

Blue Team

ivan notes 2022

▼ 1. Fundamentals

▼ Storytelling

▼ defense is all about stories

- what questions to ask?
- when to ask those questions?
- how do we answer those questions?
- what story is the evidence telling?
- who needs to hear this story?
- what story do i tell this person?

▼ NIST CSF

▼ I P D R R

▼ Identify

▼ develop org understanding to manage cyber risk to systems, people, assets, data, and capabilities

- what is inside/outside your org?
- who are the actors?
- what assets do you have?
- how do you model your threats?

▼ Protect

▼ develop and implement appropriate safeguards to ensure delivery of critical services

- how do you secure systems?
- how do you configure and read logging?
- what tools and tech can you leverage?
- how do you lock down networks, access controls, mobile, and cloud?

▼ Detect

- ▼ develop and implement appropriate activities to identify the occurrence of a cyber event
 - now that defense is breached, how do you catch attacker?
 - what do these logs mean, what's normal vs anomalous?
 - what are the IOCs and TTPs?
 - what is the timeline of events
 - how do you link different types of logs together?
- ▼ Respond
 - ▼ develop and implement appropriate activities to take action regarding a detected cyber incident
 - how do you manage a security incident?
 - how do you react to live attackers?
 - who needs to be notified and when?
 - how do you collect forensic evidence that's admissible?
 - how do you build a legal case?
 - what goes into an IR report?
 - ▼ Recover
 - ▼ develop and implement appropriate activities to maintain plans for resilience and to restore any capabilities or services that were impaired due to a cyber incident
 - how do you recover from an incident?
 - what's a postmortem?
 - how do you secure your systems for next attack?
- ▼ CIA
 - ▼ confidentiality
 - is this private?
 - ▼ integrity
 - is this real?
 - ▼ availability
 - is this usable?
- ▼ AAA

- ▼ Authentication
 - who are you?
- ▼ Authorization
 - what can you do?
- ▼ Accounting
 - did you do this?
- ▼ Risk
 - ▼ vulnerability
 - a weakness, something we control
 - ▼ threat
 - can exploit the vulnerability, something we cant control
 - ▼ risk
 - ▼ combo of vulns and threats
 - Threat likelihood * Vuln Impact

▼ 2. Threat Modeling

- ▼ Threat Categories
 - ▼ Adversarial
 - deliberate undermining of orgs security
 - ▼ Accidental
 - mistakes, especially during routine work
 - ▼ Structural
 - something fails because of resource exhaustion, capacity, age, etc.
 - ▼ Environmental
 - natural or man-made disasters
- ▼ Threat actors
 - disgruntled employees
 - corp spies
 - thieves, vandals, etc.
 - ▼ Cyber
 - script-kiddie

- ▼ hacking groups
 - hactivists
 - black hat pros
 - organized criminals
 - nation states
- ▼ Threat models
 - ▼ define your scenario
 - what are your business reqs
 - ▼ what are your assets
 - what do you care about
 - what might attackers value
 - ▼ list out as many threats as you can
 - how does each threat target an asset
 - how does each threat attack CIA or AA
 - ▼ narrow your list of threats
 - what are you afraid of
 - categorize and prioritize threats
 - ▼ vulnerability-first
 - enumerate vulns, possible with scanners
 - create a threat model based on relevant threats
 - ▼ tool-based
 - ▼ Microsoft threat modeling tool
 - Define > diagram > identify > mitigate > validate
 - create data flow diagram, tool suggests common threats
- ▼ Summary
 - ▼ we use categories to label threats
 - categorizing threats will help with assessing severity and likelihood
 - ▼ threat models help define what's in scope
 - you'll defend against what's in the threat model

▼ 3. Asset Mgmt

▼ Identify 1

- ▼ who/what are you protecting?
 - why are you protecting that?
 - what threats are you afraid of?
 - what vulns do your systems have?
 - what are your risks?
 - who needs to know these answers?
- ▼ who do you need to inform?
 - why?

