Evolution of cooperative personalities

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Introduction

Recently empirical research suggest that animals show different personalities within a population.[[1]](#footnote-1) The personality of an animal is described as different individual behaviour that is consistent over time (e.g. as a juvenile and as an adult) and context (e.g. in interaction with a predator and a potential mate) . This is not only true for animals, but is also found in birds, chimpanzees, fish, amphibians[[2]](#footnote-2), spiders [[3]](#footnote-3)and insects[[4]](#footnote-4). From an adaptive perspective an infinite plasticity of behaviour would be preferable, since an individual would have the right behaviour in any kind of situation. Than why is this not observed in the empirical data? Could some poorly understood evolutionary mechanism be at the core of this?

While aggressiveness and responsiveness have been subject to recent research, no models were created on cooperation personalities. Deciding what to do based on the signal the partner in the interaction has given, is the core part of the model we implemented for the Snow Drift game. The snowdrift game can evolve to some kind of coexistence under the right circumstances, where a more broadly used prisoner’s dilemma focusses more on the free-riding problem. In the prisoners dilemma no cooperation is expected, since it is an evolutionary unstable strategy.[[5]](#footnote-5)

In this research we aim at cooperation evolving as different personalities under different responsiveness and signalling levels. Do different cooperative personalities evolve to coexist in populations of different levels of responsiveness and signalling? First, the snowdrift game is implemented. Later we will try to look at different games such as the prisoners dilemma and the stag-hunt game.

Model 0.0

* Small overview variables
  + B (benefits) 4
  + C (costs) 2
  + μ (mutation rate) 0.01
  + P0 (cooperation either 0 or 1) 0.05, 0.95, 0.67
  + nI (number of interactions) 10
* Model set-up/traits
  + Each individual has nI interactions in its life. Gets fitness according to payoff matrix depending on strategies. Next generation based on fitness values. μ chance to change P0 state.
* Data overview

Model 0.1

* Small overview variables
  + B (benefits) 4
  + C (costs) 2
  + μ (mutation rate) 0.01
  + P0 (cooperation between 0 and 1) 0.05, 0.95, 0.67
  + nI (number of interactions) 10
  + σ (standard deviation of normal distribution used for change of P0) 0.01
* Model set-up/traits
  + Each individual has nI interactions in its life. Gets fitness according to payoff matrix depending on strategies. Next generation based on fitness values. μ chance to change P0 by small amount taken from normal distribution with standard deviation σ)
* Data overview

Model 1.0

* Communication

Only honest communication is evolutionary stable 🡪 Botero et al.

* Small overview variables
  + B (benefits) 4
  + C (costs) 2
  + μ (mutation rate) 0.01
  + P0 (cooperation between 0 and 1) 0.05, 0.95, 0.67
  + nI (number of interactions) 10
  + σ (standard deviation of normal distribution used for change of P0) 0.01
  + Pi (obtain information either 0 or 1) 0.5
* Model set-up/traits
  + Each individual has nI interactions in its life. Gets fitness according to payoff matrix depending on strategies if no info is present. If info is present, individual guesses what partner will do depending on P0 and pick optimal strategy based on it. Next generation based on fitness values. μ chance to change P0 by small amount taken from normal distribution with standard deviation σ. μ chance to change Pi state.
* Data overview

Model 1.1

* Small overview variables
  + B (benefits) 4
  + C (costs) 2
  + μ (mutation rate) 0.01
  + P0 (cooperation between 0 and 1) 0.05, 0.95, 0.67
  + nI (number of interactions) 10
  + σ (standard deviation of normal distribution used for change of P0) 0.01
  + Pi (obtain information either 0 or 1) 0.5
* Model set-up/traits
  + Each individual has nI interactions in its life. Gets fitness according to payoff matrix depending on strategies if no info is present. If info is present, individual guesses what partner will do depending on P0 if it’s not a responsive individual, otherwise based on mean cooperation chance in previous generation, and pick optimal strategy based on it. Next generation based on fitness values. μ chance to change P0 by small amount taken from normal distribution with standard deviation σ. μ chance to change Pi state.
* Data overview

Literature list

1. Sih, A., Bell A., Johnson J. C. 2004 Behavioral syndromes: an ecological and evolutionary overview. *Trends in Ecology and Evolution*. **19**, 372 – 378

* Johnson J. C. & Sih A. 2005 precopulatory sexual cannibalism in fishing spiders (*Dolomedes triton*): a role for behavioural syndromes. *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **58**, 390 – 396
* Wolf M., Van Doorn G. S. & Weissing F.J. 2010 On the coevolution of social responsiveness and behavioural consistency. *Proc. R. Soc. B*. **278,** 440 – 448

Interesting not yet used literature:

* Smaldino, P. E., Flamson, T. J. and McElreath, R. (2018) “The Evolution of Covert Signaling,” *Scientific Reports*, 8(1). doi: 10.1038/s41598-018-22926-1.

1. Sih, A., Bell A., Johnson J. C. (2004) “Behavioral syndromes: an ecological and evolutionary overview.” *Trends in Ecology and Evolution*. **19**, 372 – 378 [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Gosling SD (2001) “From Mice to Men: What Can We Learn About Personality from Animal Research?,” *Psychological bulletin*, 127(1), pp. 45–86. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Johnson J. C. & Sih A. 2005 precopulatory sexual cannibalism in fishing spiders (*Dolomedes triton*): a role for behavioural syndromes. *Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol.* **58**, 390 – 396 [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Brodin, T. and Johansson, F. (2004) “Conflicting Selection Pressures on the Growth/predation-Risk Trade-Off in a Damselfly,” *Ecology*, **85**, pp. 2927–2932. doi: 10.1890/03-3120. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. VOETNOOT NOG INVOEGEN [↑](#footnote-ref-5)