Platforms & Tools

D2L (DEN) : Syllabus ✓
Lecture Notes ✓
Lecture Videos ✓
HW Assignments ✓
HW Submissions ✓
Any other reference material
Exams

Piazza : Discussion Board ✓
Announcements ✓

Roles & Responsibilities

- Instructor — lectures & Discussions
- TAs — HWs, Project, Exams
- Graders — HW grading
- Course Producers — *
- CS Dept. Advisors — Registration
- DEN Support — DEN Support

Textbooks

- Algorithms Design by Jon Kleinberg & Eva Tardos

- Supplemental Textbook: Introduction to Algorithms, 3rd edition, by Cormen et al.

Your Responsibilities

- ✓ Attending lectures & Discussions
- ✓ Completing reading assignments
- ✓ Doing HW problems
- ✓ Doing as many other problems from the textbook as possible

Your Grade

Exam 1	33%	Feb 18
Exam 2	33%	April 1
Exam 3	29%	April 29
Final Project	5%	May 9
	100%	

Grading Scale

90 - 100	A	60 - 64.99	C^+
80 - 89.99	A^-	55 - 59.99	C
75 - 79.99	B^+	50 - 54.99	C^-
70 - 74.99	B	45 - 49.99	D
65 - 69.99	B^-	Below 45	F

- Grade boundaries will be reduced by the difference between class average grade and 75 if class average falls below 75

- At least 20% of the class will receive an A grade.

- At least 10% of the class will receive an A^- grade

Prerequisites

- Discrete Math – Mathematical Induction
- Sorting methods
- Basic data structures: Arrays, stacks, queues, linked lists
- Basics of graphs: Trees, cycles, DAG, adjacency list/matrix, etc.
- Graph search algorithms: BFS, DFS

- Asymptotic Notation

High level Syllabus

Today!

- Introduction
- Review of some prereq's + asymptotic notation
- Major algorithmic techniques
  - Greedy
  - Divide & Conquer
  - Dynamic Programming

Exam 1

Exam 2

- Network Flow
- Computational Complexity Theory
- Approximation Algorithms
- Linear Programming

Exam 3

Corrections

1- ~~An algorithm is a set of instructions in machine language.~~

Kharazmi 780-850

2- ~~... Algorithmic science advanced on Wall Street ...~~

3- ~~... Invite 6 million algorithms for a listen ...~~


Performance
Hardware
Software

When studying a problem, we go through the following steps:

1- Come up with a concise problem statement

2- Present a solution

3- Prove Correctness

4- Perform complexity analysis

Stable Matching

Stable Matching Example

Problem: We are interested in matching $\underline{n}$ men with $\underline{n}$ women so that they could stay happily married ever after.

Step 1: Come up with a concise problem statement.

We have a set of $\underline{n}$ men, $M = \{m_1, \dots m_n\}$

We have a set of $\underline{n}$ women, $W = \{w_1, \dots w_n\}$

Def. A <u>Matching</u> S is a set of ordered pairs.



$(m_2, w_1), (m_4, w_4)$

A matching

Def. A <u>perfect matching</u> S' is a matching with the property that each member of <u>M</u> and each member of <u>W</u> appear in exactly one pair in S'.



A perfect matching

Add notion of preferences

Each man $m \in M$ ranks all women

- $\underline{m}$ prefers $\underline{w}$ to $\underline{w'}$ if $\underline{m}$ ranks $\underline{w}$ higher than w'.

- Ordered ranking of $\underline{m}$ is his preference list

$P_{m_i} = \{ w_{i_1}, w_{i_2}, \ldots w_{i_n} \}$

Same for women, i.e. each woman $w \in W$ ranks all men ...

S



$(m_1, w_1), (m_2, w_2) \ldots$

Such a pair (m, w') is called an instability WRT S

Def. Matching S is stable if

1- It is perfect

2- There are no instabilities WRT S

Step 1: Input: Preference lists for a set of n men & n women.