▼ Identify 2

- people
- ▼ asset inventory
 - ▼ network maps
 - dependencies
- ▼ vulns
 - ▼ threats
 - risk

▼ Mgmt

- ▼ track assets and associate identifiers from all sources
 - many vendors and solutions
 - link identifiers across different layers and different sources
 - given some info (hostname, IP, etc.) can we find all associated devices?
- ▼ time is a key aspect for many fields
 - computer may be wiped and re-issued
 - DHCP leases may change on renewal
 - record any changes with timestamps

▼ Identifiers

- ▼ asset unique ID
 - we create this
- ▼ device/hardware info

- asset tags
- ▼ people and authorized users
 - who was this device issued to? connect to org chart
- ▼ physical location
 - which dept or office was this device issued to?
- ▼ OS and installed software
 - what is running on this machine?
 - what software licenses are active?
- ▼ network identifiers
 - ▼ MAC address
 - ▼ hostname
 - security log status
 - ▼ IP address
 - certificates (user and device)
 - ▼ authenticated users
 - backup or patch status
- ▼ Recon
 - ▼ active
 - ▼ activity that can be seen or logged
 - port scanners: nmap, angry, IP, other tools
 - ▼ external vs internal
 - vulnerability scanners
 - ▼ passive
 - ▼ packet analysis
 - netflow
 - ▼ log analysis
 - routers, switches, DHCP, DNS, firewalls
 - ▼ config files
 - network devices
 - ▼ host config

- apps (installed/running)
- ▼ domains, IP blocks, certificates
- org data

▼ 4. Vulnerability Mgmt

▼ Servers & Apps

- ▼ missing patches
 - outdated, unsupported systems or apps
- ▼ buffer overflows
 - ▼ priv esc
 - arbitrary code exec
- ▼ insecure protocols
 - ▼ debug info
 - injection

▼ Networks

- ▼ firmware updates
 - ▼ outdated ciphers (SSL/TLS)
 - dont use TLS.12
- ▼ cert issues
 - mismatched names, expiration, unknown CA
- ▼ DNS
 - zone transfers, open resolvers, amplification
- NAT IP exposure
- VPN, SSH, RDP

▼ VMs

- ▼ VM sandbox escape
 - patches
- mgmt interfaces
- virtual guests, virtual networks

▼ IoT and other

- firmware never gets updates

- hardcoded passwords
- smart power grids
- microphones and cameras
- ▼ indicators of home presence
 - smart locks/bulbs/alarms
- ▼ Scanning
 - ▼ scanners
 - nessus, nikto, openVAS, WpScan, etc.
 - vulnerability reports
 - credentials and agents
 - CVSS score
- ▼ Why?
 - ▼ regulations
 - PCI DSS, FISMA, HIPAA
 - ▼ business impacts
 - CIA: limited, serious, severe/catastrophic
 - ▼ security and privacy
 - GDPR
 - internal & external policies
- ▼ How?
 - detection > testing > remediation
 - ▼ prioritization
 - criticality, difficulty, severity, exposure
 - ▼ documentation
 - exceptions, false positives, processes
 - SLO's and SLA's
- ▼ **5. Firewalls**
 - ▼ Prevent Recon
 - ▼ limit services/attack surface
 - block ping

- ▼ IDS/IPS
 - snort, bro
- ▼ harden DNS servers
 - dont allow zone transfers to just anyone
 - whois privacy services
 - social media policies
- ▼ Firewalls
 - ▼ device or software designed to filter network traffic
 - allow, block, other
 - ▼ packet filtering
 - stateful inspection
 - ▼ app specific firewalls
 - NGFW
- ▼ Placement
 - ▼ on your host
 - between your apps and the network
 - ▼ at network segment boundaries
 - between 1 network segment (LAN) and another (DMZ)
 - ▼ on your home router
 - between your LAN and the internet (WAN)
- ▼ Host based
 - ▼ Windows
 - defender
 - group policy
 - ▼ Mac
 - security preferences
 - Lulu
 - ▼ Linux
 - iptables
 - ufw

▼ 6. IDS/IPS

▼ IDS/IPS almost interchangeable

▼ actions

- allow, deny, alert
- network vs host based

▼ deeper packet inspection

- trade-offs with resource usage

▼ Detections

- signatures
- anomalies
- IPS= active, can prevent
IDS = passive, only detect & alert

▼ Snort

- NIDS

▼ inspects packets over a network and make decisions; signature based

- alert

▼ rule vs heuristics

- threshold can still be rule-based

▼ rules

▼ rule header

- Action, 5-Tuple, (direction)
- ▼ always start with the 5-Tuple
 - src IP, src port, dest IP, dest port, protocol
 - the direction will generally be src -> dest
 - may be "any"

