

## Internet Security

- **Q: What are the goals of attackers?**
  - From machines
    - \* *Infiltration*: take over machines/resources
      - *Defacement*: replace legitimate content
    - \* *Denial of service*
  - From users
    - \* Get data
      - Credit card, password, ...
    - \* Get traffic
      - Attention = money
      - The real currency of our age is user's attention
- **Q: How do attackers achieve the goal?**
  - Many, many different ways
    - \* *Phishing*: spoof web site to look like the real one
    - \* *Pharming (DNS cache poisoning)*: wrong DNS resolution, for example
    - \* *Packet sniffing*
    - \* *Man-in-the-middle attack*
    - \* Password brute-force attack
    - \* *Buffer overflow*
    - \* *Client-state manipulation*: cookie poisoning
    - \* Cross-domain vulnerability
      - *Cross-site request forgery (XSRF)*
      - *Cross-site script inclusion (XSSI)*
      - *Cross-site scripting (XSS)*
    - \* *SQL injection*
  - Note: some of these vulnerabilities can be controlled by “good” programming practice. More discussion later
- **Q: When we communicate over Internet, what type of guarantee do we want?**
  - *Confidentiality*
  - *Message/data integrity*
  - *Authentication*

- *Authorization*
- **Q: How can we keep confidentiality of the messages?**
  - *Steganography*: “embed” true message within harmless-looking message
    - \* Kathy is laughing loudly
    - \* Change the lowest bit of image pixels
    - \* “Security by obscurity”
  - *Encryption*: “scramble” message with a key, so that it wouldn’t make sense to others unless they have the key
    - \* e.g., bitwise XOR with k
    - 11110000 (message) XOR 10111001 (key) -> 01001001 (ciphertext)
    - 01001001 (ciphertext) XOR 10111001 (key) -> 11110000 (message)

## Symmetric Key Cryptography

- [Encryption as generalization of XOR example]

In general, an encryption algorithm requires:

- $c = F(m, k)$ : encryption function ( $m \text{ XOR } k$ )
  - \*  $m$ : message = *plaintext*. want to keep secret
  - \*  $c$ : *ciphertext*. transmitted over insecure channel
- $m = F'(c, k)$ : decryption function. inverse of  $F$  ( $c \text{ XOR } k$ )
  - \* From above,  $m = F'(F(m, k), k)$
  - \* e.g.,  $((m \text{ XOR } 10111001) \text{ XOR } 10111001) = m$
- $F(m, k)$ ,  $F'(m, k)$  are called “cipher”
- **Q: What other property should  $F(m, k)$  have?**
  - Ideally, one should never be able to guess  $m$  from  $c$  alone
    - \* Ciphertext should not reveal any information about plaintext
  - *Perfect secrecy* (= *Shannon secrecy*)
    - \* For all plaintext  $x$  and ciphertext  $y$ ,  $\Pr(x | y) = \Pr(x)$

- \* OTP (one time pad) encryption is proven to be perfectly secret, but due to practical limitation, cannot be used directly
- \* Many encryption algorithms try to “mimic” OTP, e.g., RC4
- Commonly used ciphers
  - DES (data encryption standard)
    - \* 64 bit block cipher
    - \* Vulnerable to brute-force attack due to short key
      - Triple DES
  - AES (advanced encryption standard)
    - \* 128 bit block cipher
    - \* 128, 192, 256 bit keys
    - \* Adopted by NIST (national institute of standard and technology) as a replacement of DES in 2000
  - IDEA, A5 (used by GSM), ...
- [AES encryption animation]

Remark:

1. Addition and multiplication used for MixColumn step are slightly different from standard definition.
  2. MixColumn step “mixes” values from multiple bytes. Other steps do not mix values from multiple bytes.
- Key agreement problem
    - Q: How can we agree on a key “secretly” over the Internet?
      - \* Out-of-band communication?
    - Q: After A and B agreeing on secret key, how can we prevent B from impersonating A to C?
      - \* Q: n parties. How many keys?
    - Q: Want to keep communication confidential between every party. How many keys do we need for n parties?