Output: Set of n marriages w/ no instabilities

Step 2: Gale-Shapley Alg.

Step 3 Proof of Correctness

(1) From the woman's perspective, she starts single, and once she gets engaged and she can only get into better engagements WRT her pref. list

(2) From the man's perspective, he starts single, gets engaged, and may get dropped repeatedly only to settle for a lower ranking woman.

(3) Solution will terminate in at most n^2 iterations.

(4) Solution is a perfect matching

Solution is a stable matching

Proof by Contradiction

Assume an instability exists in our solution involving two pairs (m, w), (m', w')



Q: Did m propose to w' at some point in the execution?

If no, then w must be higher than w' on his list $\Rightarrow$ Contradiction!

If yes, he must have been rejected in favor of m'' and due to ① either $m'' = m'$ or m' is better than m''

$\Rightarrow$ Contradiction!



men proposing $(m, w), (m', w')$ 1

women " $(m, w'), (m', w)$ 2

Step 4 Complexity Analysis

1- Identify a free man $O(1)$

2- For a man $\underline{m}$, identify the highest ranked woman to whom he has not yet proposed. $O(1)$

3- For a woman $\underline{w}$, decide if $\underline{w}$ is engaged, and if so to whom $O(1)$

4- For a woman $\underline{w}$ and two men $\underline{m}$ & $\underline{m'}$, decide which man is preferred by $\underline{w}$ $O(1)$

5- Place a man back in the list of free men. $O(1)$

1. Identify a free man

	get	put
1- Array	O(1)	O(1)
2- Linked list	O(1)	O(1)
3- Stack	O(1)	O(1)
4- Queue	O(1)	O(1)

2. Identify the highest ranked woman to whom <u>m</u> has not yet proposed.

Keep an array Next[1..n] where Next[m] points to the position of the next woman he will be proposing to on his pref. list.

Men's preference list: $ManPref[1..n, 1..n]$, where

$ManPref[m, i]$ denotes the i^{th} woman on man m's preference list.

To find next woman w to whom m will be proposing to:

$$w = ManPref[m, Next[m]]$$

takes $O(1)$

3_ Determine woman $\underline{w}$'s status

keep an array Called Current[1..n]

where Current[w] is Null if w is single & set to $\underline{m}$ if w is engaged to $\underline{m}$.

takes O(1)

4_ Determine which man is preferred by $\underline{w}$.

61 ? 123

input

WomanPref.

WomanPref.	3	8	4	32	1	.	.	.	
i	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	→

We construct this

WomanRanking	5		1	3		.	.	.	
j, i	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	. →

Preparation before entering GS iterations

Create a Ranking array where Ranking[w,m] contains the rank of man m based on w's preference

$$\underbrace{\text{Preparation}}_{O(n^2)} + \underbrace{\text{GS itreations}}_{O(n^2)}$$

overall complexity $= O(n^2)$

Best valid partner

w_{i_1}

w_{i_2}

$\underline{m_i}$ w_{i_3}

Valid partners

$w_{i_{15}}$

$\vdots$

$w_{i_{24}}$

$\vdots$

w_{i_n}

Def. Woman $\underline{w}$ is a valid partner of a man $\underline{m}$ if there is a stable matching that contains the pair (m, w)

Def. m's best valid partner is

the valid partner with the highest ranking in m's pref. list

Claim: Every execution of the G-S algorithm (when men propose) results in the same stable matching regardless of the order in which men propose.

Plan: to prove this, we will show that when men propose, they always end up with their best valid partner.

Proof by contradiction:

Say $\underline{m}$ is the first man rejected by a valid partner w (in favor of m')



(m', w) is an instability WRT S'

Claim: When men propose, women end up with their worst valid partners

Proof: By contradiction . . .

Suppose we end up with a matching S where for a pair (m,w) in S, m is <u>not</u> w's worst valid partner.

So there must be another matching S′ where w is paired with a man m′ whom she likes less.



(m,w) is an instability WRT S′