ANTFLIX AND CHILL



What Had Happened Was

Fire Ant has been conducting a prolonged cyber espionage campaign this year, primarily targeting VMware ESXi hosts, vCenter environments, and network appliances.

This campaign highlights the vulnerabilities in virtualization infrastructure that traditional endpoint security tools can't effectively monitor. Unfortunately, systems like these often lack proper detection and response solutions, making them ideal targets for long-term, stealthy operations.

Fire Ant demonstrated deep understanding of target environments and focused heavily on remaining undetected while maintaining persistent access across network segments.

Whodunnit?

Not to be confused with a supervillain from DC Comics, "Fire Ant" is a threat actor that targets virtualization infrastructure. *Virtual machines (VMs), virtual storage, virtual networking, etc.* The group is believed to be linked to UNC3886, a Chinanexus cyber espionage group.

How They Did It

By **exploiting CVE-2023-34048**, a VMware vCenter Server vulnerability that was used as a zero-day before being patched in October 2023 to gain initial access, **extracting 'vpxuser' service account credentials** from vCenter to access connected ESXi hosts, **deploying multiple backdoors** including VIRTUALPITA malware family and a Python-based implant called "autobackup.bin", then finally using **CVE-2023-20867** (VMware Tools flaw) to interact with guest virtual machines.

If that wasn't enough, Fire Ant was able to maintain operational resilience by adapting to containment efforts, deploy unregistered virtual machines on ESXi hosts, use V2Ray framework for network tunneling, breaks down network segmentation barriers, and tamper with ESXi logging by terminating the "vmsyslogd" process to avoid detection.

How This Attack Could Impact Businesses

Due to the high level of this attack, we're looking at data and privacy breaches (financial and medical records, customer and employee information), revenue loss from service disruptions, massive regulatory fines, and supply chain disruption.

How This Attack Could Impacts Users

An attack of this magnitude would send tidal waves through the cyber world. We could see anything ranging from email and social media sites going dark, to online educational and shopping services becoming inaccessible, all the way to banking, financial, and healthcare services going offline.

As noted above, sensitive information (healthcare records, social security, and credit card numbers, etc.) could be comprised, leading to a greater chance of identify theft.

Targeting the hypervisor layer (the hardware layer that enables multiple operating systems to run on a single physical machine), an attacker could gain control over the **entire virtualized infrastructure**.

In short:



Prevention/Remediation Steps

While an attack like this can be overwhelming and devastating, there are ways to prevent or defend against them.

These include:

- Immediate patching of the exploited VMware vulnerabilities.
- Enhanced monitoring at the hypervisor level where these attacks operate.
- Network segmentation to limit lateral movement between virtual environments.
- Privileged access management to prevent credential theft and misuse.

Let's break down each step.

Step 1. Patching Critical VMware Vulnerabilities

Immediate patching of the exploited VMware vulnerabilities.

First thing's first, we patch CVE-2023-34048 (VMware vCenter Server) and CVE-2023-20867 (VMware Tools).

Next, we apply automated patch management for all VMware infrastructure and establish all emergency patching procedures for zero-day vulnerabilities.

This is why security awareness training and proper policies are so important.

Finally, we maintain current inventory of all VMware versions and patch levels.

Step 2. Patch Management Process

Alright, so we've patched the vulnerabilities, but how do we make sure they work?

We'll place them in test environments first, observing any bugs or remaining vulnerabilities they may have slipped through.

From there, we'll schedule regular maintenance windows for critical updates, apply rollback procedures for any failed patches, and monitor vendor security advisories and threat intelligence feeds.

Step 3. VMware Environment Security

Now that we've disrupted the attack chain, we can focus on securing the environment.

We disable any unnecessary or unauthorized service on ESXi hosts and vCenter servers ASAP, change default credentials for all service accounts including vpxuser, apply role-based access control (with principle of least privilege), enable ESXi host lockdown mode to restrict direct access, configure ESXi firewall rules to limit network access, and -- DEEP BREATH -- disable SSH access when not required for maintenance.

Step 4. Network Segmentation

Network segmentation to limit lateral movement between virtual environments.

Got your trusty bolt cutters handy? Good, because we're about to get medieval on the attack chain.

Let's isolate management networks for hypervisor infrastructure, apply micro-segmentation between virtual machines, deploy network access control (NAC) solutions, create secure jump boxes for administrative access, and use VLANs and security system rules to separate critical systems.

Step 5. Hypervisor-Level Monitoring

Enhanced monitoring at the hypervisor level where these attacks operate.

First, let's deploy specialized hypervisor security solutions (HyTrust, Trend Micro Deep Security, etc.), use vSphere native logging and forward to SIEM, monitor ESXi shell access and command execution, track virtual machine creation, modification, and deletion, then alert any unauthorized PowerCLI usage.

Log Management

We'll need to protect vmsyslogd process from termination, apply tamper-resistant logging with log forwarding, deploy centralized log management (SIEM/SOAR), configure real-time log analysis and alerts, then establish baseline behaviors for normal operations.

Behavioral Detection

Let's monitor unusual network tunneling (V2Ray, other protocols), detect any unauthorized virtual machine deployment, track credential usage patterns across infrastructure, set up alerts when memory snapshot is accessed and or analyzed, and – TAKES SIP OF WATER -- monitor for security tool interference.

Step 6. Privileged Access Management

Privileged access management to prevent credential theft and misuse.

Patched vulnerabilities? Check.
Secured VMware environment and the network? Double check.
Set enhanced Hypervisor-level monitoring? Affirmative!

Now let's apply PAM (Privileged Access Management) solutions for administrative accounts. We need to require multi-factor (MFA) authentication for all administrative access, use just-in-time access for maintenance activities, routinely rotate/change service account passwords, and monitor and log all privileged account usage.

Identity and Access Management

Finally, we'll deploy single sign-on with centralized authentication, apply conditional access policies, conduct regular access reviews and deprovisioning (the process of revoking or removing user access to IT resources, systems, and applications when that access is no longer needed), separate administrative and user accounts, and use certificate-based authentication where possible.

And Yippee-Ki-Yay!

Until next time, keep fighting the good fight!

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