▼ rule options

- option keyword, protocol arguments, ...
- SID = unique identifier, user large numbers (>1,000,000)
- msg = human-readable msg
- others: flags, thresholds, packet bytes, etc

▼ Example rule

▼ Alert when the word "hacked" appears in the contents of a packet"

- `sudo vi ~/snort/example.rule # make a new rule file`
- `i # enter insert mode`
- `alert tcp 192.168.56.100 any -> 192.168.56.200 any (msg:""hacked'`
`detected!!!"; content:'hacked'; sid: 1000001)`
- `:wq # save and close`

▼ 7. Defense in Depth

▼ Security layers

▼ Data

▼ App

▼ Endpoint/System

▼ Network

- Perimeter

▼ physical

- gates, manned roadblocks, lobby reception, badging, guards, biometrics

▼ network

- firewalls, segmentation, DMZ, jump boxes, NIDS/NIPS, web proxy, VPN, NAC, logging

▼ host

- firewalls, HIDS/HIPS, TPM, passwords, MFA, logging

▼ software

- secure code, code reviews, security assessments, SAST, DAST

▼ controls

▼ types

- administrative
- physical
- technical

▼ internal types

- preventative
- detective
- corrective

▼ Assess

- ▼ single points of failure
 - cascading failures
- ▼ views of architectures
 - operational
 - technical
 - logical
- Human elements

▼ 8. Logs

- ▼ Detection stories
 - ▼ start with an alert, or single IOC
 - create hypothesis about what could explain it
 - gather additional context and evidence
 - ▼ revise hypothesis
 - document everything
 - write conclusions and cite supporting evidence
 - Hypotheses > evidence > revise > conclusions
- ▼ what are they?
 - ▼ an official record of events
 - contain semi structured data about what happened
 - ▼ timestamp & message
 - actors, actions, errors
 - ▼ types
 - network, host, app, physical
- ▼ why collect them?
 - ▼ CIA, AAA
 - tracking who, when, and what resource

- ▼ nonrepudiation
 - actors cannot refute actions taken
- ▼ laws
 - ▼ data retention laws and policies
 - presidential records
 - historical records - we may get new info
- ▼ how to read them?
 - ▼ determine what sort of system created these logs
 - network, host, app, physical, access, etc
 - narrow this down as much as possible - use context clues
 - ▼ map out the structure
 - timestamp, message, delimiters, fields
 - is each line separate, or are groups of lines for a single log message
 - ▼ identify additional related info
 - network models, OS, types of apps
 - ▼ parse content
 - what is the story that the logs are telling?
 - make sure TIMESTAMPS are config'd properly
- ▼ IOCs
 - ▼ evidence left behind by attacks
 - ▼ logs
 - requests made, errors, actions taken
 - ▼ artifacts
 - user accounts, services, machines
 - ▼ metrics
 - service degradation, strange activity upticks, failure rates
 - MITRE ATT&CK - industry standard language
- ▼ detecting attacks
 - ▼ how do we know we've been breached?
 - alerts, anomaly detection, reports, service issues

- ▼ get report > investigate issue
 - hypotheses > evidence'
 - conclusion with reasoning and supporting evidence
- ▼ network detection
 - ▼ routers
 - Netflow, RMON, SNMP
 - ▼ scanners
 - ping, iPerf, network mapping
 - ▼ network taps
 - pcap, other analyses
 - ▼ firewalls
 - dropped vs allowed packets
 - issues and attacks
- ▼ host detection
 - ▼ host device/machine
 - system resources, software/apps, access/privilege
 - ▼ monitoring tools
 - Win - perfmon, resmon, sysinternals
 - Lin - ps, top, df, w
 - ▼ where are alerts coming from?
 - SCCM - central logging tools
 - AC, authentication/access logs
- ▼ app detection
 - service status, failures, actions
 - ▼ what type of errors to catch?
 - ▼ anomalous activity
 - new accounts - AAA
 - ▼ unexpected output
 - unexpected outbound comms (networks)
 - ▼ service interruptions

- memory overflows

▼ Triage

- ▼ example: network issues and attacks
 - scans/probes, DOS, rogue devices, link failures, beaconing
- ▼ how do we triage and deal with these issues?
 - use tools, help identify and prioritize alerts
 - IPS - block/drop traffic
 - 3p providers, sinkhole traffic from DOS
 - use network maps to identify what is working
 - think about CIA - is it even a security issue?

