entitlements*. New York: Routledge.

Piper, N., & Yamanaka, K. (2005). Feminized migration in East and Southeast Asia: Policies, actions and empowerment. In *UNRISD Occasional Paper, No. 11* (pp. 1–45).

Sassen, S. (2000). Women's burden: Counter-geographies of globalization and the feminization of survival. *Journal of International Affairs, 53*(2), 503–524.

Sereda, V., Havrysh, O., Fischer, J., & Soliman, K. (2022). *Aus der Ukraine nach Thüringen geflohen ergebnisse einer landesweiten befragung*. Erfurt: IKPE. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.14478.02884

Solari, C. (2017). On the shoulders of grandmothers: Gender, migration, and post-soviet nation-state building. *Routledge, 19–23*, 25–33.

Staniszewski, R. (2022). *Społeczna percepcja uchodźców z Ukrainy, migrantów oraz działań podejmowanych przez rząd Mateusza Morawieckiego - raport z badania opinii publicznej. June 2022*. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17930.34243

State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSS). (2009). *Labor emigration of Ukrainian population in 2005-2008*.

State Statistics Service of Ukraine (SSS). (2013). *Labor emigration of Ukrainian population in 2010-2012*.

Statista report on Russia-Ukraine conflict 2021-2022 - Statistics & facts. (2023). https://www.statista.com/topics/8922/russia-ukraine-conflict-2021-2022/#dossier-chapter6. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Union of Polish Metropolies. (2022). The report: Urban hospitality. In *Great growth, challenges and opportunities*. https://metropolie.pl/artykul/raport-miejska-goscinnosc-wielki-wzrost-wyzwania-i-szanse. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

German Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland (BMI), Bundesministerium des Innern und für Heimat. (2022). *Interrogation of Ukrainian war refugees*. https://www.bmi.bund.de/SharedDocs/kurzmeldungen/DE/2022/04/umfrage-ukraine.html;jsessionid=EE9B39832061CCF5E131BB6A8430DF78.2_cid332. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Mikheieva, O., & Sereda, V. (2015). 'Suchasni ukrainski vnutrishno peremishcheni osoby: osnovni prychyny, stratehii pereselennia ta problemy adaptatsii', Stratehii transformatsii i preventsii prykordonnykh konfliktiv v Ukraini. In *Zbirka analitychnykh materialiv 2014–2015*. Lviv: Halytska vydavnycha spilka. https://peace.in.ua/stratehiji-transformatsiji-i-preventsiji-prykordonnyh-konfliktiv-v-ukrajini-zbirka-analitychnyh-materialiv-2014-2015/. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Mrugała, G., & Tomczyk, I. (2022). *Foreigners in the Polish insurance system - December 2021*. Warsaw: DEPARTMENT OF STATISTICS AND ACTUARIAL FORECASTS (June 2022) https://www.zus.pl/documents/10182/2322024/Cudzoziemcy+w+polskim+systemie+ubezpiecze%C5%84+spo%C5%82ecznych+-+XII.2021.pdf/cd231552-e7eb-264f-ece6-a63a834cf458?t=1655991180351. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Nowosielska, P., & Otto, P. (2022). *Ukraińcy na rynku pracy radzą sobie dobrze. Ale mogliby lepiej*. Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. https://praca.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/8618086,zatrudnienie-rynek-pracy-pracownicy-z-ukrainy.html. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Pertek, S., Kuznetsova, I., & Kot, M. (2022). *"Not a single safe place": The Ukrainian refugees at risk of violence, trafficking and exploitation. Findings from Poland and Ukraine*. University of Birmingham. https://www.birmingham.ac.uk/documents/college-social-sciences/social-policy/iris/2022/sereda-cee.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Polish Economic Institute. (2022). *How Polish society has been helping refugees from Ukraine. Warsaw, July 2022*. https://pie.net.pl/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Pomoc-pol-spol-UKR-ENG-22.07.2022-C.pdf. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights. UNHCR operational data portal for the Ukraine refugee situation. https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. (Accessed 9 April 2023).

Urbańska, S. (2016). Transnational motherhood and forced migration. In , *Central and Eastern European migration review: vol. 5, No. 1. Causes and consequences of the migration of Polish working-class women 1989–2010* (pp. 109–128). https://doi.org/10.17467/ceemr.2016.11. forthcoming.

Vakhitova, H., & Fihel, A. (2020). International migration from Ukraine: will trends increase or go into reverse? *Central Eastern European Migration Review, 9*(2), 125–141. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780333985519_12

Vakhitova, H., & Iavorskyi, P. (2020). Employment of displaced and non-displaced households in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasti. *Europe-Asia Studies, 72*(3), 383–403. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1691154

Vang, C. Y., Nibbs, F., & Vang, M. (2016). *Claiming place: On the agency of Hmong women*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Vollmer, B., & Malynovska, O. (2016). Ukrainian migration research before and since 1991. In O. Fedyuk, & M. Kindler (Eds.), *IMISCOE research seriesUkrainian migration to the European Union. Lessons from migration studies*.

Volodko, V. (2011). Transnational family practices of Ukrainian female labour migrants in Poland. In J. Isanski, & P. Luczys (Eds.), *Selling one's favorite piano to emigrate: Mobility patterns in central Europe at the beginning of the 21st century* (pp. 105–118). Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.

Volodko, V. (2015). Homemaker and breadwinner roles in the eyes of female labor migrants. In M. Rubchak (Ed.), *New imaginaries: Youthful reinvention of Ukraine. Cultural paradigm* (pp. 191–210). New York: Berghahn Press.

Yekelchyk, S. (2022). Naming the war: Russian aggression in Ukrainian official discourse and mass culture. *Canadian Slavonic Papers, 64*(2–3), 232–246. https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2022.2106688