▼ SIEM

- ▼ Splunk
 - ▼ investigations that correlate logs from different sources
 - type of tool defenders use to correlate logs across time and other dimensions

▼ 9. File Systems

- ▼ what?
 - ▼ ways to store and organize info on a disk
 - has a structure and a filing system
- ▼ data categories
 - ▼ file system
 - general file system information - a map
 - ▼ content
 - actual data that it stored - data units
 - deletion will sometimes not actually delete the content, just the pointers to the content
 - ▼ metadata
 - ▼ data that describes data
 - localization, size, timestamps, etc
 - slack space: commonly used to hide information

- ▼ file name
 - human interface/names for files
- ▼ application
 - other, special features
- ▼ Forensics
 - handling evidence - chain of custody
 - ▼ SIFT - toolkit of forensic software
 - classes of tools
 - write blocker, memory analyzer, etc.
- ▼ **10. Incident Response**
 - ▼ What is an incident?
 - ▼ event
 - any observable occurrence in a system or network
 - ▼ adverse event
 - any event that has negative consequences
 - ▼ security/privacy event
 - any event that relates to a security/privacy function (CIA, AAA, etc)
 - ▼ security/privacy incident
 - a violation of security/privacy policies or practices
 - ▼ Phases
 - 1. prep > 2. detection & analysis <> 3. containment eradication & recovery > 4. post-incident activity > (loop)
 - ▼ Prep
 - encompasses identify & protect
 - ▼ creating org policies
 - staff members & authority
 - partner teams (legal, PR, etc)
 - ▼ hardware, software, info required
 - forensics (hardware, bootable images, backup/cloning device)
 - logging/monitoring and alerting systems

- procedures and playbooks - training
- continuous improvement
- ▼ baseline normal behaviors
 - understand expected behaviors
- ▼ establish logging policies
 - synchronize clocks
- ▼ maintain org knowledge base
 - asset inventories
- ▼ Detection & Analysis
 - ▼ encompasses Detect
 - validate event -> incident
 - ▼ where do we get detection indicators?
 - alerts, logs, public info, people
 - ▼ start finding context and stories
 - perform event correlation to combine sources - SIEM
 - ▼ capture network traffic or other evidence
 - consider storage and bandwidth
 - filter info/noise
 - escalate - seek assistance from internal/external resources
- ▼ Containment, Eradication, Recovery
 - encompasses respond & recover
 - escalated a detection into an incident
 - ▼ choose and implement a containment strategy
 - tradeoffs between CIA, acting too early vs acting too late
 - ▼ gather more (legal) evidence
 - know all of the things that happened
 - ▼ identify attackers
 - actors, systems, infra
 - ▼ eradicate incident
 - recover normal business operations

- evidence preservation
- ▼ consider SLA and other business process
 - this is what makes money
- ▼ costs and effectiveness of the strategy
 - time, money, degradations of the business process - how much can you stop the attack?
- ▼ segmentation - proactive
 - ▼ isolation
 - removal
- ▼ re-imaging is the only way to be certain about sanitizing
 - ▼ patch vulns
 - restore system from backups
- ▼ audit accounts and permissions
 - verify logging systems
- ▼ conduct vuln scanning
 - continuous, track changes over time
 - verify business processes
- ▼ Post-incident Activity
 - ▼ lessons learned review
 - ▼ reports and meetings
 - ▼ timeline of events
 - evidence retention
 - root cause, evidence details, actions taken in IR, impact of incident, validation efforts
 - ▼ blameless culture
 - ▼ dont attach shame to the errors
 - encourage learning and growing
 - ▼ engage humans to fix issues
 - accountability, empowerment
- ▼ postmortems

- ▼ whenever there is impact above a certain threshold
 - larger security incidents (data loss, prolonged efforts, actions were taken)
- ▼ state facts, dont point fingers
 - gather learnings and share them for the future
- ▼ action items to change stuff that went wrong
 - focus on fixes on processes
- ▼ root cause
 - how did this incident start
- ▼ detections
 - how did we catch the incident
- ▼ action items
 - how can we improve defenses